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NOTE ON SPELLING 
The student of New Caledonia has to cope with the 
absence of standardization, even in recent scholarly works, 
in the French rendition of New Caledonian names (e.g., Wagap 
compared with Houailou), and the tortuous spelling imposed 
by the transliteration of New Caledonian sounds into French 
orthography (e.g. Hienghene, Pouebo, Houailou, Tchambouenne, 
which are rendered phonetically as Yengen, Pwebo, Wailu, 
Cambwen). As far as possible, without causing confusion by 
the juxtaposition of different versions of the same word, I 
have attempted to use a simplified phonetic spelling for 
indigenous names, except when actually referring to a place or 
person at the present time, when I have used the modern 
French form. This phonetic spelling makes no allowance for 
local variations in the pronunciation of specific sounds, or 
for nuances which are not readily expressed in a Europeanized 
spelling of native sounds. This is because I believe it 
to be essential in a linguistically non-specialist work, and 
in the absence of uniformity, to achieve a balance between 
accuracy, clarity and simplicity. 
I have used is as follows: 
In outline the system 
I 
French 
a 
e 
e 
i 
0 
ou 
di 
[h]ou + vowel 
[hli + vowel 
tch 
International 
Phonetic 
Alphabet 
a 
e 
e: 
i 
;)} 
0 
u 
d3 
w 
j 
t! 
B.D. 
a 
e 
e 
i 
0 
u 
j 
w 
y 
c 
N.B. I have adopted a general rule of including accents in 
French quotations, even when they were omitted in the 
original, in the belief that their omission generally 
reflected carelessness or haste rather than genuine 
idiosyncrasies of style. In all other respects quotations 
reproduce the exact wording of the original. 
vi 
.. 
P• 11i, 1.8 
P• vi, 
ERRATA 
Chapter IV 
insert after 1.141 
The consonants b, bw, d, j, g are all 
prenasalised and thus do not need 
to be preceded by m or n. This 
correction is to apply, where 
appropriate, to the spelling of 
Melanesian names throughout the text. 
Hence, e.g., 
Yabe, Cabwen, Bode, Tijin. 
g corresponds to the sound of ng in 
finger, e.g. Yegen. 
ng corresponds to the sound of ng in 
singer, e.g. , Mwelebeng. 
The a)"'libol q is used to indicate whether 
a spelling sequence of three identical 
vowels is to be pronounced as long plus 
short or short plus long, e.g., Csaqac. 
The spelling of the following Melaneaian 
names is to be amended throughout the 
text: 
Bwaivat for Bwaibat 
Duui for Dwi 
Go a for Gwa 
Kavarik for Kabarik 
lwenyi for Kunye 
Paaqak for Paak 
Tadin for Tin din 
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INTRODUCTION 
THIS work is a study of interaction and change. The central 
theme is interaction between members of two entirely 
different cultural groups, Melanesians of New Caledonia and 
the Europeans with whom they came into contact between 
1774 and 1870. Within this theme the main focus of 
attention is the impact of culture contact on Melanesian 
s~cial organization, attitudes and way of life during the 
period of intensive contact after 1843. The process was 
reciprocal and to some extent self-generating, since the 
attitudes and reactions of Europeans to the indigenous 
society helped determine their actions and policies. The 
broad process of culture contact between Melanesians and 
Europeans was the most dramatic, but by no means the only 
important process of interaction during this period, and its 
course was deeply affected by relationships within as well 
as between each of the two great cultural groups. Different 
groups of Melanesians reacted in different ways to the 
challenge of European encroachment, while the interaction of 
indigenous groups in the context of culture contact was of 
profound, if not always discernible, relevance. Similarly, 
the attitudes, aims, methods and mutual relationships of 
various categories of European differed, and evoked a 
variety of Melanesian reactions. Of prime importance in this 
X 
regard was the relationship after annexation in 1853 
between the French colonial authorities and the Roman 
Catholic missionaries, who had settled in the archipelago 
ten years earlier. The ramifications of this interaction 
were far-reaching, especially in the 1860's when a bitter 
conflict over ecclesiastical jurisdiction and control of 
Melanesians developed under the administration of an 
anticlerical governor, Charles Guillain. 
These considerations determined my mode of approach 
and the methodology adopted. New Caledonia has been 
virtually untouched by historians and by all but a few 
social scientists, and there exist almost no adequate 
regional or thematic studies on which to base a comprehensive 
general history. The scope of this work is therefore narrow, 
but is not for that reason arbitrary. 
To Melanesians the local or regional context was all 
important, because it formed the effective horizons of their 
existence. As far as New Caledonia was concerned, the same 
was basically true of the Europeans, explorers, traders and 
missionaries, who visited its shores or established a foothold 
there in the period before annexation. After 1853, however, 
each locality or region increasingly became a segment of 
a whole as far as administrators and missionaries, and to a 
lesser extent colonists, were concerned. If the study is to 
be truly one o'f interaction on several levels, it would be 
both artificial and misleading to limit consideration of 
xi 
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official and missionary policies after 1853 to a particular 
region. By the same token, however, a detailed regional 
study of the impact on small groups of Melanesians of the 
various types of interaction outlined above seems likely 
to be particularly profitable. I have therefore combined 
the two approaches: i.e., an intensive regional study of 
Melanesian participation in the process of culture contact 
before 1870 is combined with and considered in the light of 
a broader examination of European involvement during the 
same period. A unifying theme is provided by an analysis 
of the acculturation in two vital areas of Melanesian society, 
the structure of authority and land tenure. 
The region chosen is in the far north-east of the 
main island. It extends from the lower Yengen valley to the 
northernmost tip, and inland along the Diahot valley to the 
upper valleys of the Wayem, Yengen and Tangen rivers. My 
choice was determined by several considerations. In the 
first place, a degree of traditional unity existed because 
the clans and tribes of the region all belonged to one or 
other of two geegraphically permanent and mutually antagonistic 
alliance groups, which is not to suggest that the region was 
in any sense artificially isolated from the rest of New 
Caledonia. Moreover the region includes the localities 
where the first contacts between New Caledonians and 
Europeans took place; where the Marist missionaries first 
settled, achieved their earliest converts and met their most 
xiii 
steadfast and violent opposition; where some of the earliest 
regular contacts between European sandalwood traders and 
New Caledonian occurred; where annexation was first 
proclaimed and some of the hardest battles of the early 
colonial period were fought. The colonial government worked 
out in this region many of its attitudes towards both New 
Caledonians and the Marist missionaries, and implemented 
policies for the control, supervision and resettlement of 
Melanesians which were later to be extended throughout the 
archipelago. It remains today one of the major areas of 
Melanesian settlement. 
The regional analysis is subdivided into four 
related case studies, each of which concentrates on a single 
tribe or group of tribes during a particular portion of the 
overall time-span: the Puma of Balad between 1774 and 1855; 
the Bwarat of Yengen between 1856 and 1859; the Mwelebeng of 
Pwebo between 1860 and 1868; several inland tribes between 
1868 and 1870. The experiences of each tribe or group of 
tribes during the contact period differed, and they responded 
in various ways, depending on their traditional situation, 
the particular form which European contact took, and the 
specific problems encountered. Each adopted different 
solutions, and some were more successful than others. Each 
chronological subdivision indicates roughly a period during 
which the tribe or tribes in question in some sense occupied 
the centre of the stage. It is by no means rigid, and 
constant interaction occurred between the various tribes 
during the period of study, or at least became apparent 
after intensive contact began in 1843. 
xiv 
As far as the overall time-span is concerned, the 
period 1774-1870 has a certain unity, both in respect of 
the particular region and for the archipelago as a whole. 
1774 was the year in which occurred the first known contact 
between New Caledonians and Europeans; 1870 marks the end 
of a period during which the region studied was probably 
the single most important part of the colony, from the 
point of view of race relations, missionary success and 
failure, extension of adminisrrative control, and often 
violent contact within as well as between the two great 
interacting cultural groups. 1870 is also an important line 
of demarcation in the general administrative and mission 
history of the colony. It marked the end of a long 
governorship during which French control was consolidated, 
Melanesian opposition suppressed, the convict system 
established, colonization extended and future policies, 
especially those dealing with Melanesians, were delineated. 
For the mission, 1870 marked the end of an acrimonious eight-
year struggle with the civil authorities over its role in 
the colony, and its position vis-a-vis Melanesians. 
As had already been suggested, the study of 
European involvement concentrates on the attitudes and 
policies of colonial administration and Marist mission, both 
XV 
in their direct impact on Melanesian society, and in their 
interaction and its effects. The process of culture change 
is examined in relation to two of the most important aspects 
of Melanesian society, the structure of authority within 
tribes and clans, and land tenure. In both cases the 
assumptions and interaction of the Europeans involved 
determined their policies and the changes they attempted to 
. 
implement; in both cases European assumptions were 
affected by what they believed to be or claimed to believe 
to be the nature of the traditional system. 
ON the question of sources, the work suffers from the lack 
of local administrative records, which I was flatly informed 
in Noumea 'no longer exist'. Thus for the viewpoint of the 
colonial administration I was forced to rely almost entirely 
on material in French archives and on official publications 
of the New Caledonian government. The French archival 
material has occasional lacunae, notably during the period of 
Guillain's governorship. This is doubly unfortunate because 
of the need for comprehensive official records against which 
to balance the Marist account of the mission/government 
conflict of this era. My discussion of this conflict is 
unavoidably weighted, in terms of volume of source material, 
in favour of the mission. It is often difficult to pronounce 
with any certainty on Guillain's actions and motives, and those 
relatively few of his letters and reports which are still 
extant must perforce bear a heavier burden of proof than 
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perhaps they warrant. 
I have not used oral testimony to any great extent. 
The length of time from the actual events under consideration 
and the stresses of the colonial period have combined to 
erase memories of many of the events in which I am interested. 
This is especially true of the north-east, which was one of 
the first areas to be evangelized and colonized, and where 
these processes were frequently connected with bitter 
clashes with the colonial authorities, in which the 
Melanesians ultimately fared badly. This has caused 
reluctance on the part of many people to discuss with strangers 
events of the colonial period, whilst many young people 
appear to take the attitude that the recent past was a period 
of oppression of Melanesian by European and is therefore best 
forgotten. Similarly, there is often embarrassment, lack of 
interest and impatience with the traditional past, and old men 
frequently complain that the young do not care about their 
heritage, and in some cases want actively to forget it. 
I gleaned comparatively little information on events 
and specific incidents from New Caledonian informants, but 
much that is useful in the way of clan, place and personal 
names, lists of traditional alliances and enmities, migration 
itineraries, short genealogies and so on, all of which are 
invaluable when used in conjunction with published material, 
collections of legends and traditions and the archival and 
manuscript sources to which I have had access. 
CHAPTER I 
THE SOCIETY 
IT is self-evident that any attempt to reconstruct definitively 
the nature of the cultural mores and social organization of the 
indigenous people of New Caledonia at or immediately before 
the first known contact with Europeans is either doomed to 
failure or delusive. The situation is especially difficult 
because the first arrivals directly affected only a small 
number of people, while the period of early, superficial 
contact began at different times in different areas, and lasted 
over the group as a whole for more than sixty years. More 
intensive contact began in several areas in the 1840's, but 
some inland,mountain tribes remained isolated and in many ways 
unaffected by European influence until the end of the nineteent 
1 
century. The area under consideration in this study includes 
the extreme example of both types: Balad, where the earliest 
known contacts occurred, and Webia, where as late as 1898 
there survived in isolated pockets elements of a way of life, 
social organization and material culture which were elsewhere 
greatly modified. 2 It is essential to be aware of the 
1 
Durand 1900. 
2 
Ibid. 
] 
variations possible in contact situations in New Caledonia, 
some of which were obviously inherent in the European 
participants and in considerations of time and place, while 
others stemmed from social and cultural differences between 
3 indigenous groups. Such differences were regional rather 
2 
than ~ocal, and general tendencies can be traced throughout the 
group. Some dissimilarities were obvious, however, between 
the northern and southern extremities, between the east and 
west coasts of the main island, and between coastal and inland 
4 
areas. The most important variable in the indigenous 
situation, one which was often not apparent to early European 
observers, was political, and resulted from local differences 
in the power, influence and authority of groups and their 
leaders. Traditionally these attributes varied widely from 
place to place, and within and between groups, while in any 
locality the potential for change in this respect during 
seventy years was considerable, especially in an area of 
relatively high instability of local groups like the east 
5 
coast. 
Although a complete reconstruction of the traditional 
society and culture at a particular point in time is 
3 
Metais 1953b:l71. 
4 
Montrouzier 1860: 37 
5 
Guiart 1953. 
Leenhardt 1946:xviii. Cf. Brou 1970:75-
3 
unattainable, there are some aspects about which much is 
known, at least in certain regions. Here literate and often 
interested and intelligent witnesses recorded their observation 
with some sympathy for the people concerned, and in many cases 
a scientific curiosity which compensated with accuracy in 
description for frequent inadequacies in attempted analysis. 
The most important of these aspects was religion. Most 
missionaries made at least some effort to record the more 
obvious observances, if only for their antiquarian value. 
6 
Moreover, some missionaries had a genuine and often scholarly 
interest in the traditional practices and attitudes which they 
were in the process, they hoped, of changing irrevocably, and 
which a few were prepared to use as a basis for inculcating 
Christianity with as little trauma and as much continuity as 
possible. Notable in these respects were Lambert and 
Gagniere. The former's work on the Belep and the Isle of 
Pines was one of the first major publications in New Caledonian 
ethnography. Gagniere, who lived in close contact with the 
people of Balad and Pwebo from 1849, was largely responsible 
for the establishment of a fervent and enduring Christianity 
at Pwebo, and later began the conversion of the people of 
Bonde and Arama before his death in 1867. His knowledge and 
understanding of traditional religion in these areas was 
6 
Such as Gagniere, Lambert, Rougeyron, Goujon, Montrouzier; 
see below, pp. 211-13. 
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profound, and, since they went beyond a mere catalogue of 
practices and ritual, gave him great insight into indigenous 
motivations and attitudes, which he used with success in the 
propagation of the faith. 
Another area in which much is known, although there are 
signif~cant lacunae, is material culture: descriptions of 
artefacts, of the construction of huts and canoes, of 
agricultural techniques, were fairly 7 common, and a reasonably 
complete picture of such objects and activities can be built 
up, with the aid of the various ethnographic collections. 
Generally the symbolic importance of the ritual involved in 
these activities was not recognized by the casual observer, 
but in this respect the records left by the more interested 
of the missionaries and the works of twentieth-century 
ethnographers are valuable. Material culture was almost 
invariably one of the areas most immediately affected by 
European contact, indirect as well as direct. Thus, iron 
tools, European cloth and utensils supplanted traditional 
implements, bark cloth and pottery almost at once, and with 
intensive contact the art of making these tended rapidly to 
fall into decay, and even to be lost. It was reported in 1898, 
however, that the Tea Janu of Webia still used traditional 
8 
weapons, while everywhere techniques of construction, 
7 
O'Reilly 1955:130-3. 
8 
Durand 1900:514. 
agriculture, fighting and so forth tended to change slowly, 
even though new implements were used, especially when the 
symbolic importance of a particular method was great. 
For the historian of the period of European contact 
5 
and penetration in a pre-literate society the most important 
aspects of the traditional situation are related to social, 
political and economic organization, and yet here reconstruction 
is difficult. The earliest Europeans known to have visited 
parts of New Caledonia rarely stayed long enough or had 
sufficient command of local languages to gain any but a 
superficial impression, which was generally interpreted in 
terms of and deeply coloured by their own social and cultural 
background, their outlook and motivatiGns. Even those people, 
residents in a tribe, missionaries, settlers and local 
representatives of the colonial authorities, who lived for a 
time amongst or in close proximity to New Caledonians, and who 
had a greater or lesser command of their language, rarely had 
the training, inclination or objectivity to investigate such 
matters. Their records and observations are not for this 
reason valueless, but except for a few whose authors were 
especially interested and qualified, the value of such works 
is generally in the nature of providing corroborative evidence 
rather than direct testimony. Among the best early descriptions 
of social, political and economic organization in parts of 
New Caledonia are those written by a few missionaries, and by 
6 
several French naval doctors, who had lived for a time near 
one or more tribes, and were usually well-trained, intelligent 
9 
observers. The earliest scholarly ethnographic publications 
10 
were those of Lambert and Sarasin, but the most important 
such material is to be found in the works of the ethnographer/ 
missionary, Maurice Leenhardt, and his pupils. Leenhardt, 
however, did not arrive in New Caledonia until the end of 1902, 
nearly 130 years after the first known contact, and more than 
sixty years after the beginning of intensive contact. 
Furthermore, his detailed knowledge and profound experience 
was based on his work in the Wailu valley, and in the areas of 
Protestant domination generally. The latter limitation applies 
to a lesser extent to the work of his most prominent pupils, 
Pierre Metais and Jean Guiart. 
An attempt to gain an understanding of those areas of 
traditional New Caledonian society which are of most relevance 
to the historian of culture contact must, therefore, be based 
to some extent on detailed knowledge and observation of 
particular groups in the twentieth century. One must rely 
partly on inference, and would lay no claim to scientific 
exactitude. Nonetheless, the evidence available is sufficiently 
reliable and detailed to enable a general picture to be drawn 
9 
Penard 1857; Rochas 1862; Vieillard et Deplanche 1863; 
Deplanche 1868-9; Bourgarel 1870; Patouillet 1872; Legrand 1893; 
Vincent 1895. 
10 
Lambert 1900; Sarasin 1916-18; [1917] 
7 
of the way in which society functioned in the area of study. 
The existence is not implied, however, of any sort of monolithic 
11 polity, formally institutionalized throughout the archipelago. 
TRADITIONALLY the Melanesians of New Caledonia had no term for 
12 the wh~le island, but used only local names. Population 
density was low in an island were settlement was scattered, and 
'villages' were generally only the cluster of huts and gardens 
which surrounded the ceremonial hill site of an extended 
13 family group or clan. Throughout New Caledonia traditional 
settlement patterns have changed more or less radically during 
the period of prolonged European contact, oying originally to 
the desire of the inhabitants to group more closely in order to 
facilitate their dealings with traders and/or missionaries, 14 
and ultimately to the desire of mission and government to 
concentrate the Melanesian population for ease of administration 
and surveillance. 
11 
Cf. Lenormand 1953:245-6. 
12 
Beaglehole 1961:544. 
13 
Forster 1777, 11:392; Laferriere 1845:69, 92-3, 103; 
Pigeard 1846:104-5; Leconte 1847:831-3; Febvrier de Pointes to 
Min., 21 Mar. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854; Thiercelin 1866, 
1:272; Guiart 1954b:3, 17. See also Montrouzier 1860:37. 
14 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 25 Dec. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854; du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855a: ibid., CG 1855. 
8 
15 The basic unit of New Caledonian society was the clan, 
an exogamous, patrilineal and patrilocal group, whose members 
were theoretically descended from a common ancestor. In 
practice this was not necessarily so, since unrelated 
individuals or small groups of different origin were often 
attached to a group as sub-clans. In time these people acquired 
the status of junior clan members, 'younger brothers', 
dependent on and owing allegiance to the chief, regarded as the 
oldest man of the oldest branch of the clan. Each clan had a 
name, which seems not to have been spoken, and which was 
generally replaced by totemic or toponymic references; a totem; 
gods, usually ancestral spirits, or a local name for more 
generally recognized deities; a psychic and emotional attachment 
to a specific location, considered to be the original (but 
generally not the actual) site of residence of the clan; a 
territory, whose limits were known and recognized both within 
and without the clan. In addition, every clan had relationships 
with a number of other groups: such as the clans of the 
maternal relations of its various members; clans from which it 
was descended, or with which it was allied through having 
15 
Except where otherwise indicated, the following details on 
New Caledonian clans are based on Leenhardt 1930:103-5; 
Guiart 1954b:3-6, 12-13; 1963:14-15, 38-9. Traditionally the 
concept of a clan was recognized in New Caledonia, and it was 
variously expressed as mwaro in the language of Wailu, tun at 
Yengen, mwalek at Pwebo (Leenhardt 1946:445). 
dispersed from a common clan of origin; dependent sub-clans, 
including both junior branches, and groups of exterior origin 
which had been assimilated to the senior lineage following 
defeat in war or a request for protection; descendant clans, 
often dispersed far from the place of origin, which retained 
ties of kinship and affection with the parent group. Such 
relationships between territorially distant clans appear to 
have been the basis for the development between related groups 
of networks of identification, which transcended linguistic 
boundaries, and which could sometimes be invoked in time of war. 
More importantly, they seem to have pointed to the existence 
of known itineraries along which usually small-scale migrations 
occurred, in a society in which casual voyaging beyond one's 
tribal boundaries was fairly rare, because of the dangers of 
16 
enemy attack, but where emigration of one of the parties 
concerned was a common response to situations involving 
conflict. 17 
The most important political relationship between 
clans, however, was that which united a group of clans in 
common allegiance to the chief of one of their number, who thus 
exercised the functions of chief of a tribe. The concept of a 
tribe seems traditionally to have been imprecise in New 
16 
Rochas 1862:250; Guiart 1954b:6. 
17 
Guiart 1963:15, 640-2. 
Caledonia, and usage of the term is further confused by the 
different application given it today by both administration and 
18 Melanesians. None of the indigenous languages appears to 
19 have a word to express the concept, but it is nonetheless 
a both valid and necessary term in any discussion of 
traditipnal polity. The various tribes formed by 
agglomerations of clans owing allegiance to a single chief had 
1 
names and were recognized by their own members, and by outsiders 
as forming entities distinct from other such agglomerations, 
and from autonomous single clans. 
The particular attributes of a tribe are difficult to 
delineate. Linguistic unity was not necessarily one, since 
more than one tribe often spoke the same language, and 
sometimes in large tribes individual villages spoke different 
languages or dialects. 20 On the other hand, Leenhardt 21 
18 
The term tribu is used today to refer to the individual 
villages, presided over by so-called petits chefs, which make up 
the larger units, called districts, which are headed by a grand 
chef (Lenormand 1953:248; Guiart 1954b: 7). 
19 
Leenhardt:1946. 
20 
Lambert 1900:65. The people of Pambwa and Gomen, who belonged 
different tribes, spoke the same language. The people of Cambwen 
and Yambe, who were considered by early European visitors to 
belong to the Mwelebeng tribe (A.Mathieu, 'Rapport •.• au sujet d• 
la formation de la tribu de Tchambouene ... ', 6 July 1869: Mon., 
5 Sept. 1869; J.M.Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de---
Pouebo en 1867': AVNC), and who say that they have 'always' been 
part of Mwelebeng, spoke Jawe, whilst the language of Mwelebeng 
itself was Caaqac (Leenhardt 1946:122; written communication of 
Professor K.J. Hollyman, 6 July 1970). 
21 Leenhardt 1946:xiv. 
l '' .... ~ "_ .. , " 
claimed that the name of each language was important, because it 
was used to designate the speakers of the language, as well as 
the area in which it was spoken, and thus provided a sort of 
regional consciousness amongst people whose principal allegiance 
was to local groups. Such consciousness was often limited, 
however, since use of a common language did not prevent the 
existence of permanent hostility between tribes. Thus the 
Belep and the Arama spoke dialects of the same language, and 
yet were traditional enemies, while the Paak and the Tea Janu, 
who spoke different languages, were united by close ties of 
amity and alliance. Continuity of territory was not necessarily 
an attribute of a tribe. Thus the inhabitants of Wegwa, on the 
lower Diahst, were members of the Puma tribe of Balad, and at 
one period the chief of the tribe actually lived at ~egw•· 
Again, several clans living on the east coast near Cape Colnett 
recognized (and continue to recognize) as chief the Tea Janu of 
Webia, which is far inland, near the headwaters of the river 
Wayem. 
In theory, and at the simplest level, tribes were 
formed by extension of the familial system on which clans 
themselves were based: a tribe was a group of clans, bound by 
kinship, recognizing a common ancestor, perhaps historical but 
more likely mythical, and paying allegiance to the man 
considered to be the oldest member of the oldest branch of the 
12 
22 
original clan. In practice, the situation seems rarely to 
have been so straightforward or so formalized. The kinship 
principle was always present, terminologically and affectively, 2 
but, as with clans, unrelated groups and individuals were 
commonly absorbed into a tribe by conquest, by immigration, by 
reques~ for protection, or by invoking matrimonial links, while 
the nature of chieftainship was considerably more complex than 
24 is suggested by the simple formula proposed above. 
The distinction between the two units, clan and tribe, 
was partly one of size. Some tribes, for example the Bwarat of 
Yengen, were large and powerful enough to embrace most of the 
clans of an entire region, and the name of the principal clan 
(that which provided the chief) was applied to the tribe as a 
25 
whole. In some other areas, such as the Wailu valley, each 
clan was virtually autonomous, or a number of small independent 
tribal groups existed, within which kinship was a much stronger 
principle than in larger political units elsewhere. 26 In the 
north, where neighbouring tribes generally belonged to opposing 
22 
Rochas 1862:240-1; Lenormand 1953:246,249. 
23 
Compte-rendu des Conferences ecclesiastiques du Vicariat 
Apostol!que de la Nouvelle-Cal~donie, VII, Conference sur la loi 
naturelle 1905:33. 
24 
Rochas 1862:240-1; Guiart 1954a:23. 
25 
Leenhardt 1930:105. 
26 
Guiart 1963:ch.1. 
27 phratries, the larger groups tended to be separated by semi-
autonomous clans or small tribes, which acted as buffers, and 
whose current allegiances usually reflected the political 
28 
situation between the warring tribes. The distinction 
between the two units went beyond considerations of size, 
however". Clan identification tended· to be retained after 
emigration, which created or reinforced a link between two often 
quite distant areas. This was not so in the case of tribal 
affiliation, and the acceptance of an individual or a group 
into a tribe meant the replacement of old tribal allegiances by 
new. Memory of origins was generally retained by emigrants, 
however, and pre-existing ties of kinship maintained in the new 
situation. 29 
The concept of a tribe in New Caledonia seems to have 
been a flexible and pragmatic means of social and political 
organization and control, based on the fundamental sociological 
unit of the clan, and transcending and replacing many of the 
functions of clans in the places where it applied. Within the 
group or groups of which an individual was a member his role 
and status were strictly defined in terms of kinship and the 
27 
See below, PP• 34-7. 
28 
E.g. Jawe 
1854: ANOM, 
au sujet de 
1869: Mon., 
29 -
(Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854; 25 Dec. 
Carton 40, CG 1854); Tande (Mathieu, 'Rapport ••• 
la formation de la tribe de Tchambouene ••• ', 6 July 
5 Sept ... 1869). 
Guiart 1963:642. 
14 
ramifications of a social model, rigid in theory, but in practic 
less so, in which every clan, and thus every member of a clan, 
had a symbolic and ceremonial function which determined 
relationships with other groups and individuals, and with the 
tribal chief, if the authority of another clan was recognized. 
Once it had been decided neither to kill nor to expel them, 
newcomers tended to be absorbed into the social model either by 
being accorded functions previously fulfilled by now-defunct 
clans, or by subdividing an existing function to make two new 
ones: for example, by creating two dignitaries for the mask, 
30 
an owner and a keeper. One of the most unexpected features 
of the absorption mechanism of local groups in New Caledonia 
was a tendency for the integration of newcomers to take the 
form of their installation as chief. The implications 
suggested about the nature of chieftainship and the role of 
migrations in New Caledonian society necessitate a closer 
examination of both questions. 
IT is important in dealing with the question of chieftainship 
to emphasize first of all the differences in the scale and 
complexity of the roles which this term encompasses, from the 
chief of a small autonomous clan, to the chief of a large tribe! 
deferred to by the members, including the chiefs, ef a number of 
clans other than his own. 
30 
Guiart 1968: Notes. 
15 
In the final analysis the status of every chief 
stemmed from the concept of the chief of a clan as the oldest 
member of the senior lineage of a group of people of common 
descent. Thus the clan chief was regarded as the 'elder 
brether' of the other members, and as the 'great son' of the 
cl~n, ~ genealogical entity which included both past and 
present generations. The term used to designate the chief of 
31 
a clan meant 'great son', and was applied by extension to 
tribal chiefs, although in this case the implication of actual 
kinship was largely verbal, and even in relation to the clan it 
had by no means absolute relevance. 
The importance of the concept of fraternity was 
generally not recognized by early European observers: 
L'erreur des voyageurs a ete de regarder le chef 
comme un etre a part, investi d'une autorite 
abstraite, au lieu de considerer en lui l'aine 
d'un groupe. Son autorite n'est point faite de 
crainte legale, mais d'une tres respectueuse 
affection fraternelle. 32 
As inheritor of the power and prestige of the past generations, 
as personification of the honour of the clan and the virile 
qualities of the masculine succession, the chief was regarded 
as the guarantor of the group's security. As such he was 
31 
Leenhardt 1946:442. 
32 
Ibid., 1937:149. 
16 
responsible for the success of communal enterprises, especially 
the harvest, and for manifesting the respect due to his own and 
his 'brothers'' maternal relations, especially the uterine 
uncles who were regarded as the source of life of the clan and 
of the individuals belonging to it. Thus the chief organized 
the great family life-crisis festivals which paid homage to the 
maternal relations, and which by their brilliance exalted the 
power and prestige of the masculine succession, culminating in 
the chief himself. On these and other ceremonial occasions 
the chief discoursed at length, listing in the appropriate 
order the names and genealogies, contracts and treaties, heroic 
feats and great victories of the groups present. Whenever he 
spoke in public the chief was manifesting by the quality of his 
discourse the honour and prestige of the clan, and where his 
33 
authority was recognized by other clans, the tribe: 
La fonction du chef est d'etre l'homme de la 
parole et de prononcer en chaque occasion les 
mots adequate, rituels, et le discours qui met 
l'acte en evidence et lui donne son sens. 34 
Among the most important acts requiring the spoken word of the 
chief to give them meaning and immediacy was the circulation 
created by the reciprocal offering of gifts, a process which 
accompanied and symbolized most of the formal inter-personal 
33 
Leenhardt 1930:77-9, 83, 89-90; 1937:150, 152; Guiart 1954b:9; 
1963:38-40. 
34 
Leenhardt 1941:366. 
17 
and inter-group relationships in New Caledonian society. This 
exchange was exemplified by the bringing of the first yams to 
the chief by his 'younger brothers' in a gesture of 
confidence in him as representative of the clan, its land and 
its undertakings, and his offering in return the equivalent 
of whaL he had received; by the exchange of precious objects 
between clans on ceremonial occasions; by the exchange of gifts 
between host and visitor, whether they be individuals or 
entire groups visiting another for ceremonial purposes. 35 
The inability of a chief's son to memorize and pronounce 
adequately the discourse appropriate for every occasion 
generally led to his replacement as heir to the chieftainship 
36 by a younger brother or an uncle whose talents were more apt, 
since the authority of a chief within a group was a function 
more of the quality of his discourse than of the force at his 
disposal. Thus the strict application of the principle of 
primogeniture was modified by the reservation that the chief 
must be a worthy representative of the honour and prestige of 
35 
E.g. Rochas 1862:250-1; Vieillard et Deplanche 1863:33, 64, 66 
Patouillet 1872:180-6, 223; Lambert 1900:91-2, 106, 110, 116, 
117-20, 234-5; Sarasin [1917] :77-8; Baudoux 1938:28. 
36 
Leenhardt 1930:63: 'L'appellation "freres" s'etend aux enfants 
du pere, des freres du pere, des freres de la mere, et plus loin 
encore, aux petits-neveux et fils des grands-peres et freres des 
grands-pereset des grand'meres paternels et uterins'; Lambert 
1900:114-5. 
the group, a matter on which the council of elders seems to 
37 have been the sole judge. 
It should be noted, however, that while in such cases 
the deposed heir lost the substance of his position, he lost 
none of the trappings. He retained the privileges and the 
marks or respect due to his rank, and in general the 
chieftainship eventually reverted to his descendants, should 
they be considered fit to exercise it. 38 Sometimes, however, 
a chief with no suitable heir would adopt a young man, who 
18 
became in every respect his legitimate successor, the bearer of 
the name and tradition of his clan, and the prerogatives and 
obligations of his position. 39 Should a chief be considered 
too young to rule, a near relation acted as his 'regent'. The 
'regent' usually retained great authority until his death, 
when the chief or his descendant resumed full control of the 
40 
affairs of the group. 
37 
Montrouzier 1860: 48; Rochas 1862:234; Leenhardt 1937:150; 
Guiart 1963:39; c.f. Montrouzier to his brother, 14 Oct. 1853: 
APM/Personal file (Montrouzier). 
38 
Personal communication of Maurice Moueaou, Pouebo, August 1969. 
39 
Rochas 1862:234; Glaumont 1889:82; Vincent 1895:23. 
40 
Montrouzier 1860: 48; Vincent 1895:23; Turpin de Morel 
1956-7:144, see below, pp. 201, 203. 
The marks of deference shown to a chief by his 
'brothers' were numerous, and were responsible for European 
misconceptions as to his position. No one passed behind his 
back, or stood higher than he; women crouched on all fours 
when in his vicinity; turtles and certain fish were offered 
to him; it was forbidden to touch any of his possessions or 
his person; he was often deified after death. Such deference 
was, however, shown to all elder brothers and maternal uncles 
by their younger brothers and nephews. It was intensified 
into ritual according to the prestige of a chief, and was 
performed by all who recognized him as the 'great son' of a 
41 particular group. The death of an important chief was 
19 
traditionally followed by the devastation of his coconut trees. 
dwellings and gardens, while his 'brothers' destroyed their 
most precious possessions and mutilated their faces and 
bodies in order to demonstrate the intensity of their sorrow. 42 
Normal activities tended to cease during the initial mourning 
43 period. Such actions were an extension of the normal 
pattern of behaviour of a family following the death of one of 
its number; the duration of the mourning period, the numbers 
41 
Rochas 1862:237, 258; Lambert 1900: 112-14; Leenhardt 1930: 
97-8; 1937:149. 
42 
Leconte 1847:843-4; Rochas 1862:267-70; Vieillard et Deplanche 
1863:63-5; Thiercelin 1866, 1:313; Patouillet 1872:102, 184-5; 
Lambert 1900:235. 
43 
Rochas 1862:267; [Gagniere] 1905:21, 28. 
participating, and the extravagence of the accompanying 
ceremonies all increased in proportion to the status of the 
44 deceased. The death of a great chief was sometimes 
commemorated often years later by a special ceremony which 
usually involved the ravaging of the lands of the host tribe 
(that to which the chief had belonged) by the visitors, led by 
45 the clan of the dead chief's maternal relations. The 
20 
nature of this ceremony meant that it often ended in war, while 
the exigency of providing sustenance for such a large and 
prolonged gathering normally involved the host group in 
hardship and often famine. Should the death of the chief have 
actually occurred in war, social shame and desire for vengeance 
would be unbounded and the resulting conflicts both bitter 
46 
and perpetuated. 
The chief generally shared his authority in matters 
of common interest with a council consisting of the elders of 
the group and any who by their particular talents earned a 
place, such as the war chief, prestigious priests and sorcerers, 
44 
Leconte 1847:843-4; Rochas 1862:267-70; Vieillard et 
Deplanche 1863:64-5; Glaumont 1889:123, 130; Lambert 1900:235; 
Sarasin [1917]:49. 
45 
Rochas 1862:268-9; Lambert 1900:245-9; [Gagniere] 1905: 28-33; 
Leenhardt 1930': 81, 85. 
46 
Patouillet 1872:165. 
47 
sculptors and so forth. Theoretically such a council 
21 
wielded only as much power as the chief was prepared to allow 
it, and it appears to have acted principally in an advisory 
48 
capacity. After the appropriate priest had consulted the 
particular spirits or totem with which he was in communion, it 
was the chief who made pronouncements regulating communal 
enterprises, and it was he who, as representative of the prestige 
of the group, was held responsible for their success. On the 
other hand, one way in which a chief showed his loyalty to 
custom was in his choice of advisors, and in the heed which he 
49 paid to their opinions. Thus the council, the members of 
which were themselves prestigious personages, was potentially 
and very often actually a body exercising real authority. 50 
After consultation with the council, then, and 
generally after reaching some sort of consensus, the chief gave 
47 
Leconte 1847:826; Rochas 1862:164; Patouillet 1872: 131; 
Durand 1900:503; Lambert 1900:80; Leenhardt 1937:150, Guiart 
1954b:9-10; 1963:39. 
48 
De la Hautiere 1869:76-8; C[olomb] 1890:9; Vincent 1895:20-1. 
After about 1860 the council of elders declined in importance, 
as a concomitant of missionary and official policies which tendec 
to enhance chiefly authority and thereby create auxiliaries who 
serve as intermediaries in the conversion or the administration 
of the tribes (see below, pp. ). In the new conditions pertai1 
ing since World War 11, however, the council has gradually 
acquired renewed influence in the regulation of tribal affairs 
(Guiart 1954b:28). 
49 
Leenhardt 1937:150; Guiart 1963:39. 
so 
Goujon, 'Journal de 1'i1e des Pins', 21 Oct. 1849, 31 Aug. 
1850, 23 Mar. 1851; Rochas 1862:244, G1aumont 1889:75. 
22 
the signal for the commencement of cultivation of the gardens, 
for the harvest, for great fishing expeditions; he punished 
malefactors and mediated in serious disputes between members of 
the group; he declared war and made peace, although he did not 
himself take part in hostilities; 51 he spared the defeated 
enemy, arranged inter-clan gatherings, and generally regulated 
52 53 
the affairs of the community. As far as land was concerned, 
the chief fulfilled a dual role, which parallelled the 
dichotomy inherent in the traditional system of property rights. 
The chief as an individual possessed only those tracts which he 
had inherited, or which he cleared and cultivated, and was not 
necessarily the largest landholder in the group. Indeed, some 
tribal chiefs had few or no personal land rights and were 
dependent on their 'subjects' for survival. As 'great son' of 
a clan, however, a chief 'owned' and administered the clan 
land, the patrimony of the past generations whose representative 
he was. It is thus necessary to distinguish between proprietary 
and usufructuary right to land: the former was vested in the 
clan, and was in practice rarely alienated because of the 
sacred nature of the clan's territory; the latter was vested in t 
individual who cultivated the land, and could be ceded to 
outsiders with the chief's approval, in return for regular 
51 
Vigors 1850:251; Rochas 1862:207. 
52 
Lambert 1900:80; Leenhardt 1937:150-1; Guiart 1954b:9; 
1963:39-40. 
53Except where otherwise indicated the following section on land 
tenure is based on Saussol 1971:227-47. See also Rochas 1862:244 
261; Vincent 1895:26-7; Lambert 1900:82-9; Leenhardt 1930:91, 
94-96; 1937;151. 
gifts, usually yams. Such transfer of proprietary rights as 
did occur was usually connected with the absorption of 
strangers into the clan or tribe, and carried with it the 
obligation of acknowledgement by periodic gifts. Sometimes a 
group threatened with extinction designated a chief as 
inheritor of its possessions, which he then assigned to new 
owners,·who by taking the name of the defunct group ensured 
that it should not die with them. 54 Similarly, a group 
seeking protection from an enemy might offer its land to a 
chief, but in both cases the latter acquired the right not to 
possess but to administer the land in question, and an 
increase rather in his prestige and power than in his material 
55 
wealth. Crops, and also fishing, hunting and gathering 
rights, rights to trees, streams and so forth did not 
necessarily have the same owner as the land on which they were 
sited. Unoccupied land was communal property. European 
ignorance of the intracacies of this dual system, as of the 
profound psychic importance which Melanesians attached to the 
specific soil, trees, streams which formed the inheritance of 
56 their clan, was to lead to inter-racial hatred, and to 
some of the most bitter clashes of the colonial period. 
54 
Guiart 1963:39; 1968: Notes. 
55 
Leenhardt 1930:91; 1937:151. 
56 
Lambert 1900:86-9, 359; Metais 1953a:114-5; Guiart 1963:15. 
23 
Agricultural activities were performed by communal 
effort, in which the chief shared. In deference to the 'great 
son', his gardens were the first to be worked, but his 
prerogatives do not appear to have extended beyond this. 57 The 
culmination of a season's work in the gardens was achieved with 
the ya~ harvest, which was everywhere an occasion of great 
symbolic and ceremonial importance. The classic manifestation 
of allegiance by an individual or a group to a particular 
chief was the offering to him of the first yams gathered from 
each garden, in a ceremony which symbolized the reciprocity 
of the relationship between a chief and his 'brothers'. It was 
customary, at least in some areas, for the chief to offer in 
58 
return the equivalent of what he had received. The 
ramifications of the distribution of the first yams in a 
particular area appear to be a fairly reliable indicator of 
2 
certain relationships between groups, and of the complex network 
of allegiances which often existed. These sometimes reflected 
situations in which the chieftainship was held by a clan of 
relatively recent origin, whilst the previous holders of the 
office retained for themselves functions which assured them of 
59 
a very real, if sometimes less obvious, authority. 
57 
Lambert 1900:220-1; Leenhardt 1930:93, 117; 1937:150; Guiart 
1963:656; cf. Thiercelin 1866, 1:303. 
58 
Leenhardt 1930:93-4, 127-30; Guiart 1954b:8-9. 
59 
See below, pp.27-9; Guiart 1963:28-37, 41, 132-43, 641; see 
also Patouillet 1872:130-1; Sarasin [1917] :73, 77-8; Turpin de 
Morel 1956-7:146. 
2~ 
Within certain limits the authority of a chief over his 
'brothers' in his own clan and in attached sub-clans was very 
60 great, While he continued to act for the common good and 
in keeping with his role of 'elder brother', representative of 
the honour of the clan and the prestige of the past generations; 
while h·e avoided violations which could disturb the delicate 
balance thought to exist between men and the spirit world, a 
balance on which the success of the harvest, and therefore the 
survival of the group, depended; while he ensured that the 
proper respect was shown and customary obligations met towards 
the maternal relations, considered to be the source of life 
of the group and its members; while he continued not to abuse 
the rights of his 'brothers', he was often blindly obeyed and 
61 had over them command of life and death. Should he fail in 
his responsibility to ensure the success of the group's 
undertakings; should he repeatedly abuse the particular rights 
of his 'brothers'; should he refuse all control of his actions; 
should it be felt that he was betraying the honour and 
destroying the security of the clan, he might be replaced in 
the chieftainship by a relative or by a representative of a 
different lineage, and be forced into exile; or individuals 
or even his entire clan might abandon him and seek protection 
60 
Leenhardt 1930:98; 1935:215; Guiart 1963:640. 
61 
Leconte 1847:851; Rochas 1862:246; Garnier 1901:231; 
Leenhardt 1937:151; Guiart 1963:40. 
elsewhere under another chief. 62 A tribal chief might 
similarly be replaced or abandoned should he fail adequately 
to fulfil his role or repeatedly abuse his position. 
The tendency for conflict within social groups to be 
solved by the exile of one or other of the parties involved 
seems to have been fairly widespread,, since the greatest 
potentiality for collision was between siblings. This was a 
natural concomitant of the abasement of the younger before the 
elder, towards whom open resistance appears to have been 
63 
regarded as sacrilegious. The alternatives were his 
peaceful removal and generally his exile, or the self-exile of 
the discontented 'brother(s)'. Such displacement of personnel 
rarely involved large numbers, whose absorption into a new 
environment would probably have led to clashes over land. 
Large-scale migrations seem, in fact, sometimes to have 
involved violent conflict and overthrow of the previous 
holders of the land, although conquest by force appears to 
have been an unusual way for people to establish themselves in 
64 
a new area. The frequency of migrations 65 necessitated 
the elaboration of means to deal with the problem of new 
arrivals. They could have been refused admittance and expelled; 
62 
Rochas 1862:225, 246-7; Leenhardt 1937:152; Guiart 1954b:8-9; 
1963:641. 
63 
Leenhardt 1937:152; Guiart 1963:640-1. 
64 
Rochas 1862:243; Guiart 1963:641, 649-52. 
65 
Guiart 1953; 1954a:24-6; 1963: passim. 
27 
they could have been killed; they could have been reduced to 
the role of slaves, all of which presuppose violence or at 
least severe tensions between the established population and 
newcomers. Or, as usually happened, they could be admitted 
into the existing social structure on a more or less equal 
basis, and assigned a particular role with corresponding 
prerogatives and obligations. Defeated enemies whose lives 
had been spared were sometimes introduced in a like manner 
into the social 66 group to which the victor belonged. The 
previous inhabitants retained almost intact their privileges, 
and usually continued to exercise authority in the group, 
although this was often obscured by the particular means used 
to introduce the newcomer. A noticeable feature of the method 
of dealing with immigrants was 'la frequence des cas, ou 
l'acceptation d'un nouveau venu ••• [prit] la forme de son 
intronisation a la chefferie.' Guiart explained this in 
terms of the relative independence of the system of land tenure 
from the structure of authority: 
66 
••• on peut concevoir qu'un etranger puisse 
apparaitre moins genant au sommet de la pyramide, 
ou il controle peu de choses, et depend de tout le 
monde, qu'a la base ou il conviendrait de lui 
accorder des terres en suffisance. 67 
Rochas 1862:234, 252; Durand 1900:514; Lambert 1900:177. 
67 
Guiart 1963:641. 
In some areas, therefore, the power of the political 
chieftainships was limited by the existence of dignitaries, 
who, as chiefs of clans which previously occupied the land, 
claimed and exercised the rights of earliest inhabitants, and 
bore the title of master of the soil: 
Celui qui ••• sacrifie a l'ancetre, distibue la 
jouissance des parcelles du sol, est l'arbitre 
dans les contestations; pretre, cadastre vivant 
et maitre du sol qu' il detient, comme lui etant 
confie par ceux qui l'ont precede, ou, s'il l'a 
mis en valeur lui-meme, lui etant laisse en 
28 
jouissance par le totem maitre de l'endroit. 68 
The master of the soil, who was not obliged to offer the 
first yams of his own gardensto the chief, was a person of 
great authority because of his presumed ability to communicate 
with the spirits of theland which he administered. He 
tended to remain in the background and allow the chief the 
appearance of power, but few chiefs dared to defy him, while 
even a conqueror usually left the master unharmed, to ensure 
69 
the propitiation of the spirits of the conquered territory. 
Chiefs who combined political authority in particular areas 
with the function of master of the soil could exercise great 
power, but such amalgamation of roles was comparatively rare, 
given the complexity of traditional New Caledonian political 
organization, the frequency of migrations and the methods often 
68 
Leenhardt 1935:140. 
69 
Guiart 1963:35. 
used to introduce newcomers. Certainly none of the great 
tribal chieftainships appears to be able to trace its lineage 
beyond eight generations, and the dynastic principle seems 
70 
never to have taken hold. The authority of the master of 
the soil continues today to be considerable, since he alone 
controls and can consent to a sale of the land of which he is 
71 
master, although legally the land in the reserves is 
communally owned. The role of masters of the soil, or those 
who ~la~med to be the original inhabitants of the land, is of 
crucial importance in many reserves,where the official policy 
72 
of cantonnement compelled large numbers of people to settle 
on lands to which they had no traditional rights. Such people 
became dependent on the masters for usufructuary rights, a 
situation aggravated by the pressure of overcrowding, and by 
the necessity for long-term alienation of such rights once 
73 
cash-cropping began on any scale. 
70 
Guiart 1954a:22-3; 1963:643-5. 
71 
Leenhardt 1935:140; Guiart 1954b:17. 
72 
The policy of cantonnement was formally instituted in 
2 
January 1868 in order to rationalize Melanesian land holdings, 
so that a clearly delimited reserve might be allotted to each 
tribe in proportion to its population. All other land could the: 
be made available for colonization. During the 1870's and again 
in the 1890's the demands of, in the first case, penal and in 
the second case free colonization caused the administration to 
abandon earlier provisions which had guaranteed the inviolabili 
of the reserved lands, and the physical link between reserves 
and traditional holdings. Thus cantonnement became a policy 
which confined Melanesians to reserves which bore no necessary 
relation to their traditional territory or to their customary 
tribal affiliations, and which were usually insufficient for 
their needs. 
73 Belouma 1958-9:21-2; Saussol 1971:235-6. 
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The influence of those people, such as masters of the 
soil, who were thought to be in rapport with powerful spirits, 
74 gods or totems was great, although in some respects it 
was not always obvious. The functions, attributes and 
prestige of such people varied according to the quality of 
75 the beings which they invoked, but all enjoyed some degree 
of respect, and were feared because of their dealings with 
the unknown. Every aspect of nature and of human life and 
endeavour was believed to be subject to the influence, whether 
beneficent or malevolent, of supernatural forces, many of 
which were the spirits of dead chiefs and ancestors. The 
human beings with whom they were allegedly in communion were 
thought to be able to call on this influence to control the 
elements, and thus the harvest; to cause ill-health or death, 
or cure disease; to determine the results of man's 
enterprises. Some fulfilled the role of priests, by under-
taking the propitiation of the relevant spirits or totems 
before any individual or group enterprise, and by paying 
homage to the ancestral spirits of a group, especially on 
ceremonial occasions; others practised divination, and 
attempted to predict the results of future actions, or reveal 
the authors of a crime; others again used sorcery or 
sympathetic magic in order to reveal and punish wrong-doers, 
to achieve personal ambitions, to cure an illness, or as an 
74 
Vincent 1895:25-6; Durand 1900:510-12. 
75 
Rochas 1862:288. 
i f 1 . 76 nstrument o po 1cy. The role of such people in the 
indigenous society was thus concerned primarily with 
attempting to control the environment and with the exercise 
of justice in 77 the group. They utilized a variety of 
methods and materials, but all made use of a stone, believed 
to be the concrete representation of the particular spirit, 
78 god or totem with which they were in contact. 
Since every action of man was believed to be subject to 
the operation of forces which were beyond his control, but 
which could be invoked through the mediation of certain 
peculiarly-endowed people, every individual or public 
misfortune was attributed to the actions of sorcerers who 
were, perhaps unconsciously, in communion with maleficent 
spirits: 
Un homme repute sorcier, et juge capable de faire 
des malefices au prejudice de la vie d'autrui, 
n'est pas seulement mal vu, mais son existence est 
consideree comme un fleau. Rarement il meurt de 
mort naturelle. 
Thus a concerted witch-hunt was the usual concomitant of 
public calamity such as epidemic, famine or the death of a 
79 
31 
chief from illness, but the victims of such a process tended to 
76 
Montrouzier to his brother, 14 Oct. 1853: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier); Montrouzier 1860:29-36 ; Rochas 1862:275-81, 
287-96; Vieillard et Deplanche 1863:25-30; Lambert 1900:1-251 
passim; Leenhardt 1930:39-42, 114-34 passim, 143-234 passim, 
235-60. 
77 
Leenhardt 1930:237. 
78 
Ibid., 241-5. 
79 
Lambert 1900:75. 
be nonentities, often people accused of being possessed, and 
80 
of acting in spite of themselves. There is also some 
evidence to suggest that such occasions were at times used, 
especially by chiefs, as a pretext to destroy a rival or an 
81 
enemy. An individual who suspected that he was the victim 
of the malevolent actions of another generally tried to use 
more powerful magic to thwart the influence of the inimical 
spirits. 
Within a clan the chief was generally not responsible 
for paying homage to the ancestors nor for communicating with 
the supernatural forces which determined the success of the 
group's enterprises, although he personally sacrificed in 
honour of his own forebears. The former function was left to 
32 
82 
a representative of a junior lineage. Specific supernatural 
talents, such as the pretended ability to commune with a 
particular totem or spirit, or knowledge of a special method 
were often exercised by a particular clan, and were passed 
down from father to son. 83 The people whose role it was to 
prepare for the various enterprises of a group by predicting thE 
outcome and by propitiating the appropriate supernatural 
80 
Leconte 1847:844-6; Rougexron to Sup~rie~r-g~n~ral, 14 F~b. 
1847: APM/ONC, 26a; Goujon, 'Journal de l'ile des Pins', 10 
June 1852; Rochas 1862:287-9; cf. Leenhardt 1930:244-5. 81 . cc 
Besson 1847:405; Montrouzier 1860:31. 
82 
Leenhardt 1930: 94-1. 
83 
Rochas 1862:296. 
beings tended, like the master of the soil, to remain in the 
background. They enjoyed considerable influence, however, 
since in practice it was they who made the decisions when to 
act, leaving the chief to proclaim them to the group. The 
difference between such dignitaries, including the master of 
the soil, and the chief, was thus one of function: the 
chief's principal role was to speak, but he would not act 
without the impetus and the support of the others, whose 
authority, primarily religious, was also of potential 
84 political importance. This division of function did not 
exist everywhere to the same degree, and a chief such as 
Waulo of Belep, who had the reputation of being a powerful 
85 
sorcerer and evocator, enjoyed a possibility for independent 
action far beyond that of chiefs in some other areas, recent 
arrivals generally, whose subordination to the priests was 
marked. In practice such division of functions provided a 
safeguard against chiefly absolutism, and lent to New 
Caledonian political and social organization a complexity and 
flexibility which was not often apparent to European 
observers. 
No chief, however powerful, seems to have possessed 
widespread authority over clans other than his own, and 
84 
Leenhardt 1930:107-9, 116-7; Guiart 1963:40-1. 
85 
Rochas 1862:296; Vieillard et Deplanche 1863:27; Lambert 
1900:10; see also Leenhardt 1930:98. 
associated sub-clans. Again, confusion over this point was 
a fertile source of misunderstanding and exaggeration by 
Europeans. In large tribes relations between the tribal 
chief and the chiefs of the various clans which paid allegiance 
to him were a matter of compromise and negotiation. Every 
member of a tribe contributed in matters which concerned the 
common.good or augmented the glory of the tribe, but they did 
so of their own volition, and their rights had to be 
86 
respected. The prestige of the chief of a large tribe, 
such as Bwarat of Yengen, might be immense, but traditionally 
he was no autocrat, and the extent of his authority depended 
more on his intelligence and his ability to realize the 
potential of his position whilst respecting its traditional 
limitations, than on the position per se. 
FROM the customary political and social viewpoint the area 
under consideration in this study can in one sense be 
considered an entity because of the existence north of a line 
between Yengen and Temala of a traditional division between 
two opposing networks of identification known as Oot and 
86 
Forget to Min., 15 June 1860: Collection Margry; Rochas 
1862:244-6; Patouillet 1872:134-5; Guiart 1954b:9; 1968: 
Notes. 
87 Waap. There is a paucity of exact information on the 
significance of these networks, while little is known about 
88 the organization and working of the system. The two 
35 
phratries seem to have been unstructured confederations, which 
furnished a means of identification between groups with 
certain common interests and problems, common enemies and often 
a common origin. Guiart considered that the traditional 
opposition of Oot and Waap functioned to provide a raison 
d'etre for the various high chieftainships of the region, 
because of the existence of hereditary adversaries and 
customary enemies. 
Present-day informants tend to reply to questions about 
Oot and Waap by giving a list of clans and tribes belonging 
to either or both groups. An informant at Tiari spoke of the 
existence of two great opposing 'families', the members of 
each of which went to the aid of their kinsmen in time of 
89 
need. 
87 
Kinship links seem certainly to have existed within 
Waap is known as Wafaf at Yengen (Guiart 1957:24) and as 
Watambwen at Kumak and Balad (Guiart 1955:43; personal 
communication of Thomas Ngai, Tiari, August 1969). The 
particular allegiances of the various tribes in the area 
studied were as follows: 
Oot: Belep, Nenema, Bonde (Paak), Pwebo (Mwelebeng), Cambwen, 
Yambe, Webia (Tea Janu), Colnett, Wayem, certain clans at 
Kumak and Gomen, Gavac, Tando, Tipinje:~, 
Waap: Arama, most of Kumak and Gomen, Cari , Balad (Puma), 
Pambwa (Maluma), Jawe, Tao, Panye, Yengen (Bwarat), Kulna 
(Guiart 1957:22). 
88 
The main details of the following section are based on 
Guiart 1957:21-7. 
89 
Personal communication of Thomas Ngai, Tiari, August 1969. 
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the two phratries. The chiefly clans of many Oat tribes 
claimed a common ancestor, called Tijit or Tinjin, while 
the chiefs of Yengen, Kumak, Balad and Arama, all Waap, were 
related. 
Almost without exception the northern clans and tribes 
90 
of New Caledonia claim allegiance to one or other phratry. 
Their geographical localization appears to have been exact 
and permanent, and to have transcended the division common 
in Melanesia between coastal and mountain people. For 
instance, the Paak of Bonde and the Mwelebeng of Pwebo were 
both Oat, and were close traditional allies; yet the Paak 
lived inland in the hilly middle valley of the river Diahot, 
while the Mwelebeng lived on the coast; similarly, the Puma of 
Balad and the Arama, allied coast-dwellers, were enemies of 
the Mwelebeng and allies of the Maluma of Pambwa, who lived 
in the upper Diahot valley. War, or at least constant enmity, 
was the usual state of affairs between the two groups. They 
provided a setting in which traditional and permanent alliances 
91 
and enmities operated, although hostility could also exist 
within as well as between the two phratries. The wars seem not 
to have involved conquest of territory, and the absorption of 
an individual or a small group into a tribe belong to the 
opposing phratry usually led to a change of allegiance. 
90 
Leenhardt 1930:105. 
91 
Lambert 1900:173-4. 
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37 
The periodic renewal of wars betwe~n Oot and Waap appears 
especially to have taken place at the time of the death of 
an important chief, in whose honour raids were organized on 
enemy territory. Counterbalancing the hostility between Oot 
and Waap, traditional and permanent matrimonial links 
existeft, and to some extent continue, between the two groups, 
although they were not entirely exogamous: 'il s'agirait 
plut6t d'une forme de mariage preferentiel, plus 
particulie;~ent dans les chefferies'. 92 The division was 
represented symbolically in the great inter-tribal 
ceremonies, especially the life-crisis festivals at which the 
maternal relations were honoured guests. Relationships 
between the two groups seem generally to have been conducted 
by intermediaries, and particular clans fulfilled this role 
. if. 93 1n spec 1c areas. Permanent patterns of reciprocal 
hospitality seem to have existed within each phratry, an 
aspect of increasing importance today with the disappearance 
of the dangers which traditionally inh~bited casual voyaging, 
and with the more recent lifting of restrictions on 
indigenous trave1. 94 
92 
Guiart 1957:24. 
93 
Guiart 1968: Notes; personal communication of Thomas Ngai, 
Tiari, August 1969. 
94 
Guiart 1954b:6. 
This discussion is not intended to imply that the 
region where the Oot-Waap dichotomy existed formed in any 
sense an autonomous or coherent unit, artificially isolated 
from the rest of New Caledonia. The division was, however, 
an important element in the traditional social and 
politi~al set-up in this region, and therefore a factor of 
potential relevance in the contact situation. 
38 
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CHAPTER II 
BA LAD 
THE Balad district became the scene of much of the earliest 
European activity in New Caledonia because of an historical 
accident. Cook, while sailing westward from the southern 
New Hebrides in seach of land whose presence Bougainville had 
suspected, happened to make a landfall there in 1774. 
D'Entrecasteaux led his expedition in search of La Perouse to Bala 
in 1793, and later French expeditions until annexation in 1853 
went there as a matter of course, because the area was known, 
and after 1843 was, except for a period of four years, the main 
base of the French Marist missionaries in New Caledonia. 
All this activity occurred despite the lack of a sure 
anchorage and in one of the least fertile parts of the north-
east coast. Furthermore, the Puma tribe of Balad was 
traditionally weaker and less numerous than its neighbours. 1 
After annexation and the development of the main settlement of 
the new colony in the south-west, at Port-de-France (Noumea 
after 1866), Balad became a backwater, deserted by many of its 
people. It retained some importance until 1870, however, 
because of its proximity to the scene of several of the more 
1 
D'Entrecasteaux 1808, 1:353; Laferriere 1845:103; Leconte 
1847:822, 835-6; du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855b: ANOM, 
Carton 40, CG 1855; Beaglehole 1961:543. 
notable conflicts of the early colonial period, and because 
of the role which the few people who remained there played 
in these conflicts. 
FROM the evidence available it seems almost certain that no 
European remained at Balad for more than a brief period before 
1843. The longest recorded visit was that of D'Entrecasteaux, 
who was at anchorage off Maamat for nineteen days. Cook's 
Resolution stayed only eight days. Despite the brevity of 
their visits, and the linguistic barrier which limited verbal 
communication, the reports 2 of these expeditions are invaluable 
because they are the earliest known descriptions of New 
3 Caledonian society, and they provide a starting point for a 
reconstruction of the political relationships between clans in 
the Balad area during the early years of European contact. 
These relationships were ultimately to influence profoundly 
the pattern and effects of acculturation at Balad until well 
into the colonial period. 
Although the members of Cook's expedition met several 
people whom they referred to as chiefs, they were unanimous 
about the identity of the paramount chief of the district 
4 
opposite their anchorage at Maamat. Cook concluded: 
2 
Forster 1777, 11:377-431; Labillardiere 1800, 11:181-248; 
D'Entrecasteaux 1808, 1:329-62; Sparrman 1953:155-75; Beaglehole 
1961:527-46, 763-4 (Clerke's Log) , 863-8 (Wales's Journal): 
[Marra] 1967:289-94. 
3 
Douglas 1970:180-90 analyses the records of the two voyages and 
the visitors' impact on the people of Balad. 
4 Forster 1777, 11:380; Sparrman 1953:158; Beaglehole 1961:544. 
4C 
••• that the Country is divided into several 
districts, each governed by a Cheif, but we know 
nothing of the extent of his power. Balade was 
the Name of the district we were at and Tia Booma 
the Chief, he lived on the other side the ridge of 
hills, so that we had but little of his Company 
and therefore could see but little of his power. 5 
41 
6 Cook's information tallies with local tradition, which suggests 
that the high chiefs of Balad belonged to the Tea Puma (or Tea 
Bweon) cfan, which had resided for a long time across the 
mountains, on the river Diahot, near the present town of 
Ouegoa. It was Tea Puma who presided at the ritual exchange 
of gifts with Cook, regarded as the clan chief of the strangers. 
References to chiefs are much less explicit in the 
accounts of d'Entrecasteaux's sojourn in the Balad area, in 
part because the French, unlike Cook's people, were always on 
bad terms with the inhabitants and had fewer dealings with them. 
On one occasion, however, two chiefs called theabooma mediated 
in a dispute between four Frenchmen and a large crowd of 
Melanesians. They then asked to be taken to the ships, where 
they exchanged gifts with d'Entrecasteaux. 7 The previous neglect 
5 
Beaglehole 1961:544. 
6 
Oral evidence provides two more or less similar versions of the 
political relationships and migrations of clans in the Balad 
area before about 1850. The more detailed version was received 
by Professor Guiart, was outlined in Guiart 1963:649, and 
elaborated in conversation with the author in 1968 (Guiart 1968: 
Notes). The second was received by the author from Thomas Ngai 
of Tiari in August 1969. The two versions are summarized and 
tested against historical evidence in Douglas 1970:185-97. 
7 
Labillardiere 1800, !1:200-1. 
by the French of this ritual ~etween hoet and visitor 
may well help explain the hostility of the Balad people 
towards the strangers. Labillardiere, one of the naturalists 
of the expedition, gave the term theabooma as a translation of 
8 
'chief'. This suggests that the Tea Puma clan was still 
influential in 1793. It is also valid to assume that the Tea 
Puma still lived some distance from Balad, since only one 
meeting with the theabooma was reported, on the second day of 
the French stay, when great crowds of people had gathered at 
the landing-~ce. 
42 
Limited though these indications are, they nevertheless, 
in conjunction with oral testimony, provide sufficient evidence 
to justify the conclusion that the leading clan in the Balad 
region in about 1800 was the Wegwa-based Tea Puma. More 
detailed information on the clans actually resident at Balad is 
available only for the period after December 1843. 
IN December 1843 the French corvette Bucephale anchored at Maamat 
bearing five Marist missionaries, who had decided to make their 
base at Balad because, despite its obscurity, it was the best 
known part of the New Caledonian group. The warship remained 
for a month. Its stay produced two naval reports, 9 which 
contain details useful for a reconstruction of the political 
situation at Balad at the onset of regular contact with 
8 
!bid, Vocabulaire:59. 
9 
Laferriere 1845; Pigeard 1846. 
Europeans, and at a time when the traditional political and 
social structure, despite the brief visits of the previous 
century, was virtually intact. 
On this occasion communication between Melanesians 
and Europeans was facilitated by the presence at Balad of 
several Polynesian speakers, with whom the missionary Viard was 
able to converse in the language of Wallis. 10 The person 
introduced to the French as chief of Balad, and under whose 
protection the mission was initially set up at Maamat, was 
named Payama. Local tradition suggests that Payama was the 
son of a man who had been adopted ~efore the arrival of the 
missionaries' to be the representative of the Tea Puma at 
Balad. The latter clan is said to have moved at some stage 
from Wegwa to Balad, where it became known as Tea Bweon, but 
the oral evidence is unclear as to when the move actually 
occurred. French naval reports, however, throw some light on 
this question. According to the naval observers the high 
chief of the Balad region in 1843 was Pakili-Puma, who lived 
h Di h i 'K k ' 11 h" h d k on t e a ot r ver at o o , a name w 1c to ay evo es no 
10 
These people were the descendants of successive small-scale 
migrations of Polynesian-speaking peoples to Uvea (Loyalty 
Islands). Linguistic evidence suggests that they had made 
contact with the eastern littoral of New Caledonia by 1774 
(Haudricourt and Hollyman 1960:219-26). By 1843, according to 
the commander of the Bucephale, they had 'envahi presque tout 
le littoral' of north-eastern New Caledonia, while several 
enjoyed the confidence of local chiefs (Laferriere 1845:108). 
The political role of these people at Balad is discussed in 
Douglas 1970: passim. 
11 
Laferriere 1845:66; Leconte 1847b:844. 
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response, but which seems to have been near Ouegoa. On his 
death in 1844 Pakili-Puma was succeeded by his son Bweon, who 
was resident at Bayup when he encouraged the missionaries to move 
there from Maamat in 1845. 12 It is possible that Bweon did 
not move to Bayup from Wegwa until after his father's 13 death, 
since his name was mission from the declaration of recognition 
of French sovereignty signed by Pakili-Puma and his two 
brothers, by Payama and his brothers Gwa Puma, Cangun and Undo, 
and by chiefs from nearby tribes who visited the Bucephale 
14 during its stay. Among the signatories were all the Balad 
chiefs who were later to become famous, or infamous, under the 
colonial regime, with the exception of Bweon; neither does he 
appear in the reports of Laferriere or Pigeard. Later his 
village at Bayup was to become the largest and most important 
15 in the region, and it is likely that he would have 
participated in the settlement of the missionaries at Maamat 
had he been at Bayup in 1843, unless perhaps he was too young. 
It thus appears likely that the move of the Tea Puma from Wegwa 
12 
Leconte 1847b:820, 844. 
13 
The implications of the term 'father' should be noted: 
'Le vrai pere n'est pas distingue de toute la generation de ses 
freres. Le pere petit peut etre aussi bien le vrai pere' 
(Leenhardt 1935:230); see also Leenhardt 1930:61; Lambert 1900: 
114-5. Montrouzier claimed that Bweon was 'illegitimate' by 
birth and was for this reason not respected (Montrouzier to his 
brother, 14 Oct. 1853: APM/Personal file [Montrouzier]). 
14 
Person 1954:211. 
15 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 25 Dec. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854. 
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to Balad may not have occurred until after the arrival of the 
missionaries. Furthermore, it was probably motivated by the 
desire of Bweon, the clan chief, to be closer to the 
supply of European goods which the mission provided, and to 
gain prestige from the installation of Europeans under his 
direct patron•ge, rather than with a chief of lesser status 
than him~elf. 
In 1843 Payama's authority in the context of the Puma 
tribe as a whole was limitee. 16 He was actually chief of the 
village of Maamat. Later, however, the second most 
17 influential chief at Balad was Payama's brother, Cangun, while 
Undo and Gwa, subsequently to be high chiefs of the Puma tribe 
after the deposition of Bweon by the French, also seem to have 
18 been brothers of Payama. After about 1849 the internal 
politics of the Puma tribe were characterized by a struggle for 
supremacy between 19 Payama's clan and the Tea Bweon. This 
rivalry may well have predated the arrival of the missionaries, 
but it was possibly limited by the physical separation of the 
clans. Overt antagonism probably originated in 1845 with Bweon's 
displacement of Payama as the patron and protector of the 
missionaries. The conflict was finally resolved at the end of 
16 
Laferriere 1845:106; Leconte 1847b:820. 
17 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 25 Dec. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854. 
18 
Garnier 1867:199; Person 1954:211. 
19 Especially after 1851; see below, pp. 61-80, passim. 
1856, with the deposition of Bweon by the French and his 
replacement by a representative of the rival clan. Thus until 
1857 intensive culture contact and acculturation operated at 
Balad in a context of internal tribal dissension, which was 
itself in part a response to the presence of Europeans. 
WITHIN this context the history of culture contact at Balad 
46 
after 1843 is a record of qualified acceptance by the inhabitants 
of at first missionary and later official influence, punctuated 
by periods of violent opposition. The process culminated in 
the division of the tribe into supporters and opponents of 
the mission, a division which reflected existing clan rivalries. 
After the physical separation of the two factions by the 
removal of the Christians to Conception, near Port-de-France, 
the relatively few people who remained at Balad in the 1860's 
were largely reconciled to the presence of Europeans when they 
became the allies of the colonial government in a campaign 
against the mission and the Christians of nearby tribes, in 
particular the Mwelebeng of Pwebo. 
Between 1843 and 1853 the Marist missionaries were 
the main agents of European contact at Balad. The process of 
culture contact during this decade occurred in three distinct 
periods, delimited by the dates August 1847 (expulsion of the 
missionaries from Balad) and May 1851 (their return). In only 
the third of these periods can the intra-tribal conflict 
outlined above be clearly delineated. The evidence extant for 
47 
the two earlier periods is simply not sufficiently detailed 
to enable the actions and responses of separate clans and 
individuals to be differentiated. 20 That this is so should 
not, however, be taken to imply that the Puma tribe operated at 
this time as a coordinated unit, which would belie both the 
traditionally loose organization of New Caledonian tribes, 
and the probable internal fragmentation of the Puma tribe in 
particular. 
In the early stages, contact between the missionaries 
and the Puma was facilitated by the presence of the 
Polynesian-speaking interpreters. This gave the Marists an 
advantage in comparison with the first missionaries in many 
other parts of Melanesia, where the multiplicity of languages 
often inhibited progress for years. The mediation of the Uveans 
enabled the Marists to explain their aims and their requirements 
and permitted the commander of the Bucephale to encourage good 
behaviour with the promise that another warship would soon visit 
Balad, to reward the friends of the mission and punish its 
21 
enemies. 
20 
The expectation that association with the strangers 
Missionary letters and reports before 1847 concentrated on 
the hardships and trials which the missionaries had to endure, 
and are of little use for a reconstruction of Melanesian 
political relationships, since they rarely mentioned place or 
clan names, or the name or rank of people encountered. Of far 
more interest in this regard are the reports of the naval 
officers Laferriere, Pigeard and Leconte. 
21 
Laferriere 1845:97-8, 100. 
would bring wealth and protection for the tribe in which they 
had settled probably helped dispose the Puma, and Payama in 
particular, to adopt the Marists and assign them land, since 
Puma was a poor tribe, surrounded by powerful enemies, against 
22 
whom any acquisition of force was a help. The non-appearance 
of a French vessel for twenty months almost certainly 
weakened the missionaries' position, since it demonstrated the 
ineffectiveness of their command over the warships, and over 
the resources of the fabulously wealthy place whence the ships 
came. 
After the departure of the Bucephale the missionaries 
were left with scanty resources, little enough food and few 
23 
objects of exchange. Their preoccupation with manual work 
h 1 . 1 i f 1 . 24 h d h 1 gave t em 1tt e t me or prose yt1sm, even a t e peop e 
been inclined to listen. But in fact throughout most of their 
twenty-month isolation the missionaries were treated with 
48 
either indifference or outright hostility. At Maamat they were 
constantly harassed and insulted, and losses from theft 
22 
Leconte 1847b:820. The periodic devastation of the Puma tribe 
by its powerful neighbours did in fact cease after the arrival 
of the missionaries (ibid., 835-6; Rougeyron to Girard, 2 Jan. 
1846: APM/ONC, 26a). A causal relationship cannot be proven, 
but may well have existed. 
23 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 1 Oct. 1845: APM/ONC, 26a; 
Laferriere 1845:97; Leconte 1847b:819. 
24 
Viard to Superieur-general, 27 Oct. 1845: APF 1846, 18: 413-19. 
Rougeyron to Favier, [1846]: APM/ONC, 26a; ~rard to Min., 
1 Aug. 1846: ANM, BB4 1011. 
threatened to become serious. This precipitated a crisis. 
They barricaded their houses and garden and chased off 
intruders with a whip. To the Melanesians this behaviour must 
have seemed appalling. The missionaries' refusal to share 
their possessions (scanty in European terms but of 
incalculable value to a stone-age people, especially their 
iron implements) was sacrilege in a society in which wealth 
was communal property, and where reciprocal gift-giving 
symbolized every relationship between individuals and groups. 
Nonetheless, although the mission dwelling was sometimes 
surrounded by more than a thousand apparently hostile people, 
they contented themselves with insults and the throwing of an 
occasional stone or fire-brand at the building. 25 Eventually 
the collapse of the house and its unsatisfactory setting led 
the missionaries to move to a more deserted piece of land 
which the French bishop, Guillaume Douarre, had purchased from 
Bweon in 1844. The present-day mission is situated on this 
site, which was near Bweon's village of Bayup. 
Great hardship continued after the move, because of 
the failure of successive harvests and the exhaustion of their 
supply of trade goods, although the inhabitants could in any 
case have spared little. The situation was relieved with the 
arrival of the warship Rhin in September 1845. Ample 
25 
49 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 1 Oct. 1845; to Favier, [1846] 
APM/ONC, 26a. 
provisions, clothes, tools, seed, animals and trade goods were 
left, and the plight of the mission was so well publicized.that 
within three months two more ships arrived with supplies. The 
sudden appearance of these rich vessels while New Caledonians 
suffered from the effects of drought was deeply impressive, 26 
and Melanesian confidence was restored in the ability of the 
strangers to commune with powerful and generous spirits. 
Missionary prestige soared and many people showed eagerness 
to learn the prayers which they probably believed would 
provide the key to their acquisition of similar wealth, as 
well as avert the horrorsof hell, which the missionaries 
frequently invoked. 27 Neighbouring tribes, especially the 
Mwelebeng of Pwebo and the Yengen, who had requested 
missionaries of their own even in the days of scarcity, 
increased their demands that the Puma should not alone benefit 
28 from the presence of the black-robed strangers. 
The extra provisions were vital when, in July 1846, 
the corvette Seine was wrecked on the reefs off Pwebo. For 
two months between 159 and 233 French sailors camped at Bayup, 
26 
Berard to Min., 1 Aug. 1846: ANM, BB4 1011. 
27 
Rougeyron to Girard, 2 Jan. 1846: APM/ONC, 26a; Dousset 
1970:65-6. 
28 
Viard to Superieur-general 27 Oct. 1845: APF 1846, 18:417; 
Berard to Min., 1 Aug. 1846: ANM, BB4 1011; Leconte to Min., 
31 Mar. 1847: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1847-8; Leconte 1847b:849, 
854-5. 
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dependent on the mission stores for survival. During this 
period an epidemic broke out in the village of the chief 
29 Cangun, and by the end of the year raged throughout the 
region. Early in 1847 Father Pierre Rougeyron described the 
agony and desolation which it caused: 
••• la peste ..• a frappe tant de victimes que 
des villages entiers sont deserts; on a trouve 
dans certaines cases des vases de terre pleins 
de taros a demi-cuit, et les personnes qui 
preparaient ces aliments etaient etendues sans 
vie a cote de leur feu. On ne peut plus pleurer 
les morts suivant l'usage du pays ni meme les 
enterrer separement; on en reunit plusieurs dans 
la meme fosse et encore les cimetieres sont-ils 
pleins. Les cadavres restent plusieurs jours 
sans sepulture, tant on est fatigue de creuser d&s 
51 
tombes. 30 
He estimated that almost half the population had died in the 
various tribes with which the Marists were acquainted. Several 
31 
chiefs, including Payama, were among the dead, but while the 
missionaries themselves were almost all sick, none was at any 
stage in danger. The epidemic and a severe famine which 
32 followed culminated in a series of attacks on the missionary 
29 
Leconte 1847b:845. 
30 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 14 Feb.1847: APM/ONC, 26a. 
31 
Leconte 1847b:868-9. 
32 
Grange to Superieur-general, 18 Sept. 1847: APF 1848, 20:175. 
establishments, in the pillage of their storehouses, and in 
their expulsion from New Caledonia in August 1847. 
The build-up of resentment against the missionaries 
was a gradual process, in which epidemic and famine played 
important, but not lone roles. The spectre of European 
occupation of Melanesian lands must have arisen during the 
stay of the Seine men, whose potential ability to impose 
their will on the inhabitants was only too obvious. About a 
month after the shipwreck a meeting was said to have been held 
of all the chiefs from the surrounding districts, and a plot 
conceived to attack and pillage the Europeans. It was only 
averted when Gwa of Mwelebeng pointed out how numerous and 
well-armed were the sailors, and how the Puma had received 
many gifts from them. He is said to have suggested that when, 
in the near future, the mission became rich in provisions and 
European goods, Douarre would not fail to share the wealth with 
his New Caledonian friends. 33 Unfortunately for all concerned 
he was wrong. 
33 
Leconte 1847b:849. Douarre left New Caledonia with the 
Seine men in September 1846, and did not return to the Pacific 
until the middle of 1849. The disappearance of the most 
respected of the missionaries probably affected Melanesian 
attitudes to his subordinates in the troubled months which 
followed. His absence may also have had an adverse affect on 
the behaviour towards the Melanesians of the remaining 
missionaries. 
5: 
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The collapse of the mission reflected the failure 
of the Marists to meet the expectations of people who had 
accepted them into their society, and demonstrated the 
bankruptcy of a policy which used the 'superstitions' and 
technical ignorance of Melanesians to create an impression of 
the intellectual, moral and physical superiority of the 
i . i 34 m ss1onar es. Their ability to play on the credulity and 
fear of the Puma seems to have saved them from harassment in 
the early stages, when tricks with spigots and matches put 
'ces sots' to flight. 35 The missionaries, especially Douarre 
and Rougeyron, gained great influence over the Puma and made 
themselves respected and feared. They were thought to have 
control over the elements (they were asked during a drought 
why they had prevented rain), and baptismal water was 
believed to have magical influence over life and death, 
probably because only infants, whose mortality rate was high, 
36 
and the dying were baptized. By early 1846 war, cannibalism 
and theft were said to have virtually ceased at Balad, while 
missionary tales of hell-fire had led to a fearful desire to 
34 
Ibid., 819, 825. 
35 
Rougeyron to Favier, [1846]: APM/ONC, 26a; Besson 1847:409-10; 
Leconte 1847b:825, 859-60. 
36 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 1 Oct. 1845; Montrouzier to 
Eymard, Jan. 1847 (typescript extracts): APM/ONC, 26a; 
Leconte 1847b:819, 825, 859; Rougeyron to Procureur, 4 Oct. 
1858: APO. 
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learn the prayers which it was said would avert this fate: 
'Tout le monde veut prier car personne ne veut aller en 
37 Enfer'. It is scarcely surprising,then, that responsibility 
for the epidemic should be placed on the strangers who were 
themselves so obviously immune to the effects of the disease, 
and whose powers were beyond those of normal men. Early in 
1847 Rougeyron noted that everywhere sorcerers were sought 
and put to death in an attempt to stop the mortality. He 
added: 
C'est un mystere pour moi que ces sauvages ne 
nous regardent pas encore nous-memes comme 
sorciers, nous a qui ils attribuent l'epidemie 
qui les desole. 38 
By August, however, it would seem that no doubt remained on 
39 this point. Furthermore, in Melanesian eyes, the 
malevolence of the white sorcerers was confirmed by their 
misdirection of the bountiful provisions which had arrived at 
Balad during the preceding months. 
During the troubled years of 1844 and 1845, when 
drought and crop failure had caused privation for both 
37 
Rougeyron to Girard, 2 Jan. 1846: APM/ONC, 26a; see also 
Leconte 1847b:835-55 passim. 
38 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 14 Feb. 1847: APM/ONC, 26a. 
39 
Not long before, several Puma had returned from Yengen claimin 
that English sandalwood traders had told them that the 
missionaries were sorcerers who made other men die. (Grange to 
Superieur-general, 18 Sept. 1847:APF 1848, 20:175). 
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Melanesians and missionaries, there seems to have been a 
feeling amongst the former that the Marists had at least 
shared hardships. By late 1846-1847, however, the material 
well-being of the mission was assured, and successive arrivals 
of ships bearing goods for the French Oceanic Society, and 
the Solomon Islands mission, had filled to overflowing the 
storehouses at Balad, at a time when severe famine ravaged 
the region. The missionaries, despite their position of 
relative abundance, did little to help mitigate the effects 
of this disaster. They apparently reasoned that their own 
resources were insufficient,to make much impact on the shortage. 
Furthermore, the bulk of the goods in the storehouses did not 
belong to them, and could not therefore be distributed to 
starving Melanesians. This distinction was naturally lost on 
the tribesmen. They may have regarded the stores as their 
own property, sent by the white man's ancestral spirits to 
reward those who had corr~ctly performed the ritual taught by 
40 the missionaries. They almost certainly saw the goods as 
communal property which the missionaries had deliberately 
refused to share with those who were not only in desperate 
need, but who had adopted the Marists into their tribe, and 
allotted them a portion of their land. Such apparently 
unnatural and inhuman behaviour destroyed the missionaries' 
40 
Dousset 1970:71-4 suggested this interpretation. 
41 prestige denied them the right to Melanesian respect. 
Regarded as sorcerers and thieves, their fate was sealed, and 
almost the whole tribe, save only a few catechists and 
neophytes, mostly children, united against them in open 
hostility. This was the first instance of a typical New 
56 
Caledonian response to the stresses of European contact. Unlike 
many Pacific island societies, especially in Melanesia, New 
Caledonians generally resorted to organized armed resistance 
rather than to religious movements of a millenarian kind. The 
suggestion of a 'cargo cult' mentality was present in 1847, but 
remained latent, and the method preferred to redress injustice, 
and acquire the material benefits of European civilization, 
42 then and later, was force. 
A period of sporadic looting came to a climax in 
July 1847 with a full-scale attack on the Balad mission by about 
fifteen warriors, led by Bweon. An unpopular lay brother was 
killed, but the remaining Europeans, who included several laymen, 
escaped to a newly-created station at Pwebo. The hostility of the 
Mwelebeng had also been aroused, however, and the Pwebo mission 
was finally evacuated in August, after the timely arrival of 
41 
Cf. the situation on Murua (Woodlark) in 1850, where the 
Marist missionaries' stinginess at a time of famine in the 
Melanesian community destroyed their prestige and created great 
bitterness against them (Laracy 1969:49-51). 
That Rougeyron eventually realized the incongruity of the 
existence side by side of missionary affluence and extreme local 
poverty is suggested by his remarks to Leepold Verguet during the 
siege of Pwebo. He was reported to have said 'qu'il etait persuade 
que pour reussir il fallait ... adopter entierement leur maniere 
de vivre; coucher comme eux, manger comme eux, et se passer des 
vetements les moins indispensables! (Verguet 1861:252). Such 
insights seem only to have been momentary, however. 
42 Guiart 1951:90, fn.24; 1962:129; Valentine 1963:45-6. 
the Brillante, commanded by Joseph du Bouzet, who was later 
to be the first governor of New Caledonia. During the 
retreat to the ship the Mwelebeng launched a heavy and 
prolonged attack on the French column. Against the wishes of 
the missionaries, du Bouzet undertook a severe campaign of 
retaliation against the Puma at Bayup and Maamat, in which 
many hu~s, coconut palms and gardens were destroyed. There 
were few New Caledonian casualties, however, as the Puma fled 
into the hills, although one Mwelebeng warrier was killed 
during the relief of the mission, and five Frenchmen were 
wounded. 43 
During this entire period neither Puma nor Mwelebeng 
57 
made a concerted attempt to wipe out the missionaries, although 
the hostility of both tribes was obvious. On one occasion 
the Puma allowed seven Europeans to escape while they 
plundered the mission storehouses. The Marists interpreted this 
44 
as proof of their brutishness and their greed. To the more 
43 
Du Bouzet to Min., 13 Sept. 1847: ANM, BB4 651; Grange to 
Superieur-general, 18 Sept. 1847: APF 1848, 20:174-86; 
du Bouzet to Gouverneur des Etabli"'S"'Sements franc;ais de 
l'Oceanie, 22 Sept. 1847: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1847-8; Vergeut 
1861:232-65. 
44 
Grange to Superieur-general, 18 Sept. 1847: APF 1848, 20:1801 
Verguet 1861:241-2. 
58 
impartial observer, however, it would seem rather to be a 
comment on the Melanesians' priorities. They were more 
concerned to drive the missionaries from Balad, and to seize 
their property than to kill them. The Mwelebeng only attacked 
during the retreat to the warship, when the Europeans were 
guarded by eighty-four armed men. Yet for most of the previous 
month the Europeans had been besieged at Pwebo, ill-supplied 
with food and ammunition, and, the missionaries at least, loath 
to defend themselves with firearms. 45 For whatever reason, 
it seems clear that the Mwelebeng were unwilling to launch 
a serious attack until the Europeans were almost beyond their 
grasp. It is possible that the Melanesians preferred not to 
kill the missionaries, either because of their supposed 
prowess in sorcery, or through fear of retaliation at the 
hands of their naval allies. The continued survival of 
professed or suspected sorcerers in the indigenous society was 
dependent on a balance between fear and respect for their 
influence, and a desire to apportion blame and exact 
vengeance for the maleficent acts which were believed to lie 
45 
For examples of missionary protestations of unwillingness of 
defend themselves by violent means, see Grange to 
Superieur-general, 18 Sept.l847: APF 1848, 20:176; Douarre to 
Superieur-general, 10 Jan. 1850: APM/ONC, 5b; Rougeyron to 
Superieur-general, 10 June 1850: APF 1851, 23:383; Rougeyron 
to abbe de Meydat, 26 June 1855: APF 1856, 28:380-1. 
46 behind every misfortune. It is probable that the power 
of the missionaries was presumed to be so great as to 
protect their lives from the resentment aroused by its 
d . 4 7 suppose m~suse · 
Several Melanesian children left with the 
missionaries, and thus created a situation which was to recur 
at Balad throughout the period of study: many members of the 
Puma tribe became fervent and faithful Christians, but they 
were only able to practise their religion in peace away from 
Balad, where a majority of the people, and especially the 
most prominent chiefs, vacillated between lukewarm acceptance 
of and stubborn hostility towards the mission. 
FOR two years after the expulsion of the Catholic missionaries 
Balad does not seem to have been visited by Europeans. This 
must have sorely disappointed the Puma, who had no doubt 
hoped to intercept cargoes intended for the missionaries. The 
latter had learned before their evacuation that the Puma 
intended to plunder any vessels which anchored at Balad, and 
had taken steps to destroy the mission house so that it might 
46 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 14 Feb. 1847: APM/ONC, 26a; 
Leconte 1847b:844-6; Montrouzier to his brother, 14 Oct. 1853: 
APM1Personal file (Montrouzier); Rochas 1862:287-8; Vieillard 
et Deplanche 1863:25; see above, pp. 31-2. 
47 
The unfortunate lay brother seems not only to have enjoyed 
less prestige than his companions but to have aroused deeper 
resentment. 
5S 
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not be used to entice the unwary visitors into a trap. In 
September 1849 a cutter, the Mary, attached to a beche-de-mer 
station which had been set up north of Balad, was cut off at 
49 Balad and four of the crew of five were massacred and eaten. 
The following May Captain Oliver of H.M.S. !!z conducted an 
enquiry into the incident, and concluded in favour of the 
guilt of the Puma. He based his opinion on the extreme 
agitation and wariness shown towards him by Bweon and Cangun. 
Bweon, however, denied that the massacre had occurred at 
Balad, and claimed: 
... that he was one of three chiefs of the same name 
and that their evil deeds fell upon him the 
ignorance of Europeans making them give the name 
of Balade to many other parts of New Caledonia. 
Oliver also made enquiries at Pwebo, Colnett and Yengen, and 
was everywhere told that Bweon must at least have given his 
permission for the attack. Cangun was said to have been 
6 
involved, but main responsibility was placed on Bweon. Oliver's 
information is probably reliable, since he had the services 
as interpreter of 'John Jackson' (William Diaper), 'who 
understood the several dialects of New Caledonia, is acquainted 
50 
with many of the Chiefs and has resided in the Country'. 
48 
Grange to Superieur-general, 
Verguet 1861:247; Rougeyron to 
11. 
49 
18 Sept. 1847: APF 1848, 20:182; 
? , 3~n.1868:APM/ONC, 
Douarre to Conseil de propagation de la foi a Paris, 11 Dec. 
1849: APM/ONC, 5b; Sydney Morning Herald, 24 Jan.1850. The 
incident is examined in detail ln Douglas 1971:161-4. 
50 
H.M.S. !!x, Letterbook. 
Shortly after the massacre, in October 1849, 
Douarre briefly visited Balad. After the people recognized 
him and Rougeyron they were said to have thrown down their 
weapons and expressed joy at the missionaries' return and 
regret at their own past behaviour. Cangun asked them to 
stay, and said that the Puma had massacred the crew of the 
Mary because they were in despair at having apparently 
driven the missionaries away for good. It thus seems clear 
that by this stage the Puma had become disillusioned with 
their 1847 policy of rejection. Rougeyron commented that he 
learned later that 'un petit nombre seulement de Baladiens, 
et des plus mauvais sujets' had participated in the Mary 
51 
massacre, and both he and Douarre mentioned that of all the 
people they met only Bweon remained aloof and apparently 
unchanged in his attitude to the missionaries: 'sa figure 
annon9ait je ne sais quoi de revoltant, tandis que la douleur 
etait peinte sur toutes les autres'. 52 These are the 
earliest hints in the reports of European observers of the 
existence of dissension within the Puma tribe, and of a 
decline in Bweon's prestige, probably consequent upon the 
61 
unsatisfactory outcome of the events of 1847. It is reasonable 
to assume, however, that the division was already far more 
51 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 10 June 1850: APF 1851, 
23:380-2. 
52 
Douarre to Conseil de la propagation de la foi a Paris, 
11 Dec. 1849: APM/ONC, 5b. 
6. 
deeply ingrained than is suggested by this meagre evidence, 
since within two years the tribe was riven by discord, on to 
which had been grafted strong religious overtones. 
Douarre refused to remain at Balad in 1849 in order to 
punish the Puma and test their sincerity, but promised to 
53 
return in the future. The missionaries took away twenty-
three neophytes who, despite persecution, had attempted to 
remain faithful to Christianity. They were eventually taken 
to Futuna (Hoorn Islands), 54 where they were joined by a 
further forty-three people from Balad and Pwebo, including 
Cangun's brothers, Gwa and Undo, who had helped lead the 
55 
opposition in 1847. At this stage, then, the mission's 
most influential supporters were Bweon's rivals, while Bweon 
himself remained hostile. It is not unlikely that traditional 
political considerations had already begun to determine the 
religious alignment of the leading clans of the tribe. After 
a year the New Caledonians in Futuna were baptized, by which 
53 
P. Rougeyron, 'Biographie du R.P. Gagniere', 32-4: AVNC. 
54 
Marist missionaries arrived in Futuna in 1837, and despite 
early setbacks had converted the entire population by 1845 
(Caste 1965:241-2). By 1850 it had become a model Christian 
community run on theocratic lines, and was no doubt expected 
to provide a salutary example for the New Caledonians. The 
future was to prove, however, that the lessons learned were 
not always those intended. 
55 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 10 June 1850: APF 1851, 
23:382, 387; Rougeyron, 'Biographie du R.P. Gagniere', 55-7, 
72: AVNC. 
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time preparations were under way for a return to their 
homeland, where it was hoped that they would form the nucleus 
for a rapid conversion of the Puma and the Mwelebeng. 
The Marists suffered a second expulsion from the 
mainland of New Caledonia in January 1850, with the failure 
56 
of attempts to set up stations at Yengen and Yate. This 
caused for Douarre a period of discouragement and uncertainty 
about the possibility of eventual success for the mission 
in New Caledonia, 57 while doubt existed also as to the 
future of the archipelago in the context of great power 
politics. The missionaries believed annexation by Britain 
to be imminent, and the visits to the east coast of 
H.M.S. Havannah in September 1849 and October 1850, H.M.S. ~ 
in May 1850 and the schooner Bramble in October 1851 
reinforced this view. On the first two visits the British 
warships were accompanied by George Augustus Selwyn, the 
Anglican Bishop of New Zealand, in his schooner u~~ine, which 
confirmed for the Marists the indissoluble relationship 
b•tween Englishmen and Protestantism: 58 
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Le Gouvernement Anglais y [New Caledonia] 
a arbore ou y arborera ••• son pavillon •.• 
Outre 1' indifference des naturels, nous 
aurons encore a combattre le protestantisme, 
peu redoutable en lui-meme, s'il n'employait 
pas la calomnie. 
Douarre had returned to France late in 1846 to publicize the 
need for more missionaries in New Caledonia, and to remind 
the Govarnment of the danger of annexation by Britain. In 
accordance with the national formula of religious affiliation 
in operation at that stage in the South Pacific, British 
annexation meant to the Marists a calamity which would almost 
certainly ruin Catholicism in New Caledonia. Douarre's 
warnings went unheeded at the time, and by the early 1850's, 
with Protestant influence strong in the Loyalty Islands and 
regular visits to the New Caledonian mainland by Bishop 
Selwyn, the danger seemed acute. 
THE Balad mission was finally re-established in May 1851, and 
the Christians returned from Futuna in January 1852. Douarre 
had occasion to regret his decision not to stay in 1849, as 
the hoped-for change in attitude of the Puma had not 
eventuated. They continued to express eagerness for the 
missionaries' return, 60 however, since they had been starved 
of contact with Europeans and its attendant material benefits 
59 
Douarre to Superieur-general, 2 July 1850: APM/ONC, 5b. 
60 
Douarre to Superieur-general, 13 Mar. 1851: APM/ONC, 5b; 
Rougeyron, 'Biographie du R.P. Gagniere', 33: AVNC. 
59 
for nearly four years. Bweon's disposition seemed to have 
improved, although he retained his reserve and never became 
a fervent Christian. 
Almost at once a village began to form about the new 
mission, although the Marists themselves were not immediately 
convinced of the need for a separate Christian settlement, 
and the ·process was instituted by the leading Balad convert. 
Indeed, Rougeyron believed at first that it would be useful 
for the Christians to return to their clans, where they might 
influence their kinsmen in favour of the new religion and way 
of life. A few, Undo and Gwa among them, were 'persuaded by 
their relatives to go back to their villages, and they 
eventually abandoned Christianity and retook the old ways. 61 
They were later to become implacable enemies of the new 
religion and its Melanesian supporters. 
For about a year the missionaries seemed destined 
to succeed at Balad, but once again an epidemic showed how 
shallow their influence had been on the bulk of the population, 
and how obdurate was the core of the traditionalist opposition. 
The sickness at first raged among the Christians, decimating 
the population of their village, and its immediate effect was 
to revive the old belief in Christianity as the religion of 
death. Christians became martyrs to their faith, while 
61 
Rougeyron, 'Biographie du R.P. Gagniere', 69, 72: AVNC. 
6~ 
everywhere adherence to custom reappeared. Persecution of 
Christians began, and culminated in a surprise attack on the 
mission village, in which a catechumen was killed before the 
mission party rallied and drove off the attackers. A period 
of calm followed, but the high mortality rate continued and 
62 
eventually spread to the pagans as well. The situation 
differed from 1847, when the missionaries had been isolated 
and opposed by almost the whole tribe. By 1852 they had 
many supporters, and two apparently irreconcilable groups, the 
converts and those who demanded adherence to custom, vied for 
the support of the tribe. 
The division of loyalty in the tribe as a whole was by 
no means clear cut. At Balad and elsewhere a majority of 
people probably paid some heed to mission teachings, while 
their way of life, attitudes and beliefs remained essentially 
unchanged. The missionaries generally fared well during 
tranquil periods, because of the value of the goods at their 
disposal, the curiosity felt towards their teachings, and the 
awed respect in which they were usually held. But they were 
rejected by all but committed Christians in times of public 
calamity, which traditional knowledge could explain only in 
terms of the malevolence of the priests and their ability to 
invoke occult forces over which the tribesmen had no 
62 
Ibid., 70-4, 89, 95. 
63 
control. Those who formed the nucleus of the Christian 
party in a tribe were notable because they lived close to the 
mission establishment in a large village, which radically 
altered the traditional pattern of scattered hamlets set among 
the gardens of individual clans. 64 The state of mission 
fortunes at a given time in a particular area could be gauged 
by the number of people who wore clothes, while a widespread 
return to traditional undress was usually one of the first 
indications of a revival of custom. Similarly, the first sign 
of persecution of Christians was generally a demand by pagan 
chiefs that clothes and rosaries should be abandoned and the 
65 
ancient ceremonies attended. The pagan party was marked by 
an attachment to custom which was sometimes dissimulated, but 
in times of crisis became aggressive. The pagans were led by 
those who stood to lose most prestige and influence under the 
new dispensation, elders, sorcerers, and the like. 66 
63 
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1855: APM/ONC, 5d); Tuo (Rougeyron to Procureur, 15 June 1860: 
APO); Wagap (Vincent to Procureur, 14 July 1868: APO). See 
also Anon., 'Etat de la Nouvelle-Caledonie en 1860 et 1861': 
APM/ONC, 19. 
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Alignment in such conflicts between old and new 
loyalties was determined by a variety of motives, and 
conditioned by local circumstances. At Balad, however, the 
particular commitment of the leading chiefs resulted, in part 
at least, from political considerations and clan rivalry. 
Cangun and his brothers encouraged the missionaries' return, 
and were at first its most influential supporters, while Bweon 
remained aloof. As a matter of policy, however, the 
missionaries always solicited the support of the most 
important chief in an area where they had settled, and, for 
all that his prestige was limited and his authority not 
unquestioned, Bweon was still high chief of the Puma tribe. 
Likewise, Bweon was prepared to trade lukewarm support for the 
mission for a power base against his opponents within the 
tribe. Not long after the return to Balad, therefore, Bweon 
had become nominal leader of the Christians. The actual 
leaders were two clan chiefs, one of whom was Bweon's son-in-
67 law. For their part, Cangun and his brothers rejected the 
mission and became leaders of the traditionalists. Their 
motives are not entirely clear, and, apart from the epidemic, 
doubtless included such factors as pressure from clan elders 
and jealousy at the favour shown by the missionaries to early 
67 
Montrouzier to his brother, 14 Oct. 1853: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier); Rougeyron to abbe de Meydat, 26 June 1855: 
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73: AVNC. 
68 
converts who were of lesser status. It is not unreasonable, 
however, to suggest that their volte-face was connected with 
the missionaries' successful attempt to gain Bweon to their 
cause. 
By 1853 mission progress at Balad had ceased, and 
familiar accusations were rife against the missionaries as 
68 
instigators of disease, who were themselves immune: 
••• la conviction que nous les faisions mourir 
etait universelle chez nos pauvres sauvages, il 
fallait aller chercher dans les cases les plus 
obscures les malades qu'on nous cachait. 69 
A turning point came at the end of April, when Douarre 
succumbed to the sickness. This created sympathy among many of 
the pagans for the mission's loss, and weakened the suspicion 
that the missionaries were deliberate agents of death. 70 By 
September 1853 the epidemic had waned, which reassured the 
Christians and removed one of the most telling arguments of 
the opposition. The future success of the mission seemed 
assured when, on 23 September 1853, Rear-Admiral Auguste 
Febvrier des Pointes arrived at Balad on the warship Phoque, 
68 
Montrouzier to Superieur-general, 3 July 1853: APM/ONC, 26c; 
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Montrouzier to Superieur-general, 3 July 1853: APM/ON~, 26c. 
Douarre was replaced as head of the mission by Rougeyron, who 
became provicar apostolic. He remained in this position until 
1874, when the vicariate of New Caledonia was once more put 
in charge of a bishop. 
70 
with instructions to annex New Caledonia in the name of the 
71 Emperor of France. Balad was chosen for the initial 
ceremony of annexation and as the site of the first establishmen 
of the new colony because the presence of missionaries there 
and at Pwebo was expected to have modified the ferocity of 
the inhabitants and disposed them in favour of the French. 
This was an important consideration in view of the insufficient 
forces available to implement annexation. 72 
THE coming of a European power to Balad foreshadowed a change 
in the relationship between the missionaries and the Puma, 
and altered the conditions of contact between Melanesians and 
71 
The question of the annexation of New Caledonia as an 
aspect of French internal and inter-Ministry politics and of 
international relations is not relevant to this study. The 
diplomatic background to the French action was discussed in 
detail in Person 1954:148-85. He also traced the development 
within France of official opinion on the matter. Unfortunately 
this work is almost totally undocumented, but use was made of 
mission and official French archival material, and perhaps of 
some official British records. See also Roberts 1929, 11: 
516-30; Jore 1959, 11:165-71; Newbury 1956:381-4. 
The decision to annex seems to have been made within the 
Ministry for the Navy and Colonies, and the act accomplished in 
the face of belated, anxious and perhaps unwilling acquiescence 
from the Foreign Ministry, which appears to have played no part 
in the formulation of policy (correspondence between the 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres and the Ministre de la Marine 
des Colonies, 14 & 22 Feb. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854). The 
policy-making process seems to have been a fairly haphazard 
affair - in October 1856 the Minister for the Navy mentioned th 
he had no record of the views of his predecessor on the future 
planned for New Caledonia when its annexation was proposed to t 
Emperor ('Note du Ministre', 12 Oct. 1856: ANOM, Carton 42). 
72Min. to French Consul, Sydney, 9 June 1846: ANOM, Carton 40, 
1845-6; Laguerre to Tardy de Montravel, 16 July 1853 (encl. in 
Tardy de Montravel to Febvrier des Pointes, 10 Jan.l854): ibid. 
CG 1854; Febvrier des Pointes to Min., 19 Oct. 1853: ibid., 
CG 1853. 
Europeans and the rate of acculturation in the traditional 
society. Despite some apprehension as to the possible 
consequenc~of annexation, the missionaries supported the 
French wholeheartedly, because their arrival averted the 
73 possibility of the seizure of New Caledonia by Britain. 
71 
The Marists used all the influence they had acquired at Balad 
to dispose the Puma to accept French sovereignty. They tried to 
explain that henceforth there would exist in New Caledonia 
an authority superior to any of the chiefs; that Melanesians 
would receive protection, provided they obeyed and cooperated 
with the French and did not initiate hostilities; and most 
74 important, that their land rights would be respected. The 
missionaries also acted as interpreters, mediated in the 
transfer to the French of a piece of land for the construction 
of a blockhouse, and made available to the admiral their 
house and their resources. 
The internal division in the Puma tribe which had 
helped determine the religious affiliation of its leading 
chiefs was again reflected in their attitudes to 
annexation. Bweon and the Christians acquiesced at once, 
whereas Cangun and most of the pagans reacted with hostility 
and suspicion. The chiefs especially feared that the presence 
of the French would seriously compromise their freedom of 
action. Within two months their worst fears had been realized 
when, to their consternation, des Pointes ordered the arrest 
73 See below, pp-142-6. 
74 Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 
1854; Montrouzier to iv~que de Montpellier, 4 Nov. 1855: APM/ONt 
26d; du Bouzet to Min., 25 Nov. 1857b: ANOM, Carton 42; Salinis 
1892:176. 
of a chief who had murdered a woman accused of sorcery. A 
plot was conceived to kidnap the admiral, but it was betrayed 
by a Christian. 75 The French made a bloodless night-time 
1 • ' ... _ ~. 
raid on several villages, in which a number of chiefs w~e 
76 
arrested. The efficiency with which this was carried out 
and the ability of the French to conduct military operations 
at night seems to have impressed the Puma, and quietened 
opposition for a time. Cangun, who was one of the prisoners, 
later escaped., but Fa~her Xavier Montrouzier managed to 
72 
dissuade des Pointes from the policy of brutal repression which 
he considered pursuing. Undo and two other chiefs were exiled 
to Tahiti, while Cangun was allowed to return to his village 
after formally accepting French sovereignty and humbly 
. i b h . h f 77 prom1s ng to e ave 1n t e uture. He continued to nurse his 
resentment, and the dispositions of the pagans did not improve. 
Their hostility, however, seems to have been directed less at 
the French as an occupying force than at the French as friends 
of the mission and, more particularly, of Bweon. Captain 
Louis Tardy de Montravel, the senior officer on the New 
Caledonian naval detachment during 1854, reported in this vein: 
75 
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••. c'est ace centre [the village of Waban], 
ou plutot a son chef Tiangoun, que se rattachent 
les autres villages pour faire opposition a 
Philippo [Bweon] et a notre occupation, opposition 
sourde et cachee, mais reelle; c'est a Ouenbane 
que se trament les petits complots, que s' 
organisent les vols et que les matelots trouvent 
l'emploi de leurs moyens de seduction. 
Refractaire a tout progres, par jalousie 
contre Philippo, son chef suzerain, plutot que 
par opposition a la mission, Tiangoun, qui s'etait 
trouve enveloppe dans une espece de complot, a 
seul ete epargne; l'impunite ne l'a pas rendu 
plus devoue a notre cause, mais n'a servi qu'a 
le rendre plus prudent et plus circonspect •••• 
il evite soigneusement aujourd'hui de se 
7 
compromettre... H 
Neither the Marists nor the naval authorities were 
under any illusions regarding Bweon's prestige and authority, 
which had never been unquestioned at Balad, and which had been 
weakened further with the advent of the French by their denial 
79 to him of the right to use force to exact obedience. Under 
the circumstances, however, it was in the interests of both to 
bolster his position at the expense of the refractory chiefs. 
The missionaries hoped thereby to obtain a powerful Christian 
chief who would control the tribe according to their advice 
and principles; the authorities wanted a cooperative 
intermediary who would be strong enough to enforce obedience on 
his fellow tribesmen, regarded as his 'subjects' ,and who could 
78 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 25 Dec. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 
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79Montrouzier to his brother, 14 Oct. 1853: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier); Tardy de Montravel to Min., 27 Apr. 1854, 25 Dec. 
1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854; Montrouzier to eveque de 
Montpellier, 4 Nov. 1855: APM/ONC, 26d; Rougeyron, 'Biographie 
du R.P. Gagniere', 32. 
at the same time be held to account for the safety of 
Europeans within the tribal boundaries. Accordingly, in 
January 1854, Bweon formally recognized French sovereignty in 
the name of the Puma tribe, and committed himself: ' ••• faire 
respecter tout suj et franc; ai s ou a ut re e tranger qui viendrai t 
s'etablir sur le territoire de ma tribu'. 80 Yet this was not 
a promise he could keep, as he could not guarantee the 
submission to his authority of the other chiefs. Thus at 
missionary instigation he requested the right to set up a code 
of laws which would translate relevant parts of French law to 
the New Caledonian situation, and which would give him the 
means to enforce his authority. This was granted, and the 
code instituted. It provided for the appointment of several 
gendarmes and promised them remuneration at government 
expense, and gave the tribal chief the right to punish 
81 
certain offenders according to a nominated scale. 
Early in 1855 du Bouzet claimed that the code had 
t th d B I • i 82 s reng ene weon s pos~t on. However, the refusal or 
7 
inability of the French to keep their promises so disillusioned 
Bweon that he turned against both the missionaries and the 
French, whom, like most Melanesians at this stage, he 
80 
'Reconnaissance et acceptation de la souverainete de 
S.M. Napoleon III par Felipo Boueone, Chef de la tribu de 
Pouma', 25 Jan. 1854: ANOM, Carton 67. 
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Correspondence between Bweon and Tardy de Montravel, 7 & 8 Feb 
1854; 'Code penal de la tribu de Pouma', 9 Feb. 1854: ANOM, 
Carton 67; Tardy de Montravel to Min., 27 April 1854: ANOM, 
Carton 40, CG 1854. 
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75 
identified. By June 1855 the code was no longer enforced, 
in part because of the failure of the administration to carry 
out its promise to pay the local gendarmes. More seriously, 
six would-be colonists arrived unexpectedly and without 
official permission at Balad, where the commandant of the 
garrison thought it was his duty to accede to their arrogant 
. 83 
demands for land. Bweon was eventually provoked into 
planning a full-scale attack on the soldiers and the mission. 
Despite the exasperation of most of the tribe, he inspired so 
little confidence that he failed to obtain much support and 
the project was dropped. It had become evident to the 
missionaries, however, that future progress among the pagans of 
Balad would be limited because of Bweon's weakness and lack of 
energy, and that conflicts were bound to occur, necessitating 
the use of force in self-defence if the mission party was to 
survive. The faith of the Christians was considered to be 
in danger at Balad, exposed as it was to the importunities of 
their pagan relatives and to constant reminders of their own 
recent past. Since a priest could no longer be spared to serve 
the relatively few Christians there, it was eventually decided 
that the mission should be abandoned and the Christians taken 
to a new station which would be created near Port-de-France. 
83 
Du Bouzet to Min., 10 June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; 
Montrouzier to eveque de Montpellier, 4 Nov. 1855: APM/ONC, 
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The project was carried out in October 1855, when 120 
Christians and neophytes from Balad, not including Bweon, were 
84 
settled at Conception. 
Missionary scruples against answering force with 
force were overcome at Conception. The Balad Christians, 
togeth~r with later arrivals from Tuo and Pwebo, formed the 
front-line of the defences of Port-de-France against a 
coalition of southern tribes, which united in an attempt to 
destroy Port-de-France and the mission establishments of 
Conception and St-Louis, and drive the foreigners into the 
sea. Hostilities began in earnest in the latter half of 
1856, and the region was not finally considered pacified until 
the end of 1859, although the last major expedition near 
Port-de-France was in December 1857. 85 The Christians acted as 
auxiliaries of the colonial authorities in almost every 
expedition against the insurgents, but the benefits which they 
gained as allies of the administration were outweighed by the 
appalling death-rate from disease which raged at Conception 
84 
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86 
until at least 1863. 
At the beginning of 1855 the population of the Puma 
tribe was fairly reliably estimated at not more than 1,000. 87 
No more than 150 people seem to have gone to Conception, and 
yet by early 1856 the Balad region was described as almost 
88 deserted. The resentment against the French of Bweon and 
the people remaining at Balad after the departure of the 
Christians did not diminish, and towards the end of 1856, at 
a time of war between the Paak of Bonde and the Balad 
garrison, Bweon led an unsuccessful attack on the blockhouse, 
which was beaten off with the loss of six Puma warriors. 89 
Bweon fled into the mountains, where he led a miserable 
90 
existence. He was deposed from the chieftainship by the 
French in November 1856, and replaced by Gwa. At about this 
77 
time an allegorical representation of the persecution of Bweon 
was popular amongst the northern tribes, where it was widely 
told to stir up anti-European feeling. Father Pierre Lambert 
explained its significance as follows: 
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••• une espece de chant allegorique ou 
Philippo, chef de Balade, est designe sous le 
nom du chef de Tuo, et le chef de Tendo n'est 
autre que le capitaine du Blokaus de Balade, 
peut-~tre m~me tous les fran~ais . Le capitaine 
est represente comme un genie implacable, acharne 
a la perte de sa victime. 
The ch~ef of Tando was depicted as hounding his quarry from 
one end of the island to the other, until eventually the 
pursuer himself fell to the axes of two children: 
.•• ils le_font tuer par deux enfants, et cela a 
dessein de montrer qu'ils n'ont pas meme besoin 
d'hommes pour se defaire de leurs ennemis. Tel 
doit etre, selon eux, le sort du capitaine qu'on 
doit attirer dans un guet-apens. La suite a 
prouve le contraire; car des les premieres 
tentatives d'hostilite, Philippo a paye de sa 
personne. 
After several years of fugitive existence, Bweon was finally 
7f 
91 
captured and shot on the orders of tbe commandant of the Balad 
garrison, after being implicated in the burning of the Pwebo 
church in December 1858. 92 
Thus through European agency the brother of Payama 
and Cangun gained total victory over Bweon, whose irresolution 
prevented his adoption of a consistent course of either 
support or opposition to European penetration, and who failed 
91 
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at every stage after 1847 to unite behind him the tribe of 
which he was high chief. He was the victim both of his 
personal inadequacies, and of an intra-tribal power struggle, 
which originated in traditional antipathies and ambitions, 
79 
and in which his opponents saw more clearly the implications of 
European occupation. Bweon did not understand a basic tenet 
of the·new regime: namely, that the imposition of Christianity 
was not a necessary consequence of annexation. The 
administration did not intend to provoke unnecessary Melanesian 
resistance by forcing missionaries upon those who rejected 
them peacefully, provided these tribes gave active support 
and complete obedience to the authorities. 93 Bweon, after 
his disillusionment, attacked all Europeans indiscriminately, 
and paid with his life. Gwa, on the other hand, realized that 
he did not have to be a Christian if he came to terms with the 
government, and that by so doing he would gain valuable 
support towards the realization of his local political 
ambitions. He no doubt considered, correctly from his 
viewpoint, that he had cleverly used the Europeans to out-
manoeuvre his traditional rival. For their part, the French 
congrattilated themselves on their manipulation of the 
traditional rivals to gain their own ends. A naval officer 
commented: 
93 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854. 
Dans les tribus ou le Premier chef se montre 
hostile on trouve a s'appuyer sur le second 
chef ou tout autre pe~it chef de sang noble 
qui ne demande pas mieux que de supplanter 
le Titulaire. C'est ainsi que nous sommes 
devenus maitres a Balade. 94 
Such is the stuff of which successful compromise is made. 
Rougeyron visited Balad in April 1858, and reported 
that scarcely anyone lived in the district; most were dead 
95 
while others had taken refuge in neighbouring tribes. An 
official report of much the same date said that a few people 
still at Balad were mostly engaged on public works, while the 
chiefs referred to the commandant of the garrison on all 
96 important matters. Towards the end of 1858 it became 
necessary to evacuate the Balad post, which no longer served 
a useful purpose. Because of official concern that the Puma 
would be left at the mercy of hostile neighbours, who 
80 
resented their subservience to the government, it was arranged 
that the people who remained at Balad should be transferred 
to the mission station of St-Louis, where an agricultural 
centre was about to be created. Only thirteen Puma eventually 
went to St-Louis, however, and the remainder were formed by 
94 
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Governor Saisset into a native militia under Gwa's 
97 leadership. 
These people had come to terms with the fact of 
European occupation and with the realities of French power. 
After Bweon's deposition they had become staunch allies of 
the government, and they remained so throughout the 1860's. 
They participated in an expedition in 1859 against their 
kinsmen and allies, the Bwarat of Yengen, and in several 
subsequent wars and expeditions against rebellious or 
unpacified tribes. 98 Their relationship with the Marists 
was purely pragmatic. At the end of 1859 they aided their 
traditional enemies, the Mwelebeng Christians, against 
a coalition of tribes hostile to both the mission and the 
8 
d i . . 99 a m n1.strat1.on. The subsequent Christian victory greatly 
enhanced missionary prestige, and led to a general movement 
1 in their favour, in which the Puma took part. A 
complicating factor appeared, however, with the arrival in 
June 1862 of Governor Charles Guillain, who disapproved of 
97 
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1see below, pp.132-3; 
missionary pretensions and their influence over Melanesians, 
and began an immediate campaign to diminish both. 2 Faithful 
servants of the administration, the Puma responded to the new 
climate of opinion, and gladly abandoned their fa~ade of 
82 
cooperation with an old enemy. When the governor's displeasure 
focussed on the Christian tribes of the north-east, he found 
willing allies in Gwa and Undo, who had been returned from exile 
in Tahiti in 1863. With official blessing the two chiefs 
persuaded Christians at Bonde and Arama to apostatize, and were 
3 
active in harassment of the Mwelebeng. 
The chiefs and the whole Puma tribe profited from 
their stance: Undo, Gwa and Gwa's successor, Mweau Gwa, were 
all awarded medals for their service by a grateful governor; 
during 1868, when almost every tribe in the region was 
compelled to provide workers for onerous corvees at Pwebo, the 
Puma were exempt; unlike most of their neighbours, their land 
rights remained more or less intact, and no colonist had 
settled permanently at Balad before 1870. 4 Despite their 
subservience to the government, the Puma had far more autonomy 
in the internal administration of their tribe than did the 
Mwelebeng, where the missionaries, with the aid of a pious chief, 
developed a theocratic form of tribal government. Furthermore, 
2 
S b 1 164-73. ee e ow, pp. 
3 
Emprin to Procureur, 5 Mar. 1865; Guitta to Procureur, 9 Apr. 
1865; Gagniere to Procureur, 3 May 1865: APO. 
4 
See below, pp. 
as valued allies of the French, the Puma were assured of 
military aid in the event of enemy attack, and they enjoyed 
greater independence and freedom from harassment by aggressive 
and m~re powerful neighbouring tribes than they had 
traditionally. 5 
It is in the reduction of their numbers that the 
cost to the Puma of nearly thirty years of intensive contact 
with Europeans becomes apparent. European estimates of the 
numerical strength of pre-literate societies are notoriously 
unreliable, but the figures which indicate the population 
decline of the Puma tribe after 1843 are reasonably accurate, 
because they were based, except for a four-year period, on the 
continuous and intimate acquaintance of Europeans with the 
members of this tribe. The population of the Puma was 
reported to be 
200 in 1860; 9 
6 7 8 1,500 in 1846; 1,000 in 1855; 538 in 1857; 
10 barely 100 in 1864. The 1857 figure is 
8 
important because it was based on a local census conducted by th 
commandant of the Balad post, a man with some knowledge of the 
area. The decline is staggering, even allowing for considerable 
5 
Du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855a: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855. 
6 
Leconte 1847b:822. 
7 
Du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855a: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855. 
8 
Du Bouzet to Min., 25 Nov. 1857b: ANOM, Carton 42. 
9 
Vieillard et Deplanche 1863:21. 
10 
Garnier 1901:233. 
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inaccuracy in the first two estimates, which seems unnecessary, 
since both ·relied Gn information ~eceived from the 
missionaries. The exodus to Conception and the dispersion to 
other tribes which occured in the mid-SO's were to some 
extent responsible, but the most serious agent of depopulation 
must have been disease. Although in New Caledonia generally 
during the period of study, introduced sickness and epidemic 
diseases seem to have most affected Christians, 
the rejection of the mission by the Puma came too late, and 
their relations with Europeans and nearby Christian tribes 
were too frequent,to enable them to escape the worst effects 
of high mortality and periodic devastating epidemics. 
The Puma endured violent epidemics in 1846-7 and 
1852-3; late in 1860 there were many deaths from measles, which 
swept through most of New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands, 
11 
and elsewhere in the Pacific at about the same time; again, 
12 both Undo and Gwa succumbed during an epidemic in 1866. Even 
in the intervening periods mortality was high, especially among 
those who had emigrated to Conception. An ominous portent for 
future demographic recovery was the fact that the Puma, like 
many other tribes, suffered by the mid-60's from a serious 
13 
shortage of women. Indeed, it was only in the second 
11 
Mathieu to Durand, 22 July 1861: ANOM, Carton 42; Forestier 
to Procure'ur, 7 Aug. 1861: APO; _ J.M. Villard, 'Memoire sur 
la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': AVNC. 
12 
Guitta t;o Roug.ewron, 27 May·l866: APM/ONC, 25; Garnier 1901: 
301-2. 
13 
Garnier 1901:233, 266. 
quarter of the twentieth century that significant population 
increase began at Balad, in accordance with the trend 
throughout New Caledonia. 14 
14 
Sarasin [1917]:38, 87; Metais 1953a:99-111, 128. 
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CHAPTER III 
YENGEN 
THE first Europeans known to have made contact with the people of 
the Balad area were members of British and French exploring 
expeditions. Subsequent visitors between 1843 and 1853 were 
mostly either naval personnel or were connected with the Marist 
mission. In contrast, Yengen seems not to have been visited by 
Europeans before 1843, and the early arrivals were almost all 
Sydney-based traders come in search of sandalwood and beche-de-mer. 
Their on-shore agents were the first Europeans to reside in the 
area. 
Notable in every early account of the people of Yengen was 
the dominance of the chief known to the English as Basset and to 
the French as Bouarate. The history of the people of the lower 
Yengen valley is inseparable from that of the Bwarat chieftainship, 
and the 'Yengen tribe' can be defined as those clans which 
recognized Bwarat as chief. The prestige of the Bwarat clan was 
such that its name was applied to the whole tribe. 1 The size of 
the tribe, Bwarat's power within it, and the extent of his 
influence over neighbouring groups were variously estimated by 
contemporary European observers. It was generally agreed that 
Yengen was one of the larger and more warlike tribes in the northern 
2 part of the island, and Bwarat a powerful and influential chief, 
1 
Leenhardt 1930:105. 
2 
E.g., Leconte 1847b:822, 850-2; Erskine 1853:356; Berard 1854:97; 
Lascazas 1855:15; Inglis 1887:304-5. 
but exaggeration was common. Especially after 1853, Yengen 
was frequently referred to as the paramount tribe in the north, 
and the Bwarat chiefs as the inspiration of most anti-French 
3 
activities in this region. Thus to du Bouzet Bwarat was 
'l'ame et le moteur de toutes les intrigues ourdies contre nous 
4 depuis la prise de possession', while .the popular impression 
of the tribe was similar to Garnier's, reported in 1867: 
la tribe de Hienguene .•• etait autrefois 
non-seulement la plus puissante, mais avait 
encore une sorte de suzerainete sur toutes les 
tribus environnantes et jusqu'a la pointe nord 
de la Nouvelle-Caledonie. 
It seems certain that in New Caledonian terms Yengen was a 
numerous and closely-knit tribal group, and Bwarat a highly-
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5 
respected chief. Other tribes, however, could at least equal the 
power and influence of Yengen, and Bwarat was not the ruthless 
autocrat many Europeans depicted. His authority and prestige 
were consistent with his position as chief of a large tribe, but 
3 
E.g., Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854; du Bouzet to Saisset, 25 Oct. 1858: ANOM, Carton 231; 
Montrouzier to his parents, 16 Jan. 1859: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier); Moniteur universe!, 17 Dec. 1859; Saisset to Min., 
1 Feb. 1860: ANM.BB4 723; Durand to Min., 12 Aug.1861: ANOM, 
Carton 26, CG 1855-64; Rougeyron to Procureur, 1 Apr. 1863: APO. 
4 
Du Bouzet to Min., 25 Nov. 1857b: ANOM, Carton 42. 
5 
Garnier 1901:222; see also Mon., 7 Mar. 1869; de la Hautiere 
1869:87-8; Patouillet 1872:50-1. 
they depended on the respect and affection which he commanded 
as an able and intelligent chief, rather than on the force at 
his disposa1. 6 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
accurately the traditional sphere of influence of the Yengen 
tribe (Waap, like the Puma of Balad), but the apparent power 
which so impressed early visitors may have been in part a 
result of the regional monopoly of trade with Europeans which 
7 the Yengen enjoyed for several years. It is hard to delineate 
traditional patterns of settlement and allegiances in this area 
because they hav~ during almost a century of occasional conflict 
and the process of cantonnement of the Melanesians, been 
altered, obliterated or realigned in response to missionary and 
official demands. Hienghene today is one of the larger centres 
of Melanesian population, but the pressure on land in the 
reserves is in places great, due to the resettlement of numbers 
of people on land to which they possess no traditional title. 
This had led to collective loss of memory regarding details of 
migrations and settlement in the area, and to a reticence to 
8~ 
discuss matters which could bring to light almost forgotten claim1 
and upset the precarious balance of land rights in the reserves. 8 
6 
Swainson 1850; Vigors 1850:250, 254-5; Erskine 1853:356; du 
Bouzet to Min., 10 June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; Laurent 
to Min., 13 Jan. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42; Forget to Min., 15 June 
1850: Collection Margry; Montrouzier 1860:9; Rochas 1862:246. 
7 
Leconte 1847b:854; Vigors 1850:249; see belo~ pp. 90-3, 97-9. 
8 
Guiart 1966:112. 
89 
Despite this limitation, there is sufficient evidence 
in the records of contemporary observers to warrant the 
conclusion that the tribe of Bwarat at the time of the earliest 
known contacts with Europeans was settled mainly in the lower 
valleys of the Yengen and Tangen rivers, with outlying groups 
scattered along the coast to the north-west, and to the south-
east towards the Tipinje river. Bwarat's main village (five 
or six huts in 1846) 9 was several miles up the Yengen river at 
10 Kamedan, but he built a further residence at Kalegon, near 
the river's entrance, apparently in order to facilitate 
11 
relations with European traders. Some clans, including a 
number of Uveans, lived near the shore and in the shadow of the 
massive dolomitic outcrops which dominate this area. Others, 
said to be immigrants from elsewhere in New Caledonia, inhabited 
12 the area known as Ware. 
The population of the Yengen tribe was estimated in 
1846 at 8,000; in 1850 at 2,000; in 1854 at 5,000 (including more 
than 600 warriors); in 1855 at 1,500; and in 1860 at 1,200. 13 The 
9 
Leconte 1847b:850. 
10 
Ibid.; Erskine 1853:354, 355; Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 Jul~ 
1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854; Laurent to Min., 13 Jan. 1857: 
ANOM, Carton 42; O'Reilly 1953:29; Guiart 1966:113. In September 
1859 the French destroyed the ancestral hill village of the Bwara1 
clan, which, they said, was situated amid nine large villages and 
more than 300 huts on the left bank of the Yengen river, about 
nine kilometres from its mouth ('ordre du jour du Gouverneur', 
7 Sept. 1859: BO 1859-60: 167-8). 
11 ---
Erskine 1853:352. 
12 
Berard 1854:97. 
13 
Leconte 1847b:822; Berard 1854:97; Tardy de Montravel to Min., 
July 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854; du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 
1855b: ibid., CG 1855; Vieillard et Deplanche 1863:21. 
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discrepancies between these figures result in part from the 
fact that some observers included in their estimates groups which 
either formed no patt of the Yengen tribe, or whose connection 
with it was tenuous; and in part because all such figures were 
at best intelligent guesses. The latter two are probably more 
accurate, as they were based on something more than rumour or 
information received from the missionaries, whose acquaintance 
with the Yengen was far more limited than with the Puma. Despite 
the unreliability of such figures, it seems certain that the 
Melanesian population of Yengen decreased noticeably during the 
first thirty years of European contact. Mortality from disease 
was probably less severe there, however, than in other centres of 
intensive early contact, such as Balad, Pwebo, the Isle of Pines 
and Conception, where sickness and periodic epidemics caused 
14 great losses, especially amongst the Christians. 
RELATIONS between the Yengen and E~glish sandalwood traders 
began in December 1843, during the period of the installation 
of the Marist mission at Balad. The Sydney-based vessels 
Portenia, Captain Richards, and Magnet were almost certainly the 
first European ships to anchor at Yengen, where they were 
enthusiastically received and quickly obtained good cargoes. The 
main objects of exchange were pieces of hoop iron, which the 
inhabitants laboriously sharpened and converted into tools. 15 
14 
See above, pp. 51, 65-9, 84; see below, pp.206-7. 
15 
Laferriere 1845:88, 108; Leconte 1847b:852. 
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The immediate attraction of Yengen for the traders was an 
abundance of cheap, easily accessible sandalwood. A further 
inducement was the presence of a united, cooperative population, 
and the security offered by a powerful chief. 16 Bwarat and the 
Yengen were not slow to realize the advantages to be gained 
from their relationship with the traders, and they were 
enthusiastic participants in a mutually satifactory business 
arrangement. The value and utility of iron implements were 
quickly recognized, and the price of sandalwood rose as the 
inhabitants gained experience and became more selective in their 
demands. By the time of Richards's second visit in 1845 the 
preferred items of commerce were iron and the small steel axes 
17 
which soon became a favourite and lethal weapon of war. As 
the Yengen became more experienced and powerful through their 
dealings with the traders, so the demands made upon the latter 
became more exigent. Hoop iron had declined in value by 1846, 
while the fairly widespread distribution of tomahawks by the 
missionaries from their Balad base had diminished the purchasing 
power of that commodity. Despite missionary objections, Richards 
eventually gave Bwarat a musket and some ammunition, and 
16 
Towns to Silver, 15 Jan. 1847; Towns to Robinson, 23 Aug. 1848: 
Robert Towns, Papers, Items 56 & 57. 
17 
Leconte 1847b:853, 862; Shineberg 1967;74. The value which 
Melanesians placed on tomahawks was demonstrated in Leconte's 
account of the acquisition by Douarre of a large piece of land 
at Kalegon: 'Pour un petit coffre contenant une trentaine de 
petites haches, un vaste terrain appartenant au thea [chief] fut 
acquis' (Leconte 1847b:854). 
shortly afterwards the chief tricked Richards's second-in-
command into giving him a further firearm. 18 
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The increase in offensive power which resulted from the 
acquisition of these weapons was said to have enabled Bwarat 
to mount a successful surprise ~ttack on the enemy tribe of 
Tipinje, during which he killed his adversaries at will. 19 This 
implication of the revolutionary impact of firearms on 
indigenous warfare in New Caledonia is misleading, since they 
were usually not possessed in sufficient numbers, nor 
maintained at a high enough state of efficiency to be effective 
. d . d i 20 aga1nst eterm1ne enem es. The initial shock value of a few 
firearms might have been decisive against warriors with no 
previous experience of them, but the European weapon which had 
21 
the greatest effect on Melanesian warfare was the tomahawk. 
The nature of this weapon was such that its adoption did not 
lead to basic changes in modes of waging war, as would have 
occurred had firearms been generally used. The possession of 
18 
Ibid., 853-4. 
19 
Ibid., 854. 
20 
Besson 1847:412; Leconte 1847a:771; Leconte, 'Notes sur la 
Nouvelle-Caledonie', 1847: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1847-8; 'Motifs 
a l'appui de !'opinion emise par le commandant du Bouzet en 
faveur du choix de la Nouvelle-Caledonie comme siege d'une 
colonie penale en sa qualite de membre de la commission de 
transportation en 1851', n.d.: Collection Margry; du Bouzet to 
Min., 25 Oct. 1857b: ANOM, Carton 42; Montrouzier 1860:5; 
Rochas 1862:209-10; Shineberg 1967:152-3, 170-4. Cf. Tardy de 
Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854; du 
Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855a: ibid., CG 1855. 
21 
Leconte 1847b:862; du Bouzet to Min., 25 Oct. 1857b: ANOM, 
Carton 42; Vieillard et Deplanche 1863:52. 
tomahawks by one side may have changed the traditional ratio of 
power between tribes and led to increased mortality in warfare, 
but the spread of the weapon tended eventually to cancel the 
advantage which tribes like Yengen and Kanala enjoyed through 
their earlier access to a plentiful supply. 
Bwarat was said to have practised his skill with the 
musket upon lowly members of his tribe, and to have used the 
weapons to procure human flesh for his own consumption. 22 
Cannibalism undeniably occurred at Yengen, as in other tribes. 
Everywhere feasts were held with the bodies of slain enemies, 
or of people who had been condemned to death for crimes such as 
infringement of tabus or malevolent sorcery. More rarely and 
93 
unnaturally, some powerful chiefs killed junior members of their 
23 
own clans to satisfy their appetites for human flesh. The 
missionaries were at first uncertain about the function and 
prevalence of cannibalism in the traditional society. Early in 
1845 Bwarat was said to have promised to abandon cannibalism, 
after the missionary Viard had informed him, to his surprise, 
that it was an evil practice. In October 1845 Rougeyron stated 
that New Caledonians ate only their captives, and never killed 
24 for food alone. By the beginning of the next year, however, 
he had changed his mind: 
22 
Besson 1847:412; Montrouzier 1860:8-9, fn.; Verguet 1861:63. 
23 
Besson 1847:352; Erskine 1853:354, 356, 360; Inglis 1854:64; 
Rochas 1862:302-3; Vieillard et Deplanche 1863:44-8; Patouillet 
1872:135; Lambert 1900:178-9; Leenhardt 1930:95-6. 
24 
Viard to Superieur-general, 27 Oct. 1845: APF 1846, 18: 416-7; 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 1 Oct. 1845: APM/ONC, 26a; see 
also Berard to Min., 1 Aug. 1846: ANM, BB4 1011. 
..• ce n'est pas toujours dans les guerres qu'ils 
se contentent de manger de la chair humaine. 
Manquent-ils de vivres pour regaler leurs amis, 
les chefs font tuer un de leurs sujets comme dans 
9· 
les pays civilises on ferait tuer un poulet. 2. 
This development in missionary opinion on the subject 
of cannibalism was apparently provoked by an increase in the 
practice which occurred at about this time. Bwarat was said to 
have encouraged his brother-in-law, Tindin, the young chief of 
the Mwelebeng tribe, to emulate him, increase the fear in which 
he was held, and supplement his diet in a time of scarcity by 
killing and eating members of his own tribe. Tindin and his 
26 friends became notorious in this regard. The upsurge in 
cannibalism seems to have been connected, at least at Pwebo, 
with opposition to the Balad mission and persecution of 
eh · ti d · famine. 2 7 B d h P · · t d r~s ans ur~ng a weon an t e uma part~c~pa e 
in the revival, but took pains to hide the practice from the 
missionaries, whose teaching on the abhorrence with which it was 
regarded by the Christian God was apparently not ignored. 28 
Tindin and most of his closest companions died quite early in 
the epidemic of 1846-7, and their fate was said by Rougeyron to 
25 
Rougeyron to Girard, 2 Jan. 1846: APM/ONC, 26a. 
26 
Leconte to Min., 31 Mar. 1847: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1847-8; 
Leconte 1847b:848-50; Rougeyron, 'Abrege de la vie de Hippolyte 
Bonou': AVNC. 
27 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 14 Feb. 1847: APM/ONC, 26a. 
28 
Leconte 1847b:850, 855. 
have been widely regarded as the punishment of God for their 
29 
misdeeds. However, the all too apparent fact that death 
during this e~idemic was not confined to such 
obvious malefactors as Tindin eventually forced a different 
9~ 
conclusion upon the people of Balad and Pwebo. They decided that 
they wanted no part of either the religion or the priests of a 
god whose justice was dispensed in such a destructive and 
arbitrary fashion. 
According to Maurice Leenhardt, a chief possessed a 
right of life and death over members of his own clan and 
associated sub-clans provided he continued conscientiously to 
fulfil the role of the clan's 'great son': 'il a droit de vie 
30 
et de mort sur les siens'. A man whose son Bwarat had eaten 
was reported to have praised the chief's greatness, and seemed 
to bear no animosity towards him. 31 Nevertheless, Leenhardt 
implied that wanton murder by a chief of his 'brothers', however 
lowly, for the sake af their flesh, was sacrilege, and would 
eventually destroy the chief's prestige and his right to his 
'brothers'' allegiance. Leenhardt described cannibalism in 
the following terms: 
29 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 14 Feb. 1847: APM/ONC, 26a. 
30 
Leenhardt 1930:98; 1935:131. 
31 
Leconte 1847b:851. 
Le cannibalisme n'est pas une institution 
sociale, comme la culture, la peche et la 
chasse et ne comporte aucun droit social que 
nous puissions noter. Ce n'est pas une 
coutume, mais un exces; il est fonction des 
appetits et de la force, et non du coutumier. 
Thus it seems clear that wholesale slaughter by Bwarat of the 
96 
32 
people of his tribe would have ruined his prestige and the esteem 
in which.he was held at Yengen. He was renowned amongst 
Europeans for his cannibalistic excesses, and yet neither his 
prestige nor his authority were ever questioned by the Yengen, 
33 
who regarded him with affection and pride. Tindin, on the 
oth~hand, was both feared and reviled for his excesses, which 
reflected both his lesser prestige and more extreme behaviour. 34 
At Yengen such aberrant acts on the part of the chief were 
probably fairly rare, especially since opportunities to 
acquire human flesh 'legitimately', in war or by the execution 
35 
of accused wrongdoers, were not unusual. 
32 
Leenhardt 1930:96. 
33 
Douarre to Superieur-general, 6 Jan. 1850: APM/ONC, 5b: 
Erskine 1853:356; Rougeyron to Superieur-general, [Apr. 1858]: 
APO; Rochas 1862:246; Patouillet 1872:50-1; Garnier 1901:225. 
34 
Rougeyron to Colin, 14.Feb. 1847: APM/ONC, 26a; Rougeyron, 
'Abrege de la vie de Hippolyte Bonou': AVNC. 
35 
Cf. Montrouzier 1860: 35 ; Rochas 1862:242; Vieillard et 
Deplanche 1863:44-5, 50-1. 
RELATIONS between Richards and the Balad missionaries were 
generally cordial, despite the somewhat unrealistic fear of 
the latter that he would encourage the settling of a 
36 Methodist missionary at Yengen. On at least two occasions 
his vessel was chartered by the Marists, and it was he who 
97 
carried news of the shipwreck of the Seine and some of the crew 
37 to Sydney in July 1846. In May 1847 the English traders at 
Yengen were said to have accused the missionaries of being 
sorcerers who made other men die. The Marists considered this 
to be a major cause of the hostility of the Puma towards the 
mission. 38 The missionaries implied that the epidemic which 
began at Balad late in 1846 extended as far as Yengen: 'il est 
mort presque la moitie de la population dans les diverses 
A 39 
tribus que nous pouvons connaitre'. Yengen, however, 
appears not to have suffered from the crop failure and famine 
which subsequently occurred at Balad. The traders may have 
cast blame on the missionaries for causing sickness in order to 
avert suspicion from themselves, but missionaries were 
generally more likely to be accused of sorcery, because of 
40 their connection with powerful alien supernatural forces, 
and because the highest death rates from disease were in tribes 
in which missionaries had settled. 
36 Montrouzier to his brother [1846]: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier); Leconte 1847b:853-4; Shineberg 1967:74. 
37 Leconte 1847a:768; Person 1954:104, 105. 
38 Grange to Colin, 18 Sept. 1847: APF 1848, 20:175. 
39 Rougeyron to Colin, 14 Feb. 1847: APM/ONC, 26a; see also 
Grange to Colin, 18 Sept. 1847: APF 1848, 20:175. 
40 Shineberg 1967:175. 
Richards appears to have given up his depot at 
Yengen and ended his personal participation in the New 
Caledonian trade between May and July 1847. 41 It is unknown 
whether he abandoned the area because it was no longer safe 
to stay, or because the exhaustion of accessible supplies of 
sandalwood had rendered the trade uneconomic. The latter 
seems mgre likely, since Bwarat and the Yengen remained eager 
to attract European traders. By the end of 1847 the Sydney 
entrepreneur Robert Towns had filled the vacuum left by 
Richards, and acquired a sphere of influence on this part of 
the coastline. 42 Despite the cooperation of Bwarat, Towns's 
43 Yengen ventures seem to have brought him litte profit. By 
the beginning of 1849 it was apparent that beche-de-mer was a 
more promising item of commerce in this area than sandalwood, 
and that the main attraction of Yengen for Europeans was the 
44 protection offered by a powerful chief. Towns remained 
anxious to use the goodwill of Bwarat, and for some years he 
continued to exhort his captains to enlist the chief's aid to 
45 form a beche-de-mer fishery. Nothing seems to have come of 
41 
Grange to Colin, 18 Sept. 1847: APF 1848, 20:175, 182; 
Shineberg 1967: Appendix I, 227, 2~ 
42 
Towns to Cooper, 2 Mar. 1848: Robert Towns, Papers, Item 58. 
43 
Towns to Silver, 26 Dec. 1848: ibid. 
44 
Towns to Rule, 23 Jan. 1859: ihid.; Erskine 1853:361. 
45 
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Towns to Rule, 23 Jan. 1849; Towns to Lewis, 27 Feb., 26 Apr., 
15 Sept. 1849: Robert Towns, Papers, Item 58; Towns to Ross, 
26 Aug. 1853: ibid., Item 62. 
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this, but the area became a favourite haunt of semi-itinerant 
petty traders and coastal shippers, most of whom were English. 
They generally lived with the tribe and procured small amounts 
of beche-de-mer and later coconut oil. They sometimes acted 
as resident agents for entrepreneurs such as Towns or James 
Paddon, .and occasionally served as pilots or interpreters on 
46 
visiting warships. These men often had Melanesian wives, and 
all were dependent on the goodwill of the chief for their 
security and their labour requirements. Their principal 
function in the indigenous society was economic. They were 
tolerated and even welcomed because they were useful, and 
because their presence did not pose a threat to the validity 
of custom or the authority of the chiefs. This class of residen1 
became more prevalent after annexation. 
The frequent visits of English ships, especially 
traders, to Yengen afforded the people of this area an 
opportunity for travel. Some served as crew members on trading 
vessels, several went to New Zealand under the auspices of 
Bi h S 1 f h M 1 · M. i 47 d h . 1 di s op e wyn o t e e anes1an 1ss on, an ot ers, 1nc u ng 
46 
Towns to Cooper, 2 Mar. 1848; Towns to Hollis, 2 Mar. 1848: 
ibid., Item 58; Moore 1850; Swainson 1850; Vigors 1850:243, 257; 
Febvrier de~Pointes to Min., 19 Oct. 1853:ANOM, Carton 40,- CG 18! 
Erskine 1853: 352, 361; Berard 1854:100; du Bouzet to Min., 10 
June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; interrogations of Frederick 
Williams, 3 & 4 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 723. 
47 
Selwyn to his sons, 17 Oct. 1857: 'Letters from the Bishop of 
New Zealand and others', I, 386; Armstrong 1900:38. 
48 Bwarat and his brothers, visited Sydney as guests of Towns. 
The city itself, and the excellent treatment he received made 
a great impression on Bwarat. Years later he was reported to 
100 
have said that in Sydney he first realized the weakness of his 
people in relation to Europeans: 
"J'aimais beaucoup ces Anglais, ajouta-t-il, 
ils me payaient bien et me traitaient en chef; 
je consentis meme un jour a les suivre sur la 
mer jusqu'a leur grand village de Sydney; c'est 
la que je compris le mieux notre faiblesse." 49 
After this visit Bwarat was reputed to be anxious to civilize 
his tribe, and to have enforced for a time the abandonment of 
50 
cannibalism. He frequently requested both the Marists and 
the Melanesian Mission to send a missionary to Yengen, but 
seems to have favoured the latter after Selwyn's visits in 
September 1849 (in company with H.M.S. Havannah) and May 1850 
(with H.M.S. !!z). The conjunction of British sea-power and 
English missionaries was certainly not lost on the chief, and 
it is perhaps significant that a Marist attempt to set up a 
48 
Towns to Cooper, 2 Mar~ 1848: Robert Towns, Papers, Item 58; 
Goujon, 'Journal de l'ile des Pins', 10 June 1849; Douarre to 
Superieur-general, 6 Jan. 1850: APM/ON~ 5b; Vigors 1850:243, 256; 
Erskine 1853:359, 394. 
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Garnier 1901:312; see also Shineberg 1967:77-8. 
50 
Roudaire to Poupinel, 12 Oct. 1848: APM/ONC, 26a; Goujon, 
'Journal de l'ile des Pins', 10 June 1849; Vigors 1850:243; 
Erskine 1853:356; Montrouzier to his brother, 8 Mar. 1859: APM/ 
Personal file (Montrouzier); cf. Montrouzier 1860:9, fn. 
station at Yengen towards the end of 1849 ended in complete 
f .1 51 al. ure. 
In all, British naval vessels made four separate visits 
to Yengen between September 1849 and October 1851. In this 
time only one French warship stopped there, although others 
had visited Balad between 1843 and 1847. Almost continual 
contact with English traders, his trip to Sydney in 1848, and 
the visits of British men-of-war confirmed Bwarat's Anglophilia. 
The only Frenchmen with whom the Yengen had direct contact 
before 1850 were Marist missionaries, whose wealth and power 
could not compare with the British. Even after annexation the 
English connection was maintained by the traders resident there, 
and Bwarat's real or assumed preference for this nation was 
later to have serious repercussions for the chief and his tribe. 
FROM 1843 until 1863 ambivalent relations existed between the 
people of Yengen and the Marists. On numerous occasions the 
Bwarat chiefs asked that a missionary be sent to their tribe, 
but every attempt to install one ended in failure. Contact 
with the Yengen people began almost as soon as the missionaries 
landed at Balad, since Puma and Yengen were linked by close 
51 
Erskine, 'Proceedings at the South Sea Islands' (Erskine to 
the Admiralty, 10 Oct. 1849): PRO, Adm. 1/5606; Erskine 1853:354: 
356; Berard 1854:98-9; Selwyn to his sons, 17 Oct. 1857: 'Letterf 
from the Bishop of New Zealand and others', I, 384-5; Armstrong 
1900:38. 
political and familial ties, and relations between the two 
groups were frequent. The Marists quickly recognized that 
their influence would be limited as long as they remained at 
52 Balad, among a divided and insignificant tribe. At an 
early stage they seem to have contemplated the eventual 
transfer of their main base to Yengen, 53 and they were always 
anxious to secure a foothold there, because of the importance 
of the tribe and its chief. A further incentive was to 
counteract the potentially detrimental influence exercised by 
Englishmen, who were assumed to be hostile towards both France 
54 
and Catholicism. In 1859 Montrouzier summed up the 
attitudes and prejudices of more than fifteen years: 
.•• voici en peu de mots ce que Yengen est dans 
l'histoire de la mission.- Tribu assez forte 
puisqu'elle compte au moins deux mille ames [sic] 
et n'est pas divisee, comme beaucoup d'autres, en 
petites cheferies [sic]. Centre d'ou sont sortis 
la plupart des grands chefs des environs, muni 
d'un petit port assez bien ferme, long-temps 
frequent€ par les Anglais qui y puisaient de grands 
quantites de sandal et y deposaient en retour les 
fusils, d'ignobles maladies et une haine acharnee 
centre les Fran~ais et les Catholiques, Yengen devait 
10 
naturellement etre l'objet de notre attention. 5 
52 
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22 July 1861: ANOM, Carton 42. 
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Leconte to Min., 31 Mar. 1847: ANOM,Carton 40, CG 1847-8. 
54 
Montrouzier to his brother, [1846]: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier); Leconte 1847b:850, 854; Degenine to Procureur, 
14 July 1858: APO; Saisset to Min., 10 Aug. 1860: ANM, BB4 
1036; Montrouzier 1860:8. 
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Montrouzier to his brother, 8 Mar. 1859: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier). 
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The first Catholic missionary visited Yengen in May 
1845. Bwarat asked that a missionary be sent permanently,and 
presented his guest with a yam crop. Four months later, at a 
time of desperate need, the missionaries were allowed to 
harvest the yams, although the tribe had exhausted its own 
provisions. 56 Shortage of personnel prevented the installation 
of a missionary at Yengen before their expulsion from Balad 
57 
and Pwebo in 1847, despite Bwarat's reiterated requests. 
By that time the chief had come to be regarded as a threat 
to the security of the mission because of his warlike habits, 
his encouragement of cannibalism and his proud and independent 
58 
nature. Although his own enthusiasm for the missionaries 
59 
seems to have waned, towards the end of 1846 Bwarat provided 
them with a fine tract of land at Kalegon, and urged them to 
settle there. The Bwarat chiefs did not question the mission's 
right to the land for years, although it was only actually 
56 
Rougeyron to Colin, 1 Oct. 1845: APM/ONC, CG 1845-9; Viard 
to Colin, 27 Oct. 1845: APF 1846, 18:415-18. 
57 
Berard to Min., 1 Aug. 1846: ANM, BB4 1011; Leconte 1847b: 
854; Montrouzier to his brother, 8 Mar. 1859: APM/Personal 
file (Montrouzier). 
58 
Leconte 1847b:848, 849-51, 854. 
59 
Dousset 1970:67-8 interpreted Bwarat's disenchantment as a 
result of outrage that his own meticulous fulfilment of his 
contract in respect of the yam crop was not reciprocated with 
equally rich gifts once the mission's penury had been relieved. 
As at Balad, the missionaries' seeming miserliness caused 
them grave loss of prestige. 
104 
60 
occupied briefly on two occasions. The role played by the 
Yengen in the events of August 1847 is uncertain, but it seems 
likely that some anti-European sentiment existed, and they may 
have encouraged the hostility of the Puma. The Yengen chiefs 
certainly received a share of the plunder, but this may have 
resulted from the close kinship links between the Bwarat and 
the chiefs of Puma, rather than from the active involvement 
61 
of the fo.rmer in the at tacks. 
Early in October 1849 the Marists made their first 
serious attempt to regain a foothold on the New Caledonian 
mainland. Yengen was one of two centres occupied, and the 
choice seemed logical: Bwarat had again requested a missionary; 
Father Gilbert Roudaire had recently visited the area, and was 
very impressed with the sincerity and goodwill of the chief; 62 
Bwarat's younger brother had been accommodated for some time at 
the Marist's station on the Isle of Pines, after being ship-
wrecked nearby on his return from Sydney, and he appeared 
lik 1 b f 1 i d . 63 e y to e a use u nterme 1ary. 
60 
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Adm., 10 Oct. 1849): PRO, Adm. 1/5606; Erskine 1853:354; Berard 
1854:98; [Forestier], 'Proprietes et biens de la mission de la 
Nouvelle-Caledonie', 18 May 1860: APM/ONC, 3. 
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foi a Paris, 11 Dec. 1849: APM/ONC, 5b; Montrouzier to his 
brother, 8 Mar. 1859: APM/Personal file (Montrouzier). 
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Goujon, 'Journal de l'ile des Pins', 23 July, 19 Nov., 10 Dec. 
1848; Roudaire to Poupinel, 12 Oct. 1848: APM/ONC, 26a; Douarre 
to Conseil de la propagation de la foi, 11 Dec. 1849: ibid., Sb. 
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Goujon, 'Journal de l'fle des Pins', 10 June 1849; Erskine 1853: 
394, 398. 
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After a brief visit to Balad, Douarre and five 
companions set up a station on the mission property at Kalegon. 
A number of Puma who had remained faithful to the mission 
were also settled on a deserted part of the south-east 
coastline at Yate. Shortly before Douarre's departure for 
Yengen,. Captain Erskine of H.M.S. Havannah met him at the Isle 
of Pines, and was struck by the low estimate in which the 
bishop held New Caledonians: 'it did not appear to me that the 
mission was embarking in the business in a spirit likely to 
ensure their success', Douarre seemed obsessed by 'the 
reproach of cannibalism' . 64 The bishop later described his own 
reaction to Bwarat in the following terms: 
Bouarat paraissait me desirer ardemment, et je 
fis mon sacrifice, quoiqu'avec repugnance. Je 
croyais, a la verite, a la conversion pleine 
et entiere de ce fameuse anthropophage, mais 
j'eprouvais pour sa personne, une repulsion dont 
je ne me rendais pas compte, 65 
The attempt, a nightmarish experience for Douarre, was abandoned 
after little more than a month, because the missionaries became 
convinced that Bwarat and his brothers planned to murder them an 
plunder their property as soon as a substantial station develope 
64 
Erskine 1853:395, 398. 
65 
Douarre to Conseil de la propagation de la foi, 11 Dec. 1849: 
APM/ONC, 5b. 
66 
The following discussion is based on Douarre to Conseil de la 
propagation de la foi, 11 Dec. 1849: APM/ONC, 5b; Douarre to 
Colin, 6 Jan. 1850: ibid.; Rougeyron, 'Biographie de R.P.Gagmere 
35-7: AVNC; see also Testard to Selwyn, 19 June 1858: ANOM, 
Carton 26, CG 1855-64. 
Bwarat was prepared to allow the Marists to settle at 
Yengen, but to the missionaries his motives and those of his 
brothers seemed purely mercenary. The chiefs expected to 
receive a share of the missionaries' possessions, and hounded 
them for gifts. Bwarat regularly honoured his guests by 
106 
presenting himself at their dwelling at meal times, but his 
generou~ condescension was not appreciated: mission provisions 
were scanty, and the Marists noted resentfully that the chief 
made no attempt to reciprocate their hospitality. The demands 
made by arrogant hosts, and their often insolent and 
provocative behaviour, distressed Douarre, but he was reduced 
to despair by the realization that the Yengen did not intend 
to modify their attitudes or way of life to satisfy 
missionary demands or spare Christian scruples. Yengen was a 
powerful tribe, with united, self-confident leaders, who had 
no reason to doubt the general efficacy of traditional methods 
and explanations. The chiefs were prepared to adapt 
potentially useful elements of a new culture to their own 
situation, but were unlikely to countenance wholesale 
inference with custom, or be able to enforce acceptance of such 
interference upon a majority of the group, unless it was 
clearly in their own or the group's interests to do so. 
The Marists were certainly harassed and threatened 
during their stay at Yengen, and several overt acts of 
cannibalism were flaunted before them, but it is difficult to 
determine whether Douarre's fears for the ultimate safety of 
lOi 
the party were justified. He learned of the plot to kill them 
third-hand, via a Christian child from Balad and his friend, 
also not a member of the Yengen tribe. The plot seems rather 
unlikely, since Bwarat possessed quite sufficient intelligence 
and imagination to be able to anticipate the vengeance which 
would follow the molestation of missionaries. He had 
observ~d in Sydney the resources at the disposal of a 
European nation, and any expectation that his English friends 
would be able to protect him from reprisals by the French must 
have been counterbalanced by the memory of the punishment 
inflicted on the Puma and the Mwelebeng in 1847. The short-term 
advantages to be gained from the murder and pillage of 
missionaries were far outweighed by long-term disadvantages, as 
his Puma allies apparently realized, since they had requested 
the mission's return. Bwarat seemed amazed and distressed by 
the Marists' decision to abandon the station, and he always 
maintained his innocence of any design upon their lives. 67 
In 1850 Captain Oliver of H.M.S. !1z was told another version 
of the story at several different places along the north-east 
coast. Bwarat's brother was said to have threatened, in jest, 
to eat a plump young lay brother. The missionaries took the 
threat seriously, and although Bwarat punished his erring 
brother and begged them to stay, their alarm was such that they 
67 
Goujon, 'Journal de l'fle des Pins', 20 Jan. 1850; Berard 
1854:98. 
101 
left on the first possible . 68 occas1on. 
By September 1853, when New Caledonia was annexed by 
France, the Yengen and the Catholic missionaries were mutually 
hostile. Shortly after annexation another abortive attempt 
was made to settle a missionary at Yengen, again on the urgent 
reques~ of the chief. He revoked his invitation before the 
priest could land, it was suspected on English advice. Bwarat 
claimed 'qu'il etait desole des mauvaises dispositions de son 
peuple, mais que les sujets ne voulaient absolument pas des 
missionnaires' . 69 The Marists denounced this as hypocrisy. 
as indeed it seemed, given their estimation of the extent of 
his authority. But the example of Pwebo and the Isle of Pines, 
where themstility of influential tribesmen, especially the 
elders, hindered mission progress for years, despite the 
70 goodwill of powerful chiefs, supports Bwarat's case. His 
personal opposition to the missionaries may well have been 
less rigid than that of more conservative members of the tribe, 
to whose opinion he, as 'great son', had to defer if the unity 
and integrity of the tribe was to be respected. 
68 
Oliver, 'The island of New Caledonia .•• ' (encl. in Oliver to 
Adm., 25 Nov. 1856): PRO, FO 27/1161. 
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Montrouzier 1860:9. 
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Goujon, 'Journal de l'fle des Pins', 7 July 1850, 1 Jan. 1851, 
15 Sept. 1854; Rougeyron, 'Abrege de la vie de Hippolyte 
Bonou': AVNC. 
109 
The rebuffs suffered at Yengen and fear of 
English influence affected the way in which some missionaries, 
especially Xavier Montrouzier, attempted after 1853 to 
influence official opinion regarding this tribe. They 
considered the Yengen to be anti-Catholic and Anglophile, and 
thus a threat to the interests of the mission and the colony: 
... on vit clairement que le Chef de Yengen, 
ami aux Anglais, itait hostile au Fran~ais, 
qu'on aurait en lui un difenseur redoutable 
de toutes les pratiques sauvages, un ennemi 
de la Civilisation. 
Although the authorities did not always entirely agree with 
this view, it remained the basis of official policy towards 
72 Yengen until 1863. 
IN May 1854 Captain Tardy de Montravel, imbued with mission 
71 
fears about the potential danger posed to French domination by 
the Yengen, made a demonstration of power there with two war-
71 
Montrouzier to his brother, 8 Mar. 1859: A~M/Personal file 
(Montrouzier). 
72 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854; de Bouzet to Min., 10 June 1855: ibid., CG 1855; du 
Bouzet to Min., 25 Nov. 1857b: ANOM, Carton 42; Saisset to Min.~ 
14 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 773; Testard to Selwyn, 19 June 1858: 
ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64; Durand to Min., 31 Dec. 1860, 
12 Aug. 1861: ibid.; Min. to Commandant des ~tablissements 
fran~ais de l'Ocianie, 22 Nov. 1861 (draft): ibid.; Digenine 
to Procureur, 14 July 1858; Rougeyron to Procureur, 1 Apr. 1863; 
APO; Montrouzier 1860:8. 
ships. He aimed to squash any idea of resistance on the part 
of the chief, 'aneantir les esperances de quelques tribus du 
nord qui n'attendaient que le signal de Hienghen pour faire 
une demonstration hostile', and to counteract the supposedly 
hostile influence exercised by English traders. Aware of the 
futility of resistance, impressed by the French display of 
. 
power, Bwarat accepted French sovereignty, and promised to 
forbid cannibalism and murder. He was guaranteed in return 
that Melanesian property rights would be respected, and that he 
would remainfree to accept or reject Christianity ae he 
. h d 73 w~s e • 
Tardy de Montravel, like almost everyone else who met 
Bwarat, was impressed by his intelligence, his ability and 
his apparent sincerity: 'a une intelligence superieure il 
joint un caractere plus droit qu'aucun autre sauvage et il 
74 tient surtout a honneur de ne jamais manquer a sa parole'. 
73 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 15 Jan. 1854: ANM, BB4 701; 8 
July 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854. 
74 
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1854; see also Leconte 1847b:848; Erskine, 'Proceedings at the 
South Sea Islands' (Erskine to Adm., 10 Oct. 1849): PRO, Adm. 
1/5606; Vigors 1850:243; Goujon, 'Journal de l'fle des Pins', 
15 Feb. 1850 ('Boirat est le kanak le plus intelligent et le 
plus politique mais aussi le plus ambitieux et le plus 
sanguinaire'); Laurent to Min., 13 Jan. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42, 
('De tous les chefs caledoniens que j'ai rencontres, Boirate 
est de beaucoup le plus intelligent'); du Bouzet to Min., 
25 Nov. 1857b: ibid.; Guillain to Min., 10 Aug. 1863: ANOM, 
Carton 26, CG 1855-64. 
I 
The Frenchman naively assumed that a ceremony and a demonstratio 
of power would suffice to bring about a revolution in morals 
and political allegiance at Yengen; that by his orders alone 
the French flag would replace human trophies as a symbol of 
prestige and authority; that 'Buarate est desormais franchement 
75 
soumis'. He underestimated Bwarat, however, by interpreting 
his acceptance of the immediate situation as indicative of 
a lasting change in attitude. In the absence of permanent 
surveillance, or at least of the threat of swift reprisals, 
the effect of any show of power by the French could only be 
transitory. Warships had stopped at Yengen before, and Bwarat 
had little reason to assume that the latest visit would be of 
more lasting significance than earlier ones, despite the 
impressive displays of pomp and military efficiency which 
accompanied it. 
The concept of French sovereignty was totally beyond 
the experience of Bwarat and the Yengen, but they were 
_,robably prepared not to oppose the development of the colony, 
provided they were left alone toregulate the internal 
affairs of the tribe and their relations with other groups. 
A collision came early in 1856, when the Yengen united with 
several unpacified tribes against the partly Christian Tuo 
75 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854; 20 Dec. 1854: ANM, BB4 701. 
76 
and Mwelebeng. So-called 'northern coalitions' provided 
persistent opposition to the mission and the colonial 
authorities in the north-east until 1862. Composition of the 
112 
coalitions was neither coherent nor permanent, but the term is 
apt, implying as it does a temporary alliance, often of 
former adversaries, to meet a common threat. War continued 
intermittently until 1862, but membership of the coalitio~s 
fluctuated in response to specific grievances and the incidence 
of repressive measures taken by the administration and/or 
the Christians. They are perhaps best described as a series 
of loose alliances, consisting of a core of implacable 
enemies of the Tuo and Mwelebeng tribes and the mission, plus 
an assortment of individuals, clans and tribes induced to 
join the insurgents at different stages and for a variety of 
reasons. The Yengen participated until 1860, but leadership 
passed from the chiefs of this tribe after the exile of Bwarat 
in 1857. Subsequent resistance was mainly inspired by Kawa 
of Pwe, who had been active from the beginning. He was dubbed 
'Napoleon', apparently by English traders. Governor Saisset 
76 
Testard to du Bouzet, 14 Jan. 1856 (encl. in du Bouzet to 
Min., 12 June 1856): ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1856; Rougeyron 
to Superieur-general, [1856], 10 Oct. 1856: APM/ONC, 5d; 
Laurent to Min., 13 Jan. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42; J.M.Villard, 
'Rapports sur les bienfaits et grices re~us de la Tris Sainte 
Vierge': APM/ONC, 2a. 
referred to him early in 1860 as 'l'ame de ces projets 
[against the missions of the north and the French] dont les 
Hyenguene sont les principaux instruments' . 77 He was 
elsewhere described as a minor chief who owed his influence 
to his renown as a warrior: 
... un tres petit chef ... [qui] a acquis depuis 
· quelque temps une certaine importance; il grandit 
tous les jours en attirant a lui les mecontents 
et les mauvais sujets des autres tribus. 11 
etait a Hienghuen [in 1859] avec tout son monde; 
c'est son influence qui a determine et organise 
113 
la resistance. 78 
Apart from the Yengen and the Pwe of Tuo and Konguma, 
it is uncertain which groups joined the alliances at various 
stages. The Tipinje, the coastal Tea Janu, the mountain 
people of Webia (Tea Janu) and Pambwa (Maluma), tribes of 
the north-west coast, members of the family of the Christian 
chief of Wagap, were all reported by European observers to 
have participated at different times. 79 It was stated in 
1856 that the Mwelebeng were opposed by a coalition of fifteen 
77 
Saisset to Min., 1 Feb. 1860: ANM, BB4 723. 
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ANOM, Carton 42; Saisset to Min., 1 Feb. 1860: ANM, BB4 723; 
Mon., 23 Feb. 1862; Villard, 'Rapports sur les bienfaits et 
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.b 80 b h b b bl d pagan tr~ es, ut t e num er was pro a y exaggerate • 
Over the whole period from 1856 to 1862 a tendency can be 
discerned for participation in the resistance to recede to 
more remote areas, as the intransigence of easily accessible 
coastal tribes moderated in the wake of military expeditions. 
Thus, Tipinje seems to have desisted from open hostility 
. 
after an expedition in 1858, while Yengen and the rebel ttibes 
to the north were subdued following a series of reverses during 
1860. 81 Kawa, whose main hamlets were inland, seems, at least 
before 1862, to have escaped the worst setbacks. His defiance 
persisted, and, as was suggested in the quotation above, his 
inland strongholds became a magnet for dissident spirits from 
82 
surrounding tribes. 
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Rougeyron to Superieur-general, [1856]: APM/ONC, Sd. 
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Testard to Min., 29 Aug. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42. 
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Again, after Kawa's submission to the French in 1864, the 
main centres of resistance receded even further inland. The 
standard bearer of the traditional cause became yet another 
fairly minor chief, Gondu, who had fought with Kawa against the 
French in 1862. His power and prestige increased rapidly with 
his successful defiance of the French, and an aggressive policy 
of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of established 
clans, which eventually carried him across the central watershed 
to the western slopes of the main range. His expansionism began 
in part as a result of French repression in the Wagap area, and 
dragged the colonial authorities into traditional conflicts, 
because of the dislocation which he caused to settlement 
patterns in an entire region. Gondu was finally tracked down an 
killed by a force of French soldiers and Melanesian auxiliaries 
in 1868, after his betrayal by a relative. 
European opinion varied as to the danger posed by 
the coalitions. The missionaries initially saw a real threat 
to the survival of the missions of Tuo and Pwebo,and in the 
early stages contemplated abandonment of these stations and 
1 f h i ' h h 83 Th resett ement o t e r supporters ~n t e sout • e 
failure of the pagan alliance to achieve victory in 1856 gave 
new heart to the missionaries and the Christians, and despite 
subsequent crises the survival of the mission stations of 
the north was only momentarily in doubt. 
While Melanesian intransigence in the north-east 
provided a constant headache for the administration, and 
necessitated an unwelcome expenditure and dispersion of forces, 
it was generally believed that tribal divisions and diversity 
of language would prevent the formation of an opposing party 
large and unified enough to pose a permanent threat to the 
security of the colony: 
83 
Heureusement toutes ces tribus sont divisees 
par d'anciennes haines, et, parlant des langues 
tout a fait differentes, sont incapables de se 
reunir. Presque partout, et avant peu, nous aurons 
pour auxiliaires, contres les tribus voisines, celles 
dont nous occupons le territoire. 8l 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, [1856], 7 June, 10 Oct. 1856: 
APM/ONC, 5d. 
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Du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855b: Carton 40, CG 1855; see alsc 
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Potentially dangerous opposition in the south had been 
suppressed with more limited forces than the administration 
commanded by 1860. The immediate danger to missionaries and 
settlers in the north was disturbing, but in practice it was 
felt to be only a matter of time before the resources of the 
colony would increase sufficiently to enable Melanesian 
resistance to be defeated in detail. This proved to be the 
case, although it was nearly sixty years before the last 
manifestation of open hostility was suppressed. On at least 
two occasions during the 1850's the rebels failed to press an 
early advantage because of dissension within the coalition, and 
most of Kawa's allies seemed to be insufficiently dedicated to 
his cause to persevere until final victory was achieved. 
Unanimity was difficult to attain, and tended to break down 
once limited objectives had been reached or setbacks suffered. 
A few non-Christian tribes were always prepared to fight 
against the coalitions, although on occasions they proved to 
be faint-hearted and unreliable allies. 85 In the long run, 
the cooperation of Melanesian auxiliaries was to prove 
probably the single most important factor in the French 
conquest of New Caledonia, and in the repression of almost ever· 
uprising from the first in 1856 to the last in 1917. 
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It was not until November 1857, after two years of 
intermittent warfare and frequent plots against Tuo, Mwelebeng 
and the mission, in all of which the Yengen played a leading role, 
that the administration actively intervened. Bwarat was 
arrested by Governor du Bouzet and subsequently exiled to Tahiti. 
He was replaced as chief by his brother Mweau, who was ordered to 
refer any inter-tribal disputes to the Governor for settlement. 
In return the Yengen were promised protection as long as they 
86 fulfilled their engagements and behaved well towards Europeans. 
Du Bouzet was a humanitarian who wanted to act with justice towards 
New Caledonians, but was thwarted by the expanding need of the 
colony for land, and by the violence with which many Melanesians 
87 
opposed mission influence and European settlement. His main 
reason for the action taken at Yengen was to protect the Mwelebeng, 
to prevent a war which would impose a serious drain on the limited 
resources of the colony and hinder the work of the mission. He 
believed that Bwarat had repeatedly provoked disaffection with 
88 French rule in areas as far away as Balad and the Loyalty Islands. 
86 
'Decision du Gouverneur nommant le chef d 1Hienguen', 17 Nov .. 185 
ANOM, Carton 69; du Bouzet to Min., 25 Nov. 1857b:ANOM, Carton 42. 
87 
Du Bouzet to Min., 16 Feb. 1855: ANM, BB4 723; 20 June 1855: ANOM 
Carton 40, CG 1855; du Bouzet to Le Bris, 4 Mar. 1856 (encl. in du 
Bouzet to Min., 12 June 1856): ibid., CG 1856. C£ du Bouzet to Min. 
10 May 1857, 25 Nov. 1857a, 27 Feb. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42. 
88 
Du Bouzet to Min., 25 Nov. 1857b: ANOM, Carton 42. If true, this 
gives a distorted impression of the extent of Bwarat's influence, 
since strong traditional ties existed between Yengen and Balad and 
Yengen and the Loyalty Islands, especially Uvea. These were thus 
areas most likely to be susceptible to his influence. 
11 ~ 
From the point of view of the administration the 
governor's action was moderate and conciliatory, given Bwarat's 
reiterated defiance of French authority. To the Yengen, howeve 
the intervention of the government in a private quarrel betweer 
traditional enemies was an unjustifiable encroachment on the 
t~ibe's independence. The exile of their chief infuriated 
them, but failed to remind them of the military power at the 
89 government's disposal. Shortly after Bwarat's arrest a 
small boat was pillaged at Konguma. Although the attackers 
were said to have been Bwarat's allies, the chiefs of Pwe and 
Tipinje, they were probably more interested in plunder than in 
a demonstration of scorn for French authority. They refused to 
pay reparations, and early in 1858 the recalcitrant tribes 
were punished. Several villages, said to belong to Kawa and 
his followers, were burned, canoes and gardens were destroyed 
and a number of Melanesians killed. The impact of this 
operation, and of another expedition sent at about the same 
90 
time against the turbulent Bonde tribe, was considerable. 
The Yengen, resentful, but shaken by the loss of their chief, 
89 
Testard to Min., 23 Apr. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42; Guillain to 
Min., 10 Aug. 1863: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64; Garnier 1901:3 
90 
Du Bouzet to Min., 5 Jan., 27 Feb. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42; 
Testard to Min., 23 Apr., 8, 21 June 1858: ibid.; Rougeyron to 
Superieur-general, [April 1858]; Degenine to Procureur, 14 July 
1858: APO; du Bouzet to Min., 25 Aug. 1858b: ANM, BB4 723; 
du Bouzet to Saisset, 25 Oct. 1858: ANOM, Carton 231. 
. 11 ~ 
91 
made repeated requests for a missionary and a military post. 
But without a large, permanent garrison in the area, the 
pacifying effect could only be short-lived. Open hostility 
did not peappear, however, until December 1858, when the chapel 
at Pwebo was burned, apparently on Mweau's orders. 
Immediately after this incident Montrouzier started a 
mission station at Yengen, despite the misgivings of most of 
92 his colleagues. He and his companion were coldly received, 
were treated initially with indifference and later with open 
hostility. Only Bwarat's son, apparently in the hope that his 
father would be returned, behaved civilly towards them. In 
May 1859 a coalition led by Kawa and Mweau attacked the tribes 
of Tuo and Wagap, and threatened to fall upon the missionaries 
at Yengen. Since their safety could no longer be guaranteed, 
and the mission had been totally unsuccessful, it was abandoned 
The reaction of the Yengen to the Marists had changed little 
since 1849, and they showed interest only in the pipes and 
tobacco which the missionaries used for trade. 93 
91 
Testard to Min., 23 Apr., 29 Aug. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42; du 
Bouzet to Min., 25 Aug. 1858a: ibid.; Rougeyron to Superieur 
general, [April 185 8] : APO; Mont rouz ier to his b rather, 8 Mar. 
1859: APM/Personal file (Montrouzier); Montrouzier to ? 
15 May 1859: APM/ONC, 26g. 
92 
Gagniere toProcureur, 2 Jan. 1859: APO; Montrouzier to his 
brother, 8 Mar. 1859: APM/Personal file (Montrouzier). 
93 
Montrouzier to his brother, 8 Mar. 1859: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier); Montrouzier to Procureur, 6 Mar., 5 June 1859; 
Vigoroux to Procureur, May 1859; Muraour to Procureur, 15 May 
1859; Rougeyron to Procureur [c.August 1859]: APO; Montrouzier 
to ? , 15 May 1859: APM/ONC, 26g. 
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IN May 1859 a new Governor, Jean Saisset, arrived in New 
Caledonia, accompanied by reinforcements to the garrison of 
the colony. The latter included a company of twenty-six 
Tahitians, who were shortly to be used to good effect in the 
repression of New Caledonians. 94 Saisse~s commission directed 
him to lessen expenditure, abandon the Balad post, occupy 
Kanala and concentrate the forces at his disposal in the 
pacified region of the south. 95 Yet within a month of his 
arrival he decided that the best way to carry out the 
intentions of his superiors was to lead two powerful 
expeditions against tribes thought to be hostile to French 
influence. The first was against the remnants of the defeated 
southern tribes, which men on the spot had considered to be 
96 
of negligible importance for well over a year. The second 
was against Yengen. 
Saisset justified the latter expedition partly in terms 
of the long term hostility of the Yengen, and the open defiance 
which they had demonstrated since Bwarat's arrest towards both 
the captains of visiting warships and Montrouzier. His main 
94 
'Le chef Tariirii en Nouvelle-Caledonie', Mon., 28 June 1868. 
95 
Saisset to Testard, 15 Nov. 1858; Saisset to Min., 13 Feb. 
1859: ANOM, Carton 42; Min. to Durand, 15 Mar. 1860 (draft): 
ANOM, Carton 25. 
96 
Du Bouzet to Saisset, 25 Oct. 1858: ANOM, Carton 231; Durand 
to Min., 26 May 1860: ANOM, Carton 42; [Foucher] 1890:72, 
77. 
reasons, however, seem to have been twofold. He feared that 
the imminent evacuation of the Balad post would be 
misinterpreted as a sign of weakness by the aggressive tribes 
of the vicinity, and he wanted to deal them a vigorous blow 
in order to show who was master; he intended to strike at 
English influence, which he believed to be detrimental both 
to French and Catholic interests. 97 
The activities of English residents were viewed with 
12 
deep suspicion by the colonial authorities in the period before 
1862, when the hold of the government on the northern two-
thirds of the colony was tenuous. Especially suspect were 
those based at Yengen, who were accused of fomenting anti-
9 French sentiments, of gun-running and of excitation to revolt. 
Despite the fears of the French, however, firearms and 
ammunition do not appear to have been extensively used as trade 
goods in New Caledonia, either during the sandalwood period 
or later. The demand for them was at times great, and they 
were certainly traded on occasions, or given as gifts to chiefs 
99 
whose favour was sought. But firearms were relatively 
97 
~isset to Min., 14 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 773; 31 Dec. 1859: 
ANOM, Carton 42; Moniteur universe!, 17 Dec. 1859. 
98 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 15 Jan. 1854: ANM, BB4 701; du 
Bouzet to Saisset, 25 Oct. 1858: ANOM, Carton 231; Saisset to 
Min., 12 Sept. 1859, 1 Feb. 1860; Saisset to Durand, 1 Apr. 186 
ANM, BB4 723; Mon~, 30 Oct., 6 Nov.1859; Durand to Min., 26 May 
1860: ANOM, Ca~n 42. 
99 
Leconte 1847b:853-4; Goujon, 'Journal de l'fle des Pins', 28 
Jan. 1859; Towns to Rule 23 Jan. 1849: Robert Towns, Papers, It 
58; du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855a: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; 
Le Bris to Min., 7 Aug. 1856: ANOM, Carton 42; interrogation 
of Ouambat, 3 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 723. 
12 
expensive, which lessened their appeal to the trader. They 
also tended rapidly to become unserviceable, which increased 
the appeal of other·goods, especially tomahawks, to Melanesians 
After annexation the colonial government enforced regulations 
forbidding the provision of firearms or ammunition to 
Melanesians, and this put a virtual end to a traffic which had 
2 in any case generally been desultory. Saisset was even more 
apprehensive about the arms' trade than his predecessors, and 
his edict of 16 June 1859 imposed severe penalties, which 
the authorities were not slow to invoke, 3 
The operations against Yengen lasted from 1-8 Septembet 
1859. 4 A force of 170 participated, Tahitians, soldierB of 
the Marine Infantry and sailors, supported by the boats of the 
steam-sloop Styx, armed with artillery. Some Melanesian 
auxiliaries also seem to have taken part, including Gwa of 
1 
Du Bouzet to Min., 25 Oct. 1857b: ANOM, Carton 42; interrog-
ation of Frederick Williams, 4 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 723; Rochas 
1862: 185, 209; Shineberg 1967: ch.12. 
2 
The first such regulation was du Bouzet's ~rriti interdisant 
le commerce des armes et des munitions de guerre', 22 Jan. 1855 
ANOM, Carton 68; see also MacGillivray 1864a. 
3 
'Arreti relatif au trafic des armes et des munitions de guerre 
16 June 1859: BO 1859-60:122-6; Saisset to Min., 1 July 1859: 
ANOM, Carton 59; 12 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 723; Paddon to Loring, 
15 Sept. 1859 (encl. in Adm. to F.O., 8 Dec. 1859): PRO, FO 
27/1321; Mon., 5 Nov. 1859. 
4 
'Ordres du jour du Gouverneur pendant l'expidition d'Hienguene 
1-9 Sept. 1859: BO 1859-60:162-70; Saisset to Min., 12 Sept. 18 
ANM, BB4 723; 14-sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 773. 
tz: 
Puma, a relative and ally of Bwarat. Aid offered by the 
missionaries was declined on the grounds that it might 
compromise their position with the Melanesians. 5 During 
four separate operations most of the villages and gardens of 
the Yengen tribe were devastated, including those of Mweau 
near Kulnwe and Bwarat at Kalegon. The French penetrated 
inland along the Yengen river as far as a ford about six 
miles upstream, and destroyed the ancestral hill-village of 
the Bwarat clan at Kamedan, together with nine large villages 
and more than 300 huts. Similar devastation was carried out 
for some miles along the Tangen river. 
Two Frenchmen, including a captain of Marine Infantry, 
were killed and twenty-five wounded, while the French claim 
forty New Caledonian lives. All the French and most of the 
Melanesian casualties occurred during the first two days, when 
heavy fighting took place as the Yengen and their allies tried 
desperately to save the coastal villages. After the 
destruction of Bwarat's village at Kalegon the defenders 
appeared to lose heart, and made little concerted attempt to 
prevent the loss of their hamlets and gardens, or to harass 
the French detachments. To the commander of the Styx such 
behaviour provided clear evidence of the internal fragmentation 
of New Caledonian tribes, and their lack of centralized 
political leadership: 
5 
De Broglie to ? , 28 Dec. 1859: APM/ONC, 4; cf. MacGillivt 
1864b, who claimed that the Mwelebeng participated. 
12 
L'Individualisme est tout a fait dans les moeurs 
de ces sauvages; nous l'avions vu a Hienghuen. 
Les diverses fractions de cette tribu qui est une 
des plus puissantes de la Nouvelle-Caledonie n'ont 
combattu que pour la defense de leur propres villages. 
Yet in the decade after annexation French policy towards 
Yengen was generally based on the premise that the tribe 
formed an integrated unit, solidly unified behind all-powerful 
chiefs, and as such posed at least a potential threat to 
French dominance. 
Saisset's reports mentioned four separate occasions 
on which Europeans, or people supposed to be Europeans, were 
7 
seen in the ranks of the enemy. Three other white men, two 
6 
Forget to Min., 15 June 1860: Collection Margry. 
7 
Saisset to Min., 9 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 773; 12 Sept. 1859: AN 
BB4 723. After the expedition, Saisset passed an edict 
expelling from the colony on pain of death five Europeans 'vus 
avec l'ennemi' at Yengen ('decision du Gouverneur', 10 Sept. 
1859: BO 1859-60:170-U~ ~six Europeans said to have been 
resident at Yengen at the time of the expedition, only one was 
actually present (interrogation of William Smith, 3 Sept. 1859; 
'proces-verbal d'information', 7 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 723). Thr 
were shot and three named in the edict, together with two other 
men who had connections at Yengen. Of the eight, only one caul 
possibly have been involved in the fighting, and he voluntarily 
surrendered about two hours after military operations got 
under way (interrogations, 3 & 4 Sept. 1859; 'proces-verbal 
d'information', 7 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 723; MacGillivray 1864b) 
MacGillivray asserted that 'the "white men" seen fighting among 
the Yengen natives, resolve themselves into a well known 
Albino'. His informant was an American, Charles Folger, said to 
have been present at the executions and to have written an 
account of the affair for Selwyn. Commodore Loring of the Royal 
Navy's Australian Station suggested on the basis of limited 
information that 'the justification of this execution rests on 
whether these Europeans did actually assist the natives against 
the French' (encl. in Adm. to F.O., 28 Dec. 1859: PRO, FO 
27/1321). See also Loring to Adm., 10 Oct. 1859: ibid. 
Englishmen and an American, were taken prisoner. One gave 
himself up soon after fighting began, and the other two were 
captured when they tried to enter Yengen bay in unwitting 
violation of a recent edict which forbade communication with 
the tribes of the region. The most serious French casualties 
were caused by gunshot wounds, although their enemies had o~ly 
few muskets, which Saisset claimed were in the hands of 
renegade Europeans. He attributed the French deaths to them, 
although none of the four white men reported amongst the enemy 
8 
was said to have had a firearm. The small number of firearms 
on the Melanesian side, and Saisset's contention that these 
were in European hands, contradict French assertions of 
uncontrolled gun-running in the area. Saisset's reactions are 
perhaps explained by events on and after 5 September. On that 
day the command post of the expedition appeared to be the 
particular target of attacks by groups said to contain a white 
man. Saisset assumed that they could only have been organized 
by Europeans, although in this he dangerously under-estimated 
Melanesian military expertise and tactical sense. In his 
orders of the day of 7 September Saisset declared: 'Le 
Gouverneur saura remplir les devoirs rigoureux qu'une pareille 
attitude d'etrangers meprisables lui impose. Il sera inflexibJ 
Accordingly, after a summary trial the three captured 
8 
'Ordre du jour', 9 Sept. 1859: BO 1859-60:169; cf. Moniteur 
universel, 17 Dec. 1859. 
126 
Europeans were shot on the beach, 'a l'effet de servir d' 
exemple aux Europeans'. They were accused of taking an active 
part in the resistance to the French, and/or of providing the 
Yengen with firearms and ammunition. Two at least were 
unsavoury characters, and it is not unlikely that they had in 
the recent past helped Mweau procure an occasional musket, and 
given him small amounts of powder and shot. But the evidence 
against all three, which was recorded in detail and sent to 
Paris by Saisset in an attempt to justify his actions, was 
entirely circumstantial or based on hearsay. They seem to have 
been the victims of the governor's chagrin at the apparently 
personal attacks of 5 September, and of his determination to 
strike fear back into the hearts of itinerant traders throughou 
9 the colony. His orders of the day made no mention of the 
presence of Europeans in the Melanesian ranks before 7 Septembe 
and the subsequent stress laid on their activities probably 
reflected his apprehension about the likely reaction in Paris 
to the executions. His reports of the incident, especially one 
written on 9 September, all showed an anxious awareness of 
possible repercussions; his justifications were elaborate, and 
10 the language used emotive: 
9 
Cf. MacGillivray 1864b. 
10 Villegeorges to Saisset, 20 June 1859; interrogations, 3 & 4 
Sept. 1859: 'proces-verbal d' information', 7 Sept. 1859; 
~roc~s-verbal d'inventaire des objets trouves a bord d'une barq 
Anglaise le 3 septembre 1859 1 ; verdict of the commission, 8 Sep 
1859; 'decision ordonnant l'execution de trois Europeans a 
Hyenguene', 8 Sept. 1859; Saisset to Min., 12 Sept. 1859: ANM 
BB4 723; 'ordres du jour', 7 & 9 Sept. 1859: BO 1859-60:169-70; 
Denison to c.o., 11 Oct. 1858 (encl. in C.O. tO F.O., 22 Dec. 
1859): PRO, FO 21/1321. 
J'attendrai respectueusement, Monsieur le 
Ministre, et je me soumettrai, sans observations, 
a toute decision qui interviendra, au sujet des 
sentiments qui m'ont guide et de l'acte dont j'ai 
ordonne l'execution. Je ne puis que vous affirmer: 
que le sentiment du devoir et le desir de bien 
servir l'Empereur ont toujours ete mon seul guide. 
12 
The harsh measures taken against their compatriots at 
Yengen thoroughly alarmed the English residents of New 
Caledonia. The most prominent, James Paddon, who had settled 
near Port~de-France, and had considerable financial interests 
in the colony, was so fearful for his personal safety that he 
fled to Australia in an open whale-boat. He publicized the 
12 
affair in Sydney and made an official complaint, but 
received little satisfaction from either the New South Wales 
or British governments. Although the latter investigated the 
matter, it agreed with the judgement of the ~vernor of New 
South Wales. He suggested that the men shot were of bad 
character, and probably deserved their fate, while Paddon's 
flight was mainly a result of bad conscience. 13 Despite the 
devious reaction of the French Foreign Office, the British did 
not press the matter, and no diplomatic incident ensued. 14 
11 
Saisset to Min., 9 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 773. 
12 
Paddon to Loring, 15 Sept. 1859 (encl. in Adm. to F.O., 8 
Dec. 1859): PRO, FO 27/1321. 
13 
Denison to c.o., 11 Oct. 1859 (encl. in c.o. to F.O., 22 Dec. 
1859): PRO, FO 27/1321; F.O. Note, 'Colonial Office of Dec. 
22/59', 24 Dec. 1859: PRO, FO 27/1305. 
14 
F.O. to Cow1ey, 30 Dec. 1859: PRO, FO 27/1287; Cow1ey to F.O. 
19 Dec. 1859: PRO, FO 27/1305. 
In the event, although Saisset's actions against the 
traders were criticized because of the possible embarrassment 
15 
which might have resulted, he received official support on 
this issue. In December 1859 a version of the events at 
Yengen was published in the Moniteur universe!, and was 
subsequently reprinted in at least two French journals. The 
report attempted to justify Saisset's behaviour by flagrant 
16 distortion of the record presented in his own despatches. 
Nonetheless, Saisset was relieved of his post in 
December 1859 primarily because of dissatisfaction over his 
17 
conduct at Yengen. Most severe criticism was directed not at 
the executions, but at the expedition itself. The provocation 
given by the Yengen was thoug~not to warrant the harsh 
measures used. His actions had dangerously over-extended the 
limited resources of the colony, and risked a violent reaction 
which would cause the administration serious embarrassment: 
15 
Min. to Durand, 15 Mar. 1860 (draft): ANOM, Carton 25. 
16 
Moniteur universe!, 17 Dec. 1859; Revue algerienne et colonia 
Dec. 1859, I:394-7; Nouvelles annales de la marine et revue 
coloniale 1860, 23:98-100. The captured Europeans were depicted 
as 'le principal agent de l'insurrectiou' and 'ses complices ..• 
pris les armes a la main', obviously guilty and deserving the 
death penalty under martial law. Saisset's decision to execute 
them was said to be a painful one, taken as a last resort to 
save his beleaguered troops, who were locked in desperate 
combat with a numerous enemy. The latter, it was said, were led 
and organized by renegade Europeans, escaped convicts mostly, 
who abandoned their Melanesian allies after the execution of 
their companions, and thus gave victory to the French. 
17 Cowley to F.O., 19 Dec. 1859:PRO, FO 27/1305; 'Note pour la 
Direction', 14 Mar. 1860: ANOM, Carton 168. Eleven years later 
Saisset achieved brief notoriety as a monarchist opponent of 
the Paris Commune. He earned from Marx's Russian editors the 
index entry 'reactionary monarchist' (Marx & Engels, Selected 
Works, Vol. I, Moscow 1951:466, 604). 
Je n'ignore pas que ces populations etaient 
tres excitees, qu'elles avaient des menanes 
et que !'evacuation meme du poste de Balade 
par suite d'ordres anterieurs dent elles n' 
avaient point connaissance, pouvait etre mal 
interprete par elles - Mais ces considerations 
ne pouvait motiver un acte aussi grave que d' 
engager la lutte dans le Nord pendant que les 
1 
affaires du Sud n' etaient point encore terminees... 1: 
By the time these opinions were expressed, the worst fears of 
the minist~r had been realized. The pagan tribes of the 
north-east, led by Kawa and including the Yengen, united early 
in December 1859 with the avowed intention to obliterate 
mission influence in the north, to kill the Christian chief 
Bonu and destroy the villages and gardens of the Mwelebeng in 
revenge for the arrest of Bwarat and the devastation wreaked 
19 
at Yengen. Saisset's isolated expedition had completely 
the opposite effect to that anticipated, especially as he was 
20 
unable to follow it up as planned. Far from being intim-
idated, the hostile tribes reacted with fury, which, since 
the administration maintained no presence in the region, could 
only be directed against the Christians and the missionaries. 
The long-standing grievances of the pagans against the latter, 
whom they blamed for the repression at .Yengen, only exacerbate' 
21 their animosity. 
18 
Min.to Durand, 15 Mar. 1860 (draft): ANOM, Carton 25. 
19 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 7 Dec. 1859: APO; Saisset to Min., 
1 Feb. 1860: ANM, BB4 723. 
20Montrouzier to Procureur, 13 Sept. 1859: Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 27 Oct. 1859: APO; Saisset to Min., 31 Dec.1859: 
ANOM, Carton 42. 
21 Rougeyron to Procureur, 7 Dec. 1859; Montrouzier to Procureu1 
7 Apr. 1860: APO; Durand to Min., 26 May 1860: ANOM, Carton 42; 
cf. Saisset, 'Note', [1861]: ibid. 
13 
The missionaries were conscious that association of 
the mission with the government's repressive measures would 
damage its reputation in most Melanesian eyes. They were 
careful to stress that the arrest of Bwarat and the expedition 
of 1859 were affairs of the administration, in which they playE 
22 
no part, and over which they had no control. Nevertheless, 
Bwarat and his tribe were well aware that an important 
reason for these measures was their overt hostility towards 
23 
the Marists and the Christians of Tuo and Mwelebeng; the 
missionaries were certainly not sorry to be rid of Bwarat, 
and only the violence of the pagan reaction caused them later 
24 to question the wisdom of Saisset's expedition. In 1860 
one of their number advised the government strongly against 
allowing Bwarat's return, and was primarily responsible for 
25 the abandonment of the idea. In 1863, when Governor 
22 
Rougeyron to Supirieur-giniral, [April 185~; Gagni~re to 
Procureur, 2 Jan. 1859; Rougeyron to Procureur, [ c.Aug.l859]: 
APO; Montrouzier to ? , 15 May 1859: APM/ONC, 26g. 
23 
Du Bouzet to Min., 25 Nov. 1857b: ANOM, Carton 42; Testard to 
Selwyn, 19 June 1858: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64; Saisset to 
Min., 14 Sept. 1859: ANM, BB4 773; Garnier 1901:313. 
24 
Digenine to Procureur, 14 July 1858; Rougeyron to Procureur, 
7 Dec. 1859; Montrouzier to Procureur, 7 Apr. 1860: APO. 
25 
Durand to Min., 31 Dec. 1860, 12 Aug. 1861: ANOM, Carton 26, 
CG 1855-64; Min. to Commandant des Etab1issements fran~•is de 
l'Ocianie, 22Nov. 1861 (draft); Min.to Durand, 22 Nov. 1861 
(draft): ibid. 
13 
Guillain determined to reinstate him a chief of his tribe, the 
missionaries were disturbed, and interpreted this action, 
rightly, as a blow directed at their influence. 26 
MOMENTARILY in December 1859 it appeared that the Christians 
of Mwelebeng would succumb to the attacks of the pagan 
coalition, especially as Saisset was unable to spare forces 
for their defence. A number of warriors from Conception, 
authorized by the governor to bear firearms, relieved the 
position, and with added support from the Christian chief of 
Wagap, the Mwelebeng were able to prevent a pagan victory. 
Dissension within the coalition provided a respite, and enable( 
Father Jean Villard to organize the defences at Pwebo. War 
began again in March 1860, but Villard's well-drilled troops, 
armed with muskets, won decisive victory by the end of April. 
During May the Mwelebeng, led by Bonu, embarked on a series of 
expeditions against the enemy tribes, in which they won 
successive crushing victories over the Maluma, the Tea Janu 
and the Yengen. Forty-five pagans were said to have been 
killed to two on the Christian side. 27 This campaign 
26 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 1 Apr. 1863; Forestier to Procureur, 
1 June 1863: APO; Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 21 Oct. 
1863:APM/ONC, 20. 
27 
Gagniere to Procureur, 3 Dec. 1859, 12 May 1860; Rougeyron 
to Procureur, 7 Dec. 1859; Gagniere to Rougeyron, 13 Dec. 1859 
Vigouroux to Procureur, 23 Feb. 1860; Villard to Procureur, 
13 May, 16 Aug. 1860: APO; Villard, 'Rapports sur les bienfait: 
et graces': APM/ONC, 2a; Saisset to Min., 1 Feb. 1860: ANM, 
BB4 723. 
established beyond question the dominance of the Mw. lebeng 
in the north-east. Only Kawa refused to submit. Everywhere 
pagan tribes requested missionaries, and meekly accepted 
catechists sent from Pwebo. Under the dual authority of Bonu 
and the missionaries, the Mwelebeng tribe operated as a 
28 
virtual armed theocracy. 
13 
Following the expedition of 1859 Yengen remained under 
interdiction to all Europeans until 1863. Cut off from 
contacts with traders, shaken by military defeat, and anxious 
for Bwarat's return, they attempted to conciliate the 
colonial authorities and eventually sought a rapprochement 
with the mission. Mweau ignored mission teachings until his 
death in 1862, but Bwarat's son, Powe, who had for some time 
been better disposed towards the Marists, was baptized in that 
year. After the death of his uncle he became undisputed chief 
of the tribe, and the future success of the mission seemed 
likely. 29 By the end of 1862 there were 600 catechumens at 
30 Yengen. Early that year Kawa had made a last effort to rid 
28 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 12 July 1860, 23 Oct. 1862; 
Forestier to Procureur, 7 Aug. 1861: APO; Forestier to Poupine: 
4 Dec. 1862: APM/ONC, 19. 
29 
Montrouzier to his brother, 8 Mar. 1859: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier); Gagni~re~to Procureur, 13 Dec. 1859: APO; Mort., 
16 Dec. 1860; Durand to Min., 31 Dec. 1860: ANOM, Carton 26, C< 
1855-64; Forestier to Procureur, 7 Aug., 3 Sept. 1861, 5 Sept. 
1862; Rougeyron to Procureur, 23 Oct. 1862~ APO. 
30 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 2 Nov. 1862: APO. 
13 
the region of mission influence when he and part of the Wagap 
tribe fell upon and destroyed the mission at Tuo and then 
attacked the station at Wagap. The Mwelebeng, accompanied by 
the warriors of Yengen, went to the defence of the besieged 
missionaries. The administration swifty despatched an 
expedition to relieve the situation and took severe reprisals, 
31 
especially against the hostile portion of the Wagap tribe. 
Kawa's resistance was effectively broken, and in October 1864 
he formally recognized French sovereignty and was pardoned 
by Governor Guillain. For similar reasons to Bwarat he 
subsequently became a staunch supporter of the colonial 
~ i 32 reg me. 
THE arrival of Governor Charles Guillain in June 1862 presaged 
a change in the role played by the Yengen in the colony, and 
a reversion by this tribe to an earlier attitude towards 
Christianity and the mission. Early in 1863 the interdiction 
on Yengen was raised, which enabled the resumption of trading 
relations with Europeans. Later that year Guillain allowed 
Bwarat to return from exile in Tahiti, in the expectation that 
31 
Thomassin to Procureur, 4 Feb. 1862; Rougeyron to Procureur, 
1, 5, 23 Feb. 1862: APO; Mon., 23 Feb., 2 Mar. 1862; Analysis 
of a report from Durand to Min., 25 Feb. 1862: ANOM, Carton 
42; 'Rapport du Commandant Hardy sur le champ de bataille a 
Wagap, 1862': APM/ONC, 15a. 
32 
Mon., 14 May, 30 July 1865; Garnier 1871:263-4. 
he would prove to be an energetic and loyal supporter of the 
government: 
Boarat est intelligent et doue de !'esprit de 
reflexion: il comprendra; et, en le retablissant 
dans son ancienne position, comme chef de Hyenguene, 
j'aurai, j'en suis convaincu, dans cette localite 
un energique et devoue partisan du Gouvernement 
13 
Colonial. 33 
Perhaps influenced by his son, he was initially prepared to 
tolerate the missionaries. It was soon made clear to him, 
however, that this would incur official displeasure, a 
situation which he accepted readily enough, since his period 
in exile had inspired in him no love for the missionaries, 
whom he was encouraged to believe had engineered his banish-
34 
ment. Although the administration's attitude towards Bwara 
had changed, the premise on which the attitude was based had 
not. The chief was still believed to be the absolute ruler of 
a large and powerful tribe. The conclusions drawn from this 
assumption were, however, very different. His influence, 
once seen as a threat to the colonial regime, was now regarded 
as an asset, as was his longstanding antagonism towards the 
Catholic missionaries. He was officially encouraged to 
consolidate his authority within the tribe and to extend it 
33 
Gu111ain to Min., 10 Aug. 1863: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64; 
see also de la Richerie to Guillain, 3 July 1863: ibid.; 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 21 Oct. 1863:APM/ONC, 20. 
34 
Forestier to Procureur, 1 Aug., 11 Oct. 1863; Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 18 Aug. 1863, 24 Mar. 1864: APO. 
13~ 
to encompass neighbouring groups over which the Yengen chiefs 
had traditionally enjoyed at best a nominal suzerainty. By 
1869 it was possible to say that 'l'autorite du chef de 
35 Hienguene s'etend presque d'une cote a l'autre', a situation 
which had almost certainly not existed before contact. Once 
he understood what was expected of him ('penetre de ce que 
le Chef de la colonie lui avait dit concernant la necessite d 
. 36) garder soigneusement son autorite sur sa tr1bu' , Bwarat 
played to perfection his dual role of tribal autocrat and 
local government agent and intermediary. French observers, 
who had always praised his intelligence and ability, even 
when they decried his canniba~istic proclivities, his 
Anglophilia and his hostility towards the colonial regime, now 
spoke of him in admiring tones as the very model of chiefly 
excellence: 
C'est le chef le plus reellement chef et le plus 
genereux que je connaisse; sa tribu, la plus riche 
et peut-etre la plus guerriere de toutes celles 
de la Caledonie, obeit religieusement a ses ordres. 3 
Bwarat remained a loyal and valued ally of the 
administration ('le chef le plus devoue a l'Autorite fran~aise 
35 
Mon., 7 March 1869. 
36-
Mon., 3 Oct. 1864. 
37 
Patouillet 1872:51. See also Garnier 1901:225 ('il est du 
tres-petit nombre des chefs actuels qui ont pu conserver de 
l'autorite sur leur sujets'). 
38 
Mon., 29 Jan. 1865. 
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and rejected Christianity for the remainder of his life. He 
provided labourers for public works and participated in most 
of the campaigns of the 1860's, against both pagan tribes 
and the mission-dominated tribes of the north. 39 Apart from 
the opportunity to strike at traditional enemies, Bwarat 
and the Yengen received more tangible rewards for their 
cooperation. Very little land was alienated at Yengen during 
the 1860's; Bwarat was awarded a gold medal for his services 
40 to the French; the tribe was exempt from corvees at Pwebo 
in 1868; its lands were not subject to reorganization along 
with those of most other tribes of the region in 1869-70. 
Bwarat died in about 1875, and shortly afterwards a 
mission station was set up at Ware, on the northern shore of 
the bay. His son, Philippe Powe, who remained an apostate 
until his death in about 1889, adopted an attitude of 
t li d h M . 41 neu ra ty towar s t e ar1sts. Bwarat's eventual success 
in coming to terms with the colonial regime was not emulated 
by at least two of his descendants. His grandson, Philippe D~ 
39 
Mon., 30 Oct. 1864, 24 Feb. 1867; Guillain to Min., 3 
Sept. 1865: ANM, BB4 847; Courrier du Havre, 14 Jan. 1866: 
ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9; Guillain to Min., 4 Dec. 1867: 
ibid. 
40 
'Etat de proposition pour des recompenses en faveur de 
deux chefs de tribus' (encl. in Guillain to Min., 31 
Aug. 1864): ANOM, Carton 171. The medal is still in the 
possession of Bwarat's descendants. 
41 
Lemire 1878:159, 161; O'Reilly 1953:30. 
' " ' '\ •...... ~ 
shot himself in 1919 after being implicated in the 1917 
revolt; his great-great-grandson, Roch, was deposed from the 
chieftainship shortly after World War II following unproven 
allegations of irregularities connected with the collection 
of the capitation tax. The tribe today is headed by a man 
who calls himself Bouarate, but who is only indirectly 
42 
related to the Bwarat clan. Hienghene is one of the 
poorer districts on the east coast, and in some areas 
overcrowding and shortage of land cause severe problems and 
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intra-tribal tensions. In 1870 the tribe was powerful, rich, 
officially well-regarded, and enjoyed considerable internal 
autonomy. Its chief had overcome setbacks to become one of 
the most influential Melanesians in the colony. This state 
of affairs resulted primarily from Bwarat's ability to 
appreciate where power in the colony lay after 1862, and to us 
the conflict of official and mission interests to his own and 
43 his tribe's advantage. In the climate of renewed official 
support for the mission which prevailed after Guillain's 
departure in 1870, the peculiarly advantageous position of the 
Yengen disappeared. Bwarat's successors, less fortunate and 
2 
Guiart 1966:112; Guiart 1968: Notes; personal communication 
of Roch Bouarate, Hienghene, August 1969. 
43 
[Forestier], 'Notes sur la mission de la Nouvelle-Caledonie' 
(1865]: APM/ONC, 15b. 
13f 
perhaps less flexible than he, were forced to accept 
European encroachment upon their lands and their independence. 
Attempted resistance was repressed, and as elsewhere in the 
colony, almost invariably ended in disaster for the 
Melanesians concerned. 
\ ·l 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE MISSION AND THE STATE 
RELATIONS between French officialdom and the Marist mission in 
New Caledonia before 1870 fall into three distinct periods: 
1843 - 1854; 1855 - June 1862; June 1862- August 1870. 
During the first two stages relations were generally amicable; 
the third was remarkable for the flare-up of a peculiarly French 
feud between ultramontane clericalism and a rabid anticlericalism 
tinged with utopian socialist overtones. In the first period 
direct dealings between the missionaries and the agents of France 
involved mainly naval captains of the Pacific, New Zealand and 
Indo-China stations. In general these men were the willing 
auxiliaries of Catholic missionary endeavour, in both its 
national and its religious manifestations. Throughout the 
Pacific, where the influence of English Protestantism had spread 
widely since the arrival of the first representatives of the 
London Missionary Society in Tahiti in 1797, the fortunes of 
Catholicism were closely identified with the political ambitions 
of France. In the almost unevangelized areas of the Western 
Pacific the Marists were frequently regarded in naval circles as 
the vanguard of French penetration into a region where Britain 
had scarcely acquired a foothold. 1 
1 
Lecon~e, 'Notes sur la Nouvelle-Calidonie•, 1847: ANOM, Carton 
40, CG 1847-8i Commandant en chef de la Division navale des 
Cotes occidentales d•Am~rique et de 1• Oceanie to commander of 
the Cornilie, 2 July 1861: ANM, BB4 789. 
14 
Throughout the nineteenth centur~howeve~ French governmer 
and society were riven by a bitter conflict between resurgent 
ultramontane Catholicism and the anti-clericalism which had 
stripped the church of much of its political power and many of 
2 its privileges during the revolutionary era. Evangelistic 
fervour was strong in the French navy, although anti-clericalism 
was not without its disciples, as the Marists in New 
Caledonia were to discover to their cost. In the entire 
period to 1870, however, relations between the Marists and the 
captains of visiting French warships were generally of the 
3 
utmost cordiality. 
Douarre and his companions were given transport to New 
Caledonia on naval vessels, and until 1846 the French flag 
flew above the mission dwelling at Balad. It was withdrawn in 
that year as a gesture of conciliation to the British, but 
naval goodwill towards the missionaries was not impaired. The 
2 
Spencer 1954: passim; Cobban 1965, !!:82-8, 100-1, 124-6, 
187-90, 223-4. 
3 
E.g., du Petit-Thouars to Laferriere, 20 Oct. 1843 (encl. in 
du Petit-Thouars to Min., 11 Nov. 1843): ANOM, Carton 40, CG 
1843; Douarre to Min., 10 Jan. 1844: ibid., CG 1844; Leconte 
1847a:766-7; Rougeyron to Favre, 10 Oct. 1856: APM/ONC, 5d; 
de Broglie to ? , 28 Dec. 1859: APM/ONC, 4; Rougeyron to 
Procureur,S Aug. 1860: APO; Mer to Min., 4 Oct. 1860: ANOM, 
Carton 42; Treve to Forestier, 21 Sept. 1865: APM/ONC, 25; de 
Cintre to Forestier, 27 Feb. 1866: ibid.; Lambert to Procureur, 
19 Jan. 1869: APO. 
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captain of a vessel about to undertake a cruise amongst the 
Pacific missions in 1847 was instructed: 'vous offrirez aide et 
protection aux missionnaires, autant que cela sera en votre 
4 pouvoir'. Four warships visited Balad between 1845 and 1847, 
and on two occasions brought relief to the missionaries in 
difficult or dangerous circumstances. Conversely, the help 
provided by Douarre in 1846 saved the shipwrecked crew of the 
Seine from disaster. Although Douarre's attempt in 1847 to 
induce the government in Paris to reassert French sovereignty 
over New Caledonia proved unsuccessful, it was at least in part 
as a result of missionary fears about the possibility of 
British annexation that the decision was taken in 1853 to annex 
the archipelago in the name of France. 5 
The attitude of the Marists towards annexation by France 
was somewhat ambiguous. Given a choice, they would have 
preferred that European intervention should not occur, and that 
the Melanesians be kept from all contact with non-missionary 
Europeans, at least while they remained at their present stage 
of development: 'si les gouvernements nous laissent encore la 
4 
Instructions enclosed in Gouverneur des Etablissements 
fran~ais de l'Oceanie to Min., 24 Nov. 1847: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 184 7. 
5 
Gouverneur des Etablissements fran~ais de l'Oceanie to Min., 11 
Mar. 1851 (quoting extracts from a letter trom Douarre) :_ANOM, 
Carton 40, CG 1849-52; Commissaire de la Republique aux iles de 
la Societe to Min., 10 Oct. 1851 (reporting the opinions of the 
missionary Gilbert Roudaire): ibid.; Directeur des Colonies, 
Report, December 1852 (draft): ibid. 
paix quelques annees un grand elan sera donne en N.Caledonie'. 6 
Faced with the possibility of a British takeover, however, they 
wholeheartedly welcomed their compatriots, since French 
annexation removed the spectre of the ruin of their work which 
they feared would follow the imposition of British control and 
i fl f P i . . 7 a consequent n ux o rotestant m ss1onar1es. It also made 
possible the e~tension of their activities under conditions of 
unaccustomed security. 
On the other hand, the aims and intentions of the naval 
officers who effected annexation were in some respects 
irreconcilable with those of the missionaries. The latter were 
mainly concerned with the well-being, as they saw it, of the 
indigenous people. In 1850 Douarre, in the belief that 
annexation by Britain was imminent, pledged his mission to the 
Melanesian cause: 
Sans faire de !'opposition au gouvernement Anglais 
ce qui ne conviendrait ni a notre habit ni a nos 
interets ••• nous serons les protecteurs et les 
defenseurs de ces pauvres sauvages, comme nous 
l'aurions ete egalement dans le cas ou le Gouvernement 
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fran~ais eut maintenu sa prise de possession. 8 
6 
Gagniere to Superieur-general, 18 Sept. 1853: APM/ONC, 21. 
7 
Cf. the attitudes of British missionaries in similar circumstances 
They tended to be isolationist and anti-annexation, until the 
threat of a French takeover and its presumed concomitant, the 
promotion of Catholicism, caused them to demand some form of 
British protectorate or even outright annexation (Gunson 1964-5: 
300-2). 
8
nouarre to S~perieur-general, 2 July 1850: APM/ONC, 5b; see also 
Montrouzier to his brother, 14 Oct. 1853: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier). 
The missionaries wished to create a situation whereby 
Melanesians would accept certain aspects of European 
civilization, especially the Christian religion, and yet 
remain beyond the influence of European vice. In the eyes of 
most of the Marists, an agglomeration of Europeans was notable 
mainly ror the prevalence of vice, and the influence of 
sailors, soldiers, colonists and traders was regarded as 
detrimental to the interests and future of the mission. While 
Montrouzier was the most vocal exponent of this view, all 
the missionaries shared it to some extent: 
•.• je suis porte a conclure que si la presence 
de nos navires est avantageuse sous un rapport 
en ce qu'ils donnent un peu de credit aux 
missionnaires aux yeux des naturels, d'un autre 
cote elle leur est fort nuisible par la mauvaise 
conduite et le mauvais exemple qu'ils donnaient. 
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9 
The naval officers, however, had to implement annexation, crush 
any sign of recalcitrance as attempted revolt against legally 
constituted authority, and create conditions of security in 
9 
Goujon, 'Journal de l'ile des Pins', 3 Nov. 1850; see also 
Douarre to Poupinel, 30 Dec. 1845: APM/ONC, Sa; Montrouzier 
to eveque de Montpellier, 4 Nov. 1855: ibid., 26d; Montrouzier 
to his brother, 10 Nov. 1855: APM/Personal file (Montrouzier); 
Montrouzier to Procureur, 7 Apr. 1860; Rougeyron to Procureur, 
22 Nov. 1861, 23 Feb. 1862: APO. 
which the new colony could be developed as rapidly as 
possible, in order to recompense France for the inevitable 
early expense of obtaining it. 10 
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Whatever the potential for future conflict of interests, 
the missionaries initially gave full cooperation to the naval 
commanders, and simultaneously attempted to turn the new 
dispensation to their own advantage. They mediated with the 
chiefs of Puma, Mwelebeng and the Isle of Pines to obtain 
recognition of French sovereignty; they smoothed over 
misunderstandings; they used their influence to discourage 
violent opposition by Melanesians, and when a collision 
occurred they persuaded the French not to take harsh reprisals. 
At the same time the missionaries sought legal titles to 
the lands they occupied, 11 and encouraged the adoption of 
legislation like the Puma and Mwelebeng codes of law, which 
embodied many of the reforms they considered necessary. They 
hoped the codes would reinforce the authority of well-disposed 
chiefs, and safeguard the position of the Christians at 
Balad and Pwebo. Missionary efforts on behalf of France won 
10 
Min. to Febvrier des Pointes, 28 Feb. 1854 (draft): ANOM, 
Carton 40, CG 1854; Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854: 
ibid. 
11 
[Forestier], 'Proprietes et biens de la mission', 18 May 1860: 
APM/ONC, 3; du Bouzet to Min., 20 June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1855. 
warm praise from Febvrier des Pointes and Tardy de Montravel, 
the men who had most to do with the foundation of the colony. 
They considered that mission influence at Balad, Pwebo and 
the Pines played a vital role in modifying the savagery of 
the inhabitants and disposing them to accept French domination 
12 peacefully. The official instructions given to du Bouzet, 
the first $Overnor of the colony, echoed these sentiments: 
M: de Montravel se loue d'une man1ere toute 
particuliere de la franche cooperation qu'il 
a trouvee chez les Peres de la mission, et 
il fait ressortir l'utilite du secours qu'il 
en a re~u dans les relations avec les indigenes 
comme pour le bien et re des equipages. J' invite 
cet officier a les en remercier de ma part. 
Je n'ai pas besoin de vous recommander de ne 
negliger de votre cote, aucune occasion pour 
leur temoigner toute la reconnaissance du 
Gouvernement. 13 
Early in 1854, however, the missionaries had a foretaste of 
vexations which would recur as a result of the contradictory 
goals of the mission and the colonial administration. Tardy de 
Montravel refused to intervene in a minor intra-tribal squabble 
in support of a Christian chief. He stressed that the 
administration's guarantee of protection in return for loyalty 
and good behaviour could only be invoked in exceptional 
circumstances, such as open revolt or a complete breakdown of 
12 
Febvrier des Pointes to Min., 5 Dec. 1853: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 
1853; Tardy de Montravel to Min., 27 Apr. 1854: ibid., CG 1854; 
Rougeyron was awarded the Legion d' Honneur on des Pointes's 
recommendation. 
13 Min. to du Bouzet, 24 Aug. 1854 (draft): ANOM, Carton 40, CG 
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1854; see also Min. to Tardy de Montravel, 24 Aug. 1854 (draft): 
ibid. 
146 
authority. He was determined not to set a precedent which 
might lead to frequent demands for official intervention in 
petty traditional quarrels, and which would expose the 
d i i i i f i h . 14 a m n strat on to accusat ons o part sans 1p. 
A key feat~reof the colonial regime in New Caledonia in the 
period to 1870 was the refusal or inability of the home 
government to provide the men on the spot with adequate resources 
15 to meet the demands of a developing colony. This affected 
almost every action taken by the administration, and its 
relations with every sector of the population. Before 1862 
shortage of forces and funds led the authorities to value 
loyalty in Melanesians above all else, and they were prepared 
to reward it and to buy it at the expense of the mission. It was 
from the beginning an official maxim that imposition of 
Christianity was not a necessary consequence of annexation. 
Peaceful rejection of the mission was not punished, provided 
Melanesians gave active support and complete obedience to the 
administration, and did not use violence. Tardy de Montravel 
described Bwarat's apparent change in attitude once he had 
been reassured on that score: 
14 
••• quand •.• je lui eus affirme que toute 
liberte lui restait de continuer a vivre dans 
l'idolatrie ou d'embrasser le catholicisme •.. 
il s'opera en lui une reaction complete. 16 
Correspondence between Tardy de Montravel and Montrouzier, 11 
Mar. 1854: ANOM, Carton 67. 
15
see Appendix II. 
16 Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 
1854. 
The Puma learned early, and after Bweon's deposition remained 
obedient allies of the government, although they had rejected 
the mission. In the south, where the ability of the 
administration to repress resistance became most immediately 
obvious, tribes such as Manongwe and Kanala also supported the 
authorities and provided auxiliaries in wars against hostile 
17 tribes, whilst ignoring the mission. But the Yengen, despite 
de Montravel's promise, failed to appreciate the lesson until 
after 1862, because their previous experience seemed to 
indicate that the missionaries and the Mwelebeng chiefs were at 
least as powerful as the government, and that the interests of 
mission, Mwelebeng and administration were identical. 
Limited resources, however, was also a factor which 
encouraged official goodwill towards the mission before 1862. 
During this period the administration, by necessity and under 
orders from Paris, concentrated on the southern third of the 
colony, which was virtually pacified by 1860, with the aid of 
18 Melanesian auxiliaries, both Christian and pagan. Apart from 
17
on Kanala, see Le Bris to Min., 7 Aug. 1856: ANOM, Carton 42; 
Durand to Min., 30 June 1861: ibid.; cf. Montrouzier to his 
family, 15 Dec. 1859: AMO, 1:419. On the Manongwe, see E. Bourgey, 
'Mort du chef Watton': Mon., 27 Jan. 1867; A.Mathieu, 'Aper~u 
historique sur la tribu~s Houassios ou des Manongoes': Mon., 
12 Jan. 1868; cf. Lambert to Procureur, 4 Feb. 1867: AP0.---
18 
Saisset to Testard, 15 Nov. 1858; Saisset to Min., 13 Feb., 31 
Dec. 1859; Saisset to Durand, 1 Apr. 1860: ANOM, Carton 42; Durand 
to Min., 20 July 1859, 26 May 1860:ibid.; Saisset to Min., 1 Feb. 
1860: ANM, BB4 723; Min. to Durand, 15 Mar.l860 (draft): ANOM, 
Carton 25. 
the small Balad post, abandoned in 1859, and a larger one at 
Wagap, which was not created until early in 1862, direct 
government influence was only felt in the north when punitive 
expeditions were sent against recalcitrant tribes. Without 
permanent surveillance, military repression failed to inculcate 
19 lasting respect among the more belligerent Melanesians. 
Throughou~ much of the north the main continuing pro-colonial 
influence was that of the mission and the partly Christian 
Mwelebeng tribe, and Melanesian hostility in this region tended 
to be directed against the missionaries and their supporters. 
The administration was generally well-disposed towards the 
mission before 1862, not least because it was believed to have 
an important civilizing and pacifying influence, especially in 
areas where official action was limited by the shortage of men 
20 
and resources. Where possible the authorities despatched 
expeditions to punish the rebellious tribes of the north. But 
148 
in practice during this period the missionaries relied very much 
on their own resources and those of their supporters, and 
government action tended to be retaliatory rather than 
. 21 preventat1.ve. 
19
nurand to Min., 26 May 1860: ANOM, Carton 42; Mon., 7 Oct. 1866. 
20 
E.g., du Bouzet to Saisset, 25 Oct. 1858: ANOM, Carton 231. 
21 
E.g., see above pp. 112-34 passim. 
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22 Of the five men who handled the internal 
administration of New Caledonia between 1855 and 1862 only 
Saisset had other than cordial relations with the Marists. Du 
Bouzet warmly acknowledged the services rendered to the French 
cause by the inhabitants of Conception during 1856 and 1857, 
23 
and regretted that missionary influence was not more extensive. 
He never wavered in his belief that the mission was an 
indispensable ally of the government, and that the civilization 
of the Melanesians and their peaceful acceptance of French 
domination would be achieved more easily where missionary 
influence was felt: 
••. ces dignes pretres sont les auxiliaires 
les plus utiles que nous puissions employer 
pour habituer les indigenes a se soumettre 
a notre autorite et les civiliser graduellement, 
ils n'ont cesse jusqu'a ce jour de nous rendre 
de grands services. 24 
The missionaries, in their turn, were equally appreciative of 
the goodwill of the administration and its efforts on their 
22 
See Appendix I. 
23 
Du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb., 10 June, 7 July 1855: ANOM, Carton 
40, CG 1855; du Bouzet to Rougey+on, 27 Apr. 1855: APM/ONC, 24; 
du Bouzet to Min., 26 Sept., 31 Dec. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42; 
du Bouzet to Saisset, 25 Oct. 1858: ANOM, Carton 231. See also 
Le Bris to Min., 28 Oct. 1856: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1856; Testard 
to Rougeyron, 10 Jan. 1857, 25 Jan., 26 Feb. 1858: APM/ONC, 
la; de Cintre to Min., 9 Jan. 1861: ANM, BB4 1036. 
24 
Du Bouzet to Min., 27 Mar. 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855. 
' .. 
behalf: 'Nous sommes toujours bien avec taus ces messieurs 
du gouvernement, ils nous rendent de vrais services et 
~ i 1 25 rec proquement . 
Nonetheless, while each side favoured cooperation with 
the other, they could only work in complete harmony together 
as long as their interests were complementary, or at least 
not opposed. Yet their priorities usually differed. Rougeyron 
was prevailed upon not to abandon Conception when it was 
attacked by hostile tribes. Cooperation with the government 
on this occasion meant the unwilling abandonment by the 
missionaries of earlier scruples against answering force with 
force. The administration's main concern was less the survival 
of Christianity in the area than the provision of an outpost 
for the defence of Port-de-France. 26 In the very early days 
of the colony, however, the authorities were themselves 
generally reluctant to use force against Melanesians except in 
15( 
the face of extreme provocation and in advantageous circumstances, 
since they feared that to do so would risk a dangerous over-
extension of their resources, and might aggravate rather than 
27 
discourage hostility. Thus du Bouzet refused to try to impose 
25 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 8 Aug. 1855: APM/ONC, 5d; see 
also Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 29 Oct.l855, [1856], 7 June 
1856: ibid.; Rougeyron to Superieur-general, [April 1858]: APO. 
26 
Le Bris to Min., 28 Oct. 1856: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1856; du 
Bouzet to Min., 31 Dec. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42; Testard to 
Rougeyron, (various letters, mostly undated): APM/ONC, la; 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 15 June 1860: APO. 
27 Du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb., 10 June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 
1855; Laurent to Min., 13 Jan. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42; Durand to 
Min., 26 May 1860: ibid.; de Cintre to Min., 9 Jan. 1861: ANM, 
BB4 1036. 
the code of laws upon the uncooperative majority of the 
Mwelebeng tribe at a time when he could not provide a garrison 
in the area, and caused Rougeyron to complain that the 
government did nothing to reinforce the authority of well-
disposed chiefs: 
..• mais ce code, ayant malheureusement cesse d'etre 
soutenu, est tombe en dessuetude [sic]; et ainsi 
les sauvages sont retombes dans leur premier etat. 
Ces chefs [of Puma and Mwelebeng] quoique bien 
disposes, reduits a leurs seules forces, ne peuvent 
rien faire pour le bien de leur pays: Nous-~emes, 
sans secours, ne pourrons agir pendant long-temps que 
faiblement et sur une petite Etendue parmi ces hordes 
indisciplinees qui ne se plaisent que dans la guerre, 
le desordre et la barbarie. 28 
Thus, despite mutual goodwill, missionaries and administrators 
consistently sought to use each other to their own advantage, 
and even in the first flush of mutual enthusiasm frustration 
and irritation sometimes resulted. 
Under the governorship of Saisset this tendency became 
more pronounced. To some extent mission/government relations 
during this period previewed the clashes and conflicts of 
interest which became of major importance under Guillain, and 
the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction was raised, at 
least implicitly. Saisset was an autocratic, energetic man, 
28 
Rougeyron to Min., 2 Aug. 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855. 
The letter bears the following marginal annotation: 'Est-il 
admissible que M. du Bouzet ait laisse retrograder la 
civilisation?' 
15 
who viewed setbacks with impatience and brooked no interference 
with his authority. 29 The Marists were at first impressed 
by his energy and excited by his vision, but were disillusioned 
by the non-fulfilment of many of his promises and the failure of 
his more grandiose plans. It became apparent that the 
missionaries would only remain in official favour as long as 
they acted in accordance with the governor's view of their role 
in the colony, but his reiterated demands that they extend the 
sphere of their activities placed severe strains of the resources 
of the mission. The Marists were resentful that they could not 
obtain permanent titles for all the land to which they laid 
claim, and they complained that Saisset's repressive measures in 
the north served only to exacerbate Melanesian hostility and 
worsen the situation of the missions in this region. 30 
Influenced by the poor relations which he had 
experienced with the Tahitian mission, Saisset arrived in New 
Caledonia suspicious of missionary pretensions, and determined 
to make them conform to the administrative framework of the 
colony. The instructions which he sent from Tahiti several 
months before leaving for New Caledonia expressed this attitude: 
29 
Saisset to Min., 5 June 1859: ANM, BB4 723; Conseil d' 
administration, 2 Jan. 1860: ANOM, Carton 42; Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 29 July, 2, 22 Sept. 1859: APO. 
30 
Fremont to Procureur, 30 May 1859; Montrouzier to Procureur, 
5 June, 17 Aug., 17 Oct. 1859; Rougeyron to Procureur, 8 June, 
29 July, 22 Sept. 1859, [1859], 15 June 1860: APO • 
15: 
En regle generale, vous devez aider nos missionnaires 
autant que possible, mais ne subordonner en aucune 
fa9on les mouvements militaires a leurs demandes ..•• 
Nous devons nous efforcer d' entrer dans la phase de 
la substitution du pouvoir de l'Empereur a celui ou 
a !'influence de la mission, tout en marchant d'un 
commun accord, cette derniere pour evangiliser [sic], 
15 3 
nous pour dominer. 31 
He consistently stressed the value of the work of the mission 
in civilizing Melanesians, however, and regarded its influence 
as an important counter to English and Protestant influence, 
32 
especially in the Loyalty Islands. His dealings with the 
church seem to have been less acrimonious in New Caledonia than 
in Tahiti, but a subsequent attempt by an apologist of the 
governor to deny the existence of conflict is not confirmed by 
33 the evidence of missionary letters. Throughout this period, 
however, the mission enjoyed better relations with Saisset 
than with some of his subordinates. At Kanala and the Isle of 
Pines friction developed between the missionaries and the 
commandants of the local garrisons, while at Port-de-France 
anti-mission feeling was said to be strong amongst some members 
31 
Saisset to Testard, 15 Nov. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42. See also 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 23 Aug. 1859: APO. 
32 
Saisset to Min., 5 June 1859: ANM, BB4 723; Saisset to Min., 
31 May, 20 Aug. 1859: ANOM, Carton 42; Rougeyron to Procureur, 
22 July 1859; Montrouzier to Procureur, 17 Aug. 1859: APO; 
Saisset to Durand, 1 Apr. 1860: ANOM, Carton 42 (' ••• les 
missionnaires ..• sont bien meritants par taus leurs efforts 
pour moraliser la population indigene'); Saisset to Min., 10 Aug. 
1860:. ANM, BB4 1036. 
33 
De Broglie to ? , 28 Dec. 1859: APM/ONC, 4; de Broglie to 
[Superieur-general], 12 Jan. 1860: ibid., lb. 
of Saisset's staff. Furthermore, many settlers and residents 
of Port-de-France resented the apparently favoured treatment 
which the mission had received in regard to land grants, 
especially the large, fertile and well-cited concessions at 
Conception and Saint-Louis, which it held under fairly 
stringent conditions in return for help in the wars of 1856 
and 1857. 34 
Disquiet in Paris over the relationship between the 
local authorities and the mission caused the following 
instructions to be sent to Saisset's successor, Lieutenant 
Colonel Jean Durand, early in 1861. They seem to have been 
motivated more by self-interest than by religious fervour, 
154 
but they reflected a firm belief that missionary influence should 
not be restricted to a purely spiritual sphere: 
34 
Il importe .•• de seconder par tousles moyens 
possibles l'oeuvre des missionnaires, de maniere 
a ce qu'elle puisse nous coaliser les tribus qui 
nous sont encore hostiles. 
Montrouzier to Procureur, 21 Sept., 7 Oct. 1859, 1 Mar., 7 
Apr., 22 May 1860; Rougeyron to Procureur, 15 June 1860: APO; 
de Broglie to [Superieur-general], 12 Jan. 1860: APM/ONC, 1b; 
Forget to Min., 15 June 1860: Collection Margry; Mer to Min., 
4 Oct. 1860: ANOM, Carton 42; Rougeyron to Goujon, n.d. 
(quoted in Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique en Caledonie, et 
de ses rapports avec le Gouvernement colonial', 6 Apr. 1865): 
APM/ ONC , 11 . 
Saisset deliberately appointed a commandant to the Isle of 
Pines in order that the Marists' theocratic grip on tribal 
affairs might be loosened, and recognition of French sovereignty 
imposed (Saisset, 'Compte rendu de la situation de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie et dependances au 31 decembre 1859': ANOM, Carton 42). 
Furthermore, any measure which might compromise missionary 
influence amongst the Melanesians, such as the creation of 
35 
military posts near mission stations, was to be avoided. 
After Saisset's departure mission/government relations 
reflected the support which the Marists enjoyed in Paris and 
the orders given to Durand. The latter's attitude was at first 
correct bnt cool, and provoked Rougeyron to exclaim, late in 
1860: 'nous sommes tres bien avec les gens de la Mer [i.e., the 
commanders of the ships of the local naval station] et 
seulement bien avec ceux de terre [i.e., Durand]' . 36 Although 
Durand later became more warmly disposed, he was never as 
enthusiastic about the mission as du Bouzet had been. But the 
supervision and interference to which missionary activities had 
been subjected under Saisset ceased, as did harassment by local 
military commandants. Prompt action by the authorities in 1862 
saved the missionaries besieged at Wagap. Rougeyron was 
35 
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Min. to Durand, February 1861 (draft): ANOM, Carton 42. These 
recommendations seem to have been based to a large extent on three 
detailed reports submitted to the Minister of the Navy by the 
captains of the warships Styx, Sibylle and Thisbe, which had 
recently returned to France after tours of duty in the Pacific 
(Forget to Min., 15 June 1860: Collection Margry; Mer to Min., 
4 Oct. 1860: ANOM, Carton 42; de Cintre to Min., 9 Jan. 1861: 
ANM, BB4 1036). The most important of the three was that of Mer 
of the Sibylle. He specifically criticized the complete 
disregard by the New Caledonian administration of the rights and 
interests of the Melanesian population and, by extension, the 
official harassment of the missionaries. According to Mer, the 
Marists were the only Europeans to concern themselves with the 
indigenous people. 
36 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 5 Aug. 1860(emphasis in original); see 
also ibid., 12 July 1860: APO. 
exultant at the speed with which help was sent, and remarked 
that for a long time he had had only praise for the actions of 
the administration towards the mission. 37 
THE missionary attitude towards repressive measures taken 
against Melanesians by French naval commanders and later by 
the colonial administration changed noticeably between 1847 and 
1862. There were also differences, which became more obvious 
after 1855, in the reactions of individual missionaries. At 
first the Marists tried as far as possible to avoid the use of 
force, even in situations of extreme danger. They refused to 
defend themselves with firearms, except by shooting into the 
air in an attempt to frighten off attackers. 38 They tried to 
dissuade du Bouzet from reprisals against the Puma in 1847, but 
he insisted that punishment was necessary, since property 
belonging to the state and to the French Oceanic Society was 
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d d d 1 1 i h h f h . i 39 estroye an sto en a ong w t t at o t e m~ss on. In 1850 thE 
missionaries abandoned an attempt to settle a number of ea techumen1 
from ~alad at Yate, in the south-eas~, rather than use firearms 
37 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 12 Jan. 1861, 1 Feb. 1862: APO. 
38 
Grange to Superieur-general, 18 Sept. 1847: APF 1848, 20:176. 
39 
Du Bouzet to Gouverneur des Etablissements .fran~ais. de 
l'Oceanie, 22 Sept. 1847: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1847. 
40 
against hostile local tribes. Later that year, however, a 
Marist lay brother played an active role in the savage 
vengeance taken on the Nenema for the Alcmene massacre. 41 In 
1855 the Balad mission was abandoned when it became obvious 
that a large portion of the tribe was prepared to offer violent 
resistance to the French and their missionary cohorts. 
Before 1856 the mission followed a policy of retreat 
in the face of open Melanesian hostility. In that year, when 
Conception and St-Louis were attacked by dispossessed local 
tribes, the missionaries were persuaded by the authorities to 
remain. 42 Stiffened by a detachment of troops and provided 
with arms by the administration, the Christians successfully 
defended themselves, and later acted as auxiliaries of the 
government in punitive expeditions against the insurgent tribes. 
The same year the missionaries requested official aid in a war 
between Yengen and Mwelebeng, in which the Christians of the 
latter tribe had become involved. The officer who investigated 
40 Douarre to Superirur-general, 10 Jan. 1850: APM/ONC, 5b; 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 10 June 1850: APF 1851, 23:383. 
41 
15 i 
Early in December 1850, while the French corvette Alcmene was 
anchored at Balad, its long-boat was cut off at Yengeban, in the 
Nenema group, and eleven of the crew of fifteen were killed and 
eaten (Berard 1854:125-38). The French took harsh reprisals, and 
claimed to have killed about thirty people, burned fifteen 
villages, destroyed twelve large canoes and devastated gardens on 
four of the Nenema islands (ibid., 150). Brother Jean Taragnat 
actively participated in the campaign as guide and intermediary 
(ibid., 139; Rougeyron to ? , 3 Jan. 1868: APM/ONC, 11). 
42 
Testard to Rougeyron, [1856]: APM/ONC, la. 
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the complaint described with some misgiving as to its efficacy 
the method which the two resident missionaries had adopted 
to bolster the defences: 
•.. les reverends peres, aides des lumieres d'un 
frere lai qui, dans sa jeunesse, avait ete 
pourvoyeur d'une piece a la bataille de Staoueli, 
avaient monte un vieux pierrier dans un tronc d' 
arbre creuse en auge, et esperaient merveilles de 
·ce canon primitif parte a dos d'hommes. 43 
The change in mission policy from resignation to militancy 
was partly a response to government pressure, and partly 
caused by a general change in attitude which occurred after 
Douarre's death in 1853. The earlier policy was mainly a 
result of his conviction that it was better not to proselytize 
44 
at all than to do so with the aid of the sword. His 
confreres, especially Rougeyron, shared this viewpoint, but 
by 1856 successive setbacks had prepared them to accept the 
need for resistance in the face of unrepentant savagery. 
The early policy of retreat was as much a matter of 
necessity as of conviction. Before annexation the Europeans, 
missionaries and traders, who attempted to maintain permanent 
relations with New Caledonians were dependent on Melanesian 
cooperation for their security and for the success of their 
43 
Laurent to Min., 13 Jan. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42. 
44 
Douarre to Superieur-general, 10 Jan. 1850: APM/ONC, 5b. 
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undertakings. Their hosts occupied a position of power, and 
knew it, and Europeans usually fared badly when violence 
occurred. To have tried to maintain themselves by force once 
they had been rejected by the traditional society would have 
exposed the missionaries and their supporters to danger and 
hardship, and at the same time negated the object of the 
missionaries' presence. After 1853 the possibility of armed 
support from the government gradually lessened the problems 
caused by isolation, and, although not immediately apparent, 
led to a change in the relationship of dependence between 
missionaries and Melanesians. 
Where possible, after the consolidation of the French 
position in the south, the administration tried to prevent the 
involvement of the converts of Pwebo, Wagap and Tuo in wars 
and military expeditions against the pagan tribes of the north, 
in order not to distract them from their progress towards 
i il . . 45 c v ~zat~on. The government's iuability to defend the 
mission stations before 1862 destroyed this hope, and the 
purely defensive measures of the Mwelebeng were eventually 
transformed, with missionary help and encouragement, into a 
crusade against the pagans. The hard-line policy of Matthieu 
Gagniere and Jean Villard was very different from the one of 
resignation and retreat which Douarre had advocated, although 
45 
Du Bouzet to Min., 25 Nov. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42; de Broglie 
to ? , 28 Dec. 1859: APM/ONC, 4. 
his viewpoint may well have altered under the changed 
circumstances of the colonial regime. 46 
Although the missionaries were anxious to dissociate 
160 
themselves from the punitive measures taken by the government, 
they hoped that repression would cause previously hostile 
tribes to turn to the mission. After the burning of the Pwebo 
church in 1858, in which Bwarat's brother was implicated, 
Gagniere hoped that the administration would punish the Yengen, 
exact reparations and set up a post there. He felt that a 
missionary could then approach the chastised tribe in the role 
of mediator and benefactor, whereas to send a priest there 
immediately would risk association of the mission with any 
military repression which might occur: 
Si on se hate d'y aller au devant de la paix, 
avant que la justice soit executee, cette tribu 
toujours orgueilleuse pouvait bien au lieu de la 
reconnaissance nous faire sentir son ressentiment 
pour l'affaire de Buarate ••• Si par contre les 
missionnaires arriveront apres le Gouvernement 
pour servir d'intermediaires de la paix apres 
1 'abaissement juste de son orgueil, ils seront 
sans doute regardes comme des bienfaiteurs et des 
sauveurs ••• 47 
Montrouzier, however, held that the importance of the tribe and 
the constant threat of adverse English influence demanded 
immediate action by the mission, and his view held sway. He 
hoped that his presence at Yengen would discourage official 
46 
Gagniere to Procureur, 2 Jan. 1859; Villard to Procureur, 
13 May, 16 Aug. 1860: APO. 
47 
Gagniere to Procureur, 2 Jan. 1859: APO. 
reprisals, and even after his hurried departure he viewed 
48 
with distaste the idea of a punitive expedition. Despite 
these misgivings, he was exultant after the expedition of 
1859, mainly because it seemed to have achieved an important 
victory over the English: 'Les Anglais ont leve le masque. 
C'est fort heureux. 0 i . ' 49 n pourra ma ntenant ag1r . Subsequent 
events a~d the violence of the pagan reaction, however, caused 
him to regret bitterly the 'mesures incomplets' which the 
50 governor had taken at Yengen. 
Rougeyron stressed that the missionaries did not ask 
for the expedition against Yengen, but he did not regret its 
51 
occurrence. He expressed similar sentiments in 1862, in 
regard to Durand's Wagap expedition. Father Eugene Barriol 
tried unsuccessfully to intercede with the administration on 
behalf of four Wagap chiefs who were condemned to death for 
their complicity in the attacks. Rougeyron commented that 
they deserved their fate, and dismissed Barriol's action as an 
expression of the missionary's duty to show mercy: ' ••. on a 
voulu que la justice eut son cours; on a eu raison, mais 
48 
Montrouzier to his brother, 8 Mar. 1859: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier); Montrouzier to Procureur, 5 June 1859: AP~. 
49 
Montrouzier to Procureur, 13 Sept. 1859: APO. 
50 
Ibid., 7 Apr. 
51 
1860: APO. 
Rougeyron to Procureur, [c.August], 27 Oct. 1859: APO. 
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c'etait notre devoir de montrer de la bonte et de la 
1 ~ 1 52 c emence . Rougeyron hoped that the expedition would teach 
the rebel tribes a lesson, and supported the creation of a 
military post at Wagap, even though the only viable site was 
1 h . i 53 c ose to t e m1ss on. His ideal was a colony in which 
Christian and well-disposed tribes would retain their lands 
intact a~d inalienable to Europeans, while those which rejected 
the twin benefits of civilization and Christianity should be 
expelled from their territory: 
Qu'on laisse aux tribus ou nous sommes etaolis 
toutes leurs terres, sans que rien ne soit vendu 
aux blancs, mais qu'on y refoule d'autres tribus, 
ou nous ne sommes pas encore etablis, c'est ce 
que nous desirons, et c'est ainsi ce que doit 
162 
desirer le gouvernement. 54 
The arrogance which inspired such a statement was far removed 
from Douarre's avowal in 1850 of complete dedication to the 
interests and well-being of Melanesians, in the event of the 
55 
annexation of New Caledonia by a European power. Rougeyron's 
recommendation of harassment for the unconverted and denial of 
their rights compares ironically with the outraged terms in 
52 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 23 Feb. 1862; see also Thomassin to 
Procureur, 4 Feb. 1862: APO. 
53 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 1, 5 Feb., 27 May 1862: APO. 
54 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 21 Feb. 1859: APO. 
55 
Douarre to Superieur-general, 2 July 1850: APM/ONC, 5b. 
which he and his colleagues later protested against what they 
regarded as deliberate persecution of the mission and the 
Christians under Governor Guillain. 
BEFORE 1862 the local authorities in New Caledonia had to work 
without clear and consistent directions from Paris, or a 
settled p~licy for the development of the colony. There were 
few serious settlers and little private capital, and the 
administrative framework was hopelessly inadequate. The 
adoption of a more coherent and systematic policy was 
indicated in December 1861 by the appointment of Guillain as 
governor. The local budget was increased, the administrative 
machinery reorganized, and plans were advanced for the 
establishment of a penal settlement, together with the 
extension of free colonization. 56 
The question of Guillain's relations with the Marist 
mission was probably the most important single issue of the 
period 1862-70, at least as far as the missionaries and a 
large portion of the Melanesian population were concerned. 
Guillain was intelligent, energetic and able, but his manner 
was of the quarter-deck. Like his predecessor, Saisset, he 
was an autocrat by training and conviction. He was determined 
56 
Testard to Min., 23 Apr. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42; Directeur des 
Colonies, 'Rapport a l'Empereur', December 1858 (draft): ibid.; 
Guillain to Min., 6 June, 4 Aug. 1862: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 
1855-64; Mon., 8 June 1862. 
L63 
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to enforce unquestioning acceptance of his authority and his 
point of view throughout the colony and over every segment 
of its population. He intended to make Melanesians loyal, 
useful and productive auxiliaries in me rapid development of 
colonization, both free and penal. Towards the end of his term 
of office the local Moniteur claimed that his native policy 
had been inspired by: 
••• des aspirations civilisatrices, le desir 
d'utiliser les indigenes aux travaux de la 
colonisation dont ils profiteraient eux-memes. 57 
In practice, however, this meant forced labour for Melanesians, 
especially on public works; the compulsory acquisition of land 
needed for colonization; military expeditions against 
recalcitrant tribes, imprisonment, usually without trial, for 
disobedient individuals and savage reprisals for acts of 
violence against Europeans or allies of the government; the 
replacement of mission influence over Melanesians in temporal 
matters by that of the government, and the restriction of the 
missionaries to purely ecclesiastical affairs. 58 The related 
57 
Mon., 14 Feb. 1869. 
58 
Guillain to Min., 30 Apr., 31 May 1863: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 
1855-64; Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique en Caledonie ..• ', 
6 Apr. 1865: APM/ONC, 11; Guillain to Min., 3 Sept. 1865: ANM, 
BB4 847; Conseil d' administration, 28 Feb. 1867: ANOM, Carton 
90. 
16~ 
questions of missionary influence over Melanesians and the 
extent of ecclesiastical jurisdiction were the focal points 
of the bitter conflict which marked mission/government relations 
59 during Guillain's governorship. 
By 1862, in areas like Conception, Pwebo, Belep and 
the Isle of Pines, the Marists, working through the authority 
of pious chiefs, had come to exercise a broad control over 
60 
many aspects of tribal life. Traditional patterns of 
settlement changed as people moved from surrounding areas to 
settle near a mission, and sometimes went far from their tribes 
61 to Conception and St-Louis. Entire tribes were organized 
59 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 2 Sept. 1862: APM/ONC, 20; Guillain 
to Rougeyron, 17, 29 Dec. 1863: ibid., 1b; Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 2 Feb. 1864: APO; Rougeyron to Guillain, 1 May 1866: 
APM/ONC, 11; Forestier, 'Etat de rapports entre Mr le Gouverneur 
de la Nlle Caledonie et le Provicaire apostolique', [August 
1867]: ibid.; Guillain to Min., 10 Sept. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166; 
Guillain, Report, [1868]: APM/ONC, 22. 
60 
Late in 1862, Lieutenant Commander Hardy, well known as a 
devout Catholic and an admirer of the mission, commented in 
a confidential memo to the governor on the extent of 
missionary authority in certain tribes: '·~· il est resulte 
pour moi que 1' influence des missionnaires sur les indigenes 
est encore plus politiq~que morale; que dans toutes leurs 
affaires interieures aussi bien que dans leurs demeles avec les 
tribus voisines, les chefs sont naturellement conduits a se 
laisser guider par eux; qu'en !'absence de contact frequent avec 
les representants naturels de l'autorite , ces influences 
partielles tendent a grandir, et se centralisent entre les mains 
du Superieur des Missions, dont la tournee d'inspection pourrait 
avoir un but plus politique que religieux': Hardy to Guillain, 
[1862] (quoted in Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique en 
Caledonie .•• ', 6 Apr. 1865): APM/ONC, 11. 
See below, ch.V, passim, for examples of missionary authority 
in action at Pwebo. 
61 Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 10 Oct. 1856: APM/ONC, 5d; 
Forestier to Procureur, 7 Aug. 1861; Goujon to Procureur, 1 Dec. 
1861; Rougeyron to Procureur, 23 Oct., 31 Dec. 1862: APO. 
to produce beche-de-mer and coconut oil, a proportion of the 
proceeds of which went to finance church-building, the 
62 purchase of clothes and the upkeep of the mission. At 
Pwebo almost everyone worked one week in four on the 
construction of a church. 63 Pagan parents were strongly 
urged to send their children to live at a mission station and 
64 
attend lessons there. Traditional festivals, regarded as 
immoral, were proscribed by all but a few missionaries, who 
d h . Ch i . . 65 attempte to convert t em 1nto r st1an ceremon1es. 
Christian chiefs and catechists were instructed to impose 
16 
punishments for misbehaviour, including dereliction of religious 
duties, and tended to be over-zealous in the exercise of their 
66 
authority, which owed much to missionary prestige. Men like 
62 
E.g., Pwebo and Belep (Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 29 
Sept. 1862: APM/ONC, 20); Pwebo (Mathieu to Durand, 22 July 1861: 
ANOM, Carton 42; Guitta to Procureur, 9 July 1865, APO; Arama 
(Rougeyron to Procureur, 23 Oct. 1862: APO; Thiercelin 1866, 
I: 279-80, 305-6); Isle of Pines (Goujon to Procureur, 20 Nov. 
1865: APO). 
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Villard to Procureur, [1861]; Forestier to Procureur, 7 Aug. 
1861: APO. 
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J.M.Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': 
AVNC; see below, p. 212. 
66At Yengen the agents - a catechist and a 'gendarme' - of Father 
JosephThomassin had people arrested for failure to attend prayer 
meetings. Tnomassin was said by the authorities to have 
acquiesced in their activities (Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholiqt 
en Caledonie .•. ', 6 Apr. 1865: APM/ONC, 11; cf. Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 16 June, 3 Aug. 1863; Forestier to Procureur, 1 Aug. 
1863; Lambert to Procureur, 4 Aug. 1863: APO). 
16 ~ 
Montrouzier, Goujon and Thomassin were often rigid and 
67 intolerant, and despised most Europeans. This was important, 
because the missionaries mediated in almost every dealing 
between their followers and other Europeans, whether officials 
or civilians, if for no other reason than that the local 
missionary was generally the only interpreter available in a 
particular area. Thus the Marists arranged for the 
administration and colonists to hire labourers from Conception, 
68 
and, again, most of the proceeds went into a common fund. 
Missionaries moved from place to place, despatched catechists, 
purchased land from Melanesians in defiance of colonial 
legislation, built chapels, dwellings, schools, started new 
stations, all without official sanction, and generally without 
informing the administration of their activities. 69 The 
Marists would not abandon their position without a struggle, 
and were na~urally determined to use every means at their 
disposal to acquire similar influence elsewhere. 
67 
E.g., Montrouzier to Procureur, 7 Apr. 1860: APO: 'Que les 
Europeens sont mechants! Une fois ils n'etaient qu'indifferents, 
maintenant ils sont impies et le vice les emprisonne'. 
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Gagniere to Procureur, 2 Aug. 1862; Rougeyron to Procureur, 
2 Nov., 31 Dec. 1862: APO; Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique 
en Caledonie ••• ', 6 Apr. 1865: APM/ONC, 11. 
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This situation had irked Saisset, and became 
intolerable to Guillain. The unrestricted movement of 
missionaries and their followers made administration difficult, 
in view of Guillain's plans to rationalize Melanesian land 
holdings and organize the indigenous population to suit the 
demands of government policy. He resented missionary pretensions 
and justifiably accused them of opposing the spread of 
70 
colonization. He objected to their usurpation of chiefly 
powers, and to their interference in the administration's 
relations with Melanesians, especially when this led the latter 
to protest against government actions. Christians tended to be 
inconveniently aware of their rights as French subjects, and 
with missionary assistance their complaints were sometimes heard 
in Paris. 71 Guillain considered it to be detrimental to the 
interests of the colony that Melanesians should contribute their 
labour and the proceeds of their commerce to the mission, and 
accused the latter of operating 'un systeme d' accaparement 
72 illegal et meme coupable' in the Christian tribes. By this 
70 
'Decision du Gouverneur suspendant !'indigene Bonou (Hippolyte) 
de ses fonctions de second chef de Pouebo', 26 Apr. 1866: Mon., 
6 May 1866; Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868: ANOM, Carton 16~ 
cf. Rougeyron to Procureur, 21 Feb. 1859 (see above, p. 163 ), 
3 Aug. 1863; Lambert to Procureur, 24 June 1863; Goujon to 
Procureur, 2 July 1863: APO. 
71 
See below, 
72 
p. 250. 
Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique en Caledonie 
1865: APM/ONC, 11. 
, 6 Apr. 
reasoning the Marists had acquired a monopoly in trade and 
labour, and their followers accordingly were unwilling to work 
for either colonists or the administration. 73 In practice, 
however, Melanesians in general were loath to work regularly 
for Europeans, and Christians tended to bear the imposition of 
forced labour with greater stoicism than the more independent 
74 pagan tribes. 
Both Guillain and the missionaries exaggerated the 
1 
other side's position. The Marists and their supporters depicted 
Guillain, even before his arrival in the colony, as an anti-
clerical fanatic, determined to destroy Catholicism in New 
Caledonia, a follower of at least one of the heinous doctrines 
of freemasonry, Saint-Simonism or Fourierism: 
L'antipathie de Mr. le Gouverneur contre les missions 
existait meme avant son depart de France. Nous le 
savions et il ne s' en cachait lui-meme .••. Il ne 
s'agit pas d'un manque de foi, ou d'un malveillance 
ordinaire, mais d'une opposition systematique, ardente, 
proselytique, qui se fait jour dans toutes les 
circonstances . .. 75 
73Anon., 'Rapport particulier a l'Empereu~', 23 Oct. 1867: ANOM, 
Carton 166: ' .•• elle fait le commerce la sainte congregation; 
si ce n'est a la plus grande gloire de Dieu, c'est a son plus 
grand profit a elle. Elle s'est reserve le trafic avec les 
Kanaks chretiens, leur achete et leur vend ... Defense est faite 
aux caboteurs de commercer avec ses clients'. See also Bailly to 
Guitta, 15 Oct. 1865: APM/ONC, 25; Bailly to Bonu, 1 Jan. 1866: 
ibid.; Guitta to Rougeyron, 27 May 1866: ibid. 
In 1859 Montrouzier had condemned the misston's trading 
operations at Belep and Pwebo as an infringement of Canon Law and 
an unnecessary source of friction with the administration and the 
civilian population of the colony (Montrouzier to Procureur, 17 
Aug. 1859: APO). 
74 
Durand to Min., 26 May 1860: ANOM, Carton 42; see below, pp.295-7. 
75 
Superieur-general to Min., 7 Sept. 1864 (not sent): APM/ONC, 15b; 
see also Rougeyron to Procureur, 22 Nov. 1861, 23 Nov. 1862: APO; 
cont.over page 
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Guillain developed a system of penal colonization which 
stressed mutual cooperation and the human dignity of the 
convict, he encouraged the formation of a friendly society, and 
set up an agricultural commune, all of which suggests that he 
espoused at least some of the tenets of utopian socialism. 76 
Like most upper class French anti-clericals, he accepted the 
social necessity for religious institutions: 
.•. dans ma pensee l'oeuvre d'evangelisation 
entreprise par la Mission sur les indigenes, 
se liait intimement a l'oeuvre de civilisation 
par l'autorite coloniale. 77 
However, he deplored the intolerant, ultramontane attitude of 
a religous order which was not even recognized in France, and 
he called for the appointment of a secular clergy which would 
78 have no pretext to meddle in temporal affairs. He would 
75 cont. 
Rougeyron to Poupinel, 2 Sept. 1862: APM/ONC, 20; de Cintre to 
Forestier, 27 Feb. 1866: ibid., 25; Anon., 'Le Guillainisme', 
n.d.: ibid.; Lambert to Procureur, 19 Jan. 1869: APO. 
76 
Mon., 10, 17, 31 Jan., 15 May, 6 June 1864; Guillain to Min., 
10-sept. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166. An admirer of the governor 
remarked that 'dans sa jeunesse, il a ete · Saint-Simonien et 
d'opinion avancee' - much as Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte had been 
(Anon., 'Rapport particulier a l'Empereur', 23 Oct. 1867: ANOM, 
Carton 166). Guillain, in fact, claimed that his agricultural 
commune at Yate was based on the model expounded in Bonaparte's 
Extinction du Pauperisme (1844). 
77 
This outline of Guillain's religious attitudes is based on 
Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique en Caledonie ... ', 6 Apr. 
1865: APM/ONC, 11. 
78 
Guillain to Min., 10 Sept. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166; Guillain, 
Report, [1868]: APM/ONC, 22. 
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tolerate 'l'oeuvre d'evangelisation entreprise par la Mission 
sur les indigenes' as long as the representativ~ of the church 
were completely subservient to the state, and worked in 
conformity with government policy. In Guillain's eyes, however, 
the Marists were engaged in a sinister conspiracy 'organiser 
.... 
un gouvernement plus ou moins occulte, en dehors, ou meme au 
d&riment du gouvernement colonial'. He claimed that they 
were 'plus remains que franfais', and that they sought to 
enjoy in a French colony the same broad jurisdiction which they 
had exercised under papal brief before annexation. He was 
unconvinced of their value as a pacifying and civilizing influencE 
To Guillain their methods were based on coercion, tended to 
divide tribes, and led to conflicts into which the administration 
was dragged in defence of missionary interests. 
To the Ma.rists, who believed their own motives to be 
entirely selfless and regarded their influence over Melanesians 
as beneficial in every respect, his attitude was inexplicable 
except in terms of godlessness, deliberate misrepresentation and 
blatant opportunism: 
79 
Le peu d'influence que le missionnaire a pu 
acquerir avec du temps et de la peine offusque 
M.le Gouv. d'une maniere extraordinaire et il 
.... 
parait decider a la diminuer a tout prix. 79 
Lambert to Procureur, 4 Aug. 1863: APO; see also Rougeyron 
to Procureur, 2 Feb. 1864: APO; [Forestier] to Min., [1865] 
(draft): APM/ONC, 15b; Rougeyron to ? , 3 Jan. 1868: 
ibid., 11; Anon., 'Le Guillainisme', n.d.: ibid., 25. 
172 
Each side accused the other of abusing the right of 
liberty of conscience. In neither case was the charge 
unfounded. The Marists opposed the admittance of Protestant 
missionaries or teachers, and they were unwilling to accord 
the right of Melanesians to reject Catholic missionaries,or the 
right of parents to determine whether their children became 
80 Christian or not. Guillain justifiably criticized the Marists 
on these grounds, and yet he refused to allow them freedom to 
evangelize, used threats, force and bribery against their 
followers, and discriminated in favour of pagans against 
81 Christians. The two parties were irreconcilable because they 
were in direct competition for influence over the Melanesians, 
and neither would nor could compromise to the extent 
necessary to permit co-existence. Neither had any understanding 
of or sympathy for the other's position, and each was totally 
convinced of the justice of its own cause and of the unworthy 
motives of the other. 
DURING Guillain's governorship the degree ~f animosity between 
mission and government steadily increased, and the missionaries 
were forced more and more an to the defensive by the methods 
80 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 2 Nov. 1862, 20 Nov. 1865; Emprin 
to Procureur, 5 Mar. 1865: APO; Guillain to Min., 10 Sept. 
1867: ANOM, Carton 166; Guillain, Report, [1868]: APM/ONC, 22; 
Vitte to Min., 26 July 1874: ibid., 19. 
81 
See below, pp. 176-9. 
used against them. Until the end of 1863 external relations 
w~re reasonably polite, despite missionary forebodings, and 
the governor's attempts to diminish their influence and make 
82 
them submit to official control and supervision. 
173 
Guillain's labour, education and land policies were 
especially repugnant to the missionaries, and a controversy 
83 
over schools helped cause an open breach early in 1864. The 
acute labour shortage in the colony and Melanesian unwillingness 
to work for Europeans led Guillain to impose corvees, mainly for 
public works, upon all tribes which had accepted French 
sovereignty. Workers were fed, clothed and paid a small wage, 
but the measure was highly unpopular, defections were 
f d h hl . h d 84 requent, an were ars y pun1s e . The main burden fell 
upon Christians or tribes which were subject to missionary 
influence, because in 1862 this included most of the 
pacified tribes. Later, when the government's strictures 
againstthe Marists had caused an obvious division between 
the supporters of the administration and the followers 
82 
Mon., 22, 29 June, 23 Nov. 1862; Rougeyron to Poupinel, 2 
Sept. 1862: APM/ONC, 20; Rougeyron to Procureur, 27 Feb., 1 
Apr., 18 Aug. 1863: APO; Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique en 
Caledonie •.• ', 6 Apr. 1865: APM/ONC, 11. 
83 
Only the labour and education issues are discussed here. The 
question of land is treated separately; see, especially, 
below p. 
84 
'Decision portant que des indigenes seront engages pour 
travailler, a titre de manoeuvres, sur les chantiers du 
Gouvernement', 19 Jan. 1863: BO 1863: 15-16; Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 25 Mar. 1863, 10 Sept. 1867: APO; Guillain to Min., 
31 May 1863: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64; Palazzy to Procureur, 
19 May 1867: APO. 
174 
of the mission, the labour ordinance continued to affect 
Christians most because Guillain could not risk alienating 
his pagan allies by making excessive demands upon them. The 
missionaries opposed forced labour, partly because of its 
injust and compulsory character, but more because it seemed to th 
85 to be part of a campaign against their influence. Missionary 
complaints about the measure prompted the Navy Ministry in 
Paris to demand an explanation from Guillain. This seems to 
have been the first, but was by no means the last occasion on 
which Guillain received an official rebuke as a result of 
Marist agitation, and it improved neither his attitude nor his 
behaviour towards them. 86 Organized forced labour at Port-de-
France was greatly curtailed at the end of 1864, mainly because 
of the need for economy, but local corvees continued. They 
weighed even more heavily on the Christians, because military 
posts tended to be close to mission stations. 87 
85 
Poupinel to archeveque de Bordeaux, 2 Dec. 1863: ANOM, Carton 
166; Rougeyron to Procureur, [March 1864]: APO; Superieur-
general to Min., 7 Sept. 1864 (not sent): APM/ONC, 15b; Goujon 
to Procureur, 1 Jan., 2 Feb. 1865: APO. 
86 
Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique en Caledonie ..• ', 6 Apr. 
1865: APM/ONC, 11. 
87 
Guillain to Min., 3 Sept. 1865.: ANM, BB4 847; [Forestier] 
'Notes sur la mission de la Nouvelle-Caledonie', [1865]: 
APM/ONC, 15b; Lambert to Rougeyron, 23 June 1866: ibid., 20; 
Vincent to Procureur, 14 July 1868; Ameline to Procureur, 
2 Jan. 1869: APO. Almost all the workers who were forced to 
remain at Port-de-France were Christians from the Isle of Pines 
(Goujon to Procureur, 2 Feb. 1865). They were eventually 
replaced in 1867 by Kanala people (Palazzy to Procureur, 19 
Mar. 1867: APO). 
In October 1863 the governor promulgated a decree 
regulating primary education in the colony. Among other 
conditions, the study of native New Caledonian languages was 
formally forbidden; all schools were subject to inspection by 
a committee appointed by the governor; the syllabus taught had 
88 to receive official approval. The Marists interpreted this 
measure, with some justification, as a deliberate attempt to 
strike at one of their most effective means of propaganda. They 
1 7 ~ 
claimed that they could not fulfil the conditions of the decree, 
and refused to submit their schools to government regulation 
or to supervision on matters other than 'hygiene, salubrite et 
moralite'. Following a protracted debate on this issue, the 
missionaries closed most of their schools rather than attempt 
89 to conform to the provisions of the decree. Again Guillain's 
actions met with @fficial disapproval, and he was tersely 
ordered to change his ways. In terms reminiscent of earlier 
instructions to Durand, Guillain was informed that missionary 
influence was an excellent (and inexpensive?) means by which 
French domination could be extended throu~hout the colony, and 
that the Marists were therefore to be given every assistance. 
88 
'Arrete du Gouverneur ••• ', 15 Oct. 1863: BO 1863:234-8 
89 
Conseil d'administration, 7 Sept. 1863: ANOM, Carton 88; 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 21 Oct. 1863: APM/ONC, 20; 
Forestier to Superieur-general, 4 Dec. 1863 (draft): ibid., 11; 
Guillain to Rougeyron, 17, 29 Dec. 1863: ibid., 1b; Rougeyron 
to Procureur, 2, 17 Jan. 1864: APO; Rougeyron to ? , 
14 Jan. 1864: APM/ONC, 25. 
Si la mission a conquis une certaine influence 
sur la population indigene, !'administration, 
loin d'en prendre ombrage, doit au contraire 
s'en applaudir, comme d'un progres profitable 
a la politique de la France et meme a notre 
domination la plus effective. 90 
Yet despite scathing repudiation, Guillain's policy on schools 
remained in force, and until 1870 education in the colony 
remained effectively, if not efficiently, in the handsof the 
administration. 91 
Guillain's resentment at the critical despatches, and 
mutual bitterness caused by the schools dispute brought the 
mission/government conflict into the ·open early in 1864. 92 
Between this date and 1867 Guillain used every method at his 
disposal, short of open warfare, to thwart and harass the 
missionaries. Three Marists were found guilty by a civil court 
of contravening a law against the provision of firearms 
90 
'Depeche ministerielle', 19 Dec. 1864 (quoted in Anon., 
'Note sur M~ le Capitaine de Vaisseau Guillain, Gouverneur de 
la Nouvelle-Caledonie', n.d.): ANOM, CartQn 166. 
91 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 12 Jan. 1865~ Artignan to Procureur, 
3 Nov. 1865; Lambert to Procureur, 8 Dec. 1865, 4 Feb. 1867: 
17 
APO; Montrouzier to eveque d'Orleans, 26 Dec. 1865: APM/ONC, 11; 
[Forestier], 'Etat des rapports entre Mr le Gouverneur de la 
Nlle Caledonie et le Provicaire apostolique', [1867]: ibid.; 
Rougeyron to Yardin, 26 Feb. 1868: ibid., 20. In January 1869 
there were only four recognized schools for Melanesians, at 
Kanala, Wagap, Gatop and on Lifu. They were conducted by 
soldier-monitors, under the general direction of the local 
commandants ('Eccles primaires ouvertes au ler janvier 1869': 
ANOM,Carton 172). 
92Mallet to Procureur, 5 Feb. 1864: APO; Superieur-general to 
Min., 7 Sept. 1864 (not sent): APM/ONC, 15b. 
and ammunition to Melanesians. They incurred a heavy fine, 
which was later annulled by ministerial order, to Guillain's 
93 intense chagrin. This setback did not lessen the 
governor's antipathy. His methods became increasingly harsh 
and arbitrary, and were directed as much against the supporters 
of the mission, especially in the north, as against the 
Marists themselves. 94 Catechists at Pambwa, Balad, Kumak, 
Gomen, Cambwen, Wenop and Jawe were arrested and imprisoned 
on specious grounds; two Christian miefs of Pwebo were deposed 
for insubordination; missionaries were refused permission to 
95 
set up new stations at Kumak and on Mare, to buy land from 
Melanesians at Yate and Kanala and on Lifu, to cut wood for 
building purposes anywhere; Christians were forbidden to help 
in the construction of chapels and mission dwellings, or to 
leave their tribal lands for religious gatherings. At Pwebo, 
colonists were encouraged to settle on lands occupied by 
Christians. Paganism was actively encouraged, while Christians 
93 
[Forestier], 'Pieces justificatives', [T864]: APM/ONC, 1b; 
Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique en Caledonie ••. ', 6 Apr. 
1865: ibid., 11; Artignan to Forestier, 31 May 1865: ibid., 21. 
94 
For specific examples of the techniques employed against 
the missionaries and the Christians, see below, chs. 5 and 6 
passim. 
95 
Permission was given for the Marists to start a station on 
Mare in November 1865, after more than three years' haggling 
(Beaulieu to Procureur, 22 Nov. 1865: APO). 
1' 
were led to apostatize by threats or bribes, and potential 
converts were bullied and forced to reject the missionaries. 
After a tour of the various mission stations in 1866 Lambert 
exclaimed in despair: 
... au nom de la liberte des cultes 
singulierement interpretee, le paganisme 
n'est pas seulement tolere, mais encore 
encourage, protege, recompense. Les palens, 
les apostats, les incendiaires, les libertins 
de tout genre ont le droit de tout dire et de 
tout faire pour detourner les ames encore 
faibles dans la foi, et pas le moindre blame ne 
leur est adresse, et si on porte des plaints 
centre de semblables actes, il y a toujours des 
circonstances attenuants pour les absoudre. Les 
pauvres chretiens indigenes, au contraire, ne 
peuvent plus defendre leur droits les plus 
legitimes sans voir eclater lbrage sur leur 
l1B 
tete et aggraver leur position. 96 
Military posts were set up near mission stations, and 
local commandants were said to have been specifically ordered 
to harass the missionaries and their followers. 97 At Wagap, 
for example, Christians were forced to cultivate gardens for 
96 
Lambert to Rougeyron, 23 July 1866: APM~ONC, 20. Some 
indication of the colonial government's priorities was given in 
an article in the journal Opinion nationale (21 Mar. 1865: ANOM, 
Carton 26, CG 1865-9), which commented: 'La coloftisation se 
developpe avec rapidite, malgre les anthropophages, qu'on ne 
crai~t que mediocrement, et les Peres Maristes qu'on trouve, 
parait-il, plus inquietants'. 
97 Goujon to Procureur, 2 Feb. 1865; Gagniere to Procureur, 3 
May 1865: APO; correspondence between Chapuy and Venturini, 
20 & 21 May 1865: APM/ONC, 25; Guitta to Bailly, 30 Sept. 1865: 
ibid.; Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 18 Nov. 1869: ibid., 20; 
Villard, 'Memoire s~ la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': AVNC. 
the garrison without remuneration, while the way of life of 
both officers and men seemed deliberately designed to curdle 
missionary sensibilities: 
Depuis long temps, les chretiens, de preference, 
sont soumis a de frequentes corvees, et ces pauvres 
Caledoniens •.• sont obliges de venir travailler et 
de se nourrir ••• pour planter les champs qu'ils 
preparent au benefice du camp •••• De plus le camp 
de Ouagap est un centre de corruption et d'irreligion. 
Bon riombre de femmes sont dans le camp mgme •.. Voila 
pourtant ces centres qu'on nous designe avec emphase 
comme des foyers de lumiere et de civilisation ou la 
jeunesse caledonien doit venir se former ••.• on ne 
17 
leur apprend pas meme A se couvrir. 98 
Guillain's opposition to the Marists' more exclusive pretensions, 
and measures such as his refusal, in accordance with colenial 
legislation, to allow them to purchase land directly from 
Melanesians, were in the best interests of the colony. But in 
general, after 1864, his methods were at best excessively 
legalistic, and caused hardship and distress for many Melanesians 
Late in 1864 the Marists sent Forestier to France to 
represent their interests and to press discreetly for Guillain's 
99 
replacement. Between 1864 and 1868 Guillain managed to 
alienate almost every segment of the colony's European 
population, with the exception of a few loyal cronies. Ironically 
98 
Lambert to Rougeyron, 23 July 1866: APM/ONC, 20. 
99 
Rougeyron to Forestier, 10 Dec. 1864: APM/ONC, 20. 
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18 
his most bitter opposition came from two groups which were in 
almost every other respect mutually antagonistic - the Marists 
and the free settlers. Colonists complained bitterly about 
the unimaginative military autocracy by· which the colony was 
governed, about an excess of petty regulation which hampered 
commerce and placed serious obstacles in the way of those who 
wished to obtain freehold land. The case for the commercial 
element, which was mostly of English origin and depended 
strongly on the Australian colonies for its transport and 
supplies, was put by the Sydney Morning Herald. That newspaper, 
in the least critical of two editorials, fulminated against 
Guillain's regime as 
•.• a grim military system- a reign of terror 
which makes everything feel damp and cold, -
which spreads everywhere an idea of danger; 
which stamps upon commerce the character of 
gambling, and upon the adventure of the person 
and life within such a sphere as an excess of 
foolhardiness. 
As far as the landholders - both actual and aspiring - were 
1 
concerned, in fairness to Guillain it should be pointed out that 
one of their main griefs against him stemmed from his 
paternalistic resolve that Melanesians should be exploited by 
the administration alone; that is, that Melanesian land was 
inalienable except to the government. The settler community 
1 
Sydney Morning Herald, 12 Jan. 1865; see also ibid., 20 Jan. 
1865. 
18 
would naturally have preferred to be able to deal directly 
with Melanesians, in the belief that traditional claimants 
would be quickly and cheaply dispossessed. Guillain's rigid 
application of the land laws, and his refusal to agree to 
large concessions which would have caused widespread dislocation 
2 Melanesian landholdings, won him several influential enemies. 
Merchants, landholders, some senior administrative, 
military and naval personnel joined with the Marists and their 
supporters to direct a stream of complaints to the Navy 
Ministry about Guillain's behaviour and character. 3 The 
controversy produced a number of polemical articles in the 
French press, in which the anti-Guillain forces were more 
4 
prominent than his apologists. The criticism bore fruit, 
as from 1864 onwards Guillain's conduct and policies were the 
2 
See below, p 
3 
E.g., Poupinel to Directeur des ColOnies, 23 Nov. 1863: ANOM, 
Carton 166; Anon. to Faucon (sous-chef de bureau au Ministere 
de la Marine), 10 Apr. 1865: ibid.; Panne~rat to Directeur des 
Colonies, 4 Sept. 1865, 12 Jan. 1866: ibid.; Desmoulin to Min., 
6 Oct. 1865: ibid.; Forestier to Directeur des Colonies, 
16 Mar. 1867: ibid.; Guillain to Min., 4 Apr. 1866: ANOM, Carton 
26, CG 1865-9. 
4 
E.g., Opinion nationale, 21 Mar. 1865: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 
1865-9 (pro-Guillain); Epoque, 28 Sept. 1865: ibid.; Le Nord, 
23 Oct. 1868: ibid.; Liberte coloniale, 26 Mar. 1870: ibid. (all 
anti-Guillain). See also Montrouzier to the editor of Revue du 
Monde colonial, 27 Dec. 1865: APM/ONC, 11; Gui1lain to Min., 6 
Dec. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166; Sentis (French Consul in Sydney) 
to Poupine1, [1868]: APM/ONC, 22; Mon., 31 Jan. 1869. 
subject of numerous official rebukes and unfavourable reports 
5 
within the Ministry. Despite official disapproval and the 
thinly-veiled attempts of his opponents, the Marists 
especially, to procure his dismissal, not only did Guillain 
remain, but in 1868, as a very senior captain about to reach 
182 
retiring age, he was promoted to rear-admiral in order that his 
term of office might be extended. It had been reported by a 
Marist in 1863 that Guillain frequently boasted of his powerful 
connections: 
5 
"Je ne releve que de 1'empereur, j'ai un 
blanc-seing de Sa Majeste. Elle approuve 
en avance tout ce que je ferai en Nlle 
Caledonie". 6 
E.g., Min. to Directeur du Personnel, 25 July 1863 (draft): 
ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64; Min. to Guillain, October 1864 
(draft): ibid.; Min. to Guillain, 22 May, 3 Dec. 1868, 25 
Feb. 1869 (drafts): ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9; Min. to 
Ruillier, 30 May 1870: ibid. An anonymous 'Note sur Mr 
le Cap it aine de V a is seau Gui llain' ( n. d. [draft] : ANOM, 
Carton 166) accused Guillain of applying 'des principes 
diametricalement opposes a ceux qui guident la marche du 
Gouvernement de l'Empereur'. 
In the Colonial Archives I found only one ministerial 
despatch which actually praised Guillain's conduct (Min. to 
Guillain, 21 Aug. 1863 [draft]: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64). 
One other document, an unsigned, undated minute which must have 
been written in 1868, approached the mission/government 
controversy in a nonpartisan, pragmatic manner. The writer 
concluded: 
.•• la situation est plus que tendue elle exige une 
resolution. Si la mission n'accepte pas la subordination 
politique et administrative •.. il faut prendre un parti 
166 ~~it a son egard, soit a l'egard de M. Guillain (ANOM, Carton 
6 
Poupinel to archeveque de Bordeaux, 2 Dec. 1863: ANOM, Carton 
166. 
At the time the missionaries gave little credence to the claim, 
but it quickly became apparent to Forestier in France that the 
governor enjoyed such high patronage that the most his enemies 
could hope to. achieve was to force him to moderate his actions. 
The exact nature of Guillain's link with Louis-Napoleon is 
unknown, but it is certain that he was the Emperor's personal 
nominee, and that he owed his continued tenure, in the face 0f 
7 
mounting pressure for his removal, to his imperial protector. 
THE conflict between mission and colonial government 
entered a new phase with the massacre in October 1867 of a 
number of gendarmes and colonists by apostate and pagan 
8 
members of the Mwelebeng tribe. Although almost no Christians 
were involved, Guillain seized the opportunity to expose the 
mission to public censure, and perhaps bring about its 
expulsion from the colony. In the government-controlled 
Moniteur and in Guillain's official reports it was at first 
7 
Forestier to Procureur, 25 May 1865, 26 July 1867; Vincent 
to Procureur, 14 July 1868: APO; O'Reilly 1953: 111. Martial 
Housez, a former aide to Guillain, reported that 'Mme Guillain 
etait liee d'amitie a Mme Cornu, soeur de lait de l'Empereur 
Napoleon Ill' (Housez 1897: 14). Mme Cornu was one of the 
closest and certainly one of the most admirable of Louis-
Napoleon's friends (Gooch 1960:69-72). Forestier, too, was 
led to believe that her influence was the key to Guillain's 
retention of his post (Forestier to Yardin, 28 Nov. 1866; 
APMtfONC, 7a). 
The unsubstantiated suggestion was also made that Guillain 
had been a crony of Louis-Napoleon during his youthful 
revolutionary period (Canac, 'Rapport sur !'audience accordee 
par S.M. l'Empereur au R.P. Forestier en 1866', 1912: APM/O~C, 
25). 
8 
See below, p. 253 et seq. 
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implied and later openly stated that the murders were a 
direct and natural result of anti-administration and anti-
colonist propaganda by the missionaries Jean Villard and 
Jerome Guitta: 
.•• les Missionnaires de la localite, les PP. 
Villard et Guitta, surtout,y ont pris moralement 
au mains une part importante par leurs actes 
anterieurs. 
This the~e was developed during the trial of twenty-six men 
accused of c9mplicity in the murders and subsequent pillage 
of European property. Three defence counsel and the 
representative of the injured parties, all either government 
functionaries or military personnel, based their cases on the 
concept of the moral responsibility of the missionaries: 
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9 
' ... les moteurs seulement imprudents, je veux le croire, des 
evenements ••. de Pouebo ••• sent les Peres Villard et Guitta•. 10 
The exaggerated smear campaign mounted by these men was 
sharply rebuked in a ministerial despatch, which criticized 
Guillain implicitly as the person ultimately responsible for 
their actions: 
9 
Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868: ANOM, Carton 166; see 
also Mon., 21 Oct. 1867; Guillain to Min., 23 Oct., 4 Dec. 
1867: ANOM, Carton 166; Guillain to Champesteve, 14 Nov. 1867 
(encl. in Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868): ibid. 
10 
Address of Le Boucher, defence counsel at the Tribunal 
criminel de Noumea, 28 Dec. 1867: Mon., 5 Jan. 1868 (emphasis 
in original). See also the addresses of Mage and Nepveur before 
~he same Tribunal: ~·, 29 Dec. 1S67, 5 Jan. 1868. 
Apres les recommandations que je vous ai 
adressees, en ce qui touche vos rapports avec 
la Mission, je ne puis croire que vous ayiez 
autorise MM.Mage et Nepveur a choisir le terrain 
sur lequel ils se sont places A l'audience et j'aime 
185 
~ penser que vous leur avez temoigne votre 
mecontentement. Je vous charger de leur infliger en 
mon nom un blame severe et une punition disciplinaire. 
11 
.No judgement was passed at this trial, and the 
tribunal ordered a detailed examination to be made into the 
causes of the crimes. During the supplementary investigation 
the administration went to ludicrous extremes to try to 
implicate the missionaries, and Villard and Guitta were exiled 
from the Pwebo circonscription on the grounds that their 
12 presence was a threat to public order. In Noumea wild 
rumours circulated about their past actions at Pwebo. Jules 
Patouillet, a medical officer attached to the Wagap post, 
reported that Villard 'fut accuse d'avoir eu connaissance du 
complot, et d'avoir retu des noirs une hache en jade pour prix 
de son silence•. 13 The accusation could not be proven. An 
even more bizarre rumour insisted that the missionaries had 
secretly detached the head from the body of the Mwelebeng 
11 
Min. to Guillain, [1868]: ANOM, Carton 166. 
12 
Conseil d'administration, 16 Feb. 1868 (transcript encl. in 
Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868): ANOM, Carton 166; Guillain to 
Min., 8 Mar., 2 Oct. 1868: ibid. Cf. Rougeyron to Forestier, 
8 Mar. 1868: APM/ONC, 22. 
13 
Patouil1et 1872:54. 
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chief Bonu, who had died in exile on the Isle of Pines. They 
were supposed to have carried the trophy to Pwebo and incited 
the vengeance of the Mwelebeng by displaying it to them with 
the words, 'La voila la tete de ce grand chef, que pensez-vous 
maintenant?' So seriously was this regarded that during the 
supplementary investigation a commission was sent to the Isle 
of Pines to exhume and examine the body. 
14 intact and scarcely decomposed. 
It was found to be 
At a second hearing the public prosecutor, a recent 
arrival in the colony, condemned the authors of the campaign 
against the missionaries, and expressed the opinion that the 
latter were completely blameless in the affair. 15 No civil 
or criminal action was brought against them, and public opinion, 
which had for a time been strongly antipathetic, changed in 
their favour as the extravagance of the government's accusations 
16 became apparent. 
In the meantime, the exigencies of building a 
military post at Pwebo had resulted in excessive demands for 
14 
[Champesteve), 'Affaire de Pouebo. Partie du requisitoire du 
minis te re pub lie se rapportan t a la miss ion' , [ 8 May 186 8] : 
APM/ONC, 25; see also Rougeyron to Procureur, 1 Feb. 1868: APO; 
Poupinel to Forestier, 26 Feb. 1868: APM/ONC, 22. 
15 
[Champesteve], 'Affaire de Pouebo. Partie du requisitoire du 
ministere public se rapportant a la mission', [8 May 1868]: 
APM/ONC, 25. 
16 In January 1868 a group of settlers got up a petition demanding 
the expulsion of the Marists from the colony (Moris to 
Procureur, 28 Jan. 1868; Vincent to Procureur, 20 Feb. 1868: 
APO). Nothing seems to have come of this, however, and within a 
month opinion had turned in the missionaries' favour (Mallet 
to Procureur, 4 Feb. 1868; Rougeyron to Procureur, 6 Mar. 1868: 
APO). 
labour, which affected both Christian and pagan tribes of 
the north-east. Resentment over the corvees and the ill-
treatment which accompanied them finally culminated in a 
violent reaction, mainly by the pagan Tea Janu. In the 
operations of reprisals mounted by the government, the people 
of Bonde, many of them Christians, and Pambwa suffered most. 
They were less culpable than the Tea Janu, but the latter's 
tribal lands were in such remote and rugged country as to 
spare them the worst effects of the military repression. 17 
Within New Caledonia Guillain became increasingly isolated 
with the failure of his attempt to bring public disgrace upon 
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the mission, and gradually he lost all but his most committed 
18 
supporters. In France, redoubled agitation by the friends of 
the mission and publicity given to the harsh measures used 
against the Mwelebeng and the north-eastern tribes in 1867-9 
alienated informed public opinion against the governor. The 
imperial government, beset by recurring crises and ultra-
sensitive to the nuances of public opinion, was appalled by the 
spiralling costs of a policy which seemed to involve endless 
military expeditions, the creation of more and more military 
17 
These events are examined in detail, below PJ?· 288-308. 
18 
Lambert to Procureur, 19 Jan., 11 Apr. 1869; Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 15 Mar., 11 April 1869; Vigouroux to Procureur, 
16 Mar. 1869; Grezel to Procureur, 25 June 1869; Emprin to 
Procureur, 27 June 1869: APO. 
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posts, and the provocation of ever more bitter Melanesian 
resistance. The governor was informed: 
Je comprends les difficultes de toute nature 
auxq~elles vous avez a faire face, mais il ne me 
parait pas qu'elles justifient l'ordre que vous 
avez donne de promener l'incendie et la devastation 
sur les territoires des tribus hostiles. Notre 
civilisation repousse de tels moyens de repression 
et !'emotion qu'ils soutenaient dans l'esprit public 
s'ils etaient connus serait de nature a creer des 
embarras serieux au Gouvernement de l'Empereur. 
· Les resultats q~ la mission a obtenus avant notre 
arrivee ••• semblent indiquer qu'il est possible de 
preparer les voies de la colonisation Europeenne 
sans recourir a d'aussi tristes extremites. 19 
The final sentence was gall indeed to Guillain. 
In March 1870 Guillain left New Caledonia for France 
on grounds of ill health, and he was replaced in June. Under 
his successor repressive measures against the Marist mission 
and its supporters ceased. Expeditions were rare and most of 
20 the military posts which Guillain had set up were withdrawn. 
Despite these revisions of policy, and the widespread revulsion 
which his conduct inspired both in New Caledonia and France, 
Guillain had some success in the achievement of his original 
aims. 
19 
Min. to Guillain, 25 Feb. 1869 (draft); ANOM, Carton 166; see 
also Le Nord, 23 Oct. 1868: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9; Min.to 
Guillain, 7 May, 22 July 1869 (drafts): ibid.; Directeur des 
Colonies to Directeur du Personnel, 27 July 1869 (draft): ibid•; 
marginal comments by Directeur des Colonies on Anon., 'Rapport 
particulier a l'Empereur', 23 Oct. 1867 (extracts): APM/ONC, 11. 
20 Min. to Ruillier, 30 May 1870 (draft): ANOM, Carton 26, CG 
1865-9; de la Richerie to Min., 30 Dec. 1870: ibid.; Anon., 
'Nelle Caledonie.Situation au 23 7bre 1870' (draft):ibid~;Min. 
to de la Richerie, 13 Apr. 1871 (draft): ibid. 
,.l..·r.,: 
The Melanesians were largely quiescent by 1870, and 
21 
in the north were completely cowed. No uprising occurred 
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before the great revolt of 1878, and the tribes which rebelled 
then included none which had felt the weight of French arms 
during the 1860's. On the other hand, at least some of the 
violent clashes which occurred during Guillain's term of 
office were direct results of government actions, and the 
eight-year truce which followed his departure was won at 
considerable cost to Melanesian~ especially in the north. 
Guillain's plan to create a permanent indigenous work force 
foundered, in part because of lack of funds; in part because 
his programme of forced labour imposed unnecessarily harsh 
conditions on Melanesians, and became confused towards the end 
of the decade with his determination to destroy mission 
influence by striking at its bases in the Christian tribes. 
Uprisings in the north in 1865, 1867 and 1868-9 provided 
Guillain with a pretext for the reorganization of the tribes 
of this region, and the application of the policy of 
22 
cantonnement. This freed large areas of land for colonization, 
and European settlement in the north, which only began on any 
scale in the mid-sixties, increased during the early years of 
23 the new decade. 
21 
Guillain to Min., 27 Aug. 1869: ANOM, Carton 166. 
22 
See below, p 
23 
Conseil d'administration, 6 Aug. 1869: ANOM, Carton 91; 
1 Feb., 14 May 1870: ANOM, Carton 92. 
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Guillain's mission policy changed in emphasis and 
method during his term of office. In the early stages he tried 
in a fairly reasonable manner to impose government control 
over missionary activities. The stiff-necked intransigence of 
the Marist response so infuriated him, however, that in the 
end he tried to discredit the Marists entirely and force their 
expulsion from the colony. In his original aim he was at 
least as successful as he could have hoped, but he failed to 
achieve the more extreme goal which became his obsession in 
the later years of his governorship. Everywhere by 1870 
mission influence over Melanesians in temporal matters was, if 
not replaced, then at least equalled by that of the 
administration. In areas such as the western part of Pwebo, 
Belep and the Isle of Pines, where the mission was firmly 
established by 1860, Christians generally remained faithfu1. 24 
In places such as Bonde, Arama and the south-eastern sub-tribes 
of Mwelebeng, however, where widespread conversions were only 
obtained in the early 1860's, apostasy was common in the face 
of strong pressure from colonists, the Melanesian allies of the 
25 government and its local representatives. Tribes like Kumak 
24 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 29 Sept. 1862: APM/ONC, 20; 
Forestier to Poupinel, 4 Dec. 1862: ibid., 19; Gilibert to 
Procureur, 26 July 1867; Ameline to Procureur, 12, 16 July 
1868; Vincent to Procu~eur, 14 July 1868; Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 18 Sept. 1868: APO. 
25 
See below, pp. 229, 238, 240, 244-5. 
and Gomen, which showed willingness to listen to mission 
teaching, were forcibly prevented from doing so. Their 
catechists were arrested and sent to Port-de-France in irons, 
and the tribesmen were led to believe that continued good 
dispositions towards the missionaries would incur official 
26 displeasure. 
Elsewhere, as at Yengen and Puma, overt antipathy 
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towards the mission had been repressed by the victories of the 
Mwelebeng in 1860 and the Wagap expedition of 1862. With 
Guillain's encouragement, however, anti-missionary sentiments 
reappeared, Christianity was rejected and the people concerned 
became enthusiastic adherents ef the so-called 'religion des 
soldats'. To Rougeyron this 'religion' was a matter of ~isbelief 
and immorality, inspired, as its name suggests, by the 
'licentious soldiery': 
••• cette religion consiste a ne pas en avoir, 
comme les anciens soldats du poste de la tribu 
de Houagape, ou elle a pris naissance, qui ne 
mettaient jamais les pieds a l'Eglise, mais 
en revanche pratiquaient la morale independante. 27 
T0 another priest, however, 'la religion soldat' implied a 
reversion to older forms of depravity: 'a marcher nus, a 
.. 28 
reprendre toutes leurs coutumes paiennes'. Thus, while the 
26 
Emprin to ? 13 Jan. 1866: APM/ONC, 25. 
27 
Rougeyron to ? 30 Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 22. 
28 
Poupinel, n.d. (fragment): APM/ONC, 22. 
number of Christians increased slowly during Guillain's 
regime, there were numerous defections amongst potential 
29 
converts. Furthermore, the possibility of widespread 
expansion by the mission into new areas, which had seemed 
unlimited in 1862, was greatly curtailed by the antagonism 
and concerted opposition of the civil authorities. 
GUILLAIN justified his native policy in terms of the need to 
civilize and assimilate Melanesians. He claimed that the 
development of new wants would necessitate their learning new 
skills, and inculcate a desire to work. This would 
simultaneously benefit the Melanesians, by raising them from 
their traditional state of savagery, and the colony, by 
30 providing a much-needed work force: 
Ce n'est pas la politique d'expedition et 
d'occupation militaire que je plaide ••• ,c'est 
simplement la politique d'organisation et de 
civilisation, cette politique pacifique qui 
consiste a lier de bonnes relations avec les 
indigenes, a nous faire connaitre et aimer d'eux 
en les consei llan t et di rigean t sui van·t 1 e ur prop re 
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interet. 31 
29 
See Appendix Ill. 
30 
'Decision portant que des indigenes seront engages pour 
travail1er .•• sur 1es chantiers du Gouvernement', 19 Jan. 1863: 
BO 1863:15-16; Gui1lain to Min., 31 May, 19 Aug. 1863: ANOM, 
Carton 26, CG 1855-64; Consei1 d'administration, 28 Feb. 1867: 
ANOM, Carton 90. 
31 
Gui11ain to Min., 30 Apr. 1863: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64. 
'"r' ' .,,_ ~ ,, 
It is apparent, however, despite such protestations of 
benevolence, that he regarded Melanesians primarily in terms 
of their potential utility to the administration and to 
colonization. Their role in his scheme of things was 'd'aider 
la colonisation europeenne par leur travail'. 32 He had no 
real concept of their existence for their own sake and on 
their own terms. He was no more convinced of the value or 
integrity of traditional culture than were most missionaries, 
and his encouragement of certain of its less violent aspects 
was a purely pragmatic tactic in his fight against Marist 
influence. 
Indeed, neither side in the mission/government 
conflict deserves credit for a-truly disinterested concern for 
the rights and welfare of Melanesians. No doubt the Marists 
proselytized in the sincere, if misguided belief that 
19 
conversion was in every way beneficial, but they as much as any 
group of Europeans were responsible for the subversion of the 
social and cultural integrity end the political complexity 
of the traditional way of life. 33 Furthermore, the Marists' 
concern for the mission as an institution outweighed their 
commitment to Melanesians, the Christians among them included, 
as human beings, while as regular clergy their missionary 
vocation was subordinate to their religious vocation. For his 
32 
Speech made by Mathieu, Guillain's colonial secretary and 
chief of staff, at Pwebo, 28 Feb. 1869: Mon., 26 June 1869. 
33 
See below, p 
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part, Guillain's actions indicated clearly enough that his 
claim to be interested in the well-being of Melanesians was 
1 1 f 1 . i 34 a rationalization for an exp icit po icy o exp o~tat on. 
Nonetheless, whatever the motives behind Guillain's 
native policy, it worked to the advantage of those pagan tribes, 
such as Yengen, Puma, Kanala, Pwe, Manongwe, which enjoyed 
the status of trusted allies of the administration. Provided 
they were willing to cede some land for the needs of colonists 
and the administration, their land rights were respected. 
Although they all provided workers for the government, no 
allied tribe was forcibly involved in the corvees at Pwebo in 
1868. Yengen and Puma were exempt from the reorganization and 
resettlement of the northern tribes which occurred in 1869-70. 
The allied tribes were completely subservient to the 
authorities, but as long as order was maintained, they enjoyed 
far more internal autonomy than mission-dominated tribes. 
Excessively violent or destructive customs (such as cannibalism, 
murder, infanticide, exposure or burial alive of the old or 
unwell), which were repugnant to administration and mission 
alike, tended everywhere to be abandoned or at least concealed 
with the imposition of French rule, whether a tribe remained 
34 
E.g., the treatment of the Yate people in 1863-4 and the 
north-eastern tribes in 1868: see below, pp. 291-2,301-5, 
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pagan or not. 35 But pagan tribes retained some aspects of 
their traditional culture (such as traditional adornment, 
polygamy, ceremonies, modes of existence,patterns of settlement, 
open adherence to customary magic,beliefs and methods), which 
were generally among the first to disappear with acceptance 
of Christianity. They gained opportunities for military 
action, in support of the government, against traditional 
enemies, and for pillage of defeated tribes in the wake of 
d • i 36 expe 1.t ons. They could generally count on government aid 
in the event of enemy attack, because their cooperation was 
sufficiently valued to justify some effort and expense. ~ 7 
Even before 1862, however, tribes like Manongwe, 
Kanala and Puma had derived similar advantages as allies of 
the French. The change in situation of these tribes after 
1862, as a result of government hostility towards the mission, 
was one of degree rather than kind. Before Guillain's arrival 
their continued adherence to paganism was tolerated. fer 
reasens of policy, but their attitude towards the mission was 
generally indifference rather than open antagonism. The small, 
35 
Patouillet was convinced that the Melanesian fusiliers of 
Wagap and Gatop indulged in cannibal feasts on the bodies of 
those slain during punitive expeditions against the enemies 
of the government. He regarded official connivance as a price 
which had to be paid for loyal and energetic allies: ' ••. il 
eut ete aussi inutile qu' impolitique de contrarier dans leurs 
moeurs ces allies toujours fideles, et l'on fermait les yeux 
sur des faits qu'on desesperait, helas! de pouvoir empecher' 
(Patouillet 1872:50). 
36 Ibid., 50, 157, 163-4; [Foucher] 1890:73-4. 
37Mon., 11 Nov. 1866, 24 Feb. 1867; Guillain to Min., 27 Aug. 
1869: ANOM, Carton 166. 
196 
weak Puma tribe had found it politic to aid its traditional 
enemies, the Mwelebeng, against pagan coalitions. After 
the Christian victories in 1860 the Puma showed improved 
dispositions towards the mission, and at no stage did they 
exhibit the truculent independence with which the people of 
Kanala rejected the mission in 1859-61. 38 The administration's 
attitude before 1862 was conditioned mainly by shortage of 
forces. While this factor continued to be relevant, a more 
pressing motive after 1862 was Guillain's desire to curb 
mission influence. 
On the other hand, the reversal of the official 
attitude towards the mission after 1862 had a profound effect 
on mission-dominated tribes, and on those which were prepared 
to accept mission influence. Most affected were tribes of 
the north-east: the Mwelebeng and its sub-tribes, the Paak 
of Bonde, the Maluma of Pambwa, the Arama and the Tea Janu 
of Webia. The impact of changes in government policy upon 
these people will be examined in subsequent chapters. 
38 
Montrouzier to his family, 15 Dec. 1859: AMO, 1:419; 
Montrouzier to Procureur, 14 June 1859, 7 Apr. 1860; Rougeyron 
to Procureur, 1 Oct. 1860, 12 Jan. 1861: APO. 
CHAPTER V 
PWEBO 
THE Mwelebeng tribe of Pwebo (Oot) seems traditionally to 
1 have been at least as numerous and powerful as Yengen, and 
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was a customary enemy of both Puma and Yengen. It is possible 
that some Pwebo people may have met members of the earliest 
European expeditions to visit Balad, since a few Mwelebeng 
words were transcribed in the vocabularies of Cook and the 
2 Forsters. Contact was almost certainly fleeting, however, 
because of the reluctance of Puma guides both in 1774 and 1793 
1 
Early European observers agreed that Mwelebeng was a large, 
strong tribe, but no reliable population figures are available 
(Leconte 1847a:766; 1847b:835-6; Tardy de Montravel to Min., 
25 Dec. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854). Population estimates 
suggest a marked decline in numbers during the first twenty 
years of intensive contact with Europeans, but it is impossible 
to ascertain with any accuracy the extent to which depopulation 
occurred. The estimates vary from Leconte's 5,000 in 1846 
(Leconte 1847b:822) to Garnier's 7-800 in 1864 (Garnier 1901: 
233). They are not worth citing in detail, however, because it 
is apparent that different observers included different groups 
in their figures: e.g., according to an official census published 
in 1870 the Mwelebeng population was 768 {'arrete du Gouverneur 
constituant la tribu des Mouelebes .•. ', 28 Feb. 1870: BO 1870: 
169); yet early in 1871 Rougeyron reported that this tribe had 
2,352 members (Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 17 Feb. 1871: 
APM/ONC, 20). The latter figure evidently referred to the people 
served by the Pwebo mission, who included groups which had been 
administratively detached from the Mwelebeng. 
2 
Haudricourt and Hollyman 1960:225-6; see also Baudoux 1938 
which records an oral tradition of the arrival of the first 
Europeans at Pwebo. 
to lead their visitors beyond the mountains south-west of 
Maamat, which suggests that Puma and Mwelebeng were actually 
at war on these occasions. 3 The earliest reasonably well-
documented contact of the Mwelebeng with Europeans occurred 
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in October 1842, when Andrew Cheyne in the English brigantine 
Bull anchored briefly off Pwebo intending to install a 
beche-de~mer fishery there. The visit ended abruptly after 
an unsuccessful attempt by a large number of Melanesians to 
take the ship. Cheyne claimed that many New Caledonians were 
killed, including eight 'high chiefs' • 4 It is unclear what 
he meant by this term, but it is unlikely that these men were 
clan chiefs, since traditionally the chief of a New 
Caledonian clan took no part in actual combat. This was 
entrusted to a war chief, a warrior noted for his valour and 
military ability. 5 In 1846 Leconte recorded an oral tradition 
which almost certainly referred to the Bull incident. In this 
version, however, only one chief was reported to have been 
killed, which seems more likely than eight. The people of 
Pwebo were said to have retained a vivid memory of the 
incident, as would be the case had a distinguished tribesman met 
his death: 'il leur reste encore le souvenir de ce desastre 
6 incomprehensible pour eux'. 
3 
Labillardiere 1800, II:197-8; Beaglehole 1961:534, fn. 4. 
4 
Shineberg 1971:135-42. The incident is examined in detail 
in Douglas 1971:159-61. 
5 
Rochas 1862:207; Leenhardt 1930:40-6, 96-7; Guiart 1963:40. 
6 
Leconte 1847b:823. 
THE chieftainship of the Mwelebeng tribe on the arrival of 
the first Europeans at Pwebo was held by the Tinjin or Tea 
Mwelebeng, a clan of Uvean origin, related to the Bait of 
Uvea and to the Maluma of Pambwa (Waap). 7 The Tinjin and 
its sub-clans mostly resided to the north-west of the Pwebo 
river, as far as the boundary with Puma. South-east of the 
river, 8 in the district known to the missionaries as Pareman, 
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the inhabitants of the hamlets of Cevit, Kabarik, Pwe-Kabarik, 9 
10 Bwaibat, Cambwen, Ubac, Yambe add several inland hamlets 
paid nominal allegiance to the Tinjin. They enjoyed far more 
independence than the western hamlets, however, and the 
Tinjin's relations with the more distant villages were 
11 infrequent. Traditionally the lands of the Mwelebeng tribe 
ended south of Yambe, but several clans further to the south-
east, such as those which lived at Jawe (Waap), Paalo and 
Wenop, at times accepted the suzerainty of the Mwelebeng 
chiefs, depending on who held the upper hand in the periodic 
conflicts between Mwelebeng and Yengen. The hamlet of Wenop, 
7 
Guiart 1957:26-7; Guiart 1968: Notes; personal communication of 
Maurice Moueaou, Pouebo, August 1969. 
8 According to Mathieu the word 'Pareman' referred to coastal 
people in general (A.Mathieu, 'Rapport •.• au sujet de la formation 
de la tribu de Tchambouene ••• ', 6 July 1869: Mon., 5 Sept.l869). 
Villard, however, specifically applied it to the people who lived 
along the shore to the south-east of the Pwebo river, and who 
paid some sort of allegiance to the Tinjin chiefs. In the 
Mwelebeng context I have adopted this usage. 
9These clans all spoke the language of Mwelebeng (Mathieu, ibid.), 
10 These clans all spoke the language of Jawe (lbid). 
11 J.M. Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': 
AVNC. 
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near Cape Colnett, was occupied by members of the Tea Janu 
tribe of Webia (Oot), who came from the mountains to obtain 
12 fish and salt water. Following the Mwelebeng victories over 
the Tea Janu and the Yengen in 1860, these small, semi-
independent tribes were absorbed into the Mwelebeng tribe, 
although the inhabitants of the area around Cape Colnett 
continued to pay allegiance to the Tea Janu, and were 
considered by Guillain's administration to belong to this 
tribe. 13 
On the beach north of the mouth of the Pwebo river, 
in a village called Oon (meaning 'sand'), lived a group of 
14 Polynesian speakers. They were the descendants of people 
who had emigrated from Uvea some years before the arrival of 
15 Europeans at Pwebo. By 1870 they numbered only twenty, and 
they were dispersed amongst other villages in the resettlement 
16 
of the Mwelebeng tribe which occurred in that year. Until 
1846, however, they enjoyed a certain prestige and influence 
12 
Ibid.; H.M.S. !!z, Letterbook. 
13 
Gagniere to Rougeyron, 12 May 1866: APM/ONC, 22; A.Mathieu, 
'Rapport .•. sur le meutre du sieur Emmanuel Cosso [par une 
bande d'indigenes (Tendianous) du village d'Ouenope] ', 24 
Feb. 1870: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9. The status of the Jawe 
was also a matter for debate. Mathieur referred to them as 
'relevant du Chef de Hienguene, bien que le territoire occupe 
par eux soit revendique par les Mouelebes' ('Rapport ••• au sujet 
de la formation de la tribu de Diaoue', 8 Dec. 1869: Mon., 6-13 
Mar. 1870). -
14
written communication of Professor K~J.Hollyman, 6 July 1970. 
15
six Uveans of Pwebo to Guillain, 29 Apr. 1866 (translation): 
APM/ONC, 22. 
16
'Arrete du Gouverneur constituant la tribu des Mouelebes ... ', 
28 Feb. 1870: BO 1870:168-9. 
in the tribe, as a result of their patronage by the 
Mwelebeng chiefs, and the marriage of one of their number 
to the high chief. The second son of this union, Gwa, was 
the leading chief at Pwebo in 1843, when more or less 
continuous contact with Europeans began after the arrival of 
the Marists at Balad. 17 
In contrast to Yengen, a single chief was not 
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dominant at Pwebo during the early years of European contact, 
although the authority of the Tinjin was generally unquestioned, 
and clan rivalries did not cause internal dissension as in 
the Puma tribe. For much of this period the legitimate 
Mwelebeng chief was a child, and the tribe was run by a 
'regent', an older relative who customarily retained great 
influence, even after the young chief was old enough to share 
power. Gwa acted in this capacity for Tindin, the elder son 
of his late brother, and Gwa's son, Bonu, filled a similar 
role while Tindin's brother, Warebat, was a child. 
After the settlement of the Marist missionaries at 
Balad, the Tinjin seem to have been envious of the prestige 
and the material benefits which the Puma acquired as a result 
of the Europeans' presence. The Mwelebeng ceased their 
17 
P. Rougeyron, 'Abrege de la vie de Hippolyte Bonou': AVNC. 
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18 periodic attacks on the weaker tribe, however, probably 
in part because of their respect for the powerful allies, 
both physical and spiritual, on which they believed the 
missionaries could call. Their memory of the Bull incident 
may well have inclined them towards conciliation to gain 
the missionaries' favour, rather than violent seizure of 
mission property. The chiefs expressed to the commander of 
the Rhin in 1845 their desire that the Marists should settle 
at Pwebo, and early in 1846 Douarre acquired a fine piece of 
land from Tindin, with the intention of opening a mission 
. h 19 stat1on t ere. Despite their interest in the mission, the 
Mwelebeng chiefs at this time showed no desire to accept its 
spiritual message, and unlike at Balad, where cannibalism and 
theft diminished, the missionaries' moral influence at Pwebo 
was limited. Gwa, a shrewd man, paid lip~service to their 
abhorrence of cannibalism, and exhibited a keen awareness of 
20 
the advantages which might be derived from cooperation. 
His two younger sons, children of eight or nine years, were 
ardent supporters of the missionaries, and left New Caledonia 
21 
with them on the Brillante in August 1847. 
18 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 1 Oct. 1845: APM/ONC, 26a; 
Leconte to Min., 31 Mar. 1847:ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1847-8; 
Leconte 1847b:836, 849. 
19 
Berard to Min., 1 Aug. 1846: ANM, BB4 1011; Leconte to Min., 
31 Mar. 1847: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1847-8. 
20 
See above, p.52. 
21 
Verguet 1861:259. 
Tindin, however, became a notorious cannibal, an 
avowed enemy of the mission and its followers: 
[il y a] un chef de tribu qui se distinguait 
entre tous les autres par sa ferocite. Il se 
nommait Tindine. L'autre jour .•• je fremis en 
voyant des membres humains que ce monstre avait 
fait suspendre ~ des piquets en signe de Tabou 
Ce tigre enlevait a nos neophites [sic] les 
vetements que nous leur avions donnes, et il 
menacait d'egorger ceux qui lui resistaient. Un 
dernier crime devait mettre le comble a la mesure; 
c'est le massacre de cinq personnes qui ait ete 
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ensuite roties et mangees. 22 
Missionary accounts of his actions were couched in such shocked 
and emotional language that it is difficult to determine the 
reaction he evoked amongst the local people. It seems likely, 
however, that his own tribe regarded his behaviour as 
t 1 d h i d d . ib 1 fl. 2 3 unna ura , an t at t cause unrest an 1ntra-tr a con 1ct. 
Gwa and Tindin both died during the epidemic of 
1846-7, in which the Mwelebeng, like surrounding tribes, 
24 
suffered severe losses. The tribe again came under the 
control of a 'regent', Gwa's eldest son, Bonu. Although he was 
subsequently referred to by Europeans as the 'second chief' of 
Pwebo, he ran the tribe until his exile to the Isle of Pines 
by Gui1lain in 1866. 25 
22 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 14 Feb. 1847: APM/ONC, 26a; 
see above, pp. 94-6. 
23 
Rougeyron, 'Abrege de la vie de 
Leconte 1847b:849-50. 
24 R S - i - - 1 ougeyron to uper eur-genera , 
Leconte 1847b:869. 
25 
Hippolyte Bonou': AVNC; 
14 Feb. 1847: APM/ONC, 26a; 
E.g., Testard to Min., 23 Apr. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42; Gagniere 
to his brother, 2 May 1866: APM/ONC, 26m. 
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Early in 1847 the Marists started a station at 
Pwebo, but the attempt was short-lived. After the 
abandonment of the Balad mission in July of that year the 
missionaries took refuge at Pwebo, where they remained in a 
virtual state of siege until their relief by the Brillante 
in August. Eye-witness _accounts indicated that Bonu, 
together with almost all his tribe, harassed the missionaries 
during· th~s period, and that he helped at least to plan a 
full-scale attack which the Mwelebeng made on the Brillante's 
landing party as it escorted the missionaries to the ship: 
Na~goro, enfant de neuf ans .•. et son frere 
Koine age de huit ans, sont venus le jour de 
notre depart m'avertir en secret que leur frere 
Renou, grand chef de Poebo, se disposait a nous 
trahir; c'etait vrai; nous etions tous perdus 
sans l'avis providentiel de ces d~ux enfants. 26 
Rougeyron claimed later in his biography of Bonu that the 
chief was already devoted to the mission in 1847, and that 
27 he had played no part in the opposition; there seems no 
doubt, however, from Rougeyron's own correspondence, that 
Bonu was the effective leader of a hostile tribe. However 
questionable Bonu's activities may have been in 1847, it is 
certain that in August 1850 he went with Rougeyron to join 
26 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 13 Aug. 1847: APM/ONC, 26a; 
see also Verguet 1861:257-9, 261. 
27 
Rougeyron, 'Abrege de la vie de Hippolyte Bonou': AVNC; 
see also Gagniere to his brother, 2 May 1866: APM/ONC, 26m. 
his brothers in Futuna, where he was baptized with the 
28 
name of Hippolyte. Hippolyte Bonu was to remain a 
fervent Christian until his death in exile in September 
1866. 
ON their return from Futuna in January 1852 Bonu, his 
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brothers and the other Pwebo Christians were welcomed with 
joy by their kinsmen, who were vastly impressed by the rich 
gifts sent by the Christians of Futuna. The missionaries 
29 
were enthusiastically received as friends of the chief, 
and, presumably, as emissaries from the land where such 
wealth originated. A chapel was built and Matthieu Gagniere 
re-opened the mission at Pwebo in December 1852. He was 
respected and obeyed, but spiritual progress was at first 
slow, as few members of the tribe desired to listen to the 
missionary or to abandon their old ways. 30 With the aid 
of several local catechists, however, more than one hundred 
people were prepared for baptism by March 1853. 31 The 
ceremony duly took place, but towards the end an epidemic 
broke out at Pwebo. Douarre and Bonu's brothers died almost 
immediately, and the population of Pwebo, both Christian and 
28 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 10 June 1850: APF 1851, 
23:387; Rougeyron, 'Biographie du R.P. Gagniere':-56-7: AVNC. 
29 
Rougeyron, 'Biographie du R.P. Gagniere', 75, 80: AVNC. 
30 
Ibid., 80, 82. 
31Montrouzier to his parents, 16 Mar. 1853: APM/Personal 
file (Montrouzier); Anon., 'Dates pour servir a la vie du 
R.P. Gagneres' [sic]: AVNC 
pagan, was said to have been decimated within ten days. 
In July Montrouzier reported: 
Depuis plusieurs mois, une cruelle 
epidemie sevit avec force parmi nos tribus; 
en dix jours, elle a enleve a Poebo un dixieme 
de la population. 32 
The reaction of the Mwelebeng to the epidemic was 
similar to that of the Puma. In both tribes the elders were 
at the best of times suspicious of the new religion, they 
resisted missionary influence and refused to abandon 
traditional customs and values. But during crises, for 
which the missionaries were usually blamed, the hostility 
of the traditionalists became overt, and was shared, to 
some extent at least, by all but committed Christians. 33 
The 1853 epidemic and the death and suffering which it 
occasioned was such a crisis, and it led to the emergence 
of a clear division in the Mwelebeng tribe between the 
supporters of the mission, who almost all lived to the 
north-west of the Pwebo river, and the defenders of custom, 
who were scattered throughout the tribe, but were strongest 
in the south-eastern villages. The nominal high chief, 
Warebat, was reasonably well disposed towards Bonu and the 
32 
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Montrouzier to Superieur-general, 3 July 1853: APM/ONC, 26c. 
33 
See above, pp.66-7; Gagniere to Superieur-general, 18 Sept. 
1853: APM/ONC, 21; Montrouzier to his brother, 14 Oct. 1853: 
APM/Personal file (Montrouzier); Rougeyron, 'Abrege de la 
vie de Hippolyte Bonou'; 'Biographie du R.P. Gagniere', 95: 
AVNC. 
missionaries, but he lacked energy and would not abandon 
polygamy because he believed that his prestige would 
34 
suffer. He was later won over by the conservatives, but 
intra-tribal dissension never seriously endangered the 
position of the missionaries at Pwebo, nor threatened the 
bases of their support. From an early date it seemed 
probable, despite opposition from within the tribe, that 
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the m1ssion would ultimately succeed unless extraordinary 
circumstances intervened. 35 The situation at Pwebo differed 
from that at Balad in three important respects. First, the 
religious division of the Mwelebeng did not correspond to 
traditional clan affiliations to the same extent as in the 
Puma tribe, and the Mwelebeng remained more or less united 
under the authority of the Tinjin chiefs, especially Bonu. 
Second, Bonu, unlike Bweon, had a firm power base in 
the north-western villages. He was a devoted servant of 
the missionaries and his new religion, and yet he retained 
the respect of a large part of the tribe because of his 
personal qualities, 36 and despite the firmness with which he 
instituted the reforms that the missionaries deemed necessary. 
34 
Gagniere to Superieur-general, 18 Sept. 1853: APM/ONC, 21; 
Montrouzier to his brother, 14 Oct. 1853: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier). 
35 
Gagniere to Superieur-general, 18 Sept. 1853: APM/ONC, 21; 
Forestier to Superieur-general, 20 Sept. 1853: ibid., 26c. 
36 
Tardy de Montravel commented, in reference to Bonu: ' la 
volonte du chef d'une tribu a d'autant plus de puissance sur 
la population, qu'il a su se faire craindre, estimer et 
respecter par une reelle superiorite' (Tardy de Montravel to 
Min., 25 Dec. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854). 
Gagniere described how Bonu punished the theft of mission 
property and an attempted act of cannibalism: 
Au premier vol nous avons fait bruler par 
notre chef toutes les cases du coupable; 
au second, quatre champs d'ignames ont payi; 
quand [sic] a !'assassin ses jambes lui ont 
sauvi la vie, et il ne s'est rapprochi qu' 
apres quelques mois d'exile. 37 
During· 1853 a bizarre episode occurred, which highlighted 
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the extent of Bonu's prestige and the missionaries' influence 
at Pwebo. For some years numerous dogs had roamed about 
the tribe. They were treated as family members, to the 
extent that pups were suckled by the women of the tribe, 
and the death of a dog was an occasion for public mourning. 
Such sacrilege led the missionaries to suggest to Bonu 
that the dogs should be killed and used to supplement the 
protein-deficient local diet. 38 The inhabitants of the 
partly Christian western villages obeyed willingly, but 
the people of Pareman refused, and a brief civil war ensued. 
A compromise settlement was reached, but the south-eastern 
villages continued to be rebellious. They occasionally 
called on the chiefs of neighbouring tribes to aid them 
37 
Gagniere to Supirieur-giniral, 18 Sept.1853:APM/ONC, 21. 
38 
Poupinel to Supirieur-giniral, 2 Dec. 1857: APF 1858, 30: 
297-8; Rougeyron, 'Abrigi de la vie de Hippoly~Bonou': 
AVNC. 
against the Christian chief, and at times fought in 
39 
alliance with the enemies of the Mwelebeng. Late in 
1859 catechists were sent to the more northerly hamlets of 
Pareman, 'revetus de la double autorite du R.P. Gagniere 
et de Hippolyte' . 40 They were well enough received, but by 
the middle of 1860 there were still no Christians in the 
western part of the tribe, and the more distant villages 
41 
were 'presqu'encore a l'etat sauvage' 
The third way in which the situation at Pwebo 
differed from that at Balad lay in the character and ability 
of Gagniere, who won the affection and/or the respect of much 
of the tribe, young and old, pagans as well as Christians. 
His methods were revolutionary in the context of missionary 
42 
endeavour in New Caledonia. He was a huge man, whose 
physical presence alone inspired respect and enhanced his 
influence. His evangelism relied in part on his ability 
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to acquire a position of moral authority in the tribe, through 
his toughness, sternness, and utilization of the prestige of 
well-disposed chiefs; and in part on his common-sense and 
his consideration for the beliefs and sensibilities of the 
39 
Gagniere to his brother, 2 May 1866: APM/ONC, 26m; 
J.M. Villard, 'Rapports sur les bienfaits et graces re~us 
de la Tres Sainte Vierge', 9 Sept. 1889: APM/ONC, 2a. 
40 
Rougeyron to Procureur, [October 1859]: APO. 
41 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': 
AVNC. 
42 
Gagniere, biographical notes: APM/ONC, 14. 
people whose conversion he sousht, particularly the 
elders. The extent of his influence and his toughness 
were demonstrated above in the examples of punishments 
which he caused the chief to impose for infringements of 
the new moral code advocated by the missionaries. Milder 
forms of coercion were also used to encourage acceptable 
behaviour. If the inhabitants of a village displeased 
Gagniere he would refuse to buy their yams and taro, thus 
depriving them of tobacco. They would be told: 
"C'est bien, un tel village est mauvais, il 
est Kanak nous n'achetterons [sic] pas ses taros 
et ses ignames quand il viendra vendre: il 
n'aura plus de tabac pour fumer". Le rendant 
ainsi caution les uns pour les autres ils se 
font la correction les uns aux autres. 43 
Implicit in all these examples was the missionary's 
unquestioning acceptance of his right, in fact his duty, 
to direct Melanesians in temporal as well as spiritual 
matters, and he recognized no dichotomy or contradiction 
between the two aspects ofhls work. At Yengen, of course, 
such coercive. tactics would only have angered and alienated 
43 
Gagniere to Superieur-general, 18 Sept. 1853: APM/ONC, 21. 
See also Gagniere to Procureur, 1 May 1859: APO, in which 
he described how he circumvented the threatened self-exile 
of several people who objected to the enforced 
Christianization of traditional ceremonies: 'jlai declare 
en public la confiscation future des proprietes en faveur 
des deux chefs, si 'expatriation avait eu lieu'. 
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the local inhabitants, whose regular relations with 
European traders freed them from dependence on the 
missionaries for supplies of goods of European manufacture. 
But few traders frequented Pwebo before 1860, and in such 
circumstances the threat of deprivation of tobacco, to 
which New Caledonians quickly became addicted once 
Europeftn contact had been established, was indeed serious. 
Many missionaries in New Caledonia were able, through 
the strength of their personalities and with the support 
of well-disposed chiefs, to acquire considerable influence 
and authority over their proselytes, but few had Gagniere's 
success in developing convinced, dedicated Christians, 
who had achieved a workable compromise between traditional 
beliefs and the demands of the new religion. Gagniere 
insisted that traditional beliefs and magic should not be 
dismissed as mere superstition·and fetishism, to be 
sloughed off as immoral and irrelevant before Christianity 
was embraced. He pointed out that it was invalid to assume 
that conversion implied a sincere and comprehensive 
renunciation of customary beliefs. A person who renounced 
paganism retained as many of its practices as his conscience 
allowed, because he would rather accept two religions than 
abandon his original one: 
C'est sa religion et il veut plutot accepter 
deux religions que de renoncer a celle qu'il 
a d~ja: c'est le parti qui lui parait le plus 
sur ••• il s'agit de leur foi, de leur culte, 
de leur conscience. 
44 G i~ 18 agn ere to Procureur, 1 May 59: APO. 
44 
The missionary who ignored this deluded himself. Gagniere 
aimed to make true Christians of Melanesians without 
first demanding complete renunciation of existing 
supernatural beliefs. He tried to indicate to his 
followers the relationship between some of their ancient 
ceremonies and practices and the patriarchal religion of 
the O~d Testament. He justified their conversion to 
Christianity in terms of the replacement of these practices, 
which may have been valid before their enlightenment, by 
better ones. He contested Montrouzier's claim that a 
missionary must justify conversion entirely in terms of 
God's will and God's authority, which demanded absolute 
abandonment of pre-existing beliefs and practices. Gagniere 
insisted that it was tactless, obtuse and self-defeating 
for a missionary to deny without explanation the entire 
supernatural framework which supported and sanctioned 
traditional beliefs. Such a denial destroyed the 
missionary's authority and discredited the authority of God, 
since Melanesians interpreted the latter in terms of the 
former. Gagniere aimed to adapt and tnansform traditional 
festivals, practices and concepts into simple Christian 
ceremonies and ritual, in order that his followers should 
better understand the implications of conversion, and not 
be faced with a traumatic break with the past. Before this 
method could be applied the missionary had to acquire a 
profound knowledge and understanding of Melanesian beliefs, 
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practices and psychology, and Gagniere himself devoted 
much time and intellectual effort to this study. The 
results were to be seen in the eagerness with which his 
teachings were heard and accepted, especially at Pwebo, 
Arama and Bonde~ and in the respect and admiration which 
45 he evoked amongst pagans as well as committed Christians. 
AFTER the annexation of New Caledonia in September 1853 
Bonu and Warebat were among the first chiefs to recognize 
French sovereignty and pledge support for and obedience to 
the colonial regime. 46 They were granted a code of laws 
similar to that received by Bweon of Puma. In 1854 
45 
The scope and depth of Gagniere's understanding of and 
empathy with Melanesian beliefs and modes of thought 
were demonstrated in his admirable monograph Etude 
ethnologique sur la religion des Nlo-Calldoniens (St-Louis 
1905). Of the Catholic missionaries in New Caledonia in 
the nineteenth century only Lambert, who became a disciple 
of Gagniere's methods and attitudes, managed to transcend 
his European and Catholic prejudices to anything like the 
same ex~ent (Lambert 1900:27; Gagniere to Procureur~ 25 
Feb., 12 May 1861: APO). Gagniere's missionary creed was 
expounded most fully in letters of 1 May 1859 and 12 May 
1861 (APO). See also Villard to Procureur, 16 May 1859; 
Gagniere to Procureur, 3 Dec. 1859, 12 May 1860, 25 Feb. 
1861: APO. 
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Gagniere died at Pwebo after a short illness on 29 
August 1867~ a little more than a month before the uprising 
of part of the Mwelebeng tribe on the night of 6-7 October. 
It is not unlikely that his restraining influence would have 
prevented bloodshed. Rougeyron, for one, believed that 'le 
besoin de ce Missionnaire' was a factor of some importance 
in the October events (Rougeyron to ? , 30 Nov. 1867: 
APM/ONC, 22). 
46 
'Reconnaissance et acceptation de la Souverainetl de 
S.M. Napollon III par Uarebat et Hippolyte, Chefs de la 
tribu de Mulllbl ',15 Feb. 1854: ANOM, Carton 67. 
Tardy de Montravel reported that the Mwelebeng, as a 
tribe, were 'plus independants et plus jaloux de leur 
liberte' than the Puma, but that individually they were 
'plus esclaves du principe de soumission a l'autorite 
47 [du] chef effectif actuel, Hippolyte'. He regarded the 
second trait as an invaluable means to manage the tribe, 
214 
by direction and manipulation of Bonu. This would only apply, 
however, as long as administration and mission remained in 
essential agreement, since Bonu's first allegiance was to 
his religion and its local representatives. 
That Bonu's authority was less absolute than the 
missionaries, de Montravel and presumably Bonu himself would 
have liked to believe is suggested by the continued 
dissension in the tribe, and the appearance of an open 
rift in 1855. Suspicion of French pretensions and 
resentment at the missionaries' blatant attempt by means of 
the code to reinforce and extend Bonu's authority at the 
48 
expense of Warebat exacerbated the already burgeoning 
hostility of the conservatives towards the mission, and by 
extension towards the French. Lambert recorded a parable 
which gained currency throughout the north at about this 
time, and which reflected the anger provoked by Bonu's 
47 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 25 Dec. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854. 
48 
Cf. Puma, see below, p. 
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enhanced position and the intrigues of the Marists. 49 It 
depicted the conflicts which occurred in the Arama tribe 
as a result of the sudden acquisition of great wealth and 
power by the mweau ('younger brother', i.e. Bonu), who 
threatened to eclipse the teama ('great son', i.e. Warebat). 
The mweau owed his rise to the machinations of two powerful 
genies, who represented the missionaries. Despite supernatural 
assistance, however, the upstart finally came to a sad end. 
The parable was intended to demonstrate the folly of attempting , 
even with powerful allies, to infringe time-honoured custom. 
In a curious way the prophecy was eventually fulfilled, since 
disaster did overtake Bonu as a result of his association with 
the missionaries, and his aspiration to greater power than that 
to which he was entitled traditionally. Ironically, however, 
his fate was determined not by his own people, but by Guillain, 
whose motives were far removed from those expressed in the 
allegory. 
Early in 1855 du Bouzet reported that about 17% of 
the Mwelebeng population was Christian, but that the tribe was 
restless, and could be counted on less than the Puma. Chiefly 
authority had been diminished by the suppression of cannibalism 
and murder as means of repression, and the code was ignored. 50 
I f .. ) 
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Lambert to Poupinel, [1860]: APM/ONC, 21.V~ ~' rP ~ 1 
50 
Du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855a: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855. 
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Within four months Warebat had thrown in his lot with the 
dissidents, 51 and ordered the Mwelebeng Christians to recant. 
With a few exceptions they refused, and some persecution 
ensued. Bonu's influence was generally sufficient however, to 
h f 1 · h 52 Th avert t e open use o vio ence aga1nst t em. e 
agitation of the pagans gained added fuel from the high&ath 
rate amongst the Christians, especially those who had 
returned from Futuna, and a widespread belief existed that: 
••. nous [les missionnaires] n'etions chez eux 
que pour les faire mourrir et pour les rendre 
encore malheureux dans l'autre monde (la plupart 
de nos chretiens de balad venus de futuna sont 
morts, tandis que les paiens sont brillants de 
sante). 
The low point of missionary fortunes within the Mwelebeng 
tribe occurred during the last half of 1855. Subsequently 
the involvement of the Pwebo Christians in traditional inter-
tribal conflicts, and the enmity of pagan coalitions towards 
the Mwelebeng seemed likely from time to time to cause the 
53 
collapse of the mission, but external pressures finally united 
the whole tribe behind Bonu and the missionaries, and were 
responsible in no small measure for its eventual conversion. 
During 1856 the Mwelebeng were more than once attacked 
by the Yengen and by a pagan coalition led by Bwarat. That 
51 
Du Bouzet to Min., 10 June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855. 
52 
Du Bouzet to abbe de Meydat, 26 June 1855: APF 1856, 28:380. 
53 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 28 Dec. 1855: APM/ONC, 5d. 
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chief's traditional enmity towards the Mwelebeng was extended 
to the Marists, for whom in any case he bore no love, and 
who actively aided the cause of his enemies. 54 Warebat helped 
the pagans, but they were unable to achieve a decisive victory, 
and the inability of the coalition to press home its 
numerical advantage helped the cause of Christianity. 55 
Warebat's coldness continued, but his lack of authority within 
the tribe negated much of the effect of his opposition: 
Poebo ••• [est] soumise, quoique le premier chef 
nous soit hostile; mais il est nul, le ze chef 
qui a toute l'influence est avec nous ••• 56 
Bwarat was arrested as a result of his uncompromising animosity 
towards the Mwelebeng and the missionaries, and his tribe was 
devastated in 1859. Apart from the burning of the Pwebo church 
late in 1858, however, the enemies of the Mwelebeng contented 
themselves with plots and an occasional murder, and open 
warfare did not again break out until the end of 1859. At 
this time Kawa's pagan coalition, determined to avenge 
Bwarat and the Yengen, hurled itself upon the Mwelebeng and 
their pagan allies from Bonde and Balad. After initial set-
54 
See above, pp. 111-12. 
55 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, [1856]: APM/ONC, 5d. 
56 
Testard to Min., 23 Apr. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42. 
backs, when some of the people of Pareman took refuge at 
57 Pwebo, while the most south-easterly villages crossed to 
the enemy, the war resulted in a crushing victory for the 
58 Mwelebeng. 
The means by which this result was attained are worth 
c1oser examination. During a lull after the initial attacks 
218 
Villard ·organized the Christians into a small army with about 
59 thirty muskets at its disposal. About 80 men drilled daily 
for three months under Bonu, who carried a sabre and wore a 
60 
sash and a general's hat. Villard described with enthusiasm 
the elan of his small troop as they learned to adapt their 
traditional talent for warlike pursuits to a new type of 
military skill: 
57 
Je me rappelai ce que j'avais appris, et depuis 
le Garde a vous, jusqu'a quoi •.. tousles mouvements, 
charge a 13 temps, l 4 temps, a volonte, petite guerre, 
tirailleur, feu de peleton, feu de file, le tir. 
Mes soldats maniaient le fusil comme une cass-tete 
[sic]. 61 
Mathieu, 'Rapport ... au sujet de la formation de la tribu 
de Tchambouine ..• ', 6 July 1869: M9rl., 5 Sept. 1869. 
58 -
See above, pp.130, 132-3. 
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Villard, 'Rapports sur les bienfaits et graces ••• ', 9 Sept. 
1889: APM/ONC, 2a. 
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Villard to Procureur, 13 May 1860: APO. 
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Villard, 'Rapports sur les bienfaits et graces ... ', 9 Sept. 
1889: APM/ONC, 2a. 
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The invaders were finally routed on 29 April 1860, and the 
Mwelebeng went on the offensive, in order, according to 
62 
Villard, to avenge 'l'honneur de la religion'; a more 
cynical observer might discern less pure motives as far as 
a majority of the crusaders were concerned. The rebellious 
coastal villages were punished, and Bonu led his warriors to 
Pambwa, ~here 'tout fut brule, pille, quelques morts, le 
reste prend la fuite, abandonne la tribu'. The Mwelebeng 
then advanced 'la pipe a la bouche, brulent, pillent'' along 
the coast to Tao, and then inland t~ attack the Tea Janu 
in their mountain strongholds, and put their land to the 
torch. Finally the Yengen in their turn were vanquished and 
. 63 the defeated tribes sued for peace. Allies and former 
enemies alike called upon Bonu to procure them missionaries, 
and the entire Mwelebeng tribe, including Warebat and the 
recalcitrant people of Pareman, succumbed to the reality of 
military success and united behind Bonu in a burst of 
64 patriotic fervour. It is important to note that the war 
62 
Villard to Procureur, 16 Aug. 1860: APO. 
63 
Ibid.; Villard, 'Rappotts sur les bienfaits et graces ••• ', 
9 Sept. 1889: APM/ONC, 2a. 
64 
Ibid.; Villard to Procureur, 6 Sept. 1869: APO. 
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and military victory provided a means by which the 
previously nominal authority of the Tinjin chiefs over the 
south-eastern clans could be transformed into autocratic 
control. According to Mathieu the refugees who returned to 
Pareman were told by Bonu where to re-establish their villages, 
and were punished if they disobeyed. The small independent 
tribe of Jawe (Waap where Mwelebeng was Oot) was annexed by 
65 the Mwelebeng, despite traditional ties with Yengen. Thus 
the 'flexibility and equality of customary inter-clan 
relationships were lost, and a loose and more or less 
voluntary grouping of clans became rig~d and compulsory. 
From 1860 the influence of the Mwelebeng was felt 
throughout much of the north-east, and missionary prestige 
reached a previously unknown peak: 
Aujourd'hui Pouebo domine partout dans le Nord, 
comme l'fle des Pins dans le Sud. La religion 
est en honneur et partout on nous demande. 
Catechists went to the most distant hamlets of the 
Mwelebeng tribe, and children from as far away as Webia were 
65 
Mathieu, 'Rapport ... au sujet de la formation de la tribu 
66 
de Tchambouene .•• ', 6 July 1869: Mon., 5 Sept. 1869; 'Rapport 
.•. au sujet de la formation de la~ibu de Diaoue', 8 Dec. 
1869: Mon., 6-13 Mar. 1870. 
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Rougeyron to Procureur, 23 Oct. 1862: APO; see also 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 12 July 1860: APO; Ro~geyron, 'Notes 
sur les diversesmissions de la Caledonie et les Iles Loyalty', 
18 Nov. 1861: APM/ONC, 20; Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe 
de Pouebo en 1867': KVNC. 
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67 
called to Pwebo to be trained for this role. In September 
68 1860 Gagniere left Pwebo to found a mission at Arama, and 
two years later, in response to reiterated chiefly demands, 
he started a station at Bonde. 69 By early 1863 most of the 
Mwelebeng and the Arama had been baptized, the youth of Bonde 
were well-disposed, the Maluma and the Tea Janu awaited 
catechisLs, while the people of Kumak, Gomen and Yengen 
received instruction from catechists sent from Conception. 70 
Some Marists had few illusions about the reasons behind 
this sudden widespread enthusiasm for Christianity. In 
reference to the Paak of Bonde, Forestier commented: 
67 
devenir plus attache a Pouebo est d'avoir 
de~ protecteurs puissants centre les tribus 
paiennes, leur ennemis communes. 71 
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During 1862 Villard sent for ('fis appeler') the chiefs of 
the tribes or villages of Puma, Tande, Pwalu, Maluma and Tea 
Janu and proposed that they should provide children 'pour .•. 
etre instruits de la Religion et de la civilisation chretienne, 
afin que plus tard, ces enfants pussent porter le flambeau de 
la foi et de la civilisation chretienne au milieu des leurs'. 
By August 1862 there were 49 children from these tribes at 
Pwebo receiving instruction (Villard to Rougeyron, [Report on 
the events at Pwebo], 7-16 Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 22. See also 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': AVNC). 
68 
[Forestier], 'Rapport sur la Nouvelle-Caledonie en 1860 et 
1861', n.d.: APM/ONC, 19. 
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70 
Ibid.; Rougeyron to Procureur, 23 Oct. 1862: APO; Forestier 
to Poupinel, 4 Dec. 1862: APM/ONC, 19; Villard, 'Memoire sur 
la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': AVNC. 
71 
[Forestier], 'Rapport sur la Nouvelle-Caledonie en 1860 et 
1861', n. d.: APM/ONC, 19, 
Nonetheless the movement was seen as a break~hrough and the 
missionaries were exultant. Only experience was to prove 
the insufficiency of such motives as a basis for genuine and 
lasting conversion, since many of these new converts and 
proselytes were to succumb to the threats or blandishments 
of Guillain and his henchmen, and abandon the new practices 
for old~r ones which were more acceptable to the civil 
h . . 72 aut orJ.tJ.es. 
EARLY in 1856 it was reported that the Catholics of Pwebo, 
encouraged by their missionaries, had begun to produce small 
quantities of coconut oil and beche-de-mer, which they sold 
t i t 1 h . 73 o pass ng coas a s l.ppers. Such undertakings, at Pwebo 
and Belep, remained an a very small scale until the early 
1860's, when a coconut oil plant was set up at Arama, under 
the control of the chief and with the advice of the local 
missionary, Jerome Guitta. Most of the tribe contributed 
their coconuts and their labour, and the proceeds were used 
in a common fund to procure clothes, tobacco and a few simple 
74 items of European manufacture. 
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See below, PP• 238-9, 244-5. 
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Rougeyron to Procureur,23 Oct. 1862: APO; Thiercelin 1866, 
1:279-80, 288, 305-6. 
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After the Mwelebeng victory in 1860 Villard began to 
organize the tribe to provide the materials and finance for 
the building of a stone church at Pwebo. A severe measles 
epidemic, which lasted from early December 1860 until the 
beginning of February 1861, caused many deaths, and resulted 
in a temporary suspension of the work and the break-up of 
Villard's militia. Work on the church began again in earnest 
after the epidemic. 75 Lieutenant Commander Adolphe Mathieu, 
later to be Guillain's chief-of-staff and renowned for his 
animosity towards the Marists, visited Pwebo in 1861, and 
reported in admiring tones on the industry of the tribe, and 
the great influence wielded over it by Villard. He described 
how the inhabitants of the various villages made coconut oil, 
the profits from which were divided into three portions: one 
part was used to pay the European workmen engaged on the 
church; the second to provide clothing for the people who had 
fled Pwebo during the war, and wished to become part of the 
tribe; the third was given to the chiefs of the various 
villages in proportion to the oil produced, and was divided 
among the workers. 
75 
Mathieu to Durand, 22 July 1861: ANOM, Carton 42; 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': 
AVNC. 
Cette bonne oeuvre et l'augmentation des 
indigenes autour de notre missionnaire prouve 
une fois de plus l'influence qu'exerce le 
Pere Villars sur les populations qui lui sont 
confiees et qu'il dirige si bon. Il est en 
effet remarquable de voir avec quel empressement 
hommes, femmes et enfants, accourent a sa voix, 
obeissant au moindre de ses gestes; ils sont 
payes en retour par le zele et le devouement 
avec lesquels leur Pere s'occupe de leurs 
224 
interets moraux et materiels. 76 
By late 1861 Villard, through his own prestige and the 
authority of Bonu, had regimented the life of the entire tribe 
around the task of constructing the church. Each village 
worked one week in four, without payment, and more than sixty 
77 
men contributed their labour each day. Early in 1864 work 
on the church was suspended, in part at least because 
Guillain's hostility towards the Marists had begun to focus 
on their position at Pwebo and their diversion of Melanesian 
78 labour to further the cause of Christianity in the area. 
The extent of Villard's authority over the Mwelebeng 
provoked comment from most visitors, both lay and missionary~ 79 
76 
Mathieu to Durand, 22 July 1861: ANOM, Carton 42. 
77 
Forestier to Procureur, 7 Aug. 1861; Villard to Procureur, 
(1861]: APO. 
78 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867':AVNC. 
79 
Mathieu to Durand, 22 July 1861: .ANOH, Carton 42; Forestier 
to Procureur, 7 Aug. 1861: APO; Bourgey 1864:157. 
80 Although he supported Gagniere's methods, Villard's 
position depended more on his energy and stubbornness, and 
the great prestige acquired during the war of 1859-60, than 
on the subtle means of persuasion, based on a profound 
understanding of New Caledonian culture, beliefs and 
motivations, which Gagniere applied. Lare in 1863 
Rougeyron provided a clue to the traits of character which 
Guillain found intolerable in Villard, and which caused him 
eventually to become the main individual target of the 
governor's anti-clericalism: 'il [Villard] tient trop a 
i 1 ~ . ' 81 mposer ses vo ontes et y est trop ent1er • 
On Guillain's first visit to Pwebo in June 1863 
his relations with the chiefs and the missionary seemed, on 
82 the surface, to be good. Yet the Marists claimed that 
on his return to Port-de-France he accused them of being 
more powerful than he in New Caledonia, of ruling like 
'petits rois', and of exercising more authority than tribal 
h . f 83 c 1e s. The discovery of gold in the mountains behind 
Pwebo gave Guillain a pretext to establish a police post at 
225 
Pwebo. The maintenance of the post even after the expectation 
80 
Villard to Procureur, 16 May 1859: APO. 
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Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 21 Oct. 1863: APM/ONC, 20. 
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Bourgey 1864:157, 159; Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe 
de Pouebo en 1867': AVNC. 
83 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 16 June 1863: APO. 
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of large gold deposits had proved ephemeral suggests 
that it was intended mainly to supervise the activities 
84 
of the missionaries. For a while Villard enjoyed good 
relations with the gendarmes. Guillain's animosity did 
not diminish, however, and late in 1863 a squabble developed 
over the ownership of the Pwebo church and land claimed by 
the mission in the 85 area. Bickering over the extent of 
mission land-holdings in the north continued throughout 
Guillain's term of office, and although fue Marists were 
not actually forced to abandon any of their main properties, 
the matter was not finally settled until after Guillain's 
86 departure from the colony. 
According to Villard mission/government relations 
at Pwebo began to deteriorate noticeably at the beginning 
84 
'Decision du Gouverneur creant a Pouebo ••• un poste de 
police occupe par la Gendarmerie', 17 Oct. 1863: BO 
1863:240; Rougeyron to Procureur, 17 Nov. 1863, 2~Mar. 
1864: APO. 
85 
Forestier to Procureur, 7 Nov. 1863; Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 17 Nov. 1863, 17 Jan. 1864: APO. 
86 
Conseil d'administration, 21 Oct. 1864: ANOM, Carton 88; 
3 Feb. 1866: ANOM, Carton 89; Bailly to Bonu, 1 Jan. 1866: 
APM/ONC, 25; Rougeyron to Guillain, 12 Jan. 1866: ibid., 11; 
'arrete ••. enumerant les proprietes reconnues a la Mission 
mariste au nord de la ligne reliant U ara:l. a Canala, 1 May 
1872: BO 1872:199-200. 
of 1864. 87 At the core of the conflict were the general 
questions of missionary influence over the Mwelebeng 
88 
and neighbouring tribes, and the refusal of the 
Marists to submit their movements and their activities to 
the control and supervision of the government. Guillain 
set himself to destroy Bonu's influence. By superimposing 
a rigid Europeanized system of succession upon an 
essentially flexible traditional institution, the 
administration was able to question the legitimacy of 
Bonu's position in terms of the higher status of Warebat, 
for whom he had acted as 'regent'. The missionaries 
227 
themselves tacitly accepted this interpretation, since they 
always referred to Bonu as the 'second' chief of 
Mwelebeng, even though they insisted that he was the actual 
and effective ruler of the tribe: 'le premier chef de fait, 
89 
mais le second en titre'. Furthermore, in their anxiety 
to reinforce the authority of a Christian chief the 
missionaries helped in large measure to bring about a loss 
87 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': 
AVNC. 
88 
'Que nous reproche-t-il, jamais autre chose que notre 
trap grande influence sur les naturels', (Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 17 Jan. 1864: APO). 
89 
Gagniere to his brother, 2 May 1866: APM/ONC, 26m; see 
also Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 30 Nov. 1867: ibid., 
22 ('2e chef de droit seulement de la tribu de Pouebo a 
ete toujours de fait le premier parses rares qualites'). 
of flexibility in the operation of the Mwelebeng 
chieftainship, the concentration of power in Bonu's hands, 
and a diminution in the importance of consultation in 
the formulation of tribal policy. 
In August 1864, at a public ceremony in Port-de-
Franc~, to which the chiefs of most pacified tribes had 
been summoned, Guillain, it was said, praised the 
recently-repatriated Bwarat and Undo for their support of 
the government at the mission's expense. He also tried to 
alienate Warebat from Bonu and ordered the younger chief 
90 
to supplant Bonu as the effective chief of Mwelebeng. 
According to the missionary account, he castigated the 
228 
Christian chiefs of Pwebo, Belep, Bonde and Arama for paying 
more attention to their missionaries than to the governor. 
He attempted to discredit the Marists in the eyes of these 
chiefs by impugning missionary motives, especially as regards 
education, the conscription of Melanesian labour and the 
alienation of tribal lands. 91 Under the inspiration of the 
90 
Rougeyron to Forestier, 10 Dec. 1864: APM/ONC, 20. 
91 [Villard], 'Paroles rapportees par les naturels de leur 
voyage a Port-de-France pour la fete du 15 aout 1864': 
APM/ONC, 25. In the Moniteur account of proceedings (Mon., 
21 Aug. 1864) Bwarat and Undo were praised for their ----
usefulness as interpreters. All the chiefs were counselled 
to submit to Guillain's orders and implement his advice, 
'[les conseils] les plus desinteresses qui puissent leur etre 
donnes'. The implications of this phrase would have been lost 
on few of the journal's readers. 
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governor's words, Bwarat promptly gave rein to his own 
prejudices and drove the catechists from Yengen, while Undo 
recalled the Puma children who had earlier been sent to 
Pwebo, and began to preach apostasy in neighbouring ttibes. 92 
Late in 1864 and in the first months of 1865 Undo 
and Gwa provoked the apostasy of one third of the Paak 
tribe (the village of Mwandin) and two thirds of the Arama. 
They used similar methods in both tribes. First they 
gained the support of a few intransigent and influential 
pagans, who helped them win over unwilling or fearful 
Christians, who in turn compelled their children to apostatize. 
Gagniere accused Bailly of complicity in these affairs, and 
maintained that both Bailly and the Balad chiefs acted on 
specific orders from Port-de-France: 'j'ai declare et prouve 
qu'on demandait positivement une apostasie'. The 
missionaries were especially hostile at the governor's 
insistence that pagan parents be allowed the right to 
determine whether or not their children should be Christian. 93 
92 
Villard to Rougeyron, [Report on the events at Pwebo], 7-16 
Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 22. 
93 
Gagniere to Procuteur, 3 May 1865: APO; see also Emprin 
to Procureur, 5 Mar. 1865: APO; Gagniere to Rougeyron, 10 
Aug. 1865 (quoted ·in Rougeyron to ? , 30 Nov. 1867): 
APM/ONC, 22. 
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From this time onwards Villard, his colleagues 
at Pwebo and in surrounding tribes, and the Christian 
chiefs were in open conflict with the commandant of the 
police post, gendarmerie sergeant Theodore Bailly. Bailly 
claimed to be under orders from Port-de-France to ~~pervise 
the missionaries' every activity. 94 He evidently took 
his duties seriously, since in 1868 the public prosecutor 
commented in the Tribunal criminel on Bailly's preoccupation 
with the most trivial details of the missionaries' conduct: 
••• la conduite et les moindres mouvements 
[des missionnaires] paraissaient faire 1' 
objet de sa plus constante occupation et le 
thime de ses rapports les plus .. longs et les 
plus circonstancies, adresses frequemment 
au chef de la colonie. 
Bailly's campaign against the missionaries relied on the 
cooperation of three groups of people, whose shared 
animosity towards the Marists was after 1864 translated 
into active opposition. The first group consisted on 
European colonists and petty traders, who had begun to 
95 
settle in increasing numbers in the area. These men envied 
the Marists their extensive land holdings in the colony, and 
94 
Villard to Rougeyron, 4 Sept. 1865 (quoted in Rougeyron 
to ? , 30 Nov. 1867): APM/ONC, 22. 
95 
[Champestive], 'Affaire de Pouebo. Partie du requisitoire 
du ministire public se rapportant a la mission', [8 May 
1868]: APM/ONC, 25. 
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at Pwebo in particular, and resented the competition 
provided by Bonu and the Christians in the coconut oil 
trade. The second group consisted of a number of 
determinedly pagan and apostate members of the Puma and 
Mwelebeng tribes, including Undo and Gwa, who sided with 
the administration against the mission for reasons both 
of s~lf-interest and conviction. The third group, which 
overlapped the second, consisted of several youthful 
Melanesian interpreters who had been trained at the 
government school at Port-de-France, where they had 
imbibed at least some of the anti-clericalism which 
dominated the administration's attitudes to the mission 
during Guillain's term of office. 
Initially, confrontation between mission and 
government occurred over four main issues: the right of 
Melanesians to contribute their labour and part of the 
proceeds of their commerce to the mission: the right of 
the missionaries to send catechists at will to neighbouring 
tribes and villages; the right of missionaries and 
catechists to cut wood and build without official 
96 permission, which was rarely granted; the right of 
96 
Bailly to Bonu, 1 Jan. 1866: APM/ONC, 25: 'Surtout ne vous 
laissez pas aller a couper du bois quel qu'il soit sur ce 
terrain [the mission property] ••. Il en est de meme pour 
taus les autres bois et terrains, du moment ou vous voulez 
construire un batiment qui n'est pas exclusivement·pour 
votre usage personnel', 
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Melanesians from a wide area to congregate for religious 
97 purposes. Later, the administration's decision to 
expropriate Mwelebeng tribal land for the benefit of 
European colonists aligned the protagonists in the open 
struggle which developed. The missionaries assumed the role 
of defenders of the Melanesians against the depredations 
of an arbitrary and tyrannical authority; the administration 
saw itself as the enlightened opponent of entrenched 
reactionary priests, who fought the spread of civilization 
and colonization in their own mercenary and unworthy 
interest. The impact and ramifications of the conflict on 
the mission-influenced peoples of the region was profound. 
During 1865 the missionaries made further efforts 
to finance work on the church. The tribe in council agreed 
to pay a monthly subscription of two francs per head to meet 
expenses, while Bonu set up a coconut oil plant, and 
98 
contributed part of the profits to the mission. He traded 
for the tribe's coconuts in direct competition with local 
European traders, and acquired something of a regional 
97 
E.g., Villaid to Rougeyron, 19 Apr. 1865 (quoted in 
Rougeyron to ? , 30 Nov. 1867): APM/ONC, 22: 'les chefs de 
Pouebo •.• ne peuvent ni sortir de leur tribu, [ni] aller 
dans les villages eloignes de leur propre tribu sans une 
permission speciale, or ces defenses ne regardent qrenos 
chefs chretiens de Pouebo'. 
98 
Guitta to Procureur, 9 July 1865: APO. 
monopoly in the commodity, because of the excellent 
bargaining position he enjoyed as chief. The missionaries 
advised Bonu to sell all his oil through Pierre Demene, 
99 
who was said to offer a better deal than other traders. 
Father Armand Emprin, the missionary at Bonde, believed that 
this factor was sufficient to explain the colonists' 
bitterness against his Pwebo confreres: 'Je crois que les 
Peres d'ici favorisent trop ouvertement Demenai: ce qui est 
cause de la lutte acharnee que le Brigadier et les autres 
colons leur font' . 1 In part as a result of traders' 
233 
complaints, Guillain ordered Bonu to cease operations on such 
2 
a large scale and to make oil only from his own coconuts. 
Not only did the mission-sponsored enterprise provide 
unwelcome competition for European commerce, however, but the 
preoccupation of most Mwelebeng with their own industry 
conflicted seriously with the demands of administration and 
3 
colonists for cheap Melanesian labour. The two franc sub-
99 
Guitta to Bailly, 22 Jan. 1866 (encl. in Guitta to Rougeyron, 
27 May 1866): APM/ONC, 25. It is perhaps not insignificant 
that the missionaries regarded Mme Demene as 'assez bonne 
Chretienne' (Rougeyron to Procureur, 3 Feb. 1867: APO). 
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Emprin to 
2 
? 12 Feb. 1866: APM/ONC, 25. 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': AVNC. 
3 
Guillain accused the missionaries of claiming the exclusive 
use of the work force of the Mwelebeng tribe: see especially 
his address to the Conseil d'administration, 16 Feb. 1868 
(transcript encl. in Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868): 
ANOM, Carton 166. 
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scription had also to be abandoned to protect Bonu from the 
governor's wrath at the tribe's contribution to the upkeep 
of the mission. Late in 1865 Guillain paid two visits to 
Pwebo, severely criticized Bonu for his relationship with the 
missionaries,and threatened him with arrest and exile. He 
was forbidden to work for the missionaries or to seek 
4 their advice on other than spiritual matters. 
On the question of catechists neither side was 
prepared to compromise, as both recognized their 
importance to the missionary cause. To Rougeyron Melanesian 
catechists were more valuable than European missionaries in 
the early stages of evangelism, because of their profound 
empathy with their own people: 
Pour preparer les populations au Christianisme 
ils [les catechistes] feront plus, je crois, que 
les missionnaires, parcequ'ils ne connaissent 
qu'imparfaitement leurs usages, leurs langues, 
et de plus, ils sont blancs et les autres noirs, 
ils ne leur inspirent plus la meme confiance. 5 
An ambitious programme was devised for the creation of a 
central school at St-Louis, where young people from all over 
the vicariate (which included the New Hebrides) would be 
gathered to be given 'une education chretienne solide', and 
4 
Villard to Rougeyron, 26 June 1866: APM/ONC, 22; Villard, 
'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': AVNC. 
5 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 15 June 1860: APO. 
6 
trained as catechists and workers. Guillain inevitably 
opposed this programme for the very reason that it 
presupposed mission control of native education and of 
relations between Melanesians and Europeans, and an 
extension of missionary influence far beyond the purely 
ecclesiastical sphere to which he insisted it should be 
. 
confined. He demanded that the training and despatch of 
235 
catechists should be subject to strict government supervision 
7 
and regulation. As early as June 1863 a catechist based 
at Yengen was arrested on the grounds that he had ordered 
the punishment of a member of the tribe who failed to attend 
regular worship. The catechist was interned without trial 
and remained incommunicado for several months, despite 
missionary fulmination against such harsh and unnatural 
punishment for a misdemeanour caused by a·mere 'excis de 
Villard and Gagniire, with Rougeyron's support, 
insisted on their right to send catechists to any tribe or 
vil±age where they were requested either by the chiefs or 
by a number of the inhabitants. 8 In practice this meant 
6 
Forestier to Poupinel, 4 Dec. 1862: APM/ONC, 19. 
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Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique en Caledonie ..• ', 6 Apr. 
1865.: APM/ONC, 11; Guillain, 'Reponse i la note de Mr. le 
Provicaire Apostolique. (Texte des principes que la mission 
regarde comme certains) ', May 1867: ibid. 
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to any place and at any time that the missionaries saw fit, 
since it was fairly easy to elicit such a request. Despite 
the efforts of the government and its assistants the 
prestige of Bonu and the missionaries remained high until 
about the middle of 1866, when fear began to erode their 
support among all but their most committed followers. During 
1865 Villard took the offensive and despatched catechists 
to Ubac, Yambe, Jawe, Wenop, Webia, Pambwa, Tande and 
9 Balad. The government struck back at the end of the year, 
when five catechists from Pambwa and Balad and those who 
worked at Gomen and Kumak under the auapices of Gagniere were 
arrested and taken in irons to Port-de-France. Others were 
10 driven from their villages. Those arrested were accused 
of catechizing in defiance of the wishes of tribal chiefs 
and of breaking a regulation against cutting wood without 
special permission. The missionaries had no doubt that 
religion was the real issue: 'c'est la religion qui est en 
jeu'. The catechist at Balad was said to have been told that 
11 he could remain at his post as long as he did not preach. 
To Guillain, however, this issue was as much a matter of 
9 
Villard to Rougeyron, [Report on the events at Pwebo], 7-16 
Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 22. 
10 
Villard to Bailly, 29 Nov. 1865 (encl. in Guillain to Min., 
8 Mar. 1868): ANOM, Carton 166; 'decisions du Gouverneur ... ', 
29 Dec. 1865: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867; Rougeyron to Guillain, 
12 Jan. 1866: APM/ONC, 11. 
11 
Rougeyron to Forestier, 30 Dec. 1865: APM/ONC, 20; see also 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 30 Dec. 1865: AFO. 
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power as of religion. In practice his quarrel was with 
individuals and their, to him, intolerable pretensions to 
secular authority, as much as with the doctrines which they 
represented. 
THE arrest of the catechists initiated an escalating process 
of repression, protest and further repression, which 
culminated in the violent upheavals of 1867 and 1868, and 
the wholesale reorganization of the north-eastern tribes 
which followed. On 26 November Jerome Guitta, against 
Villard's wishes, read from the pulpit a highly emotive 
public protest in which he accused the administration of 
religious persecution: 
Je proteste centre une procedure qui, pour le 
seul motif de la religion, met la liberte, 1' 
honneur et la vie de nos indigenes a la merci de 
nos administrateurs ... Je finis cette 
protestation en souhaitant que, pour 1' honneur 
demon pays,l'histoite ne puisse compter aucun 
d'eux parmi les premiers martyrs de la 
Nouvelle-Cale donie. 12 
It is difficult to assess the immediate relevance of the 
protest, which was read in French and was thus incomprehensible 
to the Melanesians present. The authorities' reaction was 
curiously muted. Not until after the massacres at Pwebo in 
12 
Guitta, 'Protestation publique centre l'arrestation de 
cinq de nos Catechistes', 26 Nov. 1865: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867. 
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October 1867 was Guitta's action widely criticized as a 
cause of the uprising: 'la protestation du 26 novembre 1865 .•. 
a ete le precurseur des massacres du 6 octobre dernier'. 13 
It was then even suggested that he should be charged 
14 
retrospectively over the protest. Villard's response to 
the arrest of the catechists was to send immediate 
replacements on his own authority, which further infuriated 
Guillain. 
The arrests, and the activities of the 
gendarmes and their friends caused widespread fear and some 
15 
apostasy among the more recent converts of the region. 
The people of Mwelebeng, however, remained firm in the face 
of increasing provocation until about the middle of 1866, 
when the inhabitants of Pareman began in large numbers to 
renounce their new religion. They were among the most 
recent converts in the tribe, but their apostasy was in 
response to more severe and concerted pressure than had been 
applied elsewhere. It was a result of one of the most basic 
Melanesian traumas - a fear of wholesale expropriation of 
ancestral lands, and the destruction of gardens and burial 
places by the unfenced herds of colonists. 
13 
Nepveur, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 
Dec. 1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867. 
14 .. 
Censeil d' administration, 16 Feb. 1868 (trans..cript en'cl. 
in Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868): ANOM, Carton 166. 
1:5 
Emprin to ? , 13 Jan. 1866: APM/ONC, 25; Gagni~re 
to Martin (commandant of the Gendarmerie), 31 Mar. 1866: ibid. 
Lambert to Rougeyron, 23 July 1866: ibid., 20. 
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The first sale of land to a colonist at Pwebo 
occurred in December 186~ when a former Marist lay brother 
was granted twelve hectares (about thirty-two acres) at 
16 Cevit. In April 1864 another settler was allowed to 
purchase six hectares (fifteen acres) at Jawe, which he 
17 had previously occupied without official authorization. 
The first large concession was made in November 1865, when 
Andrew Henry was granted fifty hectares at Ubac (Oubatche), 
with the requirement that he indemnify any dispossessed 
Melanesians. 18 None of these land grants can be considered 
unreasonable, and all were made more or less with the 
acquiescence of the Melanesian proprietors. Towards the end 
of 1865, however, the inhabitants of most of the land to 
the south-east of the Pwebo river as far as Yambe, and inland 
to the mountains (Pareman) were warned that they were to be 
expropriated to provide land for an expected influx of 
colonists. According to Villard, Bailly told Bonu that the 
re-settlement of these people was the chief's business: 
19 that they could go 'au niaouli [bush]' for all he cared. 
16 
Conseil d'administration, 18 Dec. 1863: ANOM, Carton 88. 
17 
Ibid., 18 April 1864: ANOM, Carton 88. 
18 
Ibid., 28 Nov. 1865: ANOM, Carton 89. 
~9 
They were to be paid 3 francs each for their huts and 15-20 
francs for their land. Villard to Rougeyron, 26 June 1866: 
APM/ONC, 22; Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo 
en 1867': AVNC. 
240 
For Guillain the planned expropriation would 
serve a dual purpose. It would extend colonization to a 
region where there were as yet few settlers; it would 
demonstrate that temporal power was firmly and absolutely 
in the hands of the administration, despite the apparent 
authority of missionaries and Christian chiefs. Whatever 
the motives, however, it is difficult to ignore the brutal 
and arbitrary nature of the act. The administration's 
refusal to concern itself with the fate of the dispossessed , 
if true, is an ugly comment on the sincerity of Guillain's 
20 proclaimed concern for the well-being of Melanesians. The 
reaction of the people of Pareman was one of consternation 
and bewilderment. Traditional ceremonies, especially the 
ancient funeral rituals which had been proscribed by the 
missionaries at Pwebo for more than a decade, reappeared in 
the south-eastern villages, despite Villard's energetic 
opposition. Bailly actively encouraged this trend, and the 
festivals were held under the aegis of the tricolour. 21 
In March 1866 Villard suggested a protest against 
the expropriations in the form of a petition. It bore the 
crosses of sixty-eight people, including Warebat, Bonu and 
most of the lesser chiefs of the tribe, and expressed the. 
20 
See above, pp. 164, 192. 
21 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867' :AVNC. 
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absolute refusal of the threatened clans to cede their 
lands unless they received adequate compensation elsewhere: 
•.• nous ne voulons ni vendre ni ceder nos 
terres, parceque nous les tenons de nos peres 
et de nos ancetres; quant a nos cocotiers, ils 
sont nos vrais richesses, une partie de notre 
nourriture et !'unique moyen de nous procurer 
des vetements. Done nous vous declarons 
que nous refusons absolument de laisser notre 
. pays aux mains des colons, a moins que Mr. le 
Gouverneur ne nous donne a la place un autre 
pays qui lui soit equivalent. 22 
Unfortunately for Villard there were irregularities in the 
recording of the names of the signatories, and many later 
claimed under interrogation not to have understood the 
implications of their action. 23 Thus at the first trial 
of the Pwebo suspects in December 1867 one of the defence 
counsels could claim: 
22 
.•. on leur [the Mwelebeng] a redige des petitions 
et des protestations, qu'on leur a fait signer 
sans leur dire ce qu'elles contenaient, car il 
est maintenant un fait avere au proces que tous 
les signataires de la petition du 16 mars 1866, 
sauf toutefois les principaux chefs et les 
redacteurs de cette protestation, ignoraient ce 
qu'elle contenait. 24 
['Protestation contre 1' alienation des terres a Pouebo' ], 
16 Mar. 1866: APM/ONC, 22. 
23 
Correspondence between Guillain and Villard, 13 Nov. 1867 
(quoted in Villard to Rougeyron, 7-16 Nov. 1867) :APM/ONC, 22; 
'Interrogatoire des accuses', 17-20 Dec. 1867: Affaire de 
Pouebo. Tribunel criminel de Noumea: 32-74. 
24 
Nepveur, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867; see also Guillain, address to the 
Conseir-d'administration, 16 Feb. 1868 (transcript encl~ in 
Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868): ANOM, Carton 166. 
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The administration and its supporters pointed to the 
petition as clear indication of the systematic opposition 
of the Marists to the spread of colonization to those areas 
where they were firmly entrenched, and of their determination 
to maintain their despotic authority over the Christians, 
whom they were said to manipulate to the pecuniary advantage 
• 25 
of their order. The missionaries understandably and 
justifiably denied this allegation, but it is impossible 
to ignore their ingrained mistrust of most laymen, or to 
avoid the conclusion that their motives in opposing the 
alienation of land to colonists at Pwebo were not entirely 
disinterested. 
Guillain retaliated at once. In April he came 
in person to Pwebo to arrest Bonu and six catechists. The 
catechists were jailed for up to two weeks. According to 
their accusers they had cut wood without permission, had 
tried to prevent dances authorized by the gendarmes, and had 
generally attempted to exercise an authority which the 
26 governor denied they possessed. The charges against Bonu 
were more serious. He was accused of having misused his 
25 
Le Boucher, Nepveur, addresses to the Tribunal criminel 
de Noumea, 28 Dec. 1867: Mon., 5 Jan. 1868; Guillain to Min., 
27 Aug. 1869: ANOM, Carton-166. 
26 
'Arrete du Gouverneur ••• ', 24 Apr. 1866: APM/ONC, 22. 
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authority, of having ignored persistent reprimands, and 
of having, under the influence of 'des suggestions 
interesses et nuisibles aux interets generaux du pays', 
impugned the sense of justice of the administration and 
formally refused to allow colonists to settle at Pwebo. 
He was suspended as chief and exiled for a year to the Isle 
of Pines 27 where he died less than five months later during 
28 
an epidemic of respiratory sickness. 
In their defence of Bonu and denunciation of the 
governor's actions the missionaries missed the vital point. 
They understood that the official attacks were an oblique 
means of striking at the mission, but since they could see 
only good in their own influence, they attributed Guillain's 
behaviour to ill-will and ungodliness alone, and saw their 
29 
own position as that of virtue oppressed by evil. And yet 
according to his lights Guillain was acting reasonably and 
justly. To him the influence of the Marists and that of their 
main disciples, Christian chiefs and catechists, was an 
obstacle which had to be removed if the administration was to 
27 
'Decision du Gouverneur suspendant l'indigene Bonou 
(Hippolyte) de ses fonctions de second chef de Pouebo', 24 
Apr. 1866; 'decision du Gauverneur pla~ant l'indigene Bonou 
(de Pouebo) en surveillance a l'ile des Pins', 1 May 1866: 
~., 6 May 1866. 
28 
F. Palazzy, 'Journal de l'ile des Pins', 16 July, 17 Aug., 
4 Sept. 1867: APM/ONC, 2c. 
29 
Gagniere to Rougeyron, 12 May 1866: APM/ONC, 22; Villard to 
Rougeyron, 26 June 1866: ibid.; Rougeyron to Procureur, 3 
June 1866: APO. 
exercise full authority in the region and colonization to 
prosper. 30 Hence the zeal with which the administration 
encouraged a return to certain aspects of the traditional 
way of life and the abandonment of Christian accretions. 
To the settler community, and to a lesser, but still 
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significant extent, the government, colonization presupposed 
the alienation of the best lands to Europeans and, 
eventually, the confinement of the Melanesian population to 
clearly delimited reserves: 
A quoi bon l'oreupation, si on ne prend aux 
indigenes une large part des terres improductives 
et le plus souvent en friche, pour les livrer 
a la culture et les mettre aux mains de ces 
laborieux colons qui les arrosent de leur 
sueur et parfois de leur sang? 31 
Moreover the opening of the region to settlers was itself 
an excellent means of attacking the missionaries' position 
because it exposed Melanesians to contact with other 
Europeans, and demonstrated that the civil authorities 
alone counted in temporal matters. 
In May 1866, according to Villard, Bailly ordered 
the people of Pareman, whose faith was already severely 
30 
Guillain to Min., 27 Aug. 1869: ANOM, Carton 166. 
31 
Mage, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867; see also Guillain, address to the 
Conseir-d'administration, 28 Feb. 1867: ANOM, Carton 90. 
32 
shaken, to apostatize. Catechists were harried and 
forbidden to proselytize, and under the influence of 
physical abuse and threats the Pareman clans succumbed 
almost to a man: 
.•. toute la partie Est de l'Etablissement 
de la mission ... [a] ete travaille d'une maniere 
indigne, soit par certains colons, soit par les 
emissaires du poste, soit meme par quelques 
gendarmes. Enlever la ceinture aux chretiens, 
arracher leurs croix, medailles; les menacer des 
fers s'ils venaient a l'Eglise. Des colons sent 
alles meme, par derision jusqu'a acheter ces 
objets religieux. Je ne puis pas dire a quelles 
vexations ces chretiens qui n' etaient pas 
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encore bien forts, ont ete en jeu. 33 
There is little doubt that they hoped, by obedience, to save 
their lands and perhaps acquire the favoured position 
enjoyed by such tribes as Yengen and Puma. Their 
subservience did them little good, however, and the rate of 
expropriation of Melanesian lands and settlement of 
colonists in the south-eastern part of the Mwlebeng tribe 
accelerated during the next year. Andrew H~nry was sold 
more land in July 1866. He thus acquired in effect the 
entire area from Cambwen to Yambe and inland to the mountains, 
while his livestock created havoc in Melanesian gardens far 
34 beyond the limits of his own property. On this occasion 
32 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867':AVNC. 
33 
Villard to Rougeyron, [Report on the events at Pwebo], 7-16 
Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 22; see also Emprin to Procureur, 24 June 
1866: APO; Villard to Rougeyron, 3 July 1866: APM/ONC, 26m. 
34 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': 
AVNC. 
the original owners of the land were given some right of 
35 
occupation for ten years. By late 1867 several other 
settlers had taken up concessions. They included Pierre 
Demene, at Bwaibat, and Delrieu-Bertrand, who ran a trading 
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post on a small property west of the river, and was granted 
a further fifty-five hectares at Kabarik in 1867. 36 Demene, 
Henry and Delrieu-Bertrand were the main civilian sufferers 
in the uprising of some of the people of Pareman in October 
1867. 
It should be noted, however, that apart from 
Henry the Marist mission was by far the largest European 
landowner in the Pwebo district in 1870. By their own 
count the missionaries held 174~ hectares, almost all good 
37 land. The administration estimated the requirements of 
the Mwelebeng tribe (at a rate of 3 hectares per person) at 
about 4,500 hectares, and allowed for another 200 hectares 
claimed by the mission. It considered that the remaining 
arable land - about 4,300 hectares - should be opened up to 
35 
Conseil d'administration, 2 July 1866: ANOM, Carton 89. 
This provision was abrogated in July 1869 as being no longer 
relevant (Conseil d'administration, 17 July 1869: ANOM, 
Carton 91). In February 1870 Henry was granted a further 132 
hectares at Ubac (Conseil d'administration, 1 Feb. 1870: ANOM, 
Carton 92). 
36 
Conseil d'administration, 28 Feb. 1867: ANOM, Carton 90; 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': AVNC. 
37 
[Forestier], 'Proprietes et biens de la mission de la 
Nouvelle-Caledonie', 18 May 1860: APM/ONC, 3. 
European colonization. 38 At the end of 1867 it was stated 
39 that only 360 hectares had been alienated to settlers. 
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This seems fairly accurate, since by my count (which does not 
include the grant to Pierre Demene, and may also omit one or 
two small concessions of which no record is extant) 331 
hectares had at that time been ceded. 
These figures were used to suggest that missionary 
complaints in 1866 and 1867 about the wholesale 
expropriation of the people of Pareman were deliberate 
misrepresentations: 
Ne croyez pas, Messieurs, a ces depossessions 
exagerees; ne croyez pas a cette pretendue 
privation descocotiers, seul moyen d'existence 
s'ecriera-t-on, de ces miserables peuplades 40 
The protests certainly seem to have been exaggerated and 
somewhat premature. In fact, they aimed less to recover 
land already lost than to circumvent the threat of future 
dispossession. Immediate Melanesian grievances centred on 
ravages caused by unfenced livestock, and on the fact that 
concessions seemed to be deliberately sited to include 
villages and garden land: 
38 
Conseil d'administration, 28 Feb. 1867: ANOM, Carton 90. 
39 
Mage, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867. The European population of the Pwebo 
circonscription in July 1869 was 54 - the largest centre of 
European settlement outside Noumea ('Division de la population 
blanche par cultes et par nationalites', 1 July 1869: ANOM, 
Carton 172). 
40 rbid.; see also Le Boucher~s address to the tribunal, 28 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 5 Jan. 1868. 
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Or actuellement a Oubath, nos sujets ont deja 
tout leur terrain envahi par la dent des vaches, 
chevaux, anes ••• des Anglais ••• [sic] (impossible, 
vous le savez, de faire une cloture de champs, 
vu le manque de bois et de permission d'en 
couper.) - A Tiambouene, des cochons des colons, 
mis a dessein a l'etat libre, rendent impossible 
la culture des ignames •.. 
Que sera-ce dans un prochain avenir, alors 
que les vaches et les chevaux se joindront aux 
cochons, soit a Tiambouene, soit a Bouaiba, soit 
a Kabarik, soit a Chevite ••• [sic] oil les 
concessions semblent a dessein accordees sur 
!'emplacement meme des villages ••• et si bien 
intercallees, qu'il n'y ait plus moyen d'y avoir 
une seule plantation. 41 
42 The administration specifically denied this allegation. 
Despite the exile of Bonu and the apostasy of the 
people of Pareman, Guillain had only partially achieved his 
objective. With Bonu's demise the missionaries and the 
Christians united behind Warebat, the weak and previously 
despised 'first chief', in a rearguard attempt to defend 
43 
the tribal lands and save the Tinjin theocracy. In 
Warebat's name Villard wrote over the governor's head to 
Paris, and described in exaggerated terms the iniquities of 
41 
Warebat to Rougeyron, 1 May 1966 (translation): APM/ONC, 22. 
42 
Conseil d'administration, 28 Feb. 1867: ANOM, Carton 90. 
43 
Evidence of the gendarme Gacher, 23 Dec. 1867: Affaire de 
Pouebo. Tribunal criminel de Noumea: 76-7: 'Napoleon [Warebat] 
passait dans le temps pour un imb.eci1e et ne commandait rien. 
Hippolyte etait intelligent. Depuis sa mort, Napoleon a pris 
les renes du pouvoir et frequente la Mission'. 
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44 the authorities with regard to Mwelebeng land. Villard's 
action is a further instance of the missionaries' inability 
to comprehend the nature of Guillain's animosity, since one 
of his main grievances against the Marists was their 
persistent attempt to mediate between Melanesians and the 
administration. To Villard it was only logical that he 
should use every avenue open to him personally in the cause 
of his flock. To Guillain his actions were an unwarranted 
and disruptive interference in affairs which were none of 
his concern. In the letter Warebat offered to cede all the 
eastern portion of the tribal lands (which was already 
heavily settled by Europeans) on the sole condition that the 
tribe received full and legal title to the land between the 
Pwebo river and Balad. He guaranteed to resettle those 
dispossessed. This apparently generous offer concealed the 
fact that the Tinjin, the most staunch supporters of 
the mission, would retain their lands intact, while the 
44 
Warebat to Rougeyron, 1 May 1866: APM/ONC, 22. The 
letter claimed that a colonist, Lepeu, had been pressed by the 
administration to accept 500 hectares of the most densely 
populated Tinjin lands, although he had previously been 
refused permission to settle at Kanala, on the lands of pagan 
allies of the government, or in the Diahot valley, where 
almost no Melanesians lived. Guillain, however, claimed that 
Lepeu's request for a large concession at Pwebo had been 
denied as contrary to Melanesian and public interests; on 
this basis Guillain denounced Warebat's protest as fraudulent 
(Conseil d'administration, 16 Feb. 1868 [transcript encl. in 
Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868]: ANOM, Carton 166). I have 
found no independent evidence against which to check these 
contradictory claims, but Guillain's argument seems to have 
rather more internal consistency. 
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people of Pareman, who had already begun to apostatize, 
would be entirely dispossessed and thrown on the mercy of 
Warebat, the Christians and the mission. 
The proposal received a gratifying reception in 
Paris. A decree of 7 September 1866 forbade the 
expropriation of the designated section of the tribe's lands 
until furth~ order, and ordered the return of those parts 
45 
which had already been alienated. Guillain was predictably 
disgusted at the directive, which he chose to interpret as 
a missionary plot to set up autonomous Melanesian colonies 
within the colony, and to limit European settlement to those 
areas where the mission had no interests. The Marists would 
certainly have appreciated such a state of affairs, but it 
is doubtful if by 1866 they still regarded it as attainable. 
In practice the governor seems 46 to have ignored the decree, 
while its immediate effect was to harden settlers' 
attitudes, to embitter Guillain still more against the Marists 
and the Mwelebeng, and to incline him to seize any opportunity 
to reduce them both to complete subservience. 
45 
Conseil d'administration, 28 Feb. 1867: ANOM, Carton 90; 
'acte d'accusation', Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 12 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 15 Dec. 1867. 
46 -
E.g., Delrieu-Bertrand's right to 5 hectares west of the 
Pwebo river was confirmed; a concession of 3 hectares to Lehuau 
was proposed in the same area, but he was eventually forced 
to settle at Cambwen. 
The conflict over land and the settlement of 
colonists in the western part of the tribe came to a head 
in April 1867, when Warebat categorically refused an order 
to cede three hectares of his personal property. He 
submitted a further written protest, drawn up by Villard 
and Father Andre Chapuy: 'j'ai declare devant vous [Bailly] 
que je ne voulais en aucune maniere conceder et aliener cet 
heritage des chefs, mes ancetres; j'ai done proteste contre 
47 
cette concession'. To no avail, however, since the 
colonist, Lehuau, was given a provisional right to occupy 
the land. Lehuau was one of the few Europeans to escape 
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unmolested from the massacre and pillage of 6-7 October 1867. 
During 1867 several incidents occurred - thefts, 
insults and threats against colonists by men of Pareman -
which Villard claimed were either ignored or treated 
lightly by Bailly. In mid-year a great traditional festival 
was held at Pwebo, attended by about 6,000 warriors from 
tribes as far away as Belep, Wagap and Gomen. The 
missionaries complained bitterly at what they saw as a 
reversion to barbarism, but Bailly insisted that the ceremony 
go on, and it passed without overt disturbance. 48 It was at 
47 
Warebat to Bailly, 4 Apr. 1867 (copy encl. in Guillain to 
Min., 2 Oct. 1868): ANOM, Carton 166. 
48 
Villard, 'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867': 
AVNC. 
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this gathering that Warebat was supposed to have initiated 
the plot to kill the gendarmes and colonists of Pwebo by 
presenting a war club to his chosen assassin, a chief known 
as Martin, from the hamlet of Bwaibat. 49 On the night 
of 6-7 October 1867 the axe fell. 
49 
'Acte d'accusation', Tribun& criminel de Noumea, 12 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 15 Dec. 1867. The validity of this allegation 
is examined below, p.269. 
CHAPTER VI 
REACTION AND REPRESSION 
PART I: PWEBO 1867-8 
AT about 5.30 p.m. on 6 October 1867 seven men, led by 
the Bwaibat chief, 'Martin', ambushed and killed Bailly and 
1 
another gendarme. The murder weapons were European axes 
and New Caledonian clubs. The murderers all lived south-
east of the Pwebo river and were either pagans or apostates. 
About two and a half hours later a mob broke into and 
looted Delrieu-Bertrand's store; an even larger crowd went 
on immediately to the Demene homestead, where Demene, his 
two youngest children and a Melanesian servant were slain, 
Mme Demene and two other children left for dead, and the 
house and store thoroughly ransacked. Gathering reinforce-
ments on the way, the band - by this time 250-300 strong -
proceeded to Andrew Henry's property at Ubac. A man well 
known to the household called Henry's son from his bed, 
whereupon the boy was attacked and badly injured. The rest 
1 
Mon., 21 Oct. 1867; 'acte d'accusation', Tribunal criminel 
de Noumea, 12 Dec. 1867: Mon., 15 Dec. 1867. 
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I 
f 
of the household, aided by the Europeans, New Hebrideans 
and convicts in Henry's employ, managed to keep the 
assailants at bay, but much pillage and destruction was 
committed in his storehouses, three New Hebrideans and a 
2 Lifuan woman were killed and others were wounded. 
254 
The rebels also suffered a major loss, as 'Martin' was killed 
at Uba.c. 3 
Early the next.morning, even before the full 
extent of the attacks was known, Warebat ordered the huts of 
4 the people of Bwaibat to be put to the torch, and later 
that day he sent his warriors to Ubac 'pour venger le 
massacre', where they were joined by the men of Balad. 
Hamlets and gardens as far south as Ubac were sacked, several 
men killed and a number of suspects arrested. On 10 
October accusations were first made against Warebat, when 
Henry claimed that the chief and the Christians had had 
prior knowledge of the plot. Almost from the beginning 
2 
Henry was granted his concession at Ubac (Oubatche) in part 
fulfilment of a contract with the administration for the 
importation into New Caledonia of New Hebridean indentured 
labour (Conseil d'administration, 1 May, 28 Nov. 1865: ANOM, 
Carton 89). Henry personally employed more than 100 New 
Hebrideans and several convicts. By 9 October 1867, after the 
return of some of his people from Yengen, Henry's establishment 
was about 150 strong (Mrs. E. Henry, letter, Mon., 21 Oct. 
1867). -
3 
Villard, 'Journal de Pouebo', 7 Oct. 1867: APM/ONC, 2d. 
4 
Except where otherwise indicated, the following description of 
events is based on Villard, 'Journal de Pouebo', 7 Oct.-15 Nov. 
passim: APM/ONC, 2d; Villard to Rougeyron, [Report on the 
events at Pwebo], 7-16 Nov. 1867: ibid., 22. 
Henry refused to trust Warebat or to cooperate with Gacher, 
the remaining~ndarme. in the defence of the Pwebo post. 
On 12 October nine soldiers from Wagap arrived at Ubac in 
response to Henry's call for help, but Henry would allow 
5 
none to aid Gacher, who was forced to rely on Warebat and 
his men to defend the post and the mission against possible 
further attacks. Despite the delay in the arrival of 
adequate reinforcements, no more attacks occurred, although 
bands of insurgents were seen around the Henry property 
and occasionally at Pwebo itself. 
For ten days the Tinjin warriors combed the 
surrounding countryside in search of suspects, and later 
accompanied official expeditions. Between 17 and 30 October 
troop reinforcements arrived from Gatop, Wagap and finally 
Noumea. News of the uprising did not reach Noumea. until 19 
October, and caused consternation. The difficulties imposed 
on the governor by insufficient forces are underlined by the 
fact that only luck enabled him to ship any troops at all 
from Noumea: had the news reached him a few days later he 
6 
would have had no vessels at his disposal. In the event, 
5 
On Henry's apparently privileged position vis-a-vis the 
colonial administration, see below, Pp. 288-90. 
6 
Guillain to Min., 23 Oct. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166. 
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the fortunate presence of a visiting frigate and steam 
corvette enabled Guillain to assemble an imposing force 
at Pwebo of more than two hundred men of various services, 
and four warships, two of them only schooners. These troops 
were reinforced by about 600 Melanesian auxiliaries, 7 led 
by the loyal allies of the government, Bwarat of Yengen, 
8 Aile of Wagap and Mango of Kone. Towards the end of 
the month Guillain went in person to Pwebo to supervise the 
repression and an official investigation into the affair. 
The overwhelming strength of the French forces 
quickly stifled any thought of further resistance on the 
part of the rebels, if indeed it had existed after the 
death of their leader, 'Martin' . 9 Those most airectly 
implicated who had not already been captured fled to the 
mountains, where all but a few were either apprehended by 
the troops and their Melanesian allies or handed over by 
chiefs anxious to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime. 
7 
Patouillet 1872:53; according to the captain of the Sibylle 
there were nearly 800 auxiliaries (Riou-Kerangal to Min., 
29 Nov. 1867: ANM, BB4 871). 
8 
Guillain to Min., 4 Dec. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166; Mage, 
address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 Dec. 1867: 
Mon., 29 Dec. 1867. 
-9-
Several missionaries claimed that the limited nature of the 
affair was proved by the rebels' general loss of enthusiasm 
after 'Martin's' death ([Frere A.Mallet], 'Nouvelle-Caledonie. 
Procedure criminelle. Massacre de 2 ~endarmes & plusieurs 
colons par les Indigenes a Pouebo. Extrait analytique': APM/ 
ONC, 22; Rougeyron to Procureur, 4 Jan. 1868: APO). 
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The rest of the Mwelebeng tribe adopted an attitude of 
complete subservience, in reaction to official suspicion 
that the affair was not the isolated crime of a few 
discontented individuals, but part of a general plan of 
revolt, in which the entire tribe, and the chiefs in 
particular, w~re involved. Early in December Guillain wrote 
in this vein: 
Des faits anterieurs et meme des indices 
recents rendaient evidente .•. une 
complicite generale dans les crimes commis, 
et ceux-ci ayant un caractere politique 
indeniable 10 
THE questions of the causes of the events of 6-7 October 
and the motives of the insurgents are vexed, mainly because 
they became inextricably involved with the tensions and 
jealousies of the mission/government conflict and its 
impact on the Mwelebeng. Predictably the administration and 
the Marists put forward totally opposed interpretations. The 
official version spoke in terms of a long-matured plot to 
drive all Europeans from the area, a plot inspired by 
missionary agitation and organized and put into motion by 
11 the Christian chiefs of Pwebo. Conversely the 
10 
Guillain to Min., 4 Dec. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166. 
11 
Mage, Nepveur, Le Boucher, addresses to the Tribunal 
criminel de Noumea, 27, 28 Dec. 1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867, 5 
Jan. 1868; Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868: ANOM, Carton 166. 
missionaries exonerated themselves and Warebat by 
depicting a limited uprising confined to the apostate 
part of the tribe: 
•.. un nomme Martin, chef du village ou 
etaient les blancs et places sur son 
terrain, a ete le seul auteur de ce 
drame sanglant avec six ou sept individus 
de son caractere ••.. Ce Martin, a 
caractere vindicatif, avait ete puni avec 
son frere, autre assassin, par le Chef 
de poste Bailly. Voila done la cause 
[du] guet-apens. 12 
When they came to elaborate long term causes the 
missionaries placed ultimate blame on the administration 
for its encouragement of paganism and the expropriation 
of the ancestral lands of the people of Pareman: 
12 
Ils etaient obliges a prendre la religion 
soldat, a marcher_nus, a reprendre toutes 
leurs coutumes paiennes. Puis on donne 
leurs terres a d~s blancs On les a 
foxces a etre paiens, ils ont agi comme 
paiens, a qui la faute ? 13 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 4 Jan. 1868: APO; see also 
Villard to Rougeyron, [Report on the events at Pwebo ], 7-16 
Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 22; summary of Dezarnaulds's address to 
the Tribunal criminel de Noumea , 28 Dec. 1867 in Mallet 
'E . ' ' xtra1t analytique': ibid. 
13 
Poupinel, n.d. (fragment): APM/ONC, 22; see also 
Rougeyron to ? , 30 Nov. 1867: ibid. 
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A third viewpoint was offered in the bill of 
indictment (acte d'accusation) of the men charged over the 
14 
affair. The author of this document, the public 
prosecutor (procureur imperial), Hyacinthe Champesteve, 
attributed the uprising ultimately to Melanesian savagery: 
' ••• ces barbares, toujours avides de sang et dont les 
appetits feroces se reveillent au moment ou on s'y attend 
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15 le moins'. In the cultural attitudes which it reflected, 
this interpretation was as biased as either of the arguments 
cited above. It was, however, the only contemporary analysis 
which attributed Melanesian actions to anything other than 
European manipulation, and in this, despite its overtly 
racial bias, it was both more objective and more reasonable 
than either the mission or the government version. As such 
it provides a point of departure for an examination of the 
causes of the uprising and the motives of the insurgents. 
Champesteve, a recent arrival in the colony who had 
16 
at once won missionary approval, had conducted the 
preliminary investigation at Pwebo. His bill of indictment 
14 
'Acte d'accusation', Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 12 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 15 Dec. 1867. 
15 -
[Champesteve], 'Affaire de Pouebo. Partie du requisitoire 
du ministere public se rapportant a la mission', [8 May 1868]: 
APM/ONC, 25. 
16 
Lambert to Procureur, 5 Oct. 1867: APO. 
charged twenty-six persons in all: eight with premeditated 
murder; two with attempted murder; these ten and a 
further twelve with lo•ting; five (including Warebat, his 
leading tribal adviser and one man already charged) with 
complicity in all the crimes cited and with having 
provoked the attacks. The bill stressed that charges had 
been laid against ouly a small number of those actually 
involved, because of lack of evidence and eye-witness 
reports. The accusations were mainly based on the 
confessions and mutual denunciations of the presaners: 
..• les charges ••• proviennent generalement 
d'aveux faits par eux [les accuses], soit 
spontanement, soit a la suite de 
confrontations. 
In the bill Champesteve examined the causes of 
the uprising in some detail. It seemed obvious to him that 
the assailants aimed primarily to kill all the Europeans 
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settled at Pwebo. He saw plunder as a secondary consideration, 
since most of the looted goods, such as sails and straw hats 
were items of little value to Melanesians. Although he was 
probably correct as far as the leaders were concerned, his 
reasoning suggests a limited understanding of human 
psychology in general and of the materially deprived in 
particular. In no society is utility always an accurate 
index of the desire of the underprivileged to appropriate the 
possessions of the wealthy. The fact that the stolen goods 
could not be used in the manner for which they were intended, 
or that they were not previously in common use, is 
irrelevant because of the status bestowed by their seizure 
and because the act of pillage itself implies the redress 
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of certain grievances. Furthermore, the looters also took 
many items, such as muskets, ammunition, knives, axes, pipes, 
tobacco and cloth, for which they had eminently practical 
uses, and which had their own value in the indigenous 
society. Thus, while wholesale murder of Europeans was 
almost certainly the goal of the leaders of the uprising, 
for the majority of those who gathered at Delrieu-Bertrand's, 
Demene's and Henry's properties the lure of plunder was a 
powerful distraction from the main business at hand. This 
may explain why Delrieu-Bertrand's overseer was allowed to 
escape while his would-be assassins struggled to break into 
the storehouse; why Mme Demene and her two small sons were 
left for dead instead of being summarily despatched; why the 
attack on the Henry's was not pressed with as much 
dedication as might have been expected. Again, these curious 
omissions may also indicate a lack of genuine enthusiasm for 
bloodshed on the part of most of the participants. 
Champesteve then went on to discount the possibility 
that the uprising was the result of 'aucun acte de vexation 
ou de brutalite commis par les Europeens de Pouebo contre les 
natturels du pays'. He admitted that the two leaders, 'Martin' 
and 'Pierre' of Bwaibat had recently been sentenced to brief 
periods of forced labour by Bailly for minor misdemeanours, 
but considered it unthinkable that well-deserved chastisements 
could have inspired such terrible vengeance. The logic of 
this presumption is explicable only in terms of the narrow 
cultural and social Europocentrism of a new arrival whose 
knowledge and understanding of the people agai~st whom he 
was called to bring charges were limited. In fact, the 
punishment of a chief, especially for a minor dereliction, 
would have been regarded as humiliation both by the 
17 individual and his entire clan. Several of Bailly's 
assassins had been recently chastized on the commandant's 
orders, which no doubt helped 'dispose them to participate 
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in the plot. Their crimes included having threatened Demene 
when he cut down coconut palms without their permission, 
and having spat in Mme Demene's face. These actions by 
the previous owners of Demene's block reflected the grievance 
which underlay the uprising - bitter resentment at the 
expropriation and sale m European settlers of tribal land 
to the south-east of the Pwebo river, and anger at the 
European assumption that the transfer of land titles 
encompassed the acquisition of everything, trees, streams, 
crop~ which the land contained. It is worth repeating 
that it would seem to be no coincidence tgat Delrieu-Bertrand, 
Demene and Henry were the main civilian targets of attack 
17 
Cf. [Champest eve], 'Partie du requisitoire ••. se 
rapportant a la mission', [8 May 1868 ]: APM/ONC, 25, in 
which he cited the punishments as sufficient explanation for 
the murderers' hatred of the gendarmes. 
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on the night in question, and that, whoever may ultimately 
have instigated the plot, its most enthusiastic executors 
were the Melanesian claimants to the land which these 
Europeans occupied. 
Indeed, Champesteve considered that 'l'unique et 
veritable raison' for the uprising was the insurgents' fear 
of further concessions of land, which would lead to their 
total dispossession. Cause but not justification in the 
prosecutor's eyes, since these people had been assured that 
no more land grants would be made before a definitive 
survey had determined what portion should be reserved for 
Melanesian needs: 
... ils savaient tres bien que de nouvelles 
concessions ne seraient plus faites chez eux, 
jusqu'a nouvel ordre du moins, c'est-a-dire 
jusqu'au moment ou, apres verification definitive, 
il serait etabli que partie des terres de leur 
circonscription, presque toujours en friche et 
beaucoup trop considerable pour leurs besoins, 
pourraient recevoir, sans les leser le moins 
du monde, et apres qu'un lot proportionne au 
nombre des familles qui la composent aurait 
ete distrait a leur profit, une destination plus 
utile a la colonisation. 
Champesteve did not explain why be believed that the people 
of Pareman should have given credence to the latest in a 
series of decrees guaranteeing the inviolability of the 
18 land they occupied, when by their reckoning the earlier 
18 
See below, p 
guarantees had not been honoured. He made no explicit 
mention at this stage of earlier expropriation as a 
possible motive, although in his address to the second 
Pwebo hearing in May 1868 he referred to previous 
concessions of land as the main cause of the violent 
Melanesian reaction. 19 
The bill of indictment stressed heavily the 
element of premeditation in the affair; the rapid increase 
in the numbers involved after the initial murders suggested 
to Champesteve a well-organized, if cleverly dissimulated 
plot: 
.•• pour reunir tant de monde autour de la 
maison Henry que l'on savait la mieux gardee, 
il a ete necessaire de ses concerter d'avance 
et de fixer un plan d'attaque regulier. 
In each of the three attacks on settlers' homesteads the 
same ruse was employed: an attempt was made to lure the 
first intended victim from the relative safety of his house 
by a person well known to him. Once the first victim had 
been despatched it was expected that entrance to the 
building would be gained easily in the resulting confusion. 
Only in Demene's case did the attackers achieve their 
initial objective, but there is little doubt that the 
deliberate use of this method was correctly st~essed in the 
19 
[Champesteve], 'Partie du requisitoire ••• se rapportant 
a la mission', [8 May 1868]: APM/ONC, 25. 
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indictment. With variations, it was a tactic commonly 
employed in traditional warfare in surprise attacks on 
20 
enemy dwellings. The use of this ruse suggested to 
Champesteve a high degree of coordination at the planning 
level. In contrast to his friends the missionaries he 
regarded Warebat as 'la cause premiere de tout ce qui a 
ete fait de mal'. He stressed that the evidence against 
Warebat and the leading men of the Tinjin clan was based 
purely on hearsay, but was of the opinion nonetheless that 
it was conclusive: 
.•• il semble ... evident, d'apres !'ensemble 
des faits et d'apres la maniere dont ils se 
sont accomplis, que leur participation ne 
saurait faire doute. 
The specific charges and evidence against Warebat and his 
21 
advisers will be examined mGre closely. 
20 
E.g., P.Goujon, 'Journal de l'fle des Pins', 9 Nov. 1849; 
Patouillet 1872:49, 160. 
21 
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The source material for this is limited. There is no record 
extant of the preliminary investigation, which formed the basis 
of the bill of indictment. Lengthy reports of the hearing befor 
the Tribun~ cri~inel de Nou~ea were published in the Moniteur, 
but they consisted only of a brief summary of proceedings and 
copies of the addresses of three of the five counsel. These 
reports were later issued in pamphlet form, together with a 
fairly detailed record of the interrogation of the defendants 
and the evidence of several prosecution witnesses (Affaire de 
Pouebo. Tribunal ~riminal da Nou~ea, Noumea n.d.). There is 
also an 1 extrait analytique' of the hearing by a Marist lay 
brother, containing a four page summary of the case put by 
Dezarnaulds, who represented the three Christians charged. At 
the close of the hearing on 28 December 1867 the tribunal 
deferred judgement and ordered a supplementary investigation 
into the causes of the attacks, to be followed by a new hearing 
The records extant of the second hearing are even more 
exiguous. A very brief summary of proceedings was published in 
the Moniteur. A copy of part of the public prosecutor's summing 
up, however, is lodged in the Marist archives labelled 
cont. over page 
APART from Henry no one seems to have doubted Warebat's 
innocence until after the arrival of reinforcements from 
Noumea. Gacher the gendarme and Krieger, the commander of 
the Gatop det~chment, both praised and thanked the chief 
for his cooperation, his help in guarding the post and the 
22 
mission, and his energetic pursuit of the rebels. With 
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the arrival on 23 October of the new commandant of the Pwebo 
circonscription, Marine Infantry Captain Eugene Bourgey, and 
of the governor four days later, relations between Villard 
23 
and the most senior administrators became strained, while 
Warebat and the Pwebo Christians became more and more 
the objects of suspicion, accusations and strict supervision. 
Guillain seems almost to have regretted that a state of open 
warfare no longer existed, so that he might have crushed the 
tribe by force of arms: 
Je ne doute pas que si la rebellion se 
montrant persistante m'avait conduit a 
mettre la localite en etat de siege, le 
resultat eut ete plus s~rement atteint 
que par les formes de la procedure ordinaire; 
mais la sit~ation ne comportait plus cette 
mesure extreme. 24 
'Affaire de Pouebo. Partie du requisitoire du ministere public 
se rapportant a la mission' ([8 May 1868]: APM/ONC, 25). The 
trials and their aftermath were the subject of letters and 
reports by Guillain and by individual missionaries, but those 
which have survived are mostly polemical outbursts, and include 
little reasoned analysis of the role played by Warebat and his 
advisers. 
22 Villard to Rougeyron, [Report on the events at Pwebo], 7-16 
Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 22. 
23 
Villard, 'Journal de Pouebo', 25-6 Oct. 1867: APM/ONC, 2d. 
24 
Guillain to Min., 4 Dec. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166. 
26i 
Several incidents reflected the hardening attitude of the 
authorities: Warebat was threatened with arrest and the 
devastation of the Tinjin's lands if certain suspects were 
1 d d h h . i 25 not immediate y captured and ban e over to t e aut or~t es; 
the Christians were forbidden to frequent the post, which 
they had guarded for ten days; Christian women and children 
were prevented from taking refuge at the mission, whence 
26 
they had fled through fear of the gov~rner's threats. That 
such measures were not imposed solely in the interest of 
administrative efficiency is suggested by Guillain's official 
correspondence and his relations with Villard. 27 The 
missionary was called before the governor on 12 November, 
and questioned closely on the validity of Bonu's protest of 
March 1866. According to Villard, Guillain expressed his 
conviction of Warebat's guilt in the following unequivocal 
terms: 
25 
.•• je ne crois pas votre chef innocent; car 
je connais assez les Caledoniens pour savoir que 
rien de grave ne se passe dans une tribu, sans 
que le chef en ait au moins connaissance. 28 
The threat of devastation was not carried out, which suggests 
that it was not made seriously, but was a fairly brutal means 
of ensuring Mwelebeng cooperation (Villard, 'Journal de Pouebo' 
25 Oct., 3 Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 2d). 
26 
Ibid., 1-2 Nov. 1867; Villard to Rougeyron, [Report on the 
events at Pwebo], 7-16 Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 22. 
27 
Correspondence between Guillaiu and Villard, 13 Nov. 1867 
(quoted in Villard to Rougeyron, 7-16 Nov. 1867): APM/ONC; 
Guillain to Min., 23 Oct., 4 Dec. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166. 
28 
Villard to Rougeyron, (Report on the events at Pwebo), 
7-16 Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 2d. 
Guillain's accusations against Warebat stemmed 
in part at least from his dislike of Christian chiefs and 
from his general assumptions regarding the structure of 
authority in New Caledonian tribes. 29 Ch~mpesteve shared 
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these assumptions, but his conclusions are important because 
they were reached despite a pro-missionary bias, which later 
. 30 became open partisanship. He reasoned on the basis of the 
evidence collected during his preliminary investigation, and 
relied heavily on the depositions of the confessed murderers, 
several of whom had claimed that 'Martin' and 'Pierre' had 
31 
acted on Warebat's express orders. At the trial itself 
seven of these men insisted that their own participation in 
the murders had resulted solelyfrom their inability to disobey 
'Martin', since he was a chief: 'l'autorite irresistible 
d'un ordre emanant de Martin'. None, however, was then 
prepared to swear that the order to kill had originated with 
32 
a higher authority than 'Martin', namely Warebat. 
29 
'Martin's' 
I.e., the belief, common to many Europeans, that only the 
high chief of a tribe could initiate a concerted course of 
action on the part of his 'subjects'; see below, p 
30 
E. g., [Champesteve], 'Partie du requisitoire •.• se rapportant 
a la mission', (8 May 1868]: APM/ONC, 25; Vigouroux to 
Procureur, 16 Mar. 1869; Grezel to Procureur, 16 Nov. 1869: APO. 
31 
'Acte d'accusation', Tribunal criminel de Noumea; 12 Dec. 
18 6 7 : Mon. , 15 De c • 18 6 7 . 
. 32 -
Interrogation of seven accused, 17, 18, 20 Dec· 1867: Affaire 
de Pouebo. Tribun~l criminel de No~mea: 32-44, 62. 
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brother, 'Pierre', the assassin of Demene and his children, 
had made a~ontaneous declaration to Champesteve, which 
provided the foundation of the accusation made against 
Warebat in the bill of indictment. According to this 
declaration, the high chief and three others had, at the 
great ceremony in August 1867, personally presented war clubs 
to 'Pie~re' and 'Martin' with the order that they be used to 
33 kill Bailly, Demene and Henry. Under interrogation before 
the tribunal, however, 'Pierre' changed his evidence to 
Warebat's advantage: he stated then that he had had no 
personal dealings with the high chief or his advisers, but 
knew of their involvement only by hearsay from 'Martin'. 
'Pierre' and 'Martin' both had a personal grievance against 
Demene because he had settled at Bwaibat without 'Martin's' 
34 permission. 
Several other witnesses claimed that when, on 7 
October, Warebat's warriors had devastated the villages and 
gardens of Pareman they were greeted with the cry 'Why do you 
do this? You know that Napoleon [Warebat] provided the clubs 
33 
According to Patouillet 1872:137, the presentation of a 
war club or axe was the means by which a chief designated 
his intended victim to his chosen assassin. Leenhardt, 
however, does not appear to mention this custom. 
34 
Interrogation of 'Pierre', 19 Dec. 1867: Affaire de Pouebo. 
Tribunal criminel de Noumea:45-8. 
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to kill the commandant!' 35 'Pierre' also gave evidence that 
'Thierry', Warebat's leading adviser, had told him and 'Martin' 
to flee, because their gardens were to be burned and all 
the blame put on to them. There thus seems to have been a 
widespread belief amongst the people of Pareman that Warebat 
had instigated the uprising and later betrayed those whom he 
had provoked to violence. Similarly, Warebat's accusers 
claimed that the escape of the colonist Lehuau, who occupied 
part of the chief's own land, was further evidence of the 
cunning means by which he diverted suspicion from himself by 
protecting the European against whom he had the greatest 
1 . 36 persona gr1evance. To Rougeyron, on the other hand, Lehuau's 
37 
escape was proof of the chief's innocence. Thus each side 
interpreted Warebat's behaviour in the way best suited to 
support its own case. 
There was no direct evidence against Warebat, however, 
and it is impossible to conclude with any certainty whether he 
was guilty, or whether 'Martin' and perhaps 'Thierry' had 
invoked his name and his authority to ensure support for the 
scheme, or to distract suspicion from the ringleaders. Warebat 
35 
Interrogation of 'Bauae': ibid., 54-5; cf. interrogation of 
'Thierry' and 'Maxima', 20 Dec. 1867: ibid., 69-71; evidence of 
Gacher and 'Manuel', 23 Dec. 1867: ibid., 76, 79. 
36 
Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868: ANOM, Carton 166. 
37 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 4 Feb. 1868: APM/ONC, 22. 
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naturally enough denied his own involvement, but suggested 
that his advisers might have given 'Martin' the club without 
38 the high chief's knowledge. Given Warebat's earlier 
reputation as an 'imbecile' and Gacher's evidence that 'Thierry' 
had been able to name the culprits as soon as news of the 
murders became known, 39 it is probable that 'Thierry' 
at least knew of the plot in advance, if he was not actually 
behind it. The final judgement of the tribunal supports this 
thesis, since Warebat was exonerated of all except civil 
liability (together with the whole Mwelebeng tribe), while 
'Thierry' was found guilty of provocation of the crimes and 
sentenced to death. One of the defence counsel expressed 
similar sentiments with regard to the relative guilt of Warebat 
and 'Thierry': 
38 
S'il m'appartenait de distribuer a chacun d'eux 
sa part de responsabilite, je la ferais plus 
legere a Napoleon qu'a Thierry. Le premier, 
comme le reconnait le Ministere public, me 
semble depourvu d'energie, une sorte de roi 
faineant que subjugue Thierry, le maire du 
palais. 
Interrogation of Warebat, 20 Dec. 1867: Affaire de Pouebo. 
Tribunal criminel de Noumea: 72. 
39 
Evidence of Gacher, 23 Dec. 1867: ibid., 76. 
40 
4 
Le Boucher, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 28 
Dec. 1867: Mon., 5 Jan. 1868. At Pwebo during the preliminary 
investigation-'Thierry' had shown great unwillingness to undergo 
interrogation, and on • one occasion had escaped from custody 
(Villard, 'Journal de Pouebo', 27, 31 Oct., 2 Nov. 1867: 
APM/ONC, 2d). 
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Innocent at law but guilty in the eyes of the 
governor, Warebat in effect ceased to be chief of Mwelebeng 
from the time of his arrest in November 1867. After the 
trials he served six months' imprisonment for an attempted 
escape from custody, and was finally relieved of the 
chieft~inship and exiled from the colony for an indefinite 
period in November 1868. This action was justified in 
terms of the chief's consistent insubordination and bad will 
towards the Pwebo commandant, and his prior knowledge of the 
planned insurrection. 41 
ON the question of motivation most of the defendants, pagans 
and apostates from Pareman, denied any knowledge of why the 
attacks had occurred. Only four expressed an opinion on the 
matter. 'Pierre' claimed to have been told by 'Martin' that 
the Europeans were to die in revenge for the death in exile 
of Bonu, who was assumed to have been murdered because he 
was strong and healthy when he left Pwebo. 42 This evidence 
was corroborated by two prosecution witnesses, minor chiefs 
from Cambwen and Jawe, who were both clients of the 
41 
'Arrete du Gouverneur revoquant l'indigene Napoleon 
Ouarebate de ses fonctions de chef de la tribu de Pouebo', 
7 Nov. 1868: ~·, 22 Nov. 1868; 'ordre du Gouverneur p.i. 
concernant l'embarquement des divers indigenes devant etre 
mis a la disposition de M. le Commandant des Loyalty', 16 Mar. 
1870: BO 1870: 230-1. 
42 --
Interrogation of 'Pierre', 19 Dec. 1867: Affaire de Pouebo. 
Tribunal criminel de Noumea:45, 48. 
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administration. 43 All three Christians charged, however, 
pointed to grievances over land as the main issue, and 
rejected Bonu's death as a possible motive. 
The differing emphasis placed on these issues by 
supporters of the administration and by Christians was 
reflected in the terms of the mission/government controversy 
over causation and motivation. The authorities were 
determined to demonstrate that Bonu's exile and the 
alienation of Mwelebeng lands were not intrinsically unjust 
or in themselves a valid source of resentment. By their 
reasoning these factors became issues only because the 
miss~onaries had used them as pretexts to stir up hatred 
against the administration and the settlers, whose presence 
at Pwebo they bitterly resented because it weakened 'leur 
t it ~ d i 1 . di ' ' 44 au or e espot que sur es 1n genes • Thus the 
administration stressed the question of Bonu's death in 
43 
The Cambwen were said by the administration to be the 
least compromised of all the groups involved in the affair of 
6-7 October, and were alone allowed to remain on their ancestral 
lands (Guillain to Bourgey, 11 Nov. 1867 [encl. in Guillain to 
Min., 4 Dec. 1867]: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9). Cf. [Ameline], 
'Journal de Pouebo', 24 Sept. 1869: AVNC, in which it was said 
that they had contributed most to the uprising. At least two of 
the gendarmes' murderers were from Cambwen. The Jawe did not 
take part in the affair, and were faithful allies of the 
government in the expeditions which followed (A. Mathieu, 
'Rapport .•• au sujet de la formation de la tribu de Diaoue', 
8 Dec. 1869: Mon., 6-13 Mar. 1870). Both tribes were later 
reconstitutedas-separate tribes, under the chieftainship of the 
two chiefs mentioned in the text. 
44 
Nepveur, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867. 
order to expose the Marists to public censure and possible 
criminal proceedings over the affair of the dead chief's 
45 head. Again, as far as land was concerned, the 
missionaries were said to have provoked Melanesian fears and 
suspicions by their intemperate protests, which had 
deliberately misrepresented the government's past actions 
and fueure intentions: 
Le pretexte tire de la depossession reposait 
.•• sur une base peu solide: neanmoins, il 
pouvait prendre une certain consistance dans 
quelques esprits non instruits des details que 
je viens de donner; aussi en fit-on usage 
pour pallier le vrai mobile de l'opposition 
l'ostracisme des colons du territoire de 
Pouebo ••• 46 
Up to a point this argument had a certain validity. 
The missionaries undoubtedly feared that widespread European 
penetration into the Pwebo area would adversely affect the 
faith and the morals of their followers, and they resented 
the diminution of their own influence in tribal affairs which 
would inevitably follow the consolidation of government 
control and the opening of the region to European settlement. 
Thus the protests which they sponsored against the 
45 
See above, pp.186-7. 
46 
Mage, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867; see also Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 
1868: ANOM, Carton 166. 
27 
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expropriation of tribal land exaggerated the extent to 
which dispossession had already occurred, and were couched 
in dangerously provocative language. But the hyperbole was 
meant for European eyes, for official circles and pious 
public opinion in France. The issue of expropriation was not 
just a pretext dreamed up by the missionaries as part of a 
campaign of subversion of colonial interests. To the people 
threatened the possibility of future wholesale dispossession 
was frighteningly real; to those who had already lost their 
lands, or whose gardens were regularly devastated by 
settlers' herds, dispossession was already a fact. The 
government's assurances that their needs would be met was 
small comfort to Melanesians thus affected, and they did not 
rely on outside agitation to translate their fears into 
action. 
For their part, the missionaries reasoned as follows: 
the authorities had forced the people of Pareman to apostatize, 
47 had split the tribe into two camps and thereby reaped the 
whirlwind. Deprived of their religion and their chief, their 
lands lost or threatened, men like 'Martin' and 'Pierre' 
refused to tolerate punishment at the hands of the commandant, 
47 
Cf. Le Boucher, who denied the existence at Pwebo of 'une 
scission politique entre Napoleon, chef des canaques 
catholiques et les canaques soldats', and who invoked Gacher's 
evidence as support: 'Gacher vous l'a dit, Messieurs, le 
schisme religieux n'a pas pour consequence le schisme politique' 
(address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 28 Dec. 1867: 
Mon., 5 Jan. 1868). 
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and the people of Pareman in general were .no longer 
restrained from acts of violence by the resignation which 
Christianity inspired. The Christians, however, their 
savagery moderated by the impact of their new religion and 
the influence of their missionaries, had protected the post 
and the mission and pursued the rebels with tireless 
devotion to the cause of France and civilization. According 
to the MariSts, religious persecution, dispossession, Bonu's 
exile and death had all helped to cause a violent 
Melanesian reaction despite the missionaries, and not because 
they had used these issues as pretexts in their campaign 
48 
against French rule and European settlement. 
Like most strongly partisan arguments neither the 
government nor the mission viewpoint was notable for its 
honesty or internal consistency. For instance, the 
administration insisted that Bonu's protest of March 1866, 
which Villard had organized, was vital in the development of 
Mwelebeng hostility towards the gendarmes and colonists of 
Pwebo: 
48 
Qu'est-il besoin d'insister pour etablir la 
correlation de l'acte presente a la signature 
des principaux de Pouebo [Bonu's petition] 
avec les cr±mes d'octobre 1867 ••. la preuve 
ressort flagrante de ce fait que dix-sept des 
accuses assis sur ce banc, et parmi eux les plus 
coupables, figuraient au nombre des adherents. 49 
Rougeyron to ? , 30 Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 22. 
49 Mage, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 Dec. 1867 
Mon., 29 Dec. 1867; see also Guillain to Champesteve, 14 Nov. 
1867 (encl. in Guillain to Min., 8 Mar. 1868): ANOM, Carton 166. 
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Yet the petition was also said to be spurious: it was 
claimed that the signatories were forced to place their 
50 
crosses on a document of whose contents they were ignorant. 
As Champesteve pointed out in his vindication of the 
missionaries during the second hearing, it was hardly possible 
that the Mwelebeng could have been profoundly influenced 
51 by something which meant nothing to them. Similar 
contradictions are apparent in Marist justifications of their 
own actions. For example, Guitta's public denunciation of 
the arrest of several catechists was at one point said to have 
52 been made in order to calm Melanesian anger. Elsewhere, 
however, the missionaries pointed out that since the protest 
was intended solely for European consumption, it had been 
delivered in French, and was thus unintelligible to the 
53 Melanesians present. Again, the missionaries rejected 
the notion that the same protest, delivered in November 1865, 
could have been a logical precursor of events two years later: 
50 
Nepveur, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noum€a, 27 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867; Guillain, address to Conseil 
' --d administration, 16 Feb. 1868 (transcript encl. in Guillain to 
Min., 8 Mar. 1868): ANOM, Carton 166. 
51 
[Champesteve], 'Pa~tie du r€quisitoire ... se rapportant a 
la mission', [8 May 1868]: APM/ONC, 25. 
52 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 4 Jan. 1868: APO. 
53 
Rougeyron to Sup€rieur-g€n€ral, 4 Feb. 1868: APM/ONC, 22. 
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'il est peu croyable qu'ils the Mwelebeng aient nourri si 
d , ~ • I 54 longtemps ce funeste projet avant e le mettre a execut~on . 
Yet the evidence of uprisings in 1878 and 1917 indicates that 
New Caledonians differed not at all from other peoples in 
their capacity both to nourish ancient grievances and to 
55 harbour long-range plans for their redress. 
The government's case against the Marists was 
developed in detail during the first trial of the Pwebo 
suspects. That these attacks were endorsed, if not actually 
inspired by Guillain was obvious from his correspondence. 
In December 1867 he expressed strong displeasure with the 
manner in which the judicial investigation had been 
conducted: 
A 
••• !'instruction ••• me parait avoir laisse 
en dehors d'elle des individus pouvant etre 
consideres comme avant eu une participation 
morale aux dits evenements. 56 
The following February he used his extraordinary powers to 
ban Villard and Guitta from the Pwebo circonscription for two 
years, on the grounds that their influence on MelanesianS 
54 
Mallet, 'Extrait analytique': APM/ONC, 22; see also 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 4 Jan. 1868: APO; [Champesteve], 
'Partie du requisitoire ••• se rapportant a la mission', 
~May 1868]:APM/ONC, 25. 
55 
Guiart 1968:119; 1970: pas&im. 
56 
Guillain to Min., 4 Dec. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166. 
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was detrimental to the interests of the government and the 
57 
colony. Guillain's irritation with Champesteve increased 
as a result of the first hearing, and the public prosecutor 
was replaced as examining magistrate for the supplementary 
investigation by Victor Coudelou, an old friend of the 
58 governor. Coudelou's inquiry concentrated on the question 
of mis~ionary guilt. He compiled a bulky dossier: 
[plein] de declarations plus ou moins vagues, 
plus ou moins etrangeres a la cause, mais ayant 
toutes pour but final d'increminer [sic] les 
Peres, les couvrir d'infame et etablir enfin 
qu'ils sont les veritables instigateurs des 
assassinats et des pillages. 59 
According to Champesteve, who admittedly had a personal 
interest in denigrating the supplementary investigation, 
the new 'evidence' consisted in the main of unfounded rumours 
which had become current since his own earlier inquiry. At 
the second hearing, in May 1868, Champesteve, in his official 
capacity, dismissed as worthless the entire case against the 
missionaries: 
57 
Guillain to Min., 8 Mar., 2 Oct. 1868: ibid. 
58 
On Guillain's friendship with Coudelou, see, for instance, 
Guillain to Min., 10 Apr. 1865: ANOM, Carton 152. 
59 
(Champesteve], 'Partie du requisitoire se rapportant a 
la mission', [8 May 1868]: APM/ONC, 25. 
Pour nous, nous les crayons completement 
innocents ••• Ou voir, en effet, une 
participation quelconque de la Mission de 
Pouebo dans ce qui s'est passe? Ou sont 
les faits materiels, positifs ••. ces faits 
manquent de la maniere la plus absolue, le 
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bon sens le plus ordinaire suffit pour le voir. 60 
The question of miss,onary responsibility for the 
events ·of 6-7 October is largely insoluble. In the legal 
terms in which the administration attempted to incriminate 
them no guilt could be proven, as Champesteve demonstrated. 
The Marists may, by means of anti-government propaganda and 
activities, have exacerbated general Mwelebeng fears for the 
integrity of their lands. On the other hand, there can be 
no doubt that the active participants in the uprising all 
belonged to that part of the tribe which was least subject 
to missionary influence, and which had for some time been 
regarded by the local authorities as well-disposed to the 
government cause. Moreover, Melanesians certainly had no 
intrinsic need of outside incitement to revolt, as their 
history of repeated violent response to European encroachment 
until 1917 proves. It is true, however, that the very 
fact of the missionary presence at Pwebo and the extent of their 
influence aggravated the relationship between the Mwelebeng 
and the civil authorities, because the tribe was inevitably 
drawn into the conflict between its spiritual advisers and 
the government. 
60 
Ibid. 
The administrative actions which helped 
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provoke the people of Pareman to violence were motivated, 
in part at least, by Guillain's abhorrence of Marist 
influence. The clans of this region suffered harassment 
and some dispossession because they had become an integral 
part of the mission-dominated Mwelebeng tribe. They 
attemp~ed to save their lands by asserting their independence 
of the Mwelebeng and the mission, and when this failed they 
resorted to force. In this sense the missionaries helped 
to create the circumstances which led to the uprising, but 
their accusers did not invoke such indirect correlation. 
'Thierry', a leading Christian of the Tinjin clan, 
was condemned as the author of the insurrection, but the 
question of 'Thierry's' involvement is not related to that 
of missionary responsibility. If indeed he did provoke or 
at least condone the violence, as seems likely, 61 he acted 
not as a Christian but as a Melanesian who happened to be 
61 
Cf. the example of Philippe Dwi, the uncle of and 'regent' 
for the infant high chief of Yengen. Dwi, a Catholic, secretly 
provoked his Protestant traditional enemies of the upper 
Yengen valley to revolt against the French in 1917. When 
it became apparent that the uprising had failed, he betrayed 
those whom he had provoked to violence, and denounced an 
innocent Protestant chief. When his own involvement was 
finally revealed he committed suicide rather than face the 
consequences of his actions (Leenhardt 1932:65; Guiart 
1970:274). 
282 
a Christian. His motives are obscure. Perhaps he hoped 
that a violent demonstration might avert the threat to the 
patrimony of his own clan, although there had as yet been 
little serious encroachment into the Tinjin heartland. 
Perhaps he deliberat~ly provoked the Pareman clans into 
hopeless revolt in order to punish them for their rejection 
of Tinjin overlordship. His betrayal and energetic repression 
of the rebels may support this thesis; again, it may merely 
have reflected a desire to cover his own tracks once it 
became obvious that the uprising had failed. Whatever his 
intentions the plan misfired badly: 'Thierry' himself was 
condemned to death for his role in the affair; during the 
reorganization of the northern tribes in 1869 and 1870 the 
Tinjin lands, like those of most other tribes in the region, 
were confiscated and a newly constituted Mwelebeng ~ibe was 
62 
confined to a specific reserve delimited within these lands: 
in the same reorganization most of the people of Pareman were 
separated administratively from the Mwelebeng and formed into 
. d d 'b 63 1n epen ent tr1 es. 
62 
'Arrete du Gouverneur constituant la tribu des Mouelebes', 
28 Feb. 1870: BO 1870:168-70; 
63 
Of the Pareman clans, only the people of Cevit and Pwe-
Kabarik (who spoke the Mwelebeng language) remained within 
the Mwelebeng tribe. 
THE virulence of the government's attacks caused near panic 
amongst the Marists. They envisaged such awful consequences 
as legal proceedings against Villard and Guitta, the 
condemnation of the mission to pay huge indemnities, or even 
64 the expulsion of the order from the colony. The Marists 
had alw~Ys placed the priorities of the mission before those 
of its individual followers. Never was this tendency more 
pronounced than in times of conflict with the civil 
authorities. Thus in 1867-8 for most missionaries the 
plight of the Mwelebeng people, even the Christians, receded 
into the background in the face of the terrible perils which 
the mission as a whole and Villard and Guitta in particular 
seemed to face. 65 
In the event, the missionaries' worst fears were not 
realized. No civil or criminal action was taken against 
either the mission or individual priests, although the ban 
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on Villard's presence at Pwebo was not lifted, 66 and relations 
64 
Moris to Procureur, 28 Jan. 1868; Rougeyron to Procureur, 
4 Jan., 1 Feb., 6 March 1868: APO; [J.M. Bertrand], 'Affaires 
de Pouebo, ou Les Trois Avocats, par Mr. X X X': APM/ONC, 22. 
65 
E.g., the Marist archives hold only that section of 
Champesteve's address which exculpated the mission from 
responsibility in the Pwebo affair. Similarly, mission letters 
during most of the Guillain period tended to concentrate far morE 
on the plight of the mission than on that of the Christians or 
Melanesians in general. 
66 
Villard, 'Journal de Pouebo', 17 Apr. 1875: AVNC. 
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between the missionaries of the north-east and the garrison 
at Pwebo remained consistently poor. In general, however, 
the position of the Marists vis-a-vis the colonial government 
reached something of an uneasy stalemate, since neither side 
had sufficient influence in France to bring about the demise 
Of the other. At Pwebo the overt influence of the 
missionaries in temporal matters became much more discreet, 
but the commitment of the Christians remained firm, and 
spiritually the mission's position was if anything enhanced. 
Warebat was replaced as chief by his first cousin, 67 
'Evaristo', a good Christian who retained his faith, yet 
managed to satisfy the administration by absolute obedience 
to the demands made upon him ~nd by giving the appearanc~ at 
68 least, of independence from missionary guidance. 
The main sufferers from the events of 6-7 October 
1867 and their aftermath, apart from the actual victims of 
the attacks, were Melanesian. The Mwelebeng tribe was 
67 
'Brother' in New Caledonian terms: Villard, 'Journal de 
Pouebo', 14 Nov. 1867: AVNC. 
68 
'Decision du Gouverneur nommant le chef de la tribu des 
Mouelebes', 28 Feb. 1870: BO 1870:170-1 (' ••. depuis le mois 
de novembre 1867 ladite tribu a ete dirigee, a notre 
satisfaction et a celle des commandants de la circonscription de 
Pouebo, par le cousin germain de !'ex-chef'); Rougeyron to 
Superieur-general, 18 Nov. 1869: APM/ONC, 20, suggested that 
'Evaristo' was left alone because the firmness and courage 
shown by his predecessors had deterred the administration from 
treating him in like manner. 
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held to be civilly responsible for the deaths and damage 
occasioned by the uprising, and was ordered to pay 
indemnities totalling 76,834 francs to the European victims. 
This judgement was based on Guillain's edict of 24 December 
1867, which decreed the legal existence of the New Caledonian 
tribe, and its collective civil responsibility for losses 
sustained as a result of criminal acts or misdemeanours 
committed by members of the tribe acting in concert: 
Art. 2. La tribu est administrativement 
et civilement responsable, susceptible par 
consequent d'etre condamnee a des dommages 
et interets auxquels donneraient lieu des 
crimes ou des delits commis sur son territoire, 
par des rassemblements ou attroupements, soit 
contre les personnes, soit contre les 
proprietes domaniales ou privees. 69 
A subsequent ministerial despatch pointed out to Guillain 
that his edict could not apply retrospectively (and thus did 
not cover the events of 6-7 October), 70 but the governor seems 
to have ignored this instruction, because later legislation 
specifically referred to the damages granted against the 
71 Mwelebeng. 
69 
'Arrite du Gouverneur declarant, par voie d'interpretation 
des actes legislatifs anterieurs, !'existence legale de la 
tribu indigene dans !'organisation coloniale de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie', 24 Dec. 1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867. 
70 
Min. to Guillain, 22 May 1868: ANOM, Carton 59. 
71 
E.g., 'Arrete ••• constituant la tribu des Mouelebes', 28 
Feb. 1870: BO 1870:170; 'arrete ... constituant la tribu de 
Diaoue', 28Feb. 1870: ibid., 184. 
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Fifteen Mwelebeng were sentenced to imprisonment 
with hard labour for terms ranging from six months (two 
Christians who had attempted to escape from custody) to life. 
Ten men, all except'Thierry'from the south-eastern villages, 
72 
were sentenced to death. Their request for leave to appeal 
to the Emperor for clemency was refused by the administrative 
council of the colony on Guillain's casting vote, on the 
stated grounds that the sentences were justified, and that a 
successful appeal would be a miscarriage of justice. 73 On 
18 May 1868, nine 74 days after the judgement was handed down, 
the ten were publicly executed on the beach at Pwebo: 
72 
'Jugement du tribunal criminel de Noumea', 9 May 1868: Mon., 
17 May 1868. Three men were imprisoned for life, three fo_r __ 
fifteen years, one for ten years, three for eight years, three 
for five years, two for six months. Those sentenced to eight 
years or more were exiled to Indo-China (Conseil d'administrat-
ion, 22 June 1869: ANOM, Carton 91). It is not known if any 
eventually returned. 
73The head of the government's legal department (~h~f du service 
judiciaire) and the governor reasoned as follows in respect of 
the men condemned to life imprisonment; the same argument had 
previously been applied to those under sentence of death: 
"Les condamnes aux travaux forces .•. pas plus que ceux 
condamnes a la peine de mort pour les memes faits, ne 
meritent, suivant nous, que l'on recours [sic] pour eux a 
la clemence de l'Empereur •••• " 
Cette lecture achevee M le Gouverneur prend la parole ••• 
La justice qui a connu de l'affaire a parfaitement pese le 
pour et le contre: il n'y a aucune exageration dans la 
peine qui frappe ces indigenes et il serait impolitique de 
revenir sur la .sentence qui le condamne en faisant appel, 
en leur faveur, a la clemence de l'Empereur. 
Nous savons taus que cette clemence ne fait jamais 
defaut quand on y fait appel et nous pouvons etre certains, 
des maintenant, que tout ce que nous demanderions dans ce 
sens nous serait accorde. 
Nous devons done faire executer le jugement ,,, 
(Conseil d'administration, 11 Aug. 1868: ANOM, Carton 90). 
74 Mon., 14 June 1868. 
••• la guillotine, montree pour la premiere 
fois aux yeux des Canaques, fit rouler neuf 
[sic] tetes sur la plage de Pouebo. 75 
227 
The impact of this gruesome scene on its Melanesian witnesses 
was not recorded, but can well be im~gined. Emprin, the 
missionary at Bon4e, reported the reaction: 'Les Blancs se 
76 disent·humains, et ils tuent plus cruellement que nous'. 
Guillain's summary justice was not well-received in Paris. 
He received peremptory orders that in future all death 
sentences were to be submitted to the Emperor for review. 
This limitation powerfully affected the governor's future 
77 
course of action, and the death penalty was not again 
inflicted on Melanesians during Guillain's term of office. 
The reversal after 1862 of the official attitude 
towards the mission thus had a profound effect on the 
Mwelebeng. Their early commitment to the mission rebounded 
upon them, and they paid dearly for the advantages which they 
had derived before 1862. They had accepted that commitment 
freely, and to that extent determined their own future. But 
they also became victims of a process beyond their control - of 
the determination of the colonial government to assert its 
authority and prerogatives in the face of the missionaries, and 
of the pretensions of the latter to have effective moral, 
social and political control over the tribes which accepted 
their influence. 
75 Patouillet 1872:54. 
76 [A. Emprin], 'Notes particulieres (Bonde)', [1869]:APM/ONC,2e. 
77 Conseil d'administration, 25 Feb.l870:ANOM, Carton 93; see 
below,pp. 307-9. 
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PART II: THE NORTH-EAST 1868-70 
FROM the time of Bourgey's arrival at Pwebo as commandant 
in October 1867 the Mwelebeng Christians had been ordered to 
78 provide porters and build shelters for the troops. Early 
in November the old four-man police post was officially 
replaced by a garrison of eighty men with artillery support. 
The new post was to be built at Uvanu, near the c ief's 
residence, with a small outpost at Ubac to guard Henry's 
establishment. 79 
It is apparent that Andrew Henry was the object of 
extraordinary solicitude on the part of a colonial government 
which often enough infuriated free settlers by its 
excessively autocratic and bureaucratic methods. He became 
by far the largest lay landowner in the Pwebo circonscription 
during the 1860's; he was granted, admittedly under terms 
favourable to the state, a total monopoly of the trade in 
sandalwood between Port St-Vincent and Nakety - in effect 
th th t hi d f h i . 1 d 80 h 11 d e nor ern wo-t r s o t e ma n 1s an ; e was a otte 
78 
Villard, 'Journal de Pouebo', 25 Oct. 1867: APM/ONC, 2d. 
79 
'Arrete du Gouverneur consti tuan t le garnison de Pouebo 
et delimitant la circonscription de ce nom', 4 Nov. 1867: 
BO 1867: 327. Guillain to Bourgey, 11 Nov. 1867 (encl. in 
Guillain to Min., 4 Dec. 1867): ANOM, Carton 166. 
80 
Douglas 1971: 168. 
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a number of convict labourers; he successfully called upon 
the Wagap post for military assistance in 1867, and the 
soldiers sent were placed under his sole command; a ten-man 
outpost of the Uvanu garrison was set up to protect his 
establishment, and after the attacks in October 1868 a 
separate forty-man post was created at Ubac for this purpose; 
he was·granted heavy damages against the Mwelebeng tribe by 
the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, but it is not known if he 
ever managed to collect them. Between 1865 and 1871 Henry 
was mentioned no less than nineteen times in sessions of the 
colony's administrative council, whose extant records are by 
no means complete, mostly in connection with concessions of 
land or business contracts concluded with th.e administration. 
No other settler received anything like as much official 
attention. 
The obvious, and probably also the real reason for all 
this concern was the fact that Henry's land and sandalwood 
concessions were granted in return for an undertaking to 
import New Hebridean indentured labourers into the colony, in 
81 
an attempt to alleviate the chronic labour shortage. By 
1870 Henry no longer had this field to himself, but he 
remained the largest operator. By that year several 
81 
Conseil d'administration, 1 May, 28 Nov. 1865: ANOM, Carton 
89; 1 Feb. 1870: ANOM, Carton 93; 9 Feb. 1871: ANOM, Carton 92. 
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hundred indentured New Hebrideans had passed through the 
colony under Henry's auspices. The other side of the coin 
was in the fact that few of Henry's business dealings with 
the government were Qn terms particularly favourable to him, 82 
several of his enterprises failed, 83 while Melanesian hostility 
84 
caused him severe financial losses, especially in 1867. 
Henry's relations with the Pwebo missionaries and the 
Mwelebeng Christians were never warm, and he was the first to 
accuse Warebat of complicity in the 1867 affair. But he seems 
not to have been involved in the administration's programme 
of harassment of the miss on between 1865 and 1867, unlike 
several other settlers of the vicinity. Champesteve referred 
to him in 1868 as a very honourable man. 85 Nonetheless, as 
the occupier of most of the expropriated Pareman land, and 
the worst offender as far as marauding livestock was 
86 
concerned, he was the main local object of Melanesian 
hatred, and the victim of the most concerted attacks. 
82 
E.g., Conseil d'administration, 1 Feb. 1870: ANOM, Carton 93. 
83 
E.g., Conseil d'administration, 17 June 1868: ANOM, 
Carton 90. 
84 
Conseil d'administration, 17 July 1869: ANOM, Carton 91. 
85 
[Champesteve], 'Partie du requisitoire ... se rapportant a 
la mission', [8 May 1868]: APM/ONC, 25. 
86 
Warebat to Rougeyron, 1 May 1866: APM/ONC, 22. 
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Inevitably, given the administration•s desperate 
shortage of men and resources, the main burden of building 
the Uvanu post fell on Melanesians. At first the 
Mwelebeng, in disgrace because of the recent uprising, were 
called out en masse, accompanied by some men from Pambwa, 
Bonde and Balad. By 17 November the situation had been 
regularized. The Mwelebeng were ordered to provide a daily 
corvee of thirty men, who were to be relieved each week and 
who were to receive no remuneration or provisions. 87 . The 
demand for labour was such, however, that nearly every tribe 
in the circonscription, Christian and pagan, was eventually 
called upon to contribute a regular contingent, although the 
Mwelebeng bore the brunt of the burden. Only the Puma, the 
Cambwen and the Mwandin (the Paak sub-tribe which had 
apostatized in 1864 under the influence of Undo of Balad) 
were consisteniy exempt, because of their status as faithful 
88 
allies of the administration. However, even they 
participated voluntarily in order to highlight their loyalty 
to the regime. Tribes such as the Maluma of Pambwa, which 
had never given the government cause for displeasure, were 
supposed to be treated more leniently than the Mwelebeng; 
87 
Guillain to Bourgey, 11 Nov. 1867 (encl. in Guillain to Min., 
4 Dec. 1867): ANO~, tartan 166; Villard, 'Journal de Pouebd, 
16, 18 Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 2d. 
88 
Vincent to Procureur, 14 July 1868: APO; 
'Journal de Pouebo', 1 Oct. 1868: AVNC. 
[J. Ameline], 
they were to be released as soon as the state of the work 
permitted, and were to receive the generous allowance of 
a ship's biscuit per man per day, when their efforts 
proved satisfactory: 
Je vous autorise a faire delivrer aux Pamboa, 
a titre de gratification, une galette de 
biscuit par jour et par homme, pour les 
encourager au travail, quand vous en serez 
content bien entendu. 
Unfortunately, however, the demand for labour at 
Pwebo increased rather than diminished, and money never 
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seemed to be available to provide even minimum sustenance 
90 for the workers. A vicious circle developed: a revolt had 
caused the need for labour in the first place; shortage of 
labour led to the corvees; owing to shortage of funds the 
89 
workers could neither be paid nor fed, which resulted in great 
hardship; this led to resentment and a marked lack of 
enthusiasm on the part of Melanesians to fulfil their 
obligations; subsequent desertions and finally outright 
refusal to obey brought about the threat of punishment of 
recalcitrant chiefs and tribesmen; this in turn deepened 
resentment and finally culminated in violent resistance. 
89 
Guillain to Bourgey, 11 Nov. 1867 (encl. in Guillain to 
Min., 4 Dec. 1867): ANOM, Carton 166. 
90 
Villard, 'Journal de Pouebo', 16 Nov. 1867: APM/ONC, 2d; 
Anon., 'Resume des lettres du P. Ameline, missionnaire a 
Pouebo, du 1 Mar au 6 Mai 1868', n.d.: APM/ONC, 25. 
Despite its unpopularity, however, forced labour 
on the Pwebo post would probably not have ended in violence 
if not for the inhumanity and intolerance of the Europeans 
who directed the work. The main complicating factor was 
Captain Louis Pons of the Marine Infantry, who succeeded 
Bourgey as commandant of the circonscription in February 
1868. By any standards he seems to have been a vicious, 
small-minded man, racist and despotic almost to the point 
of insanity. 91 If Joseph Ameline, Villard's replacement at 
Pwebo, is to be believed, Pons took sadistic pleasure in 
making the lot of the Melanesian workmen as unpleasant as 
possible. The missionary's account may well have been 
exaggerated, but there is reason to believe that it was 
accurate in essence. 92 Ameline was a gentle, mild man, who 
had not previously indulged in anti-government polemics, and 
who had enjoyed good relations with the civil authorities 
93 in his previous post. This was in all probability one of 
the reasons why he was sent to Pwebo. Yet his letters and 
91 
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Dr Jules Patouillet, who was not at all sympathetic towards 
the missionaries, commented of Pons: 'Malheureusement, le 
commandant charge d'y installer un poste fut force d'accabler 
les noirs de corvees. Peut-etre meme se montra-t-il un peu 
negrophobe' (Patouillet 1872:54). 
92 
Vincent to Procureur, 14 July 1868: APO. Ameline was rather 
too mild for Rougeyron's liking- see Rougeyron to Superieur-
general, 12 Oct. 1868, 8 Dec. 1869: APM/ONC, 20. 
93 
Ameline to Procureur, 24 Aug., 4 Dec. 1867: APO. 
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diary for 186894 are full of appalled descriptions of the 
brutal punishments inflicted by Pons on the Christians, 
and of the unnecessary harshness with which Melanesians 
were treated, pagans as well as Christians. During the 
supplementary investigation into the causes of the 1867 
uprising Pons was said to have had unsatisfactory witnesses 
95 tied tQ trees or posts, bound neck, waist, hand and foot 
until they changed their evidence. A catechist was trussed 
up in this way for five days and nights. Others were 
imprisoned on feeble pretexts, and a Christian who refused 
to work on Easter day was reported to have been tied to a 
cross, laid out in the sun until he fainted, and then 
imprisoned, still bound to his cross, until the following 
Sunday. Such treatment does not exactly accord with 
Guillain's injunction to Bourgey in November 1867 to allow 
Melanesians freedom to worship: 
94 
Vous devez d'un autre cote leur laisser une 
entiere liberte pour l'exercice des cultes 
sans tolerer toutefois qu'aucun d'eux y 
soit contraint. Vous n'oublierez pas que 
les dimanches et jours feries les travaux 
doivent etre suspendus .•• 96 
Anon., 'Resume des lettres du P. Ameline , n.d.: APM/ONC, 
25; Ameline to Procureur, 12, 16 July 1868; APO; [Ameline], 
'Journal de Pouebo', 16 Aug. -31 Dec. 1868 passim: AVNC; see 
also Vincent to Procureur, 14 July 1868: APO. 
95 
At the Isle of Pines, at least, this was a traditional form 
of punishment (Goujon, 'Journal de l'fle des Pins', 10 June 
1852). 
96 
Guillain to Bourgey, 11 Nov. 1867 (encl. in Guillain to 
Min., 4 Dec. 1867): ANOM, Carton 166. 
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According to the missionary account Pons, whom 
Ameline, with bitter humour, dubbed 'Pilate', reserved his 
worst excesses for the Christians. Nonetheless, pagans also 
suffered, with the exception of the allies of the government. 
Not only were no workmen fed by the administration, but their 
hours were long (twelve hours per day according to Ameline), 
and they were often refused permission to return to their 
tribes to harvest their yams and plant new ones. At times 
people who attempted to gather their crops had them 
confiscated for the use of the garrison. The Mwelebeng were 
in one respect better off, because the construction work 
actually took place on their lands, and they did not therefore 
have to travel long distances to tend their crops. However, 
the starving foreigners, including the Christians of Bonde, 
were authorized by the commandant to forage in the gardens of 
the Mweleb~ng, which placed an intolerable burden on this 
tribe, and exacerbated inter-tribal tensions. 97 
In the end, however, reaction to this treatment came 
not from the more heavily-burdened Mwelebeng, but from the 
Tea Janu, a pagan tribe which resided at Webia, near the 
headwaters of the river Wayem. The passivity of the 
Mwelebeng doubtless resulted in the main from their vivid 
memories of the suppression of the previous year's uprising, 
97 
Rougeyron to Cardinal Barnabo, 6 Apr. 1868: APM/ONC, 20; 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 17 Jan. 1869: APO. 
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and of the harsh sentences which had been meted out by the 
Tribunal criminel. Furthermore, Mwelebeng lands were very 
much occupied territory, and the tribe was under constant 
surveillance. The Marists, of course, claimed that their 
stoicism under severe stress was an attribute inspired by 
Christianity. 98 The Tea Janu, however 9 had had 
relatively few contacts with Europeans, and had never felt 
the weight of French repression, although their lands had 
been sacked by the crusading Mwelebeng in 1860. In 1862 
the Tea Janu chief had agreed to send children to Pwebo to 
be trained as catechists. They had returned to their tribe in 
1865, but made little progress in the face of concerted 
official opposition. In August 1867 an old enemy of the 
mission, a man who had been exiled to Tahiti for several years 
for his role in burning the Pwebo church in 1858, boasted 
publicly that he had been charged by the governor to prevent 
the Tea Janu from becoming Christian. 99 In mid-1868 the Tea Jan· 
workers at Pwebo were simply not prepared to compromise 
their proud independence in obedience to the orders of an 
authority which they scarcely felt, and which they had no 
reason to recognize After cooperating for about two 
98 
Ameline to Procureur, 2 Jan. 1869: APO. 
99 
Villard, 'Journal de Pouebo', 10 Aug. 1867: APM/ONC, 2d. 
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months, they decided that the burden was intolerable. 
Towards the end of September 1868 Ameline described 
in tones of deep foreboding the extent to which the 
situation had deteriorated: 
Les affaires secom?liquent pour le Commdt. 
Les tribus canaques refusent partout de venir 
travailler disant que ~a n'en finit point, se 
plaignant d'etre maltraites par les soldats 
· avec qui ils travaillent et disant qu'ils 
meurent de faim. - Par suite de ces dispositions 
des Canaques et du caractere du Commdt. il 
pourrait fott bien arriver des affaires graves 
dont on ne saurait prevoir maintenant 1' issue, 
mais qui a coup sur ne se termineront pas a 1' 
avantage des pauvres canaques. - A dire vrai, 
il est tres-certain que les travaux deviennent 
insupportables et a cause de leur duree et a 
cause de leur mode d'execution. 1 
On 4 October the Tea Janu provided their own solution; they 
walked out and refused to return. Workers from other tribes 
2 followed suit. The next day Pons, tocrown his brutality 
with arrogant folly, sent a party of six soldiers to Webia 
to retrieve the workers. Ameline confided his fears to his 
diary: 
1 
Je ne sais si je me trompe, mais je crains qu'il 
arrive quelque malheur •••• Je ne crois •.. pas 
bien prudent d'envoyer ces six soldats au 
milieu de ces gens, dans de telles circonstances. 3 
[Ameline], 'Journal de Pouebo', 29 Sept. 1868: AVNC. 
2 
Ameline to Procureur, 2 Jan. 1869: APO. 
3 
[Ameline], 'Journal de Pouebo', 5 Oct. 1868: AVNC. 
His presentiments were well founded, for on 7 
October, a year to the day after the murders and looting at 
Pwebo and Ubac, the soldiers were ambushed and murdered by 
a party of Tea Janu, acting on the orders of their chief. 4 
The next day a small force which Pons had led to the scene 
of the massacre was forced to withdraw when attacked by 
several hundred warriors. This ill-considered action by 
Pons reassured the Tea Janu of the impregnability of their 
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mountain strongholds and convinced them that they were feared 
by the French. Not long afterwards the affair blossomed 
into full-scale war. On 17 October an isolated colonist was 
robbed and murdered by a band of women and children from 
the coastal Tea Janu village of Wenop. The following morning 
the main body of Tea Janu descended upon Henry's property at 
Ubac. They were beaten off, but remained in the vicinity . 
The attack was renewed on 29 October, but was again repulsed 
with heavy losses to the assailants. 
Between 8 October and 15 November, when Mathieu 
arrived as commander-in-chief of the three northern 
circonscriptions of Gatop, Pwebo and Wagap, Pons made no 
4 
Except where otherwise indicated the outline of events in the 
remainder of this chapter is based on [Ameline], 'Journal de 
Pouebo', 7 Oct. 1868 - 10 Dec. 1869; Mon., 25 Oct., 22 Nov. 
1868, 14, 21, 28 Feb., 7 Mar., 20 June-1869; Guillain to Min., 
19 Feb. 1869: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9. 
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move against the marauders except to send the Mwelebeng, 
armed with mission muskets, and the Cambwen to Ubac to 
harass them. Reinforcements arrived slowly, until by mid-
November a force of about two hundred, including twenty-
seven fusiliers indigenes from Wagap, had been collected 
at Pwebo and Ubac. Ubac became the main base for the great 
operation of repression which finally goc under way at the 
end of November and was to continue intermittently until 
the middle of the next year. 
Before the repression began, however, it had been 
decided officially that the uprising also encompassed the 
Maluma of Pambwa and the Paak of Bonde, a partly Christian 
tribe. The Maluma were said to have participated in the 
second attack on Ubac, but the main grievance against both 
tribes was the refusal of their chiefs to obey successive 
summons to present themselves at Pwebo to make formal 
professions of allegiance to the French. According to 
Guillain this proved, ipso facto, their complicity in the 
revolt, and the entire tribes were subjected to the full 
rigours of the repression because of the sins of omission of 
their chiefs. 5 An elaborate case was later built up against 
both tribes. Under interrogation Koima, the Tea Janu chief, 
5 
Mon., 14 Feb. 1869; 'arrete ••• qui declare les tribus des 
Paiacs et des Maloumes dissoutes et expulsees de leur 
territoire', 28 Feb. 1869: Mon., 28 Feb. 1869. 
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claimed that his opposite number at Pambwa had originally 
devised the plot whereby any soldier who came on to their 
respective territories would be killed. After the massacre, 
according to Koima, he had proposed an alliance with the 
chief of 6 the Paak, and been accepted. The missionaries, howev' 
strenuously denied that the Paak were guilty of anything 
more serious than unwillingness to work under inhumane 
conditions and the chief's refusal to obey the summons to 
Pwebo, a refusal inspired by fear rather than defiance: 
Toute leur crime est de n'avoir pas voulu aller 
travailler pour le gouvernement sans une petite 
retribution, au mains en vivres pour leur 
propre subsistence •••• ne pouvant plus faire 
de pareilles corvees dans de telles conditions 
ils avaient pris le parti de refuser, lorsq'on 
les sommerait de revenir, quoiqu'il leur en 
coutat. Ils ont done refuse de se rendre a l'appel 
du Commdt. du poste pour les services et a l'ordre 
du gouverneur qui leur enjoignait de venir lui 
rendre compte de leur conduite. Apres trois 
sommations M. le Gouverneur a donne ordre de tout 
detruire dans cette tribu, ce qui a ete execute 
a la lettre malheureusement. 7 
Oddly enough, no official mention was made of the refusal 
of the Paak to continue the corvees, although several years 
before similar behaviour had been considered ample justificatic 
6 
Mathieu to Guillain, 24 Feb. 1870 (encl. in Guillain to Min., 
11 Mar. 1870): ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9. 
7 
Rougeyron to Procureur, 17 Jan. 1869: APO; see also 
Ameline to Procureur, 2 Jan. 1869; Lambert to Procureur, 19 
Jan. 1869: APO; Emprin, 'Notes particulieres (Bonde)', 1869: 
APM/ONC, 2e; J.Thomassin, [Report, 1869]: APM/ONC, 22. 
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for the devastation and expropriation of a partly Christian 
8 tribe. This omission suggests that even Guillain 
considered that the treatment of the workers might be thought 
excessive, and had therefore decided to play down this 
issue. After the end of the war, however, the governor 
tacitly admitted that the corvees had been a major source of 
Melanesian resentment when he consigned a detachment of 
convicts to Pwebo to continue the construction work which 
9 had begun nearly two years before. 
The Marists saw the accusations against the Paak 
and the subsequent punishment of this tribe as yet another 
manifestation of Guillain's insensate hatred of 
missionaries and Christians, and of his determination to 
drive the mission from the colony: 'Guillain ne veut pas 
de missionnaires. C'est un bon expedient qu'il a trouve 
pour s'en debarrasser'. 10 Once again the matter is 
difficult to elucidate because the evidence produced by both 
sides, especially the Marists, was interpreted in terms of 
the mission/government polemic. At this time the 
administration, warned perhaps by experience, made no attempt t1 
incWpate the Marist order or individual missionaries. 
8 
See below, p 
9 
'Arrete du Gouverneur relatif a la formation et a l'emploi 
du detachment d'ouvriers de la transportation dit d'Ouvanou' 
3 Sept. 1869: BO 1869:460-2. 
10 -
Rougeyron to Procureur, 17 Jan. 1869: APO. 
In any case, a good number of the Christians of Bonde 
11 (said to be two-thirds ), the inhabitants of the hamlets 
of Pwalu and Tande, saved themselves from proscription by 
dissociating themselves from their chief's stance and 
professing loyalty to the regime. As will be seen, the 
advantages they derived were dubious, but they at least 
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escaped the weeks of military expeditions and devastation of 
villages and gardens which the rest of the Paak, the Maluma 
and the Tea Janu had to endure. 
It seems likely that on this occasion the governor, 
unable to strike effectively at the mission, took the 
opportunity provided by the war to crush the independently 
minded tribes of the region, in order that the Melanesian 
population might be reorganized, its land holdings delimited 
and the way paved for the opening of the north to European 
1 i . 12 co on zatJ.on. Guillain certainly did not abandon his 
policy of trying to reduce the mission to subservience - the 
extension of European colonization was in a sense a means to 
achieve this end - but he concentrated on the task of 
consolidating by force the European occupation of this part of 
the colony, and of compelling the Melanesians to adopt the 
11 
Ameline to Procureur, 1 Jan. 1869; Rougeyron to Procureur, 
17 Jan. 1869: APO. 
12 
A ministerial despatch to Guillain~ February 1869 
commented on '[le] systeme q~vous entendez suivre pour 
procurer, dans de bonnes conditions de securite, de nouveaux 
espaces a la colonisation' (Min. to Guillain, 25 Feb. 1869 
[draft]: ANOM, Carton 166). 
role which he envisaged for them: 'd'aider la colonisation 
13 
europeenne par leur travail'. 
The emphasis placed after 1868 on the subjection of 
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Melanesians and the expansion of European colonization was in 
no sense a departure from Guillain's earlier policies. 
Both were essential parts of the programme which he had 
outlined on taking up office. 14 Admittedl~ another aspect 
of his initial programme, the imposition of government 
authority on the Marist mission, acquired an inflated 
importance in the years after 1864, and especially in 1867-8. 
Guillain's Melanesian and colonial policies, however, 
continued to be implemented, at times as a corollary of his 
campaign against the mission, at times independently. By 
late 1868, with relations between mission and administration 
at an impasse, the other aspects of Guillain's original plan 
of action came to the fore, as he strove to complete the 
tasks which he had set himself in 1862. His concern to 
develop and extend European colonization to some extent 
reflected pressure from powerful settler interests; but with 
fewer than 1,500 free settlers in the colony by 1869, and no 
elected legislature, or even a council with elected members, 
only those few colonists with powerful connections in France 
13 
Mathieu, speech made at Pwebo, 28 Feb. 1869: Mon., 26 June 
1869. 
14 
See above, pp.165-6. 
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could hope to bring effective pressure to bear on a governor 
whose autocratic powers were matched by his readiness to 
exercise them. Similarly his interest in the future of 
colonization hardly reflected a benevolent concern for the 
aspirations of the settler community, since in general he 
despised the colonial population: 
. A vrai dire, il n'y a pas encore d'opinion 
publique dans notre population coloniale, pas 
de lien entre les individus qui la composent 
si ce n'est le mobile capricieux d'un interet 
immediat. Son niveau moral est soumis aux 
memes oscillations et se rejoint d'ailleurs 
du grand nombre d'aventuriers et de gens tares 
qu'elle comprend. 15 
Guillain's concern tended to be based on the rather academic 
notion that European settlement had to develop if the 
colony was to prosper and if France was to receive some return 
for her outlay in acquiring and pacifying it. He regarded a 
steady increase in the number of free settlers as a vital 
corollary of a healthy colony, especially one with such a 
strong penal character. 16 
The policy of repression implemented by the governor 
in 1868-9, and his refusal to allow individual tribes to sue 
15 
Guillain to Min., 10 Sept. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166. 
16 
Guillain to Min., 30 Apr. 1863: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 
1855-64, 27 Aug. 1869: ANOM, Carton 166. 
17 for peace, convinced the missionaries that he meant to 
annihilate the rebels. It deepened a long-felt suspicion 
on the part of the Marists that Guillain's native policy 
aimed to provoke Melanesians to violent reaction in order 
that they might be crushed militarily and their lands 
confiscated in retaliation. 18 A charge of such sinister 
intent-cannot be proven, and it owes much to missionary 
readiness to attribute to Guillain the most base motives. 
It is in any case sufficiently damning to point out that 
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Guillain used the pretext provided by the revolt of the Tea 
Janu to suppress less guilty tribes and to deprive the 
people of the region of much of their freedom of action and 
most of their lands. Furthermore, as will be seen, the 
processes of reorganization and cantonnement were not applied 
with equal rigour to all tribes, but were based on criteria 
which reflected the religious affiliation of particular 
tribes. 
The first stage of the repression lasted a month. 
It included a four-day operation against the Tea Janu and 
two campaigns against the Paak and the Maluma, lasting ten 
17 
See below, p. 306. 
18 
Lambert to Procureur, 8 Dec. 1865, 19 Jan. 1869: APO; 
[Ameline], 'Journal de Pouebo', 14 Mar. 1869: AVNC; see also 
Palazzy to Procureur, 11 Apr. 1869: APO, for a rather 
hysterical suggestion that Guillain aimed to exterminate 
the Melanesian male population in order to solve the problem 
of shortage of women in the colony. Given the governor's 
preoccupation with Melanesians as a possible source of 
unskilled labour, this seems unlikely, to say the least. 
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days in all. On each occasion a number of detachments of 
French and Melanesian troops, supported by Melanesian 
auxiliaries (including the warriors of Yengen, Mwelebeng, 
Arama, Puma, Cambwen, Jawe, Mwandin, Kumak and Gomen) set 
out from different points and criss-crossed the rebels' 
territory. The insurgents were rarely seen, although a few 
people were killed at Bonde, and some female prisoners were 
taken. The troops concentrated on devastation: gardens were 
plundered and destroyed, dwellings were burned. This was 
justified as the only effective means of striking at an 
enemy who refused open confrontation and who easily melted 
away into tangled mountain terrain as soon as European troops 
penetrated into his territory: 
Il ne faut pas oublier d'ailleurs que c'est 
la perte la plus serieuse pour l'ennemi, et 
que le moyen le plus efficace pour le 
reduire est precisement cette destruction de 
ses abris et de ses ressources alimentaires 
que tend a completer chaque expedition. 19 
On 24 December 1868 a military post was established at 
Bonde, in the former main village of the Paak tribe, adjacent 
to the mission. From this base small detachments constantly 
harried the Paak and to a lesser extent the Maluma. One full-
scale battle occurred on Maluma territory when one of these 
patrols was trapped by a large contingent of warriors. The 
19 
Mon., 7 Mar. 1869. 
/ 
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soldiers managed to escape, but lost two men. According to 
the French account many Melanesians were killed, including 
a war c~ief of the Maluma. 
While the Paak and Maluma bore the brunt of 
operations, the Tea Janu had enjoyed a two month respite, 
until early in February a five-pronged assault was launched 
against them. Only one of the French columns encountered the 
rebels, and killed several, but the scorched earth policy 
was continued. In March Guillain rejected an attempt by the 
Maluma and the Paak to sue for peace, on the grounds that all 
the rebel tribes must surrender and the murderers of the 
20 
soldiers be handed over before peace could be concluded. 
Two more big expeditions, in the second of which the Paak and 
the Maluma were allowed to participate as auxiliaries of 
the French, were necessary before the Tea Janu could be 
induced to surrender on the government's terms. The French 
troops were by this stage equipped with the chassepot rifle, 
which was greatly superior to their old muzzle-loading 
carbines and muskets. But their increased firepower did not 
markedly affect the number of Melanesians killed, despite the 
20 
A precedent existed for this, as in the late 1850's a 
number of southern tribes which were at war with the French 
were refused permission to surrender until they had handed 
over the murderers of several settlers (Testard to Min., 
29 Aug. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42; du Bouzet to Saisset, 25 
Oct. 1858: ANOM, Carton 231). 
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fact that the Tea Janu must by this stage have been 
weakened by their fugitive existence and the loss of their 
21 gardens. The Tea Janu finally submitted on 14 June 1869, 
and handed over the men demanded by the government, who 
were all said to have been involved in the initial massacres. 
The prisoners were at once incarcerated at Uvanu, 
22 
on very short rations, and suffered severely from hunger. 
Their case did not came up for consideration until 
February 1870. The manner in which they were judged and the 
sentences they received differed strikingly from the trials 
and sentences of the Mwelebeng in 1867-8. The men were 
judged by administrative fiat of the governor rather than by 
court martial or in the civil courts. Guillain reasoned as 
follows: the repression and subsequent investigations had been 
protracted, and the tribe had been reduced to great misery: 
the sole proof of guilt against the prisoners was the fact 
that their own tribesmen had surrendered them as the 
perpetrators of the murders; should the case go to the courts, 
some of the accused would be sentenced to death, which would 
occasion further delay while the judgement was submitted to 
the Emperor for review (in accordance with ministerial 
instructions of September 1868). The question of delay no 
21 
Mathieu to Guillain, 4 Apr. 1869 (extract encl. in Guillain 
to Min., 9 May 1869): ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9. 
22 
[Ameline], 'Journal de Pouebo', 14 June, 17 Aug., 8 Dec. 
1869: AVNC. 
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doubt loomed large with Guillain, as he was to leave the 
colony for France within a month. But certainly of greater 
significance was his painful recollection of the 
recriminations, both public and official, which his treatment 
23 
of the Mwelebeng had provoked. Several New Caledonians 
and New Hebrideans were tried for the murder of Europeans 
24 during 1869, and all escaped the death penalty. The same 
applied to the Tea Janu. The instigators of the crime and 
those who were said to have struck the soldiers (seven men) 
were sentenced to indefinite expulsion from the colony (but 
not to imprisonment with hard labour); those who stole 
carbines or witnessed the massacre (eighteen men) received 
either one or two years' detention. 25 
One cannot help but be struck by the cold-blooded 
expediency in Guillain's approach to the administration of 
23 
Guillain, address to the Conseil d'administration, 25 Feb.1870: 
ANOM, Carton 93; 'arrete du Gouverneur expulsant de leur 
tribu les assassins de Pongouesse', 25 Feb. 1870: BO 1870:164. 
24 
'Arrete du Gouverneur pla~ant les nommes Bouma, Mindivi et 
Diopahipi en surveillance a Chepenehe (Lifou) pendant deux 
ans', 14 Jan. 1869: BO 1869: 54: these men were said to be the 
murderers of Bridon,-a convict. It was believed that the 
evidence against them would be insufficient to condemn them in 
the courts and they were judged administratively by the 
governor (Conseil d'administration, 14 Jan. 1869: ANOM, Carton 
91). 'Arrete du Gouverneur rendant ex~cutoire l'arret criminel 
rendu le 28 fevrier 1869 contre des indigenes de l'lles 
Sandwich', 15 Mar. 1869: BO 1869:144-6: two New Hebridean men 
were sentenced to hard labour for life for the murder of a 
European man and a Melanesian woman and child; a New Hebridean 
boy received twenty years imprisonment for the murder of 
Auguste Demene, Pierre's brother. 
25
'Arrete du Gouverneur expulsant de leur tribu les assassins de 
Pongouesse', 25 Feb. 1870: BO 1870:161-5. 
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justice to Melanesians in 1868 and 1869-70. The government's aim 
on the first occasion seems to have been vengeance and example. 
By 1869, however, the administration had become almost 
surreptitious in its desire to avoid adverse publicity, or 
a critical reaction in Paris. In both cases the questions of 
guilt or innocence, of motivation and justification, of the 
individuals involved, receded almost into insignificance beside 
those of how the cases might best be judged to achieve the 
desired result, what sentences were desirable or feasible, 
and what the possible effects might be. For all that, however, 
there is no doubt that to the Melanesians spared by Guillain's 
leniency in 1869-70, the question of the purity of his 
motives mattered not at all. 
The three rebel tribes - Tea Janu, Maluma and Paak -
had been decla~ed disbanded and their lands confiscated early 
in 1869. 26 On their formal surrender each tribe agreed to 
pay an indemnity to the government of 3,000-4,000 francs, to be 
remitted in hours of labour; they provided a number of boys 
and girls as hostages; fue tribes were reconstituted, were made 
subject to cantonnement, and were given a provisional right to 
27 
occupy certain lands for their current needs. In many 
26 
'Arretes du Gouverneur 
28 Feb. 1869. 
27 
, 20, 28 Feb. 1869: Mon., 21, 
E.g., 'Proces-verbal de la seance dans laquelle les 
indigenes de l'ancienne tribu des Tendianous ont fait 
soumission au Gouvernement colonial', 3 Oct. 1869: BO 1870: 
173-6. 
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wa~they received better treatment than the Bonde Christians 
who had dissociated themselves from the uprising. These 
people had been moved en masse to Pwebo, where they were 
kept virtually incommunicado for several months. They had 
been forced to give up their own territory, and were 
eventually amalgamated into the Mwelebeng tribe, but had 
still not been allocated lands at Pwebo by the time of 
Guillain's departure from the colony in March 1870. Food 
was scarce in the Mwelebeng tribe in 1869 because of the added 
demands of the refugees, and because the gardens had had 
perforce to be neglected. Great hardship ensued and there 
were frequent deaths: 'nous enterrons presque tous les jours 
28 quelqu'un'. Even after the end of the war the work of 
reorganization of the tribes and delimitation of their lands 
progressed slowly, although gardens could not be replanted 
nor villages rebuilt until this task was finished. It seemed 
to Ameline that .Mathieu deliberately postponed the 
reorganization of the Mwelebeng because they were Christian. 
The allied tribe of Cambwen was reconstituted first, then the 
war-ravaged tribes, then the allied tribe of Jawe and finally 
the Mwelebeng. The Puma do not at this stage seem to have 
been made subject to cantonnement. 
28 
[Ameline], 'Journal de Pouebo', 16 Feb., 24 Sept. 1869:AVNC. 
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Strong measures were taken to ensure the continued 
submission of the tribes of the Pwebo circonscription. It 
was divided into three districts, each dominated by one of 
the three posts of Uvanu, Ubac and Bonde. Each post was 
garrisoned by about forty men and Pons was named commandant 
f h i . . i .2 9 d d . f o t e ent re c1rconscr1pt on - an un eserve promot1on or 
one who had done so much to provoke the uprising, and of whom 
the Tea Janu chief was supposed to have said: 'que c'etait a 
lui qu'il en voulait et qu'il l'aurait tue s'il en avait eu 
30 1' occasion'. The tribes were to be strictly supervised. 
Chiefs had to report regularly to the commandant of the nearest 
post, every village was to be visited at least twice a month 
by the commandant of one of the posts, and no Melanesian could 
leave his tribe for more than a fortnight without official 
31 
authorization. Thus the system of confinement and restraint 
which was eventually extended to all New Caledonian tribes was 
born, while the rigid concept of the tribe as an administrative 
unit of the colony was formally implemented. The guidelines wer1 
set for nearly eighty years of second-class citizenship for a 
people who had every reason to conclude that the obligations 
imposed by their new nationality far outweighed the rights. 
29 
'Decision du Gouverneur fixant la composition des garnisons 
des trois circonscriptions du Nord', 3 Sept. 1869: BO 1869: 
459-60; 'decision du Gouverneur reglant les rapports-hierarchiq· 
ues des officiers commandant les trois detachments de la 
circonscription de Pouebo', 25 Nov. 1869: BO 1869:549-50. 
30 -
[Ameline], 'Journal de Pouebo', 29 June 1869: AVNC. 
31
' ~ d • 1 . . i d 
· Decision du Gouverneur p.i. iv~sant a c1rconscr1pt on e 
Pouebo en trois districts et reglant les attributions des 
Commandants de ladite circonscription et des districts', 31 Mar 
1870: BO 1870:258-61. 
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CHAPTER VII 
LEADERS 
FOUR of the previous five chapters have been concerned with 
a detailed regional study of the impact of nearly three 
decades of intensive culture contact on the peoples of north-
eastern New Caledonia. The other examined the general 
European context in which culture contact occurred, specific-
ally the relationship between colonial government and Marist 
missionaries. From the Melanesian viewpoint, culture contact 
operated in a context of dynamic traditional institutions and 
attitudes, which underwent further modification under the 
impact of contact. I have isolated two important facets of 
the traditional society: namely, the structure of authority 
and the roles of tribes and tribal chiefs; and land tenure. 
The nature and function of each was examined in Chapter I, to 
the extent that reconstruction of the institutions of a pre-
literate society is possible, when the society in question 
has long been subject to European influence and a process of 
rapid acculturation. The remaining two chapters will con-
sider both the ways in which traditional patterns affected 
culture contact and acculturation, and the way in which each 
of the two facets - the internal political organization of 
tribes, and land tenure - changed under the impact of European 
contact and as a result of distortions introduced by mission-
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aries and administrators in pursuit of their particular goals. 
The focal point of the present chapter will be the role of 
chiefs under the colonial regime. 1 
FEW Europeans in New Caledonia before 1870 came to grips with 
the question of the nature of chieftainship and its associated 
prerogatives and limitations. Even the most astute and 
sensitive observers, such as the naval surgeons Rochas, 
Vieillard and Deplanche, and the missionaries Lambert, Goujon 
and perhaps Montrouzier, either ignored or dismissed the 
important concept of fraternity. Even those few who perceived 
the familial basis of social and political organization almost 
always thought of the relationship between a chief and the 
members of a clan or tribe in European political terms. 2 A 
feudal analogy was often invoked. Thus Montrouzier spoke of 
'une vraie feodalite': 
••• les Neo-Caledoniens etaient divises 
en deux classes separees par un abime: 
les chefs et les sujets. Les chefs se 
divisent en plusieurs categories. 3 
Vieillard and Deplanche used more modern, but even less 
appropriate terminology: 'la population de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie peut se diviser en trois categories: les chefs, 
1 
On the nature and role of chieftainship in traditional New 
Caledonian society, see above, pp. 14-34. 
2 
E.g., Rochas 1862:244-5; Glaumont 1889:74; 
1900:79-82. 
3 
cf. Lambert 
Montrouzier 1860:47-8; see also Rochas 1862:244-5. 
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4 la bourgeoisie, et le peuple', Whatever the wording, how-
ever, all such descriptions tended to stress the authority 
and rights of a chief at the expense of his duties. Even 
those observers who recognized limitations to a chief's power 
interpreted them in terms of the inability of a feudal lord 
to control a fractious nobility, instead of as the obliga-
tions of an 'elder brother' towards his extended family and 
its various members. 5 
The marks of deference shown to a chief were often 
regarded by Europeans as proof of the servility and fear of 
oppressed 'subjects' towards an absolute or quasi-absolute 
ruler. They were almost always seen as marks of a chief's 
authority, rather than as the natural corollary of the respect 
and affection borne for the 'elder brother' who was the teama 
or 'great son' of a clan or tribe. 6 The following 
description by Durand of the prestige of a high chief was 
fairly accurate as far as it went, but he failed to understand 
the rationale behind actions and attitudes which to him seemed 
merely degrading: 
Maitre abso1u de ses sujets, tous s' 
inclinent devant lui; i1 a droit de vie 
4 
Viei11ard et Deplanche 1863:66; see also G1aumont 1889:74. 
5 
Montrouzier 1860:48; Rochas 1862:244-5; Viei1lard et 
Deplanche 1863:67; Patouillet 1872:134. 
6 
E.g., Erskine 1853:356; Glaumont 1889:75; 
19-20. 
see above, pp. 
et de mort. Le respect et la veneration 
pour le grand chef sent portes a leurs 
dernieres limites. Sa case est pour ainsi 
dire sacree. Ses volontes sent executees 
et ne sent jamais discutees. Les femmes 
le considerent comme un dieu. 7 
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Further confusion occurred over the extent of the power of a 
tribal chief. The authority exercised by a high chief over 
the memb€rs of his own clan was usually assumed by Europeans 
to apply to all the clans in a tribe, whereas in general 
inter-clan relationships were a matter of negotiation between 
relative equals. Similarly, the New Caledonian tribe was 
usually seen by Europeans as an immutable political entity, 
rather than as a loose association of clans bound by common 
8 
allegiance to a particular chief. 
It is, however, a mistake to claim that early 
European observers of New Caledonian society exaggerated the 
power and prestige of all tribal chiefs, or invariably 
attributed feudal or absolute authority to the institution of 
9 
chieftainship. Indeed, as long as only the Balad area was 
known, chiefly authority appeared almost non-existent, and a 
state of virtual anarchy was thought to prevail. 
D'Entrecasteaux, for instance, reported that the people 
7 
Durand to Min., 26 May 1860: ANOM, Carton 42. 
8 
'Arrete du Gouverneur declarant ••. !'existence legale de 
la tribu indigene dans !'organisation coloniale de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie', 24 Dec. 1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867; cf. above, pp. 
8-14 on the traditional attributes of clans and tribes. 
9 
As Guiart does on occasions: e.g., Guiart 1954a:22. 
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designated as chiefs seemed to exercise no police function, 
and that their authority was insufficient to maintain good 
order. He commented, with some perspicacity, that the 
respect of the tribesmen for their chiefs seemed more like 
d f h b . 10 e erence t an su serv1ence. The Marists' first impress-
ions were much the same: 
•.• ces rois sont a peu pres sans influence, 
et une des causes auxque1les il faut l'attribuer, 
est, je pense, leur trop grand nombre; il n'est 
pas de si petit hameau qui n'ait le sien. 11 
Later, experience of other areas, especially Yengen, 
modified and even reversed this view, and the European equa-
tion of chieftainship with either feudalism or absolute 
despotism became much more common. Such interpretations 
acquired general currency, even among relatively experienced 
observers, after the consolidation of the colonial regime, 
and reflected changes in the role of chieftainship which 
occurred as a result of mission and official policy. 12 Both 
10 
D'Entrecasteaux 1808, 1:349; see also Forster 1777, 11:431; 
Labillardiere 1800, 11:247; Sparrman 1953:166. Remarkably 
few European observers made the distinction between deference 
and subservience. Rochas and Goujon were two who did: Goujon, 
'Journal de l'ile des Pins', 12 Mar. 1849; Rochas 1862:243, 
245-6. 
11 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 1 Oct. 1845: APM/ONC, 26a; 
see also Laferriere 1845:106, 107 ('le chef Paiama ... a sur 
ses sujets une autorite plus morale qu'effective'; 'l'autorite 
s'y exerce d'une maniere toute patriarcale, plutot par le 
conseil que par aucun moyen de repression'); Pigeard 1846: 
104; Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 3 Sept. 1846: APM/ONC, 
Se; Leconte 1847b:825-6; Mrintrouzier to his brother, 14 Oct. 
1853: APM/Personal file (Montrouzier). 
12 
E.g., Mage, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 
cont. over page 
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the Marists and the administration sought to use chiefly 
authority to organize and control the Melanesian population -
both parties therefore treated tribal chiefs as legally-
constituted rulers, who each possessed some sort of abstract 
authority over a clearly delimited group of people, designated 
their 'subjects'. The mission attitude was important because 
of its effect in the Christian tribes, especially the 
Mwelebeng and the Kunye of the Isle of Pines, and because of 
the extent to which missionaries were able to influence the 
official viewpoint; the administration's attitude was 
obviously vital, because it was translated into the practice 
and the legislation on which the role of Melanesians in the 
colony came to be based. Thus in 1872 Jules Patouillet, who 
was generally an accurate and sensitive observer, could con-
fidently refer to Bwarat's 'vaste teritoire (sic] ou il 
d . "t - . b 1 ' 13 om~na~ en souvera~n a so u . Similarly, Ulysse de la 
Hauti~re, GuilYain's private secretary, depicted New 
Caledonians in 1863 as: 
.fid~les travailleurs, "gent taillable, 
corveable, et tuable a volonte" ..• ces 
pauvres opprimes, sans cesse soumis au 
caprice du chef, en leurs biens, leur vie, 
celle de leurs proches. 14 
12 (cont.) Dec. 
1869:28, 30, 74; 
13 
1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 
[C]olomb 1890:9. 
1867; de la Hauti~re 
Patouillet 1872:50; see also Moncelon 1885:4 (' ... tyrans 
hereditaires'); Vincent 1895:19 ('le chef de tribu a toute 
la puissance d'un roi absolu'). 
14 
De la Hauti~re 1869:29. 
319 
It is difficult to recognize these people as those whom 
Lambert, Rochas and Vieillard had known in the 1850's. The 
nature of the changes and the manner of and reasons for their 
occurrence will be the subject of the remainder of this 
chapter. 
ONCE Eur~peans began to develop continuous relationships with 
Pac i fie islanders, it became useful for them to distin-guish 
in each locality some personage who would provide protection, 
act as intermediary with the populace, and on whom respons-
ibility could be placed for a breakdown in relations. The 
obvious person to fill this role was a tribal chief: 'quand 
on a un grand-chef pour soi, on est sur tot ou tard de 
, i 1 15 reuss r • People sending representatives to New Caledonia 
usually stressed the need to placate and interest local chiefs, 
the more influential the better, in order to establish viable 
relations with the indigenous people. This applied equally 
to Sydney entrepreneurs, mission superiors, naval officers and 
16 government officials. At places like Yengen, Pwebo and the 
Isle of Pines, where the tribal group was larger than usual, 
15 
[Forestier], 'Rapport sur la Nouvelle-Caledonie en 1860 et 
1861', n.d.: APM/ONC, 19. 
16 
Towns to Silver, 15 Jan. 1847; Towns to Redmond, 16 Jan. 
1847 ('be sure you do all you can to conciliate the native 
chiefs without they are on your side you will do nothing'): 
Robert Towns, Papers, Item 56; Shineberg 1971: 151 ('I always 
make it a rule to make much of the chiefs and have always 
found myself a gainer by it'); du Petit-Thouars to Laferriere, 
20 Oct. 1843: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1843; due Bouzet to Min., 
22 June 1855: ibid., CG 1855 ('On ne reussit guere avec ces 
cont. over page 
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and the leadership of one clan unquestioned, the control 
required could be achieved by using existing chiefly authority. 
The desired effect was generally attained while it was in the 
interests of the chief, the council of elders and the tribe 
as a whole to promote peaceful dealings. At Balad, where 
tribal unity was weak, and conflicts between rival clans were 
rife, it was more difficult for Europeans to live with safety 
under the protection of a single chief, and the danger of 
antagonizing a particular clan by associating with its ene~ies 
was far more real there than at Yengen or Pwebo. 
Tardy de Montravel quite clearly recognized the 
contrast between Puma and Mwelebeng in this regard, and con-
eluded that the French would be able to dominate the entire 
Mwelebeng tribe by manipulating Bonu: 
16 (cont.) 
to Colin, 
17 
On ••• trouve [les Mouhelebe] ..• plus francs 
dans leurs allures et dans leurs relations 
que les gens de Pouma. Ils sont en m~me 
temps plus independants et plus jaloux de 
leur liberte, mais aussi plus esclaves du 
principe de soumission a l'autorite de leur 
chef. Ce trait de caractere me parte a 
penser qu'en continuant a diriger le chef 
effectif actuel, Hippolyte, dans la voie du 
progres, il sera facile d'y conduire toute sa 
tribu. Par sa toute-puissante autorite, on 
organisera, j'en suis convaincu, la population 
entiere pour le travail, avantage immense, que 
l'on ne saurait obtenir dans la tribu de Pouma, 
dont le chef n'a ni la confiance, ni l'estime 
des habitants. 17 
naturels que quand on gagne les chefs'); Rougeyron 
[April 1858]: APO. 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 25 Dec. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854; see also Montrouzier 1860:35. 
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On the other hand, de Montravel did not entirely foresee that 
the same traits which he admired in the Mwelebeng - power, 
self-confidence, unity of interest and submission to a 
prestigious chief - would render the Yengen much more formid-
able opponents to European domination than were the Puma, 
whose clan rivalries provided a useful lever and led to the 
dissipation in intra-tribal squabbles of energy which might 
have been directed against the European occupation. 
BEFORE 1853 the balance of power in contact situations 
between New Caledonians and European missionaries and traders 
lay firmly with the Melanesians, except for the few brief 
occasions on which missionaries were reinforced by the 
presence of warships or naval detachments. The only aspect 
of the contact situation over which Melanesians had no con-
trol was the high incidence of death from introduced diseases 
to which they had no immunity. 
relevant at Balad and Pwebo. 
This factor was especially 
The annexation of New Caledonia and its geographical 
dependencies by France in September 1853 did not cause an 
immediate change in relationships between Melanesians and 
Europeans, nor in the social and political role of New 
Caledonian chiefs. Yet future developments were implicit in 
the earliest actions of the colonial authorities. Annexation 
was initially proclaimed by Febvrier des Pointes at Balad and 
the Isle of Pines. At Balad the immediate and purely 
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practical aim of the French was to obtain and enforce 
unquestioning acceptance of their authority in order to safe-
guard the garrison left there. The Puma were not called 
upon to take part in the annexation ceremony, and the chiefs 
were asked neither to sign the record of proceedings nor to 
18 give formal acquiescence to the act. Annexation was a 
fait accompli, and no lip-service was at that stage paid to 
the concept of a legal cession of sovereignty by Melanesians. 
At the Isle of Pines, however, the presence of an 
English warship on a hydrographic mission led to the assiduous 
courting of the chief by the Marist missionaries and the 
French admira1. 19 The chief's mark appeared on the official 
record of annexation, which declared that: 'l'ile continuera 
a etre gouvernee par son chef qui relevera directement de 
20 l'autorite fran~aise'. The chief was promised and later 
received a monthly allowance of 125 francs, to be paid as 
21 long as he fulfilled his obligations to the Franch. This 
18 
'Proces-verbal de la prise de possession de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie et de ses dependances par M. le Contre-amiral 
Febvrier des Pointes', 24 Sept. 1853: ANOM, Carton 67. 
19 
Febvrier des Pointes to Min., 19 Oct. 1853: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1853; Tardy de Montravel to Febvrier des Pointes, 10 Jan. 
1854 (encl. in Tardy de Montravel to Min., 15 Jan. 1854): 
ANM, BB4 701; Montrouzier 1860:50. 
20 
'Proces-verbal de la prise de possession de l'ile des Pins 
par M. le C.a. Febvrier des Pointes', 29 Sept. 1853: ANOM, 
Carton 67. 
21 
'Attestation de M. le Capitaine de fregate de Bovis qu' une 
solde mensuelle de 125 fr. a ete promise au Chef de l'ile des 
cont. over page 
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clearly indicated the role envisaged for tribal chiefs under 
the colonial regime, and the French assumption that this role 
was a continuation of their traditional function in the con-
text of a newly-established superior authority. Missionary 
influence was apparent, both in encouraging the acceptance of 
French sovereignty by the chief, and in influencing the 
• 2 2 
official interpretation of his role. 
During 1854 the sovereignty of France was pro-
claimed at several places around the New Caledonian coastline. 
The chiefs of seven tribes between Balad and Numea, including 
Puma, Mwelebeng and Yengen, formally accepted French 
sovereignty and promised to protect Europeans on the territory 
of their tribes. 23 In return they were guaranteed protection 
from enemy attack and fair treatment, especially regarding 
land. The Yengen were promised that they would not be com-
24 pelled to become Christians against their will. Undoubtedly 
21 (cont.) Pins par M. le C.a. Febvrier des Pointes', 18 
Jan. 1854: ANOM, Carton 67; du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855c: 
ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; Directeur des Colonies to Min., 31 
Aug. 1855: ibid.; Min. to du Bouzet, 31 Aug. 1855: ibid. 
22 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 15 Jan. 1854: ANM, BB4 701; 
Directeur des Colonies to Min., 31 Aug. 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1855. The missionaries Goujon and Chapuy agitated strongly 
in favour of Vendegu's subsidy, and their signatures as wit-
nesses appeared on de Bovis's official declaration, see above, 
fn. 21. 
23 
E.g., 'Reconnaissance et acceptation de la souverainete de 
S.M.Napoleon Ill par Felipo Boueone, Chef de la tribu de Pouma', 
25 Jan. 1854: ANOM, Carton 67. 
24 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 
1854. 
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the positive aspects of these transactions made more impress-
ion on Melanesians than the cession of sovereignty, which was 
25 
a concept totally foreign to them. Yet the implications of 
the transfer of sovereignty, while not immediately obvious, 
were nonetheless far-reaching. The administration invested 
tribal chiefs with some of the functions of French local 
government officials. Their authority was in many ways 
potentially greater than that wielded traditionally, but so 
were the demands made upon it. According to the missionaries 
the denial to the chiefs of the right to use force deprived 
them of the one means by which they could have imposed their 
will on their 'subjects' • 26 Yet the colonial government, 
mainly for administrative convenience, tended to hold a chief 
responsible for the maintenance of order within his tribe. 
25 
E.g., Kanala was one of the first areas to which sandal-
wooders had been attracted in the 1840's, and the local people 
had been quick to use their new-found wealth and power to 
oppress their neighbours. But eventually the exhaustion of 
sandalwood supplies at Kanala had caused the traders to go 
elsewhere and the balance of power had rapidly swung against 
the people of Kanala. Thus by 1853 the chief of this tribe 
was eager to accept French sovereignty: '[il] fut done 
enchante d'accepter la souverainete de la France, dans 
l'espoir de vivre desormais en paix, et des le lendemain de 
notre arrivee, lui et ses gens etaient tout entiers a notre 
devotion' (Tardy de Montravel to Min., 8 July 1854: ANOM, 
Carton 40, CG 1854). 
In 1856 Commander Edouard Le Bris, the commandant 
superieur of the colony, commented in exasperation that 'les 
habitants semblent n'avoir qu'imparfaitement compris notre 
prise de possession' (Le Bris to Min., 7 Aug. 1856: ANOM, 
Carton 42). 
26 
Montrouzier to his brother, 14 Oct. 1853: APM/Personal file 
(Montrouzier); Tardy de Montravel to Min., 27 Apr. 1854: 
ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854. 
325 
Although its practical impact was limited before 1862, this 
process began shortly after annexation, and it became the 
basis of official policy in the 1860's. 
The transactions of 1854 implied that the European 
participants believed the Melanesian signatories to be 
competent to speak for and exact obedience from their 'sub-
jects'. This viewpoint received legal expression early in 
1854 with the promulgation of the Puma and Mwelebeng codes of 
law, after the chiefs of these tribes had formally renounced 
'les lois et coutumes du pays' . 27 The codes incorporated 
most of the social, political and moral reforms which the 
missionaries believed essential. A clause enforced obedience 
to the tribal chief and his representatives, on pairi of 
imprisonment: 
Toute desobeissance au chef de la tribu ou 
aux personnes deleguees par lui pour veiller 
a la surete publique sera puni, selon la 
gravite de la desobeissance, d'un emprisonne-
ment de trois jours a un mois avec applica-
tion aux travaux d'utilite publique. 28 
This desire to create a centralized authority reflected the 
missionaries' past experience at Balad, and their frustration 
that the prestige of the chiefs and the deference in which 
27 
E.g., 'Demande adressee par le Chef de la tribu de Pouma a M. 
Tardy de Montravel d'un Code penal (Ecriture du R.P. Montrouzier, 
de la Societe de Marie)', 7 Feb. 1854: ANOM, Carton 67; see 
above, p.74. 
28 
'Code penal de la tribu de Pouma', 9 Feb. 1854: ANOM, Carton 
6 7. 
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they were held did not provide a social control which the 
missionaries could have used to safeguard themselves and en-
force the adoption of a new way of life and a new religion. 
The Marists' immediate aim was to reinforce the authority of 
the high chiefs and the position of the Christians in each 
tribe. 
The French authorities saw the codes as a possible 
means to maintain order in these tribes with minimum expend-
iture of their limited resources. The punitive clauses had 
no sanction in tradition, however, and the chiefs, particularly 
at Balad, lacked the means and perhaps the will to enforce 
them. The refusal or inability of the administration at this 
time to intervene in the internal affairs of a tribe except in 
the case of open revolt and a complete breakdown of authority 
troubled the missionaries. They blamed the government for 
the ineffectiveness of the codes, and accused it of allowing a 
29 
reversion to savagery and anarchy. 
The rebuffs suffered by the Marists at Yengen at the 
hands of a powerful chief gave rise to an ambiguous attitude 
on their part towards chiefly authority, and affected the ways 
in which they attempted to influence government action towards 
this tribe. They advocated that the well-disposed, pro-
Christian chiefs of Ba1ad (before 1855), Pwebo and the Isle 
29 
Rougeyron to Min., 2 Aug. 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; 
see above, pp. 145-6, 150-1. 
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of Pines should become salaried officials of the regime, and 
their authority be supported by armed intervention when 
necessary: 
si ces chefs etaient gagnes a la france [sic], 
au moyen de quelques legeres retributions 
annuelles et de plus secondes dans l'occasion 
par les forces du Gouvernement, il n'est pas 
douteux que cette ile ne changeat promptement 
de face et que ce peuple ne marchat a grands 
pas dans les voies de la civilisation. 30 
On the other hand, the missionaries encouraged the government 
to curb the influence of Bwarat, whom they regarded as a 
threat both to Catholicism and to the peaceful imposition of 
French control in the north. This viewpoint dominated the 
official attitude to the Yengen until 1863. 31 
THE major implication of the actions of des Pointes and more 
particularly de Montravel was that tribal chiefs would be 
regarded as local administrative officers and intermediaries 
between the colonial government and the Melanesian population. 
This policy was not systematically applied, however, by the 
early governors and commandants of the colony. Indeed, 
between 1855 and 1862 French policy towards New Caledonian 
chiefs and the Melanesian population as a whole generally 
consisted of ad hoc solutions to particular problems. This 
resulted partly from the lack of clear and consistent 
directions from Paris, and partly from the fact that the 
30 
Rougeyron to Min., 2 Aug. 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855. 
31 
See above, p.l09. 
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resources at the disposal of the administration were so 
limited that a coherent plan of expansion and development 
could not be implemented. Several well-disposed chiefs, 
both Christian and pagan, were fostered by the government, 
and acted as military auxiliaries, guides and messengers for 
the French. They included Vendegu of the Isle of Pines, 
Titema o~ Manongwe, Gelima and Kake of Kanala, Bonu of 
Mwelebeng and Gwa of Puma. All benefited from their support 
of the French. Vendegu received his subsidy; Titema was 
paid for services rendered, he received a gift of cattle and 
a gold medal in recognition of his contribution to the cause 
of France, and his son was given some schooling at the 
colony's expense; 32 Gelima, Kake and Gwa all received medals; 
Bonu was loaned firearms which helped him to advance the 
cause of Christianity and become the most powerful chief in 
the north by 1860. With these exceptions, however, only 
limited attempts were made to use Melanesians to further the 
development of the colony, or to interest tribal chiefs in 
its future, as Tardy de Montravel had envisaged. 
The principle that chiefs were responsible for good 
order in their tribes was generally implicit in official 
attitudes and policies, but repressive measures tended to 
fall indiscriminately on entire villages or tribes. Between 
32 
BO 1853-8:44, 153, 289, 311; 1859-60:220; 
92. 
1861:220; 1862: 
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1854 and 1862 at least thirteen separate punitive expeditions 
were sent against clans or tribes accused en masse of murder, 
pillage, insubordination to the authorities, or similar 
crimes. This figure does not include the expeditions in the 
1856-9 campaign against insurgent tribes in the south, where 
the administration was best able to enforce its will. The 
southern· tribes were banished from their lands, and were not 
finally pardoned until after the death or submission of their 
chiefs. 33 Similarly, the presence of a military post at 
Balad, and the weakness and disunity of the Puma meant that 
this tribe was also subject to French authority from an early 
date. Even in these areas, however, official intervention 
in tribal affairs only occurred after the outbreak of open 
hostility towards the French, their Melanesian allies, mission-
aries or settlers. Bweon of Puma was only replaced by Gwa, 
his long-time adversary, after leading an attack on the Balad 
post. 
In most other parts of the colony, punitive expedi-
tions were no more than isolated incursions into unpacified 
33 
Testard to Min., 29 Aug. 1868: ANOM, Carton 42; 'Decision 
du Gouverneur: les tribus des Jack, Kandio, Make, Plum et 
Teaururus sont expropriees de leurs territoires respectifs. -
Il leur est defendu, sous peine de mort, de revenir sur leurs 
territoires. - Les tetes des Chefs de ces tribus sont mises a 
prix', 10 June 1859: BO 1859-60: 110-11; 'Proclamation du 
Gouverneur adressee a~ indigenes du Sud, et rendant leur 
territoire aux tribus de Jack, Kandio, Quindo et Maque', 
2 Dec. 1859: ibid., 259. 
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territory. Generally there were few casualties, as Melan-
esians refused open combat with an enemy possessing patently 
34 
superior firepower. On the other hand, there was almost 
always indiscriminate destruction of canoes and dwellings and 
35 devastation of gardens and coconut groves. On occasions, 
however, individual chiefs were singled out for reprisals. 
Following an expedition in 1862, four Wagap chiefs were 
executed as rebels, while at other times chiefs were arrested 
and exiled to Tahiti. 36 The latter category included Bwarat 
of Yengen, who was kidnapped and exiled because of the threat 
he posed to the Mwelebeng and Tuo Christians. The govern-
ment's aim in this case was less to assert French domination 
than to forestall or postpone the need to take firmer, more 
costly measures against this tribe. Subsequent interference 
34 
Three notable exceptions to this rule were an expedition of 
the Balad post against the Paak early in 1858, during which 
more than twenty Melanesians were said to have been killed 
(Testard to Min., 21 June 1858: ANOM, Carton 42); an expedi-
tion against the people of Tipinje and Konguma at about the 
same time, in which about twenty warriors were reported to have 
died (ibid.); the Yengen expedition of September 1859, when 
the French claimed forty Melanesian lives (see above, p.l23). 
35 
E.g., Le Bris to Min., 7 Aug. 1856: ANOM, Carton 42 (Wailu); 
du Bouzet to Min., 25 Aug. 1858: ANM, BB4 723 (Tipinje and 
Konguma); Mon., 8 July 1860 ('Mea'); Durand to Min., 26 
Feb. 1861: ANM, BB4 797 ('Uitoe'); Durand to Min., 30 June 
1861 (Nakety), 25 Feb. 1862 (Wagap): ANOM, Carton 42. 
36 
Du Bouzet to Min., 16 Feb. 1855: ANM, BB4 723; Le Bris to 
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by the administration in the internal affairs of the Yengen 
tribe was minimal before 1862. 
THE situation changed in several ways after Guillain's arrival 
in June 1862, as a result of his determination to lessen 
missionary influence amongst Melanesians, especially at Pwebo, 
and to implant respect for the authority of France and 
obedience to his own orders throughout the colony. Native 
policy under Guillain continued to some extent to evolve in 
response to specific situations. But the guidelines w~re 
drawn at the outset, and the methods used and the results 
attained were consistent with the aims and policies which he 
originally outlined. 
The role of chiefs under Guillain was essentially 
that envisaged by Tardy de Montravel and implicit in the 
policies of the men who had annexed New Caledonia: 
•.• la ou l'autorite n'a pas de delegues, 
les chefs de tribus ..• [etaient] naturelle-
ment responsables envers elle de ce qui se 
passe dans la localite et de !'execution des 
ordres du Gouverneur •.• 37 
Within three months of taking office the governor had called 
the chiefs of twelve pacified tribes to Port-de-France for 
the celebrations of 15 August, the great public holiday of 
th S d E . 38 e econ mp1.re. Few of these men had previously visited 
37 
Guillain, 'De la Mission Catholique en Caledonie 
1865: APM/ONC, 11. 
38 
, 6 Apr. 
The date was the anniversary of the birth of Napoleon Bonaparte. 
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the capital, and Guillain regarded their attendance as a 
demonstration of allegiance to the colonial regime, and as a 
symbol of their new role of government servants: 
••. les constituant pour ainsi dire 
fonctionnaires du Gouvernement, au lieu 
d'allies plus ou moins independants 
qu'ils etaient restes jusque-la. 39 
The governor was almost certainly too sanguine 
about the significance of what to many of the visitors must 
have been merely a gesture motivated by curiosity to see 
Port-de- France. Nonetheless, the gathering was in at least 
one respect momentous, because the chiefs present accepted 
Guillain's labour and education proposals, which were to be 
the early focal points of his battle with the Marists for 
influence over Melanesians. The chiefs agreed to send a 
number of children from each of their tribes to Port-de-
France to be trained as interpreters and tradesmen, and they 
agreed to the governor's demand for labourers for the 
40 government's public works programme. Guillain attempted 
to buy cooperation with the promise that a chief would receive a 
1 franc per month bonus for every worker supplied from his 
41 tribe. It is difficult to know to what extent individual 
39 
Mon., 24 Aug. 1862; 
ANOM, Carton 171. 
40 
Mon., 7 Sept. 1862. 
41 
see also Guillain to Min., 11 Feb.l863: 
'Decision portant que des indigenes seront engages pour 
travailler, a titre de manoeuvres, sur les chantiers du 
Gouvernement', 19 Jan. 1863: BO 1863:15-16. 
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chiefs were seduced by the bribe, but one reason for the 
unpopularity of the labour ordinance was probably the fact 
that it gave high chiefs power over their 'brothers' which 
traditionally they did not possess. Chiefs were made 
responsible for the replacement of defectors from their 
tribes, which caused resentment amongst workers and amongst 
those ch~efs whose authority over their 'subjects' was in-
sufficient to enable them to obey. A chief who refused to 
comply with the ordinance, or was unable or unwilling to 
replace deserters, brought severe chastisement upon both him-
self and his tribe. Thus the people of Yate suffered the 
devastation of their villages and gardens and the expropria-
tion of their land, while their chief, who had refused to 
42 
supply the required number of labourers, was deposed. A 
majority of the pacified chiefs cooperated, however, and 
within a year nearly two hundred workers had been provided. 43 
Gwa of Puma was the first to respond, and earned a grateful 
governor's recommendation that he be awarded a medal; Titema 
of Manongwe returned a fair dividend on the investment of his 
medal by providing the largest contingent. 44 
During 1863 Guillain negotiated the return to New 
42 
See below, pp. 375-6. 
43 
Guillain to Min., 10 Aug. 1863: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64. 
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Caledonia of the Melanesians who had been exiled to Tahiti 
by his predecessors. They included such old adversaries of 
the mission as Undo of Puma, Bwarat of Yengen and a man who 
had burned the Pwebo church in 1858. Guillain held great 
hopes for these people; he expected them to become his local 
agents in matters of tribal administration and his committed 
supporters in the campaign which he was about to launch 
against Marist influence in Melanesian affairs: 
... j'ai pu esperer ... que dans ces gracies, 
je trouverai d'utiles intermediaires et des 
auxiliaires disposes a propager mes vues de 
conciliation et de civilisation. 45 
Nor was he disappointed. According to Forestier the 
repatriates adopted a coldly pragmatic attitude to the 
mission/government conflict. They had no love for the ad-
ministration which had stolen their liberty and exiled them 
from their tribes; they had even less for the priests whom 
they believed to have conspired to bring about their banish-
ment, and against whose ideas and influence they had long 
fought: 
45 
Ces chefs ne sont pas mains hostiles au 
gouvernement qu'aux missionnaires; mais 
ils disent assez publiquement qu'ils 
profitent des dispositions du Gouverneur 
pour combattre le christianisme, et ils 
repetent unanimement que M. Guillain leur 
recommande avant tout d'empecher qu'il ne 
penetre dans leurs tribus. 46 
Guillain to Min., 10 Aug. 1863: ANOM, Carton 26 ,CG 1855-64. 
46 
[Forestier], 'Notes sur la mission de la Nouvelle-Caledonie' 
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Other chiefs, such as Kawa of Pwe, who had fought 
for years against mission influence in the north, were 
encouraged to accept French sovereignty and become active 
47 
auxiliaries of the government. By the end of the decade 
Guillain possessed a solid core of committed allies, includ-
ing Bwarat of Yengen, Mweau-Gwa of Puma (Gwa's successor), 
Gelima and Kake of Kanala, Mango of Kone, Aile of Wagap, Kawa 
of Pwe, Anle of Manongwe (Titema's son and successor), Jaot 
of Jawe and Dwima of Cambwen. Needless to say, these chiefs 
and the members of their tribes were almost without exception 
aggressively pagan or apostate. Their stance was an indica-
tion of successful adaptation to the conditions of European 
occupation, and proof that they had learned to differentiate 
the interests of various groups of Europeans, and to use 
strife between them to their own advantage. 
Chiefs benefited from cooperation with the govern-
ment, especially when they enjoyed sufficient prestige to be 
able to guarantee the acquiescence of their tribes. Guillain 
offered his supporters prestige, relative independence in 
matters internal to their tribes, opportunities for military 
action against both hereditary enemies and more recent foes, 
with the attendant attraction of rich plunder in the wake of 
expeditions. In return they had to obey, or give the 
appearance of obeying, the dictates of the government; to 
47 
Mon., 14 May,30 July 1865; Garnier 1871:263-4. 
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guarantee the cooperation of their tribes; to provide 
workers for Port-de-France and auxiliaries in expeditions 
against recalcitrant or insurgent tribes; to reject mission-
ary influence and harass Christians and Marists where 
possible. None of this was any hardship to the allied 
chiefs, and the terms of their bargain with the governor must 
have seemed extremely favourable. They were almost always 
able to carry their tribes with them, because of the obvious 
benefits which all could derive from cooperation; the chiefs 
could in any case have called on assistance from the admin-
istration in the event of serious dissension within their 
tribes. 
It therefore seems debatable whether the transition 
from independent allies to government functionaries, of which 
the Moniteur had boasted in 1862, 48 can be said to have been 
completed in the case of Guillain's pagan allies. In return 
for their military assistance and support in his anti-Marist 
campaign he found it expedient to allow them considerable 
freedom of action within their own tribes. Similarly, the 
land rights of the allied tribes generally remained intact, 
and their members were spared most of the burden of forced 
labour which during the 1860's caused such hardship for other 
pacified tribes, especially those which were subject to 
mission influence. 
48 
See above, p. 332. 
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In June 1865 Guillain promulgated the first of 
several decrees in which the role in the colony of tribes and 
tribal chiefs was defined. The decree in question regulated 
the administration of Uvea (Loyalty Islands), and divided the 
atoll into three districts based on traditional tribal 
allegiances, each district to be headed by a high chief. 49 
The trib~s were to function as local administrative units and 
their chiefs as intermediaries between the colonial govern-
ment and the local people: 
Art. 5: Chacun des grands Chefs est responsable 
de ce qui se passe dans son district, et rend 
compte au Commandant de Lifou. Il peut arreter 
tout individu qui causerait du desordre ou qui 
refuserait de lui obeir; mais il doit etre ban 
et juste avec taus et se considerer comme leur 
pere. 
The insistence on a high chief's right to absolute obedience 
from all members of a tribe, and on the paternalistic nature 
of the relationship between a tribal chief and his 'subjects' 
both rested on a complete misunderstanding of the concept of 
fraternity and the reciprocal rights and obligations of 
chiefs and tribesmen. Another clause in the same decree out-
lined the price which a high chief might have to pay for his 
enhanced authority, should he prove unable or unwilling to 
exercise it. 
Art. 8: Tout Chef qui ne ferait pas executer 
49 
'Decision du Gouverneur portant division administrative, en 
trois districts, de l'ile d'Ouvea (Loyalty)', 25 June 1865: 
BO 1865:123-4. 
les ordres du Gouverneur sera revoque de sa 
chefferie et conduit a Port-de-France, car il 
ne serait plus digne de commander. 
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The administration had always assumed,and exercised 
with increasing frequency after 1862, the right to ratify, 
appoint, punish, suspend or depose chiefs, in keeping with 
the official concept of their role. 50 Where convenient, 
traditional succession was observed when a chief was replaced, 
since the administration wanted to use customary authority to 
further its own ends, rather than destroy it and be faced with 
the need to legitimize a new chief whose position was not 
sanctioned by tradition. Thus 'Evaristo' was appointed chief 
of Mwelebeng after the deposition of his cousin Warebat in 
1867. But in some tribes, such as Puma and Wagap, the ad-
ministration took advantage of contending factions and re~ 
51 placed a dissident chief with a member of a rival clan. 
Guillain's legislation had profound implications 
for the role within the colony of New Caledonian tribes 
50 
E.g., the deposition of Bwarat of Yengen in November 1857; 
'arrete du Gouverneur pronon~ant la decheance de !'indigene 
Dame de la chefferie de Yate ..• ', 14 May 1865: BO 1863:106-8; 
'par decision du Gouverneur ... !'indigene Moin'bOu, s'etant 
mis en etat de rebellion envers l'autorite coloniale, a ete 
declare dechu de la chefferie de la tribu de Pokeureu', 4 July 
1864: Mon., 10 July 1864; 'par decision du Gouverneur •.. 
!'indigene Krio Gomb'bouha a ete nomme chef de la tribu 
d'Ounia, en remplacement de Manganaki, decede', 7 Sept. 1864: 
BO 1864:460. 
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'Arrete du Gouverneur constituant le territoire de Houagape 
et en nommant le Chef', 14 July 1866: Mon., 22 July 1866. 
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and their chiefs. The most notable general result was to 
enhance chiefly authority at the expense of other dignitaries 
in a tribe, and to lessen the importance of consultation in 
determining tribal policy. In allied, pagan tribes, however, 
the practical effects on the relationship between chiefs and 
their 'subjects' appear to have been limited before 1870. 
In most eases the decision to cooperate with the administra-
tion seems to have been taken collectively by the tribe in 
"1 52 councJ. . Certainly Bwarat enjoyed such immense prestige 
that he was said to be able to exercise almost absolute 
authority within the Yengen tribe. Comments by contemporary 
observers, however, suggest that the extent both of his 
prestige and his authority were unusual: 'il est du tres-
petit nombre des chefs actuels qui ont pu conserver de 1' 
t "t~ 1 . ' 53 au orJ. e sur eurs suJets . 
Although the government had expressed clear inten-
tions with regard to the function of tribes and their chiefs, 
by 1870 the most notable changes in the leadership patterns 
and the political, social and economic organization of New 
Caledonian tribes had occurred in places where missionary 
influence had long been accepted, and largely as a result of 
that influence. The most striking examples were on the Isle 
52 
Mon., 7 Sept. 1862. 
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of Pines and at Pwebo. The Isle of Pines chief Vendegu, 
who died in 1855, had for several years previously been well-
disposed towards the missionaries, but had resisted conversion 
to Christianity. Like chiefs in other areas, including 
several at Balad and Pwebo, he refused to renounce polygamy 
54 because of the loss of face involved, and he could not 
ignore t~e opinion of the tribal elders, who jealously 
guarded their own influence against the threat posed by the 
missionaries' insistence on monogamy and encouragement of 
55 
chiefly absolutism. On his deathbed, however, Vendegu was 
converted to monogamy and Christianity, and designated as his 
successor a small daughter by his chosen wife, to the 
exclusion of sons by other wives. He entrusted the child to 
the missionaries' protection, and nominated a 'regent' to run 
the tribe. 56 The Marists educated the child and insisted 
that she be referred to as 'queen'. The intrusion of a 
54 
Du Bouzet to Min., 22 June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; 
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Goujon, 'Journal de l'ile des Pins', 15 Sept. 1854 ('Ils 
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separer'); Durand to Min., 26 May 1860: ANOM, Carton 42. 
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female into the chiefly succession was, in a male-dominated 
society, a sacrilege which could not be tolerated by the 
displaced male heirs or by the elders. The young 'queen' 
1 d b F h i . 57 was on y confirme in her position y renc ntervent1on. 
In the middle of 1856 an expedition was sent to the Isle of 
Pines to punish several chiefs whom the missionaries had 
accused pf opposition to the 'queen'. Forty soldiers landed 
and burned a village, but there was no resistance and the 
only casualty was a chief who tried to escape from custody 
and was killed. Another chief was exiled to Tahiti. 58 The 
traditionalists gradually and unwillingly bowed to the 
superior power on which the missionaries, in the name of the 
'queen', could call, and by the end of 1861 the whole island 
was Christian, and its population generally subservient to 
the 'queen's' advisers, who accepted missionary direction in 
59 both spiritual and temporal matters. After 1862 the Pines 
people and their missionaries were harassed by Guillain and 
his aides, and were made to bear much of the burden of forced 
labour at Port-de-France. In general, however, they fared 
57 
Vieillard et Deplanche 1863:68-9; Glaumont 1889:75. 
58 
Le Bris to Min., 7 Aug. 1856: ANOM, Carton 42. 
59 
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better under Guillain than did the Mwelebeng: perhaps because 
of their relative isolation on a wholly Christian island; 
perhaps because the missionaries stationed there were less 
recalcitrant than Villard; perhaps because the important corn-
plication of European settlers was lacking on the Isle of 
Pines. 60 
At Pwebo, the victories achieved over a pagan 
coalition by Bonu's mission-drilled troops enabled that chief 
to consolidate his authority over the Mwelebeng at the expense 
of Warebat, the 'first' chief. Neighbouring clans and small 
tribes, over which the Tinjin chiefs had traditionally enjoyed 
only nominal suzerainty, were forced into the Mwelebeng tribe 
and became subject to Bonu's, and by extension the mission-
aries' orders. The entire tribe was organized under Bonu's 
authority to produce such commodities as coconut oil and 
beche-de-mer. Most of the proceeds were used in a common 
fund to finance church-building and other projects which the 
Marists believed to be of benefit to the community. 61 
There can be no doubt that the Marists regarded the 
customary limitations on chiefly absolutism, and the 
60 
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flexibility and equality of the traditional relationships 
between the various clans in a tribe as serious drawbacks to 
the effective implantation of the European ideal of Christian 
civilization. Nor is there any doubt that they deliberately 
encouraged well-disposed chiefs to acquire autocratic control 
within their tribes. In 1866 Rougeyron explained this 
policy qpite plainly: 
Le Missionnaire n'est-il pas ... interesse a 
soutenir le Chef? C'est une force qu'il doit 
menager et dont il doit se servir pour le 
bien. La Mission l'a compris, aussi dans 
toutes ses stations s' est-elle etudiee a le 
relever. Au reste, c'etait son devoir; car 
apres avoir dit aux naturels: "Rendez a Dieu 
ce qui est a Dieu, elle devait ajouter rendez 
a Cesar ce qui est a Cesar". 62 
. In the same letter Rougeyron implied that high chiefs 
possessed absolute authority in the tribal context. This 
directly contradicted numerous complaints which he and his 
confreres had made in the past about the 'anarchy' which 
traditionally prevailed in New Caledonian tribes. The 
contradiction seems to have resulted from the fact that it 
was currently in the missionaries' interest to exaggerate 
the extent of chiefly authority, in order to refute Guillain's 
accusation that they had usurped the power of chiefs in 
Christian tribes: 
62 
Quant aux chefs, est-il bien vrai que nous 
les annihilons, en absorbant leurs pouvoirs? 
Rougeyron to Guillain, 1 May 1866: APM/ONC, 11. 
Pour peu que l'on connaisse le prestige qui 
les environne et !'ascendant qu'ils exercent 
dans leurs tribus; ne doit-on pas regarder 
toute tentative d'absorption, comme peu 
34 4 
adroite, impossible a realiser par le 
Missionnaire, compromettante pour son oeuvre. 63 
Within two years, however, the attempts of the administration 
to blame the events of October 1867 on an all-powerful 
Christian chief had caused Rougeyron, for reasons of ex-
pediency: to revert to the earlier interpretation: 
..• notre experience de vingt et quelques 
annees parmi les indigenes, nous apprend au-
contraire que souvent les petits chefs de 
villages s'arrogent et exercent a l'egard de 
leur sujets le droit de vie et de mort, a 
l'insu de leur grand chef. 64 
Ironically, at the hearing before the Tribunal 
criminel de Noumea in December 1867, the centralized system 
of tribal administration which had developed at Pwebo under 
Marist auspices was repeatedly described by the enemies of 
the mission as the embodiment of the traditional structure 
of authority in New Caledonian tribes. The intention of 
most of the European participants in the trial was to 
establish the responsibility of the Tinjin chiefs for the 
attacks, with or without missionary provocation, and to 
assert the principle that an entire tribe should be made to 
indemnify the victims of the belligerence of its individual 
members. 
63 
Ibid. 
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This had important ramifications in two directions: 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 4 Feb. 1868: APM/ONC, 22. 
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on the role of a tribe and the structure of authority within 
it under the colonial regime; on the extent to which the 
administration would admit the concept of individual owner-
ship of resources, especially land, by Melanesians. The 
first of these questions is elaborated here; the second is 
the subject of separate treatment in the following chapter. 
The actual perpetrators of the attacks at Pwebo 
were depicted at the hearing as helpless pawns, who had only 
obeyed the orders of dreaded, autocratic chiefs, 'Martin' 
and 'Pierre', who were themselve~ the mere instruments of 
Warebat and his advisers. Warebat's crime was reviled as 
particularly heinous and treacherous, because he had been 
one of the first New Caledonian chiefs to accept French 
sovereignty and pledge his authority to the maintenance of 
order within the Mwelebeng tribe. In return, he had been 
granted the code of laws, which confirmed his authority over 
his 'subjects' and gave him the means to enforce it. 65 
Hence, it was said, he must indubitably have known of the 
plot, even had he not actually provoked it. The concept of 
the absolute authority of chiefs was frequently invoked by 
the various counsel as the basis of the internal organization 
of a tribe: 
65 
Mage, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867. 
Les indigenes, vous le savez, sont groupes 
par tribus a la tete desquelles est place un 
grand chef dont la puissance est absolue .... 
rien d'importance ne se fait en dehors de 1' 
initiative de ce dernier ou au mains sans son 
autorisation. 66 
The events at Pwebo were depicted as a reversion to a 
barbaric custom whereby the person chosen to carry out a 
346 
chief's orders could disobey only at the cost of his own life: 
L'autorite des chefs dans les tribus est tres-
grande, rarement leurs ordres sont meconnus 
par leurs subalternes, alors surtout qu'en 
exprimant leur volonte, ils fournissent en 
meme temps !'instrument qui doit servir a 1' 
execution et qui ne saurait leur etre rendu 
qu'apres le fait accompli. 67 
These descriptions, despite their exaggeration and errors, 
reflected the centralized system of administration which the 
missionaries had helped develop at Pwebo in order to 
facilitate their work. The descriptions also reflected the 
belief in an hierarchical structure of authority within 
tribes which was implicit in the actions and policies of 
Febvrier des Pointes and Tardy de Montravel, and which 
Guillain had previously legislated into existence in some 
tribes. The fact that such a system was claimed to exist 
was of greater relevance for future developments than the 
accuracy of the description in traditional terms. 
66 
Le Boucher, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 
28 Dec. 1867: Mon., 5 Jan. 1868. 
67 
'Acte d'accusation', Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 12 Dec. 
1867: Mon. ,15 Dec. 186J,; 
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THE administrative system which the missionaries and a Christ-
ian chief had formulated at Pwebo was subsequently applied to 
all the pacified tribes by gubernatorial decree, and became 
the pattern for the reorganization of the north-eastern 
tribes between 1868 and 1870. While the trial of the Pwebo 
suspects was still in progress, Guillain promulgated a decree 
which co~firmed the legal existence of the tribe in the 
administrative hierarchy of the colony, and the role of 
chiefs within it: 
a sa tete se trouve un grand chef, a qui 
sont adjoints des chefs de village et des 
conseillers, qui'il choisit parmi les plus 
influents: tous ayant pour mission de 
veiller au bien general de la communaute; d' 
empecher au moyen de l'autorite dont ils 
disposent et, au besoin, de l'appui des 
commandants de circonscription, que nul ne 
soit atteint dans sa personne ou dans ses 
biens. 68 
As suggested earlier, the implications of these 
developments for Melanesians were profound, although not al-
ways apparent by 1870, especially in tribes on which the 
administration relied for support. The 'tribe', a rigid 
administrative grouping with a clearly defined place and role 
in the colony's hierarchy of governing bodies, supplanted as 
the main organizational unit of Melanesian society the clan 
or the traditionally loose grouping of clans which may be 
68 
'Arrete du Gouverneur declarant, par voie d'interpretation 
des actes legislatifs anterieurs, l'existence legale de la 
tribu indigene dans l'organisation coloniale de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie', 24 Dec. 1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867. 
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referred to as a tribe. Furthermore, the 'tribe' under the 
colonial regime was subdivided into 'villages', which bore no 
necessary relationship to customary clan allegiances or settle-
ment patterns. The clan, whose organic connection with the 
past generations through the medium of the ancestral lands had 
provided the focus of a person's existence, retained the 
affection a~d allegiance of most New Caledonians, and the clan 
chief remained the object of his brothers' 'tres respectueuse 
affection fraternelle'. 69 But the colonial administration's 
stress on the tribe as the formal local government unit of the 
Melanesian people caused the clan to lose much of its practical 
raison d'etre, a situation reinforced by the frequent dis-
appearance of the necessary physical link between a clan and 
70 its ancestral lands, in the wake of the cantonnement of tribes. 
By assigning the internal administration of pacified 
tribes to well-disposed chiefs, and by supporting their authority 
with force if necessary, the administration simultaneously in-
validated traditional sanctions against the abuse of authority, 
and deprived the members of a tribe of the right to exercise 
them. The position of high chief was institutionalized as part 
of the administrative hierarchy of the colony, and, despite the 
provision in the 1867 decree for a council of notables, the 
importance of consensus in the internal decision-making process 
69 
Leenhardt 1937:149. 
70 
See below, pp. 393-4. 
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of many tribes declined. Furthermore, the importance of the 
fraternal relationship between a chief and the members of a 
clan or tribe was ignored by Europeans, to such an extent that 
the term for 'brother' in the various New Caledonian languages 
came to mean 'subject'. 71 In the short-term, much of the 
traditional complexity and flexibility of clan and tribal 
organization was lost, and a rigidly legalistic interpretation 
of the structure of authority became possible. From the 1860's 
Europeans, especially settlers, frequently complained that the 
excessive influence of tribal chiefs ('l'autocratie de ces 
tyrans hereditaires' 72 ) was a prime reason for the failure of 
attempts to assimilate Melanesians or to reconcile them to the 
role for which they were intended in the colony. Thus in 1868 
Mathieu explained that: 
.•• !'experience nous revele que, partout ou 
la surveillance de !'Administration ne peut 
s'exercer, les indigenes sont livres a 
l'arbitraire du chef dont la domination 
materielle et morale est une cause de retard 
dans leurs progres en tout genre. 73 
Ironically, however, this comment appearecr in a report which, 
71 
Maurice Leenhardt explained this paradox in his vocabulary of 
the language of Wailu. Under 'Kamosari - La personne de la 
generation cadette', he remarked: 
72 
L'idee de sujet n'est pas degagee - "Si je parle ma 
langue, je dis 'mes freres', si je parle fran~ais, je 
dis 'mes sujets'" (chef Henri Naiseline, de Mare, 
parlant en fran~ais, et deplorant cette traduction en 
usage et inadequate). Mod.: Sujet, serviteur, 
domestique (Leenhardt 1935:131). 
Moncelon 1885:3,4. 
73 
A. Mathieu, 'Rapport ... relativement a la constitution de la 
cont. over page 
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by its reinterpretation of customary land tenure, was itself a 
k . h 1 d . h" fl b 1 . 74 ey stage 1n t e conso i at1on of c 1e y a so ut1sm. Thus 
the concept of the 'subservience' of New Caledonians to 
tyrannical chiefs, which Europeans deplored, resulted both from 
a misunderstanding of customary relationships between a chief 
and his 'brothers', and from the changes which actually came 
about in this relationship as a result of missionary influence 
and government legislation. 
Eventually, however, a new complexity evolved as a 
result of the deposition of dissident or ineffectual chiefs, and 
the voluntary abdication of others who preferred to avoid the 
pressures and responsibility of their new position. Real 
authority was not always exercised by official nominees, who 
were sometimes little more than figureheads, acting as inter-
mediaries and buffers between the administration and the 
customary leadership of a tribe. For instance, Patouillet 
described how, as early as the 1860's, some chiefs had ceded the 
appearance of power to 'brothers' who understood French, in order 
that they should not be at the mercy of government interpreters, 
who were often unscrupulous, and who were frequently members of 
enemy tribes. 75 A former chief always continued to receive the 
73 (cont.) propriete territoriale indigene', 22 Jan. 1868: 
Mon., 26 Jan. 1868. 
74 
See below, pp. 383-5. 
75 
Patouillet 1872:130-1. E.g., a pagan interpreter attached to 
the Pwebo post boasted in 1866 that he had misled the governor 
during Bonu's interrogation and thereby brought about the chief's 
cont. over page 
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deference due to his position, and his voice sometimes carried 
great weight in the councils of a tribe: 
Des chefs ant mal rempli leur role; !'admin-
istration leur a ote le titre de chef et les a 
remplaces par des Canaques, petits chefs ou 
sujets. Les chefs depossedes n'en ant pas 
mains garde leur influence; ils ne portent pas 
d'uniforme, mais ils gouvernent. 76 
The new complexity has become more relevant since 
the Second World War, with the relaxation of paternalistic con-
trols on Melanesians. The council of elders has again come to 
play an important role in the internal affairs of the New 
Caledonian tribe. In many areas today, including the 
municipality of Pouebo, a clear distinction is drawn between 
the position and influence of local government officials, such 
as the mayor, and the customary tribal leadership. In commun-
ity matters the latter is almost always supreme. The position 
of Melanesians in present-day New Caledonian society, and the 
current problems which they face have obviously been shaped by 
events since 1870. But the working out before that date of 
European attitudes on the Melanesians' role in the colony, and 
of official policies for their supervision and control by a 
transformed traditional leadership, provided the foundation for 
future developments. 
75 (cont.) exile (Villard to Rougeyron, 25 June 1866: APM/ 
ONC, 25; Lambert to Rougeyron, 23 July 1866: ibid., 20). 
76 
Vincent 1895:22; 
[1917]: 37, 77. 
see also Rochas 1862:178, 243; Sarasin 
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CHAPTER VIII 
LAND 
THE question of land tenure is the most important single 
issue in the history of the impact of European government 
and colonization on the indigenous people of New Caledonia. 
It is a history of European disregard for, or at best 
reinterpretation of traditional land rights, balanced 
against an official desire to extend to Melanesians at least 
an appearance of justice, in regard to land claims. By 1870, 
however, such justice in the pacified regions, was largely 
determined by the need to delimit Melanesian land holdings 
clearly and efficiently, so as to free the largest possible 
area of good land for European colonization, both free and 
penal. The legal and administrative framework for the 
delimitation and dispositionof land which had developed by 
1870, and almost the whole spectrum of European assumptions 
on the extent and validity of Melanesian land rights were 
based to a greater or lesser extent on misconceptions about 
the nature of customary tenure. Furthermore, the legacy of 
the years before 1870, both in terms of attitudes and 
policies, formed the basic model for the practices and 
prejudices of later decades. Only in the years since World 
War II have Melanesians been able to escape from the 
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strait-jacket imposed by the policy of cantonnement, and the 
European assumptions on the nature of traditional land 
tenure which underlay it. Even today, tensions over land 
rights are acute in some reserves, while the pattern of 
Melanesian settlement and the mode of land holding still 
bear the imprint of policies applied before 1900, policies 
whose o!igins can be traced to the pre-1870 period. It is 
therefore essential for an understanding of later 
developments, as well as intrinsically important to this 
study, to examine the interaction before 1870 of the various 
Melanesian and European attitudes to the land question, and 
the policies of successive colonial administrators, 
culminating in Guillain's legislation of 1867-70, which laid 
the legal guidelines for the future. The unifying theme of 
this chapter is the impact and effect on the clans and 
tribes of north-eastern New Caledonia of colonial land 
legislation and the motives and opinions which lay behind it. 
THE possibility of adapting traditional land tenure to the 
colonial situation was complicated by the existence of a 
dual system of property rights, which effectively encompassed 
most of the land area of the archipelago, and which 
differentiated land ownership from usufructuary rights, to say 
nothing of hunting, fishing and water rights. 1 
1 
See above, pp.22-3; the best analyses of traditional land 
tenure are to be found in Lambert 1900:82-9; Salmon n.d.; 
Saussol 1971:227-30. 
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Proprietary rights, generally inalienable, were 
in theory vested in the clan which first settled a 
particular tract of land, but in practice they were based 
on possession, whether derived from presumed first occupancy, 
conquest, or cession by the master of the soil to outsiders 
who were absorbed into the clan. As 'great son' of a clan 
its chief administered but did not 'own' the clearly-
defined tract of land which formed the clan's patrimony, and 
which symbolized the organic connection between the 
ancestors and the present generation. The profound 
psychological attachment of New Caledonians to the lands 
which contained the physical remains and spiritual presence 
of their ancestors was explained by a Melanesian priest: 
..• pour les aborigenes la terre est un Etre 
Vi vant et dans certain .cas [sic J , elle est me me 
"divinisee", car elle parte dans son sein le 
corps et 1 esprit des ancetres. 2 
Usufructuary rights, however, belonged to the individual who 
cleared the land, and were bequeathed to his direct lineage. 
Use rights to land, trees, waterways, fishing and hunting 
grounds could be, transferred, with the approval of the clan 
chief, and the products of the soil became the property of 
the cultivator, w~o usually acknowledged his debt by a gift 
of yams. Transfers of use rights, however, did not affect the 
proprietary right of the possessor clan. The uncleared land 
2 
Anova-Ataba 1969:207; see also Bourgey 1865:183. 
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which surrounded a clan's gardens belonged to the community, 
whose members could hunt and gather there without restriction, 
unless an individual member acquired use rights to a 
portion by clearing and cultivating it. 
Thus traditionally the only land which was not 
individually owned was the uncleared and generally less 
fertile· part of a clan's territory, and this alone could be 
ceded by the chief and the council of elders without the 
3 
agreement of a usufructuary. All except the most 
inaccessible and sterile parts of the archipelago were 
therefore specifically owned; much was the uncleared, communal 
land of particular clans, but fertile agricultural land was 
almost always the dual property of the individuals in whom 
usufructuary rights were vested, and the proprietor clan. 
Under the colonial regime the dual system of land tenure 
resulted in two main areas of mutual misunderstanding and 
recriminations: namely, over the possibility of alienation 
of proprietary rights (the European concept of 'sale'), and 
the role of individual ownership of land. In both cases by 
1870 the subtleties of the traditional polity had been 
legislated out of existence, and replaced by paternalistic 
controls which effectively left Melanesian destinies in the 
hands of the colonial administration and, at the lowest 
level of devolution of authority, of tribal chiefs. This 
3 
Salmon n.d. 
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chapter will look mainly at the way in which European 
misconceptions affected official policy, and at the 
effects of official policy on Melanesian land holdings. 
Before 1860 misunderstanding centred on the implications of 
transfers of land by Melanesians. After this date the 
main issue was the reinterpretation of the nature of 
Melanesian land tenure which resulted from colonial 
legislation. 
SOME of the earliest European descriptions of New Caledonian 
land tenure were surprisingly accurate, at least in general 
outline. In 1846 Rougeyron, whose experience at that stage 
was mostly limited to Balad, explained that the tribe's land 
did not belong to the chiefs, although they received 'une 
espece de tribut' (the right of the first yams 4 ), and that 
individual ownership of land was firmly established. 5 Captain 
Fran~ois Leconte, who owed his information mainly to 
missionary informants, elaborated on this description: 
Les Nouveaux-Caledoniens possedent chacun 
autant de terrain qu'ils en peuvent cultiver, 
et le chef du village dispose du reste, s'il 
le juge convenable. 6 
Both these accounts alleged the possibility of sale of land, 
but they also stressed the need for a prospective purchaser 
4 
See above, p.24. 
5 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 3 Sept. 1846: APM/ONC, Se. 
6 
Leconte 1847b:827. 
357 
to disinterest both the appropriate chiefs and the actual 
proprietors; A copy of the bill of sale for the main mission 
property at Bayup is still extant. 7 It listed twenty-three 
vendors including several chiefs, who all agreed, according 
to the document, to full and entire cession of the land in 
question. It ~s probable, however, that what the Europeans 
interpreted as sale, represented to the Melanesians a 
transfer of usufructuary rather than proprietary rights. 
The transaction may well have symbolized the adoption of 
the missionaries into the clan or tribe involved, which would 
have entailed hereditary usufructuary rights, but in neither 
case would existing proprietary rights have been alienated. 
In all some 200 hectares (500 acres) were 
'purchased' by the mission at Balad in return for a large 
quantity of trade goods, and during 1845 and 1846 Douarre 
also 'bought' large properties at Pwebo and Yengen. Although 
the Puma and the Mwelebeng forced the missionaries to leave 
their tribes in 1847, the Marists' continuing right to the 
land obtained at Balad and Pwebo does not seem to have been 
questioned. Similarly, the Yengen scrupulously recognized 
the cession they had made, although they consistently refused 
to accept the Marists' spiritual message. 
7 
Bill of Sale, 1 Oct. 1846 (copy encl. in fForestier], 
'Proprietes et biens de la Mission de la Nouvelle-Caledonie', 
18 May 1860): APM/ONC, 3. 
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Thus the transactions by which the missionaries 
acquired land in these three tribes seem to have been 
mutually satisfactory to the parties concerned. The same 
cannot be said of the land on which the mission stations of 
Conception and St-Louis, near Port-de-France, were later 
established. Resentment over the loss of these lands was 
crucial in provoking the tribes of the region to armed 
resistance against the mission and the French in 1856-7. 8 
The conflict arose because the land in que-stion was not 
acquired by the mission as a result of free and direct 
negotiation between the Marists and the Melanesian 
proprietors, but was granted by the colonial administration 
in total disregard of the claim of the previous owners. The 
official attitudes which underlay this and similar actions 
are central to an understanding of French land policy in 
New Caledonia before 1870. 
THE formulation of an official policy towards Melanesian land 
rights was begun by du Bouzet in 1855. Du Bouzet's appreciation 
of the nature of traditional tenure was in many ways quite 
accurate. He recognized a division between individual, 
joint and common ownership, and stressed the limitations on 
chiefly authority over land: 
8 
Forget to Min., 15 June 1860: Collection Margry; [Foucher] 
1890:10. 
Les chefs ont la pretention d'etre possesseurs 
du sol, mais ce droit ne leur est pas 
toujours reconnu. La propriete personnelle, 
comme la propriete indivise, sont tres-definies; 
il faut !'intervention des interesses pour qu'on 
puisse l'aliener .... il n'y avait pas un 
cocotier qui n'eut son possesseur .... Quant aux 
terres communes, ce sont les forets, les terres 
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non habitees et non cultivees. 9 
But du Bouzet made two assumptions regarding Melanesian 
land rights, which were of great significance for future 
policy. In the first place he did not regard the existence 
of clearly defined individual property rights as a serious 
impediment to colonization: 
Je ne crois pas .•. que tout cela nous 
empeche de nous procurer a tres-bas prix 
les terrains propres ala culture, et deja 
cultives, dont nous aurons besoin. 10 
In making this assumption he either underestimated or 
disregarded, as did most Europeans, the passionate attachment 
of New Caledonians to their garden lands, the patrimony of 
their clan, the source of life, and the symbol of the link 
between past and present generations, forever reiterated by 
11 the life cycle of the yam. Second, he stressed that at any 
one time Melanesians actually cultivated only small areas of 
land. He thus distinguished between cultivated, or 'occupied' 
9 
Du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855b: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; 
see also du Bouzet to Min., 20 June 1855: ibid. 
10 
Ibid. 
11 
Lambert 1900:86-9; Metais 1953a:114-5. 
lands, which were to be regarded as Melanesian property, 
and communally-owned lands, forests, abandoned and 
uncultivated areas, which 'pourrant etre considerees comme 
appartenant au domaine'. Thus basically he recognized no 
Melanesian rights to any except garden lands which were 
currently under cultivation. 12 In the light of this 
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presumption he proclaimed in January 1855 that all 'unoccupied' 
lands, torests, construction wood and potential mines were 
part of the government domain. 13 
bulk in 
The concept of the 'unoccupied' lands, by far the 
14 
area of the new colony, stemmed in part from the 
rotational system of traditional crop production, which 
resulted in large areas of fallow ground and apparently 
15 
unused gardens. Many Europeans surmised that these were 
the traces of a dense population which had formerly occupied 
12 
Du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855b: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855. 
13 
'Declaration ..• relative a la propriete et a !'alienation 
des terres en Nouvelle-Caledonie et dependances', 20 Jan. 
1855: ANOM, Carton 67. 
14 
In answer to the Minister's question: 'Quelle peut etre 
l'etendue des terres dont on peut disposer sans etre oblige 
de les acheter?' du Bouzet replied: 'Elle est inconnue, mais 
elle est grande, surtout dans le Sud et dans l'Ouest, parties 
qui sont fort peu habitees' (du Bouzet to Min., 15 Mar. 1855: 
ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855). 
15 
Saussol 1971:228. 
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the archipelago and later suffered a drastic numerical 
decline. 16 Hence the area used (and therefore needed, 
according to the utilitarian criterion applied) by the 
present inhabitants was generally thought to be much less 
than it actually was. This misconception led to bitter 
Melanesian resentment, because it was de facto a pretext for 
expropriation, generally without indemnity, of vast areas 
of garden land, while its application upset the tenor of 
customary land use, and destroyed the balance which had 
existed between men and the soil. 
Nonetheless, du Bouzet seems to have been genuinely 
concerned that Melanesians should be treated justly by their 
new masters. His letters, including those written before he 
left France, reiterated the high-minded, if naive conviction 
that the colony would prosper in a climate of racial harmony 
if Melanesians were treated with what he saw as scrupulous 
fairness, especially in the matter of land and payment for 
services rendered: 
16 
Woodin 1852:325; du Bouzet to Min., 20 June 1855: ANOM, 
Carton 40, CG 1855; du Bouzet to Le Bris, 4 Mar. 1856 
(encl. in du Bouzet to Min., 12 June 1856): ANOM, Carton 
40, CG 1856; Montrouzier 1860:13-14; Moncelon 1887:97-8; 
Glaumont 1889:91, 113. Cf. Lambert 1900:85: 'il est 
important de ne pas confondre les biens incultes avec les 
biens vacants. Tout ce qui est plaine ou cultivable a 
ordinairement un propnetaire'. 
Au debut de notre etablisseme~t a la 
Nouvelle-Caledonie il me parait necessaire 
de nous concilier la population indigene en 
respectant le droit de propriete la ou nous 
etablirons, en gagnant les chefs par des 
presents et en remunerant taus les services 
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qui nous seront rendus par les naturels. 17 
His edicts of 10 April 1855 and 1 June 1857 guaranteed that 
one-tenth of the rural land available for sale to colonists 
would be reserved for Melanesian use, affirmed the 
inalienability, except to the government, of the reserved 
I~ 
and the occupied lands, annulled all transfers of land to non-
Melanesians which had occurred before annexation, 18 and 
declared that settlers could buy or lease land only from 
the administration. 19 New Caledonians were never again to 
receive such generous treatment in respect of their land 
17 
Du Bouzet to Min., 28 Mar. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; 
see also du Bouzet to Min., 20 June 1855: ibid.: ' ... nous 
serons obliges d'user de grands menagements quand nous aurons 
besoin de no us approprier ces terres [i.e., the "unoccupied " 
lands]'. 
18 
This included the properties claimed by the mission, some 
of which had been acknowledged by Febvrier des Pointes in 
November 1853 (APM/ONC, 3). After investigation by a commission 
appointed by the governor, the mission's right to properties 
on the Isle of Pines and at Conception and Saint-Louis was 
recognized, as were those of two Englishmen, James Paddon and 
William Underwood, who had settled in New Caledonia before 
annexation ('Arretes du Gouverneur ••• ', 30 Mar., 23 Apr. 1855: 
ANOM, Carton 68; 15 Dec. 1857: ANOM, Carton 69). The mission's 
title to its other properties, however, remained in dispute until 
after Guillain's departure from the colony (see above, p.226). 
The large properties at Conception and Saint-Louis were free 
grants under fairly onerous conditions, which had later to be 
modified as unrealistic. The same applied to several large 
grants made to settlers. 
19 
'Decision portant reglement sur les concessions de terres en 
Nouvelle-Caledonie', 10 Apr. 1855:ANOM, Carton 68; 'decision 
reg1ementant les concessions de terre', 1 June 1856: ANOM, 
Carton 69. 
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claims, as by the late 1860's du Bouzet's distinction 
between occupied territory and the reserved portion of the 
domain had been conveniently mislaid. His measure was by 
then interpreted as having guaranteed Melanesians one-tenth 
20 
of all land in the colony, and had inany case been 
superseded by later legislation which promised them only the 
land 'reconnus necessaires' 21 for their needs. 
Even during du Bouzet's term of office, however, his 
policy did not in general achieve its aim of reconciling the 
indigenous population to the new regime, because what seemed 
like justice to him seemed anything but to Melanesians. The 
main sources of friction have already been outlined. Du 
Bouzet believed that New Caledonians would sell their lands 
for a pittance. His reasoning had both humanitarian and 
utilitarian consequences: direct purchase of land by settlers 
from Melanesians was forbidden in order to prevent the latter 
from squandering their birthright, and to keep control of 
European settlement and a lucrative source of revenue in the 
22 hands of the government; moreover, it was believed that all 
land claims outside the occupied and reserved territory 
20 
A. Mathieu, 'Rapport ... relativement a la constitution 
de la propriete territoriale indigene', 22 Jan. 1868: Mon., 
26 Jan. 1868. 
21 
'Arrete du Gouverneur portant reglement sur les concessions 
de terre en Nouvelle-Caledonie', 1 Oct. 1859: BO 1859-60: 
181-92. 
22 
Du Bouzet to Min., 20 June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855. 
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would be easily and cheaply dispensed with. 23 Inevitably 
the utilitarian aspects of the argument had most appeal for 
24 land hungry potential colonists. Unfortunately for the 
French, du Bouzet's original premise was false, since what 
25 he and Europeans in general regarded as cheap sale, 
Melanesians considered to be the transfer of short-term 
usufructuary rights. Thus in 1856 Le Bris bemoaned the 
obtuseness of a chief who did not seem to realize that in 
accepting goods in exchange for land, he had renounced fue 
right of continued occupancy: 
J'ai eu dernierement !'occasion de faire une 
concession de terrain ruraux pour fonder une 
habitation sucriere a M~ Berard ... J'ai ete 
moi-meme presider a son etablissement, je 
crois avoir a peu pres reussi a faire comprendre 
au Chef qui se disait possesseur du terrain qu'en 
acceptant en echange de sa propriete les objets 
que lui donnait M: Berard, il renon~ait au droit 
de continuer a y vivre. Eh bien! malgre toutes ces 
precautions et notre voisinage je redoute toujours 
quelques mesintelligences entre le nouveau et 
!'ancien proprietaire. 26 
His fears were timely, as shortly afterwards the colonist in 
question and twenty-seven of his companions were murdered by 
enraged tribesmen led by the dispossessed chief. The mutual 
lack of comprehension demonstrated by this example perplexed 
and distressed both parties, and sadly disillusioned du Bouzet. 
23 
Du Bouzet to Min., 15 Mar. 1855: ibid. 
24 
E.g., Lascazas, 'Projet de colonization pour la Nouvelle-
Caledonie', 27 Feb. 1855: ibid. 
25 
E.g., Mer to Min., 4 Oct. 1860: ANOM, Carton 42. 
26 Le Bris to Min., 7 Aug. 1856: ANOM, Carton 42; see also Le 
Bris to Min., 28 Oct. 1856: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1856. 
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The violence and bitterness of the Melanesian reaction to 
European encroachment in the late SO's convinced him that 
they were a vicious and treacherous people, who interpreted 
conciliation as weakness and understood the meaning of force 
27 
alone. He did not cease to maintain the necessity m avoid 
large-scale dispossession of Melanesians, but he no longer 
stresse~ the need for justice; rather he invoked the 
practical impossibility of protecting colonists from revenge 
at the hands of expropriated tribes. 28 
The second source of friction inherent in du Bouzet's 
land legislation stemmed from the distinction between 
'occupied' and 'unoccupied' lands, and an unintended corollary, 
the fact that in the short term at least, the inhabitants of 
well-populated areas stood a better chance of retaining most 
of their lands (because they might be expected to resist 
expropriation more fiercely and more effectively) than did 
those in more sparsely settled areas. Du Bouzet reiterated 
that the northern and eastern regions of the main island 
seemed likely to be unproductive for colonization because of 
the density of the indigenous population', whereas the south 
and west, especially the area around Port-de-France, were 
27 
Du Bouzet to Min., 10 May 1857, 27 Feb., 10 Mar. 1858: 
ANOM, Carton 42. 
28 
Du Bouzet to Min., 25 Nov. 1857, 10 July 1858: ibid. 
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highly promising because there were so few native 
inhabitants. 29 And yet it was the tribes in the neighbourhood 
of Port-de-France which produced the first great uprising 
in the history of the colony, and tribes of the western coast 
and hinterland which led the way in the great revolts of 
1878 and 1917. 
The inhabitants of the Port-de-France region were 
apprehensive about the general encroachment of Europeans 
on to their lands, and specifically resentful about the 
concessions made to the mission at Conception and St-Louis, 
and to a group of colonists at Mont d'Or. In October 1856 
a series of isolated murders began, which culminated in the 
assassination of thirteen European settlers and fifteen 
Efatese labourers at Mont d'Or and fierce attacks on the 
mission establishments. 30 After many strenuous, expensive 
and destructive expeditions, the remnants of the tribes 
responsible, or accused of participation, were finally 
pardoned in December 1859, and allowed to resettle on a small 
31 part of their former territory. 
29 
Du Bouzet to Min., 15 Mar., 20 June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1855. 
30 
[Foucher] 1890. 
31 
'Proclamation du Gouverneur adressee aux indigenes du Sud, 
et rendant leur territoire aux tribus de Jack, Kandio, Quindo 
et Maque', 2 Dec. 1859: BO 1859-60:259. 
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Despite the costs, the French learned at least 
three important lessons from this war. First, they soon 
realized that their enemy would rarely meet them in open 
combat, despite a large numerical advantage, because the 
insurgents possessed too few muskets to be able to match 
the firepower of the French and their Melanesian auxiliaries. 
The French were thus forced to develop and refine the 
technique of attrition - villages and gardens were sought 
and destroyed as soon as they were built, and the hunted 
tribes were eventually reduced at least as much by hunger 
and the strain of a fugitive existence as by military action. 
Second, the French at once adopted a policy of using 
Melanesian auxiliaries, mainly Christians from Conception and 
the warriors of Manongwe, to augment the small garrison 
of marines and sailors. 32 Native allies and auxiliaries 
were subsequently to play a central role in the repression 
of intransigent tribes throughout the colony. 
Finally, a vital by-product of the war in the south 
was the acquisition by the administration of a large area of 
land which had previously been occupied by the insurgent 
tribes. Frequent expeditions forced these people to flee 
their lands and take refuge in more inaccessible areas. 33 
32 
[Foucher] 1890: passim • 
33 
Du Bouzet to Min., 10 May, 10 Dec. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42; 
[Foucher] 1890:14, 78. 
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In June 1859 they were formally expropriated by Governor 
S . 34 a1sset, by which time settlement of colonists in the 
region was already well under way. No one in Port-de-France 
was unaware of this useful corollary of armed repression: 
Il est vrai que le resultat definitif de 
toute guerre sera de faire le vide et de 
donner par la.destruction ou la dispersion 
des chefs beaucoup de terrain disponible. 35 
Moreover, as settler pressure on available land grew in the 
1860's, this realization may have disposed the administration 
to take extreme measures in circumstances where tough 
language and a demonstration of power would have sufficed to 
enforce obedience. The treatment of the people of Yate in 
1863 36 and of the Paak and the Maluma in 1867-8 are cases 
in point. 
THE official attitude in Paris towards the question of 
Melanesian land rights was, it seems, at best intended to 
give the appearance of justice towards the traditional 
occupants. In the Ministry of the Navy and Colonies the 
theoretical justification for annexation was expressed in 
34 
'Decision du Gouverneur: les tribus des Jack, Kandio, Make, 
Plum et Teaururus sont expropr1ees de leurs territoires 
respectifs .... ', 10 June 1859: BO 1859-60: 110-11. 
35 
Forget to Min., 15 June 1860: Collection Margry; see also 
Garnier 1901:214~ 'une des consequences de ces revoltes des 
indigenes est qu'on s'empare aussitot apres de toutes leursterreE 
pour y installer des colons'. 
36 
See below, pp. 375-7. 
terms of the natural right of a civilized nation to claim 
sovereignty over the lands occupied by 'des peuplades 
sauvages': 
Les habitants non civilisis d'un pays n'ont 
sur ce pays qu'un droit de domination restreint, 
une sorte de droit d'occupation ... Une puissance 
civilisie acquiert en itablissant une colonie 
dans un pareil pays un droit piremptoire sur le 
sol, ou, en d'autres termes elle acquiert la 
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faculti d'iteindre le titre primitif. 37 
In practice this reasoning was translated into the distinction 
between 'occupied' and 'unoccupied' lands. Within the limits 
of this doctrine local ooministrators were frequently 
enjoined to deal fairly with Melanesians in respect of land 
claims. The main consideration of the policy makers, however, 
was less the demands of natural justice or the good name of 
France as a colonizing power than the desire to acquire land 
for European settlement quickly, cheaply and without provoking 
Melanesian resistance which would necessitate expensive 
38 
and laborious repression. 
Ideally settlement was to be limited to areas where 
the protection of Europeans could be assured. Those who 
37 
Min. to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 22 Feb. 1854 
(draft): ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854. An analogy was drawn with 
British practice in New Zealand, where such a policy was said 
to have been implemented. 
38 Min. to Febvrier des Pointes, 28 Feb. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854; Directeur des Colonies, 'Rapport a l'Empireur', 
December 1858 (draft): ANOM, Carton 42; Min.to Durand, 18 Feb. 
1860 (draft): ANOM, Carton 25. 
ventured beyond the secured parts of the colony (the 
southern third by 1860) were to be responsible for their 
39 
own safety: 
Les colons sont avertis qu'ils s'etablissent 
a leurs risques et perils et que le 
Gouvernement entend ne leur garantir aucune 
protection en dehors du rayon d'action 
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naturel de nos postes et etablis~ements. 40 
This stipulation broke down for seyeral reasons. Most 
traders and many would-be colonists refused to be thus 
. d 41 restr1cte , while the missionaries had long had stations 
beyond the pacified region. Harassment and murder of 
Europeans, wherever it occurred, could not be ignored by 
the colonial administration, because to do so would set too 
dangerous a precedent. Furthermore, the adverse publicity 
which such a policy would provoke outside the colony would 
39 
Min. to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 22 Feb. 1854 
(draft): ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1854; Min. to Durand, 15 
Mar. 1860: ANOM, Carton 25. 
40 
'Depeche ministerielle •.. ', 30 July 1862: BO 1862:196; 
see also du Bouzet to Min., 6 Jan. 1857: ANO~ Carton 
40, CG 1857; Min., 'Rapport a l'Empereur sur la colonisation 
de la Nouvelle-Caledonie', 15 Feb. 1858: BO 1853-8:243; 
Durand to Min., 20 July 1859: ANOM, Carton 42. 
41 
Du Bouzet to Min., 25 Oct. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42; 
Guillain to Min., 30 Apr. 1863: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64; 
27 Aug. 1869: ANOM, Carton 166; Conseil d'administration, 
14 Jan. 1869: ANOM, Carton 91. 
42 
retard its development and greatly embarrass a home 
government, which, although a dictatorship, became 
increasingly sensitive during the 1860's to the nuances, 
i f d 1 f bl . . i 43 n erre or actua , o pu 1c op1n on. Few serious 
colonists would be attracted to New Caledonia unless they 
44 
were guaranteed ample protection, but before 1862 most 
emigra~ts were not serious settlers, but petty traders, or 
pepple who wanted to own land, but lacked either the 
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h 1 . i 1 ' ' 45 M resources or t e app 1cat on to exp o1t 1t. oreover, by 
1860 there was little suitable land still available to 
settlers in the pacified region, partly because of the policy 
of large concessions which had been adopted in Paris and to 
46 
a lesser extent in Port-de-France, and partly because of 
42 ie Vial d'Aram & C to du Bouzet, 1 July 1857 (encl. in du 
Bouzet to Min., 22 Aug. 1857): ANOM, Carton 42; du Bouzet to 
Min., 25 Aug. 1858: ANM, BB4 723. 
43 
Case 1954:270-5. 
44 
Saisset to Min., 26 Feb. 1861: ANOM, Carton 42; Guillain to 
Directeur des Colonies, 10 Sept. 1867: ANOM, Carton 166. 
45 
Le Bris to Min., 7 Aug. 1856:ANOM,Carton 42; du Bouzet to Min. 
25 Oct., 25 Nov. 1857, 29 Jan. 1858:ibid.; Testard to Min., 
23 Apr. 1858: ibid. 
46 E.g., 40,000 hectares to Brown & Byrne- never taken up 
('decret imperial •.. ', 17 Feb. 1858:BO 1853-8:244-9); 500 
hectares to Darnaud ('decret imperial~.', 23 Aug. 1858: ibid., 
258-60); 570 hectares to Adam, 4,000 hectares to Paddon, 
3-5,000 hectares to Joubert ('arretes du Commandant particulier 
.•. ', 19 Dec. 1858:ibid., 312-17); 2,000 hectares to Cheval 
('arrete du Commandant •.. ', 23 May 1861: BO 1860-1:202-6; 
'decret imperial ... ', 28 Nov. 1861: ibid.-,-181-4). The Marists 
also held two large properties near Port-de-France. 
Cant. over page 
the aridity of much of the south. Before 1862 the local 
government allowed only small concessions to colonists in 
such fertile but densely populated areas as Kanala and 
Wailu, because of its reluctance to displace large numbers 
of Melanesians, or to alienate powerful but well-disposed 
47 tribes. 
The men on the spot soon became convinced of 
the impracticality in New Caledonia of large unbroken 
48 
concessions of land on the Australian pattern. In 1858, 
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however, the imperial government made a vast grant of 40,000 
hectares to an Australian company (Brown and Byrne), which 
would stretch virtually from coast to coast, and include 
some of the most populous parts of the island. 49 Du Bouzet 
Several concessions (e.g., Darnaud's) were later revoked 
because the conditions under which they had been granted 
(such as the import of a certain number of European settlers, 
permanent buildings to a certain value, a certain area under 
crops or grazed, etc.) were not fulfilled in the specified time. 
47 
Du Bouzet to Min., 20 June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; 
25 Nov. 1857: ANOM, Carton 42; Testard to Min., 23 Apr. 
1858: ibid.; du Bouzet to Saisset, 25 Oct. 1858: ANOM, Carton 
231; Saisset to Min., 13 Feb. 1859: ANOM, Carton 42; Mathieu 
to Durand, 22 July 1861: ibid. 
48 
Du Bouzet to ~e Bris, 4 Mar. 1856 (encl. in du Bouzet to 
Min., 12 June 1856): ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1856. 
49 
'Traite entre le Ministre ... et M. Alexander Brown senior 
et M. Byrne, pour la colonisation de la Nouvelle-Caledonie', 
17 Feb. 1858: BO 1853-8: 244-9. 
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strenuously opposed the project, on the grounds that such 
a grant would necessitate the expropriation of entire tribes, 
and would invariably provoke bitter resistance: 'Je crois 
qu 1 il faut renoncer a faire des concessions d'une aussi 
50 grande etendue tout d'un bloc'. The scheme eventually 
lapsed, but the Ministry's predilection for large-scale 
enterpr~ses apparently remained. During the 1860's a long 
controversy ensued with Guillain over the Minister's 
intention to grant a large tract of land in the Diahot valley 
to a French company. Guillain's opposition was expressed 
in much the same terms as du Bouzet's, but he ultimately 
failed, and a somewhat smaller grant was approved in 1870. 51 
ONCE a coherent plan had been formulated for the future of the 
colony, its administration reorganized and Guillain appointed 
h b . . f 52 . as governor to oversee t e eg1nn1ng o a new era, 1t was 
virtually certain that the French desire to accord justice 
50 
Du Bouzet to Min., 25 Nov. 1857, 10 July 1858: ANOM, Carton 42 
51 
Conseil d'administration, 6 Aug. 1869: ANOM, Carton 91; 
'arrete du Gouverneur promulguant une decision ministerielle 
accordant 6,000 hectares de terres en locatio~e avec droit de 
preemption, a MM. Menier freres, Courtin et c . I' 5 Aug. 
1870: BO 1870:444. One of the Menier brothers was a friend 
and supporter of the mission (Kougeyron to Procureur, 4 Jan. 
1861: APO), but it is not recorded what the Marists, sworn 
upholders of Melanesian property rights, thought of his land 
claims. 
52 
Guillain to Min., 6 June 1862: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64. 
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to Melanesians, always equivocal, would be subordinated 
to the twin gods of efficiency and European land hunger. 
In Paris during the 1860's the official attitude vacillated 
between a desire to speed the development of the colony in 
order that it should eventually become self-sufficient, and 
the need to minimize current expenditure and commitment of 
forces ~o the lowest possible degree. Guillain, like his 
predecessors, recognized the incompatibility of these 
53 demands, but he brought tothe position a ruthless energy 
and a clarity of vision which they perhaps had lacked, and 
with which he was to achieve much, despite the parsimony 
of his superiors and their hostility towards many of his 
actions and policies. His strengths of characte~ were, however, 
marred by a rigid authoritarianism and an arrogant pride, 
which divided the European population of the colony into 
mutually antagonistic pressure groups, and worse, reduced 
Melanesians to mere instruments of policy, who would refuse 
at their peril to adapt themselves and their institutions 
to the role for which they were intended. 
Not long after his arrival, Guillain passed a new 
edict regulating the alienation of land to settlers. 54 It 
53E.g., du Bouzet to Min., 25 Aug. 1857: ANOM,Carton 42; Durand 
to Min., 20 July 1859, 31 Aug. 1860: ibid.; Saisset to Min., 
20 Nov.1859: ibid.; Guillain to Min., 4 Aug. 1862: ANOM, Carton 
26, CG 1855-64; Guillain, 'Rapport', (1868]:APM/ONC, 22. 
54
'Arrete du Gouverneur sur l'alienation des terres domaniales 
en Nouvelle-Caledonie', 5 Oct. 1862: BO 1862:145-52. 
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contained no specific reference to Melanesians, but the 
administration later pointed out that it had implicitly 
maintained the rights guaranteed in earlier legislation. 55 
In fact, du Bouzet's specific provision that one-tenth of 
all land offered for sale in the colony should be reserved 
for Melanesians, in addition to the lands they actually 
occupied, was quietly disregarded. By 1862 Melanesian 
land rights were limited to the 'occupied' lands, a nebulous 
concept which was liable to varying interpretations, and 
which in practice made New Caledonians dependent on 
administrators' estimates of their requirements. Needless 
to say, as the century progressed the size of these estimates 
tended to decrease in inverse proportion to the urgency of 
the demand for land for colonization. 
That even the restricted right to the 'occupied' 
lands was subject to the requirements of government policy 
was amply demonstrated by the Yate affair of 1863-4. The 
partly Christian Yate tribe and its chief, Dame, ran foul of 
the governor by their unwillingness to cooperate with his 
compulsory labour ordinance. A punitive expedition was sent 
against them, and on the approach of the soldiers they 
abandoned their dwellings and fled. This, according to 
Guillain, was traditionally prima facie evidence of hostile 
55 
'Arrete du Gouverneur declarant .. ~ !'existence legale de 
la tribu indigene ••• ', 24 Dec. 1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867; 
'Rapport ... relativement a la constitution de la propriete 
territoriale indigene', 22 Jan. 1868: Mon., 26 Jan. 1868. 
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intent, and an acknowledgment of defeat at the hands of 
a superior force. The huts and gardens of the Yate people 
were accordingly devastated, Dame was diamissed from the 
chieftainship and the tribe's land was declared confiscated 
to the profit of the domain. 56 In 1869 the same pretext 
was used to justify the dispossession of the people of Bonde. 
Early in 1864 the land acquired at Yate was 
appropriated for the governor's pet project, an agricultural 
commune of twenty immigrant workmen, who were given a free 
grant of 300 hectares and loans on generous terms. It was 
expected that the dispossessed tribesmen would return to 
work as labourers on their former land. 57 Despite much 
effort and expense by the administration, however, the 
experiment was not a success, partly because the members 
of the commune lacked agricultural experience and expertise, 
56 
'Arrete du Gouverneur pronon~ant la decheance de l'indigene 
Dame de la chefferie de Yate, et la confiscation du territoire 
occupe par sa tribu', 14 May 1863: BO 1863: 106-8; G uillain 
to Min., 31 May 1863: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64; Rougeyron 
to Procureur, 16 June 1863: APO. Guillain's action met with 
wholehearted approval in Paris; his report of the affair bore 
the annotation in red ink: 'Il a bien fait', and a ministerial 
despatch informed him: 'J'apprecie les considerations que vous 
avez fait valoir pour justifier ces mesures auxquelles je 
donne mon appreciation' (Min. to Guillain, 21 Aug. 1863: 
ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1855-64). 
57 
'Arrete du 6ouverneur autorisant l'association agricole de 
Yate'; 'arrete du Gouverneur portant concession, a titre 
gratuit, de 300 hectares de terres situes, a Yate, a la 
Societe agricole de ce nom', 8 Jan. 1864: BO 1864:5-7; Mon., 
10, 17, 31 Jan. 1864. ---
and partly because the enterprise owed far more to 
Guillain's enthusiastic Fourierism than to a genuine 
acceptance of socialist principles by those actually 
. 1 d 58 1nvo ve . 
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The contrast between the governor's lavish concern 
for the commune and his callous disregard for the rights and 
future of the dispossessed Melanesians reflects poorly on 
his proclaimed socialism, and on the implications of such 
apparently generous programmes as the following, which 
appeared at about this time in the Moniteur, over the 
signature of a government functionary: 
58 
Effacer !'impression qu'a laisee l'emploi des 
armes, n'est chose realisable qu'en amenant les 
indigenes a une grande communaute d'interets 
avec les colons, en les considerant comme 
citoyens, en leur accordant taus les droits qu'ils 
peuvent, toutefois, exercer sans danger pour le 
bien public •... En un mot: protection egale a 
taus. Si !'indigene possede, aux termes de la 
loi, respect a sa possession ou a sa propriete; 
s'il travaille, respect et remuneration a ses 
efforts; s'il se cree une famille, veneration aux 
liens qu'il a formes .•. il devienne le frere et 
l'ami du colon, et non un esclave anonyme. 59 
Conseil d'administration, 7 Feb. 1865: ANOM, Carton 89; 
14 Jan. 1867: ANOM, Carton 90; 27 Oct. 1870: ANOM, 
Carton 92. 
59 
T. Mage, 'De !'influence du Ministere public sur la 
civilisation et le progres d'une colonie naissante', Mon., 
20 Dec. 1863; see also Mon., 13 Dec. 1863. 
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Apart from the Yate incident, however, the 
question of Melanesian land rights only came to the fore in 
the late 1860's, and then mainly as a result of Guillain's 
determination to prepare the way for the extension of 
European colonization in the north by reorganizing the tribes 
of the region and delimiting their land holdings. Years 
before ~u Bouzet had pointed out the incompatibility of large 
land grants with the maintenance intact of Melanesian land 
holdings, and Guillain reasoned similarly. During his early 
years as governor he consistently refused to approve large 
grants, to which he was in any case temperamentally and 
60 ideologically opposed. By the end of 1867 he had rejected 
61 four out of twenty-two applications for concessions, and 
had instructed his local commandants to divert prospective 
colonists from Melanesian garden lands or coconut groves, 
unless the occupants proved willing to renounce all their 
62 
claims. Two of the rejected applicants, however, made their 
63 grievances heard in France, and the vehemence of their 
protests caused Guillain to alter his policies. At a time 
60 
Forestier to Procureur, 7 Nov. 1863: APO; Guillain to 
Directeur des Colonies, 10 Sept. 1867:ANOM,Carton 166. 
61 
Mathieu, 'Rapport ••• relativement a la constitution de la 
propriete territoriale indigene', 22 Jan. 1868: Mon., 26 Jan.l861 
62 
'Circulaire du Secretaire colonial', 28 Aug. 1865:Mon., 29 
Dec. 1867. 
63 
Conseil d'administration, 28 Feb. 1867: ANOM, Carton 90. 
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when he was embroiled in bitter conflict with the Marists, 
he would presumably have preferred not to alienate 
powerful settler interests, which were his natural allies 
against the mission because of the general resentment against 
the size and quality of Marist land holdings and their 
. 1 . . 1 . i 64 1nvo vement 1n commerc1a act1v ty. 
· Provided Melanesians did not offend his 
sensibilities (e.g., by being Christians), did not 
inconvenience his plans or resist his orders, when his 
reactions could be implacable, Guillain was willing enough to 
treat them justly, according to his lights, and even defend 
them against the depredations of land-hungry Europeans. He 
was consistently loyal and generous to such devoted allies as 
the Kanala, the Manongwe, the Yengen and the Puma,partly 
as a matter of policy, but also in grateful recognition of 
services rendered. The agitation of the settler lobby and his 
own desire to put colonization on a sound footing were 
sufficient, however, to lead him to plan the rationalization 
of Melanesian land holdings in the areas settled by 
Europeans, especially places such as Pwebo, where it would 
serve the dual purpose of diverting criticism and harassing 
a Christian tribe. He had begun to speak in these terms even 
before the upheavals in the north-east in 1867-9 provided him 
64 
See above, pp.230-3. 
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with the opportunity to reorganize the tribes of this 
region and make them subject to the policy of cantonnement. 
Guillain outlined such a policy in the 
administrative council early in 1867. He spoke of the 
necessity to delimit lands sufficient for the needs of the 
allied southern tribes of Manongwe and Kanala, where all 
vacant ~and had been conceded to settlers. He added: 
Il faut done penser a delimiter aussi leur 
[the Mwelebeng's] territoire, a les 
cantonner dans une espece suffisant m@me en 
vue de leur culture tout a fait primitive, 
et a donner cours aux demandes des colons 
audela du cantonnement. 
The implications of cantonnement were several and important. 
It was to deprive Melanesians of land which they actually 
occupied, and thus deny them the basic right which they had 
been guaranteed by du Bouzet. Furthermore, the traditionally 
scattered pattern of settlement, based on the family unit 
and centred on the garden lands of particular clans was to 
be formally replaced by concentration in villages, based on 
the artificial administrative unit of the tribe. According 
to official policy Melanesian land was to be communal 
property, vested in the tribal unit and controlled and 
65 
Conseil d'administration, 28 Feb. 1867: ANOM, Carton 90. 
65 
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administered by the tribal chief. Thus the complex 
traditional system of inalienable clan proprietary rights 
and clearly defined individual usufructuary rights was 
broken down, and the tribal chief, his authority already 
enhanced in other directions by government policy, was given 
power to which he was customarily not entitled over the most 
basic a~d often sacred aspect of Melanesian existence. 
This was yet another manifestation of an official policy which, 
whether deliberately or inadvertently, tended to destroy the 
flexibility of traditional political relationships and 
invalidate safeguards against chiefly autocracy. 
In December 1866 Guillain had ordered legislation 
to be prepared defining Melanesian property rlghts, 66 but the 
legal framework for cantonnement was eventually devised under 
the impact of the Pwebo affair of October 1867, in which 
resentment at the expropriation of tribal lands for the 
benefit of colonists had provoked a violent reaction hy the 
dispossessed clans. The key legislation was twofold. In 
December 1867 the 'tribe' was proclaimed to have legal 
existence as an administrative unit of the colony. 67 This 
66 
Mathieu, 'Rapport ..• relativement a la constitution de la 
propriete territoriale indigene', 22 Jan. 1868: Mon., 26 Jan. 
186 8. 
67 
'Arrete du Gouverneur declarant, par voie d'interpretation 
des actes legislatifs anterieurs, !'existence legale de la 
tribu indigene dans !'organisation coloniale de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie', 24 Dec. 1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867. 
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edict was drafted specifically in response to questions 
which had arisen during the concurrent trial of the 
Mwelebeng suspects, and aimed to establish the collective 
responsibility of an entire tribe for acts of belligerence 
by its members. The process of erosion of Melanesian 
individuality, which had long been implicit in official 
policy,·became explicit. A month' later Guillain promulgated 
a decree which formally constituted Melanesian landed 
property, and which was to set the precedent for future land 
legislation. 68 
By this decree every tribe was eventually to be 
granted inalienable possession of a reserve carved from its 
traditional territory, the size to be proportionate to the 
fertility of the soil and the number of inhabitants. No 
rights of private property were recognized, and division 
of the land amongst the individual members or families of a 
tribe was to be the prerogative of the tribal chief, who was 
also granted the use of a specific terrain, designated 'terre 
de chefferie'. A pretext f~ future expropriation of reserve 
land was provided by a clause which allowed resumption by 
the government in the public interest, with or without 
indemnity depending on whether the land was deemed to be 
'occupied' or not. An edict of the same date delimited 
68 
1 Arrete du Gouverneur relatif a la constitution de la 
propriete territoriale indigene',22 Jan. 1868: BO 1868:17-21. 
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h f h .b 69 t e reserve o t e Manongwe tr1 e. It was allotted 
1,624 hectares in four separate parcels, plus 100 hectares 
for the personal uae of the chief. 
The rationale behind the decree on Melanesian 
land was expounded by Mathieu in a report to the 
d . . . 1 h 1 . 1 . 70 a m1n1strat1ve counci proposing t e eg1s at1on. Its 
provisions were said to have been adapted from traditional 
polity: 
Dans presque toute l'ile, elle [la propriete 
territoriale indigene] parait ~tre, au mains 
nominalement, personnelle aux chefs de tribus; 
toutefois par la maniere dont ils usent de ce 
privilege, c'est en realite une propriete 
indivise et commune a la tribu. 
By this reasoning, du Bouzet's description of the 
simultaneous existence of individual, joint and common 
ownership of land was incorrect: 
-La propriete territoriale individuelle parait 
avoir ete en Caledonie chose fort peu connue .... 
il n'y a la rien de semblable a la propriete 
fonciere telle que l'entendent les peuples 
civilises. 
The final comment was apt enough, but for reasons very 
different to those suggested by Mathieu. 
Ironically, in the same report Mathieu stressed that 
inalienable land ownership was a transitional, tutelary 
measure designed to conserve Melanesian land holdings until 
69 
'Arrete du Gouverneur delimitant le territoire de la tribu 
des Manongoes', 22 Jan. 1868: BO 1868:21-2. 
70 
Mathieu, 'RaP.port ... relative~ent a la constitution de la 
propriete territoriale indigene , 22 Jan.1868: Mon., 26 Jan. 
1868. 
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such time as they were sufficiently civilized to be 
entrustedwith their own destinies and property. Similarly, 
he criticized the arbitrary and autocratic power of tribal 
chiefs, 'dont la domination materielle et morale est une 
cause de retard dans leurs progres en tout genre'. And yet 
this very decree destroyed traditionally sanctioned 
individ~al property rights, and consolidated chiefly 
autocracy by giving them power over the distribution and use 
of land to which they had no customary right. These 
paradoxes seem to have resulted from two unrelated causes. 
In the first place Mathieu believed that traditional 
occupancy was almost always a consequence of military victory: 
'le droit du plus fort etait ]a base du droit de posseder'. 
He based this assumption on the evidence of the post-contact 
territorial expansion of two groups of clans, those in the 
area of Numea and Paita, and those led by the war chief 
Gondu in the centre-north of the island. 71 In both cases, 
however, the aggressive clans had previously occupied 
inadequate and infertile lands, and were impelled as much by 
necessity as by greed. Furthermore, the territorial 
ambitions of the former group seem at least to some extent to 
have been inspired by their acquisition of improved weaponry, 
71 
On Gondu, see above, p.l14, fn. 82; on the clans near 
Numea and Paita, see Bourgey 1865:179-83. 
including firearms, as a result of dealings with European 
72 
sandalwood traders. 
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It is perhaps not surprising that such dramatic 
examples should make a profound impression on European 
observers, but stress on the aggressive activities of these 
clans obscured the far more usual pattern of peaceful 
mig~ations and absorption of newcomers into occupant clans 
by mutual agreement. Mathieu's preoccupation with the 
unusual caused him to ignore entirely the traditional role 
of masters of the soil, and the frequent occasions on which 
even conquerors left them unmolested, through fear of alienating 
the spirits of the land with which they were in communion. 73 
The second and perhaps more significant source of 
Mathieu's misunderstanding of the nature of traditional land 
tenure would seem to have been the situation which had 
developed in some Christian tribes by the mid-1860's, notably 
Mwelebeng, although he did not himself admit this. The 
suggestion is supported by the arguments put forward during the 
first hearing before the Tribunal criminel de Noumea in 
December 1867. As with chiefly authority, the system of land 
ownership was grossly misrepresented by one counse~ in terms 
very similar to those which Mathieu was ~o use_in his report 
of the following month. The lawyer, Theodore Mage, claimed 
that Melanesians knew nothing of individual ownership of land, 
72 
Guiart 1963:649-51. 
73 
See above, pp.26-9. 
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that all landed property, the produce of the soil, and thus 
the wealth of the tribe and its members, were held in common, 
and were administered solely by the chief: 
Sauf de rares exceptions, speciales a nos 
possessions des Loyalty, les indigenes sont 
ignorants de la propriete territoriale individuelle: 
le patrimoine personnel n'y est point constitue, et 
le sol ou s'eleve une case particuliere n'en 
· fait pas moins partie de l'apanage commun de 1' 
etre collectif nomme tribu. Un grand chef (Teama 
ou aliki), s'inspirant de l'avis de quelques 
conseillers de son choix, administre seul 1' 
universalite des biens immobiliers et des produits 
de la terre: il designe l'emplacement des habitations 
et des cultures; il preside a la distribution, par 
village, de la recolte generale; et, de petits 
chefs, ses simples agents, en font ensuite la 
distribution par tete. 74 
Mage was inspired to adopt this interpretation by his role 
as counsel for the European claimants, whose only chance of 
obtaining damages lay in the court's acceptance of the 
concept of common tribal responsibility to reimburse the 
victims of attack by its individual members. Nonetheless, 
as has already been seen, the administration officially adopted 
an almost identical interpretation, and Mage's statement cannot 
therefore be dismissed as the over-zealous hyperbole of a 
lawyer anxious to win his case. 
74 
Mage, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 27 Dec. 
1867: Mon., 29 Dec. 1867. 
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For all his misrepresentation of the role of 
tribal chiefs, and the nature of traditional tenure, and his 
virtual denial of the existence, let alone the importance, of 
the clan, Mage's model was a caricature of the situation which 
had developed at Pwebo under the authority of Bonu and 
Villard. The missionaries had encouraged the acceptance of 
a concept of common ownership of resources, under the 
direction of the chief, as an antidote to what they termed 
the 'prtmitive communism' of Melanesians. Traditionally the 
demands of hospitality and fraternity imposed on an 
individual the duty to share his possessions and his 
provisions with his 'brothers'. This was regarded as a 
severe handicap to missionary efforts to inculcate an ethic 
of achievement through hard work, and militated against their 
attempt to develop new needs in Melanesians which would serve 
to make them more receptive to a European and Christian way 
of life: 
Ce fleau social, avec ses hideuses et desolantes 
consequences, tyrannise les tribus de nos iles. Ici 
il faut tout partager •.. Le communisme est 
assurement un des plus grands obstacles qui s' 
opposent aux efforts des missionnaires pour 
ameliorer la position physique et moral de ces 
tribus, et les faire jouir du bienfait d'une 
civilisation chretienne. 75 
The centralized organization of the production and sale of 
coconut oil and beche-de-mer was intended as a means to 
75 
Poupinel to Superieur-general, 2,Dec. 1857: APF 1858, 30:296. 
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overcome this problem, as well as provide resources for 
community projects such as church-building and clothing the 
faithful. 76 Careful control of the produce of the gardens, 
through the agency of the chiefs, was imposed to prevent the 
dissipation of supplies in the great ceremonies which 
traditionally followed the yam harvest, or celebrated 
important events in the life of the group and its members. 
But the customary exchange at such ceremonies of foodstuffs 
and other items, over which the chief presided, was very 
different from the sole administration in the hands of the 
chief of all landed property and the products of the soil, 
which was claimed to exist in 1867. 
As with chiefly authority and land tenure, Melanesian 
settlement patterns were also redefined by the experts at 
the 1867 hearing. One of the defence counsel confidently 
asserted that New Caledonians 'ne se tiennent pas isoles les 
d i , ~ , ~ 1 77 uns es autres, ma s au contra1re reun1s, groupes . This 
contradicts the evidence of almost every early observer, who 
stressed that the Melanesian population lived in scattered 
hamlets, the largest of which contained only a few families. 78 
It would be tempting to attribute yet another misconception to 
the model which had developed at Pwebo and in other Christian 
76 
See above, pp.222-4. 
77 
Le Boucher, address to the Tribunal criminel de Noumea, 28 
Dec. 1867: Mon., 5 Jan. 1868. 
78 
See above, p.7. 
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tribes. And, indeed, the traditional pattern of settlement 
in these areas had been disrupted by the missionary policy of 
gathering their followers around the local chapel, which 
became the nucleus of a large village containing several 
clans. This facilftated regular worship and the surveillance 
of the faithful, and afforded mutual protection. 79 But the 
transition from small hamlets to large villages also occurred 
very early in such areas as Kanala and Yengen as a result of 
80 prolonged contact with European traders, and can in no 
sense be regarded as a development confined solely to the 
Christian tribes, although it was more pronounced and more 
general in Christian areas. It can be said, however, that 
the higher mortality rate which afflicted Christians throughout 
81 the 1850's and 60's almost certainly owed much to their 
crowded living conditions, in which infection could spread 
unchecked. It is also not unjustifiable to surmise, despite 
the lack of concrete supporting evidence, that the high death 
rate, low birth rate and declining population which Melanesians 
throughout the colony suffered well into the twentieth 
82 
century was in part a result of the extension of cantonnement, 
and the crowding of people into large villages where they were 
far more vulnerable to contagious disease. 
79 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 25 Dec. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854; Man, 26 Feb. 1860. 
80 -
On Yengen, see above, p.89; on Kanala, see du Bouzet to Min., 
14 Feb. 1855a: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855. 
81 E.g., the measles epidemic of 1860-1 seems to have taken most 
disastrous effect in the Christian tribes: Goujon to Procureur, 
8 Oct. 1860; Montrouzier to Procureur, 12 Nov.1860; Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 14 Nov.1860, 1 Jan. 1861; Forestier to Procureur, 7 
cont. over page 
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Guillain ordered the application of cantonnement 
h M 1 b f h 1867 . . 83 d . h to t e we e eng a ter t e upr1s1ng, an 1n t e 
aftermath of the war of 1868-9 the decree of January 1868 
was applied to all tribes of the Pwebo circonscription, 
except the Puma. The decree had provided for the 
delimitation of a reserve on a tribe's traditional territory, 
but in ~ractice the territorial provision was often ignored, 
or at least was not applied to individual clans, which were 
shuffled about to suit the demands of government policy. 
The upheavals of 1867 and 1868-9 had caused widespread 
dislocation of the settlement patterns of the entire region. 
Several Paak and Maluma sub-tribes and all the Pareman clans 
except the people of Cambwen and Jawe had fled their lands 
84 
or been moved en masse at the behest of the government. 
These voluntary or compulsory migrations, and the formal 
dissolution and expropriation to which the three rebel 
tribes of Tea Janu, Maluma and Paak had been condemned, 
provided an administrative pretext for widespread reorganization 
Aug. 1861: APO; Mathieu to Durand, 22 July 1861: ANOM, 
Carton 42. 
82 
Metais 1953a:128. 
83 
Guillain to Bourgey, 11 Nov. 1867 (encl. in Guillain to Min., 
4 Dec. 1867): ANOM, Carton 166. 
84 
[Ameline], 'Journal de Pouebo', 21 Nov., 16, 17 Dec. 1868: 
AVNC; A. Mathieu, 'Rapport ... au sujet de la formation de la 
tribu de Tchambouene ... ', 6 July 1869: Mon., 5 Sept. 1869; 
Mathieu, 'Rapport ..• au sujet de la format1on de la tribu de 
Diaoue', 8 Dec. 1869: Mon., 6-13 Mar. 1870. 
391 
and the arbitrary regrouping of clans in new tribal units, 
which bore little relation to traditional patterns. 
The main aims of government policy were twofold: 
to 'rationalize' Melanesian land holdings on a quasi-
permanent basis, so as to free the largest possible area for 
colonization; to reduce the influence of the Christian 
Tinjin and Paak chiefs. With the latter in m1nd, all the 
Pareman clans except the Caaqac85 speaking people of Cevit 
and Pwe-Kabarik were separated from the Mwelebeng and 
86 incorporated into the independent tribes of Jawe and Cambwen. 
The Paak tribe was similarly truncated. The Christians of 
Tande and Pwalu, who had dissociated themselves from the 
'rebellion' of their chief, were resettled at Pwebo and 
eventually incorporated into a newly constituted Mwelebeng 
tribe, together with the Maluma sub-tribe of Welis. 87 The 
people of Mwandin, apostate members of the Paak tribe, and 
committed allies of the government, were rewarded with 
separation from the Paak and inclusion into the favoured Puma 
85 
Caaqac is the Mwelebeng language. 
86 
'Arrete du Gouverneur constituant la tribu de Tchambouene 
(circonscription de Pouebo)', 3 Sept. 1869: BO 1869:456-7; 
'arrete du Gouverneur constituant la tribu d;-Diaoue 
(circonscription de Pouebo)', 28 Feb. 1870: BO 1870: 183-4. 
87 
'Arrete du Gouverneur constituant la tribu des Mouelebes 
(circonscription de Pouebo)', 28 Feb. 1870: BO 1870:168-70. 
'b 88 tr1. e. In the same vein, a Maluma sub-tribe which had 
won official approbation by its ready abandonment of its 
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tribal chief and support of the French cause, was attached 
to the allied Cambwen tribe. 89 
It thus seems certain that the administration 
deliberately adopted a policy of polarizing Christians or 
Christian sympathizers and the pagan allies of the government. 
To the extent that the 'tribe' as an official administrative 
unit of the colony was an artificial creation, the transfer 
of clans from one tribe to another need not have seriously 
infringed traditional allegiances, as long as the integrity 
of clans and their land holdings were maintained. Furthermore, 
in each case the detached clan or sub-tribe was an outlying 
group whose traditional dependence on the tribal chief, be 
he Tinjin, Paak or Maluma, was fairly tenuous, and in some 
cases unwillingly endured. For instance, the Pareman clans 
which were split from the Mwelebeng tribe probably accepted 
the new dispensation gladly enough, since they had originally 
been forced by circumstances and crusading Mwelebeng Christians 
into an unnaturally dependent relationship with the Tinjin. 
88 
'Arr~te du Gouverneur incorporant les gens de Muendine 
(ex-Paiacs) dans la tribu des Poumas (circonscription de 
Pouebo)', 28 Feb. 1870: BO 1870: 192-3. 
89 
Mathieu, 'Rapport .•. au sujet de la formation de la tribu 
de Tchambouene ... ', 6 July 1869: Mon., 5 Sept. 1869; 'Etat 
nominatif deS indigeneS propOSeS pour deS reCOmpenSeS,,, I' 
1 July 1870 (encl. in Ruillier to Min., 2 July 1870): ANOM, 
Carton 171. 
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To this extent the reorganization can be seen as a 
reversion to a situation more nearly approximate to the 
traditional status quo, while the liberation of the people of 
Jawe from Mwelebeng hegemony was an act of justice. In other 
respects, however, the government's measures were arbitrary 
and harsh, especially towards the Christians. The 
cantonnement of the Mwelebeng was interminably delayed, which 
90 
caused unnecessary hardship for the refugee clans. 
Furthermore, in the land settlements of 1869-70 in which 
tribal reserves were delimited, the Paak fared very badly. 
Ameline complained that they were allotted insufficient land, 
t f h . h f 1' 91 h'l 11 . 1871 mos o w 1c was o poor qua 1ty, w 1 e a trave er 1n 
described their reserve as 'miniscule', and commented: 
Le sage arrete de M. Guillain, qui clans la 
delimitation des tribus, accordait suivant la 
nature du terrain de 2 a 5 hectares par personne, 
a ete completement elude et meconnu en ce qui 
concerne la tribu de Bonde 92 
The main effects of cantonnement and the decree of 
January 1868 were to perpetrate what Saussol had called 'the 
continuing administrative fiction of collective common 
93 property', and, as far as the resettled Paak and Maluma 
Glans were concerned, to divorce actual occupation of land from 
90 
[Ameline], 'Journal de Pouebo', 24 Sept., 18 Oct. 1869: AVNC. 
91 
Ibid., 25 Nov. 1869. 
92 
Dauzat, 'Une excursion clans la vallee du Diahot' 
31 May 1871. 
92 
Saussol 1971:232. 
Mon., 
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tradition. Thus the intimate psychological connection 
between a clan and its ancestral lands was severed, and 
groups of people were relocated on lands to which they had 
no customary title, where they became dependent on the 
generosity of established clans, which enjoyed the position 
of masters of the soil. In both respects clear precedents 
were set for future policies of expropriation and oppression 
of Melanesians. 
No doubt Guillain's successors were not dependent on 
precedent, especially when it came to arbitrarily resettling 
tribes to suit administrative convenience. But his concept 
of common ownership of resources and his denial to 
Melanesians of individual property rights was a vital 
contribution to the colony's legal framework, and one which 
owed much to his personal ideological position. Like so many 
of Guillain's native policies his land measures contained both 
humanitarian and exploitative elements. They combined a 
paternalistic desire to protect certain Melanesian rights, with 
a ruthlessly pragmatic determination to mould Melanesians to 
meet the demands of his programme, whatever the cost. He no 
doubt quite genuinely believed that the assurance of inalienable 
land rights protected Melanesians from the reckless 
dissipation of their reserved lands. And in view of the 
potential for conflict inherent in the differing Melanesian 
and European attitudes to the concept of sale, thts may well 
have been a wise measure, at least on a temporary basis. 
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Inalienability, however, had been guaranteed by du Bouzet 
long before Guillain appropriated it as a central feature 
of his own policy. And there seems to be no necessary 
reason why inalienability, a measure with certain traditional 
validity, should have been combined with the denial of 
individual property rights, which were also sanctioned by 
traditipn, and with the exaltation of chiefly power over 
land, which was not. 
Guillain's land decree did not find favour in Paris. 
In his instructions to Guillain's successor the Minister of 
the Navy criticized both its actual provisions and the 
rationale behind it. He stressed the need to individualize 
Melanesian property in order to facilitate its transfer to 
settlers; he criticized the arbitrary power over the division 
and distribution of reserve land which the decree granted 
tribal chiefs; and he po~nted to the need to limit the 
government's right of expropriation for public works. 94 In 
fact, the minister's intentions seem to have been entirely the 
reverse of Guillain's: the former wanted opportunities for 
exploitation of Melanesians to be in the hands of free 
settlers rather than the administration. His reasoning was in 
94 
Min. to de la Richerie, 'Instructions generales remises 
a M. Gaultier de la Richerie, Gouverneur de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie et dependances' (draft), 13 June 1870: ANOM, 
Carton 25. 
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line with that of most colonists, who agitated for the 
individualization of Melanesian land holdings and the 
removal of barriers to their alienation in the belief that 
the bulk of the reserves would then pass into European hands. 95 
Guillain's legislation was intended to thwart just such a 
possibility. 
In the event, however, Melanesians were spared the 
depredations of rapacious settlers only to fall victim to a 
far more rapacious and more irresistable predator - the 
colonial government. In view of later occurrences, it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the local administration'! 
much vaunted concern to protect Melanesians from unscrupulous 
colonists, however genuine as far as du Bouzet was concerned, 
had by the mid 1870's, and perhaps even as early as the late 
1860's, become a means, more authoritarian than humanitarian, 
to ensure that control over land and the exploitation of 
Melanesians remain~d entirely in the hands of the government. 
DURING the 1870~s the restricted land rights which Melanesians 
had been granted by Guillain's legislation were eroded by 
an administration eager to acquire land for penal colonization. 
A 'cantonnement decree' of 6 March 1876 paved the way for 
inroads into the 'immutable' reserve land with a clause 
permitting the revision of boundaries in accordance with 
95 
E.g., Moncelon 1885:5-6. 
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changes in the numerical strength of tribes - which during 
the remainder of the nineteenth century and well into the 
next almost invariably diminished. The application of 
cantonnement procedures in the region of La Fwa and Burai 
precipitated mass murder of Europeans in June - September 
1878, and a prolonged war of repression. The commission set 
up to inquire into these events pointed to the wholesale 
expropriation of tribes, and the ravages of European livestock 
i f h . . 96 as pr me causes o t e 1nsurrect1on. Nothing was done to 
redress earlier wrongs, however, and during the repression 
whole tribes and clans were dispossessed and their members 
deported en masse to Belep and the Isle of Pines. 
Again, in the late 1890's a government-sponsored 
attempt to promote agricultural settlement by free colonists 
led to the further application of cantonnement by Governor 
Feillet. The often tenuous connection which still existed 
between the reserves and the traditional territory of tribes 
was effectively destroyed by wholesale resumptiop of 
reserve lands and the arbitrary resettlement of tribes on the 
96 
A. de Trentinian, 'Rapport sur les causes de l'insurrection 
canaque en 1878', 4 Feb. 1879: reproduced in Dousset 1970: 
127-59; cf. Anova-Ataba, who suggested that such grievances 
were symptoms of a far more fundamental cultural and 
psychological incompatability between Europeans and Melanesians: 
'la raison done principale, a notre avis, de l'insurrection 
c'est l'impossibilite de dialogue entre deux civilisations et 
deux cultures heterogenes' (Anova-Ataba 1969:207). 
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traditional lands of other groups. 97 With the development 
of cash-cropping in the second quarter of the twentieth 
century, tensions became acute between traditional masters of 
the soil and immigrants, whose land rights depended entirely 
on the generosity of the original owners. The latter were 
and are far less disposed to grant the long-term usufructuary 
rights needed for the cultivation of crops such as coffee, 
than they had been to allow short-term subsistence cropping. 98 
Since the Second World War Melanesians have emerged 
from the strait-jacket of second-class citizenship to which 
they had been condemned by nineteenth century paternalism and 
oppression and early twentieth century neglect. They are now 
playing an increasingly important role in the social, 
political and economic life of New Caledonia. Paradoxically 
the European innovation of common ownership of land became 
the new orthodoxy, and the recent desire of younger, better 
educated Melanesians to break down the collective principle 
and free reserve land from the iron grip of the chiefs and 
the elders have met with little success. After the 
depradations of the Feillet era the reserves remained 
inviolate, but inalienability and collective ownership under 
97 
Saussol 1971:234-6. 
98 
Belouma 1958-9: 21-2. 
the authority of the chiefs have become a handicap to 
Melanesian economic development in a capitalist society 
which in recent years has become increasingly fixated on 
mineral exploitation for the livelihood of most of its 
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members. Furthermore, the reserves are now unable to cope 
with Melanesian population increase, which in the last few 
decades has far outstripped that of other ethnic groups. 
Individual Melanesians have begun to acquire land outside 
the reserves, as Europeans increasingly abandon the 
agricultural and pastoral industries. The possibility of 
large-scale Melanesian enterprise in these fields is the 
best hope for genuine diversification of the island's 
economy, and for meaningful Melanesian participation in the 
future of the land which they have at last begun to share 
with those who took it from them. 
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CONCLUSION 
NO other Melanesians demonstrated anything like the 
capacity of New Caledonians to organize concerted resistance 
to the threat posed to their lands and way of life by 
European political control and agricultural and pastoral 
settlement. Throughout most of Melanesia, excluding Fiji, 
the possibility of effective armed opposition to European 
encroachment was negated by political fragmentation and the 
bitter rivalries of local groups. In New Caledonia, however, 
sufficient regional cohesiveness existed to enable the clans 
and tribes of a wide area to carry out a series of more or 
less simultaneous and coordinated attacks which caused the 
death of nearly two hundred Europeans in June-September 1878. 
On a smaller scale, Bwarat and Kawa's several 'northern 
coalitions' exemplified the same tendency. In this case the 
common enemy was the missionaries and Christians of Pwebo, who 
before 1862 represented to most of the tribes of the north the 
epitome of French occupation. Again in 1868-9 shared resentment 
at oppression suffered at the hands of the colonial 
administration caused most of the clans of three large inland 
tribes to unite in an attempt to force the Europeans from their 
territory. As will be seen, this tendency both aided and 
retarded Melanesian efforts to resist the conquest of their 
territory. 
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The tendency to united action should not be over-
emphasized, since local loyalties were almost always paramount, 
coalitions were generally loose and allies often unreliable, 
except where their personal interests were concerned. 
Furthermore, in no case, including 1878, can any more than 
regional consciousness be discerned. But the examples cited, 
and others which lie beyond the scope of this study, indicate 
a substantial degree of unanimity between local groups over a 
fairly wide area. Indeed, throughout the period to 1870 the 
French administration was almost continuously at war with a 
succession of dissident groups of clans and tribes. The 
geographical location of the areas of unrest receded inland in 
the face of stern military repression, until by 1870 an uneasy 
peace prevailed in the pacified areas, while the more 
uncompromising opponents of the colonial regime had been driven 
into the most remote and inaccessible parts of the island. 
To the early administrators, the possibility of 
Melanesian coordination to oppose French rule seemed unlikely, 
and was far less interesting than the apparent fragmentation of 
New Caledonians into mutually antagonistic, frequently warring 
local groups, 'tribes' in administrative parlance. Thus 
Tardy de Montravel expressed the opinion that: 'cette grande 
variete d'interets, ces haines de tribu a tribu ... peut servir 
dans le debut si l'on sait en tirer parti en opposant les unes 
1 
aux autres'. 
1 
Du Bouzet offered an even more optimistic 
Tardy de Montravel to Min., 27 Apr. 1854: ANOM, Carton 40, 
CG 1854. 
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appraisal of the incapacity of Melanesians to make common cause 
against the European invasion of their lands, and also pointed 
to the advantages which the French could expect to achieve from 
a policy of 'divide and rule': 
Heureusement, toutes ces tribus sont divis~es par 
d'anciennes haines, et, parlant des langues tout 
a fait differentes, sont incapables de se reunir. 
Presque partout, et avant peu, nous aurons pour 
· auxiliaires, centre les tribus voisines, celles dont 
nous occupons le territoire. 2 
From the examples suggested above, and those analysed 
in the body of this work, it will be seen that the first part 
of du Bouzet's prognostication was drastically inaccurate. On 
the other hand, his expectation that French arms would obtain 
useful support from Melanesian auxiliaries was vindicated beyond 
his most extravagant hopes. The seeming paradox is elucidated 
by reference to a phenomenon whose importance was often 
overlooked by early observers: namely, that the apparent 
fragmentation of the small kinship units at the base of New 
Caledonian social organization was transcended by complex 
networks of reciprocal obligations, enmities, alliances, trading 
2 
Du Bouzet to Min., 14 Feb. 1855b: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; 
see also Min. to Durand, 18 Feb. 1860: ANOM, Carton 25; Durand 
to Min., 26 May 1860: ANOM, Carton 42; Forget to Min., 15 June 
1860: Collection Margry; de la Hautiere 1869:69-70. 
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and marriage patterns extending over whole regions. This 
tendency was best exemplified by the partition of the clans 
and tribes of the far north between the mutually antagonistic 
phratries known as 3 Oot and Waap. The ramifications in the 
culture contact situation of this and other divisions meant that 
few incidents involving Melanesians and Europeans could have 
purely local implications, especially in the case of violent 
opposition to missionary influence or to European encroachment 
on to tribal lands. 
Neither Tardy de Montravel nor du Bouzet was unaware of 
the existence in the north of patterns of permanent allegiance 
or enmity between tribes. Du Bouzet actually referred to the 
division by name: ' .•. les diverses tribus ..• se groupent 
seulement en deux confederations connues sous les noms de Ot 
4 
et de Uanap'. Du Bouzet, however, did not see the groupings so 
formed as anything more than unstable military confederations, 
and he missed entirely the ritual significance of the dichotomy. 
He also failed to foresee that the existence of the division 
would help determine regional patterns of acceptance or 
rejection of European penetration. This does not necessarily 
imply that the patterns so formed followed traditional lines 
of demarcation. It does suggest, however, that New Caledonians 
3 
See above, pp.34-8. 
4 
Du Bouzet to Min., 20 June 1855: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1855; see 
also Tardy de Montravel to Min., 27 Apr., 25 Dec. 1854: ibid., 
CG 1854; Vieillard et Deplanche 1863:21. 
had a tradition of collaboration with clans and tribes 
beyond their immediate locality, and explains why groups 
were prepared to play an active role in affairs which did 
not directly concern them. 
The other side of the same coin, however, lay in 
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the fact that Melanesians fighting with the French showed a 
similar capacity for united action, and, for example, warriors 
from Kone, Yengen and Wagap, each group resident more than 
fifty kilometres from the others, could operate together with 
reasonable efficiency as auxiliaries of the French. It would 
be difficult to overemphasize the importance of Melanesian 
auxiliaries in the pacification of New Caledonia. Often armed 
with muskets, and with a knowledge of country and traditional 
modes of fighting unmatched by Europeans, they provided the 
only really effective means by which intransigent groups in 
remote areas could be .made to feel the weight of military 
repression - which generally consisted of plunder and 
destruction of dwellings and gardens, a task to which the 
auxiliaries applied themselves with enthusiasm, especially 
when the dwellings and gardens in question belonged to 
hereditary enemies. 
In practice, however, the allegiances and antagonisms 
of the Oot/Waap dichotomy were not always maintained under the 
stress of culture contact and colonization. Local considerations 
were always important, and the old patterns sometimes broke 
down in the face of the new needs, power relationships and 
jealousies which resulted from the presence of Europeans, 
especially missionaries and representatives of the colonial 
regime. This tendency was exemplified by the oscillating 
loyalties of the Puma, a Waap tribe, during the 1850's and 
1860's. In the late SO's they fought with the French and 
their own former enemies, the Mwelebeng of Pwebo, against 
their kinsmen, the Yengen, who were also Waap. This action 
resulted from a purely pragmatic assessment of the current 
balance ~f power in the region, and the realization of the 
Puma that for them the alternative to obedience was 
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repression and dispersion. After Guillain's arrival, however, 
the changed relationship between government and mission 
destroyed the unnatural dominance which the Mwelebeng had 
built up in the region, and enabled the Puma to revert to an 
earlier pattern of allegiance, while at the same time they 
continued to serve as the instruments of government policy. 
For the remainder of the decade they filled the presumably 
satisfying role of allies of the French in conjunction with 
the Yengen and other Waap groups, and enjoyed frequent 
opportunities to harass and sometimes fight against their 
ancient enemies. 
Indeed, during the 1860's the Oot/Waap dichotomy 
regained much of its former validity, in the main as a result 
of Guillain's anti-missionary stance. The administration's 
allies in the north-east were all Waap, while most of the 
tribes which felt the weight of official disapproval and 
military action, both Christian and pagan, were Oot. It 
is thus evident that the customary alignment of the northern 
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clans and tribes, while not universally applicable under 
the colonial regime, remained an important factor. Its 
existence helps explain why armed conflict between 
Melanesians and French forces in the north so often involved 
fighting between loosely-structured Melanesian coalitions. 
The tragedy as far as Melanesians were concerned lay in the 
fact that their sense of regional consciousness was as much 
a divisi~e as a cohesive force. The French, however limited 
their understanding of the intricacies of the Oot/Waap 
dichotomy, knew only too well how to turn it to their own 
advantage, and were prepared to be quite unscrupulous in so 
doing. 
THE theme of this work can be summed up as 'exploitation', in 
the non-emotive sense. It is a record of successive attempts 
by white and brown men, both individually and in groups, to 
use the other to their own advantage, whether pecuniary, 
political or, in the case of the missionaries, spiritual. 
Melanesians encouraged missionaries and traders to settle in 
their tribes because they hoped to benefit from their presence. 
In some cases, as at Balad in 1847, their resort to violence 
can be attributed, at least partially, to disappointment and 
frustration at the failure of their expectations to 
materialize. On the evidence of the case studies presented, 
such frustrations were less likely to arise with traders than 
with missionaries. The demands made on Melanesians by the 
former were generally not onerous, and both parties enjoyed 
an ideal economic relationship, each believing that it had got 
' .~ '"· _,' " ... ,'· ,, -~ -' -.. 
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something for nothing; i.e., from the point of view of the 
Melanesian, that he had exchanged a quantity of worthless 
aromatic wood or sea slugs, plus his own labour, for valuable 
and prestigious goods like iron, axes, knives, beads, cloth, 
and an occasional musket and ammunition. 
Missionaries, on the other hand, not only made much 
more ser!ous demands, but offered much less immediate and 
tangible rewards. Their teachings presupposed radical 
changes in the way of life, customs and entire belief system 
of Melanesians, and struck at the very bases of the 
indigenous society. For instance, missionaries separated the 
physical from the spiritual universe, which to Melanesians 
were inseparable. They insisted on a renunciation of 
polygamy, of belief in magic and of veneration of ancestral 
spirits, which were all fundamental parts of Melanesian 
culture, as, respectively, a mark of prestige, a means of 
social control and a pious and utterly necessary duty to the 
dead and living generations. The missionaries also attempted 
to inculcate an ethic of achievement through personal effort 
rather than through group virtue. In the process, they tried 
to destroy the genuine reciprocity of traditional 
relationships, by which each man shared his 'brothers'' 
property and shared his own property with his 'brothers', and 
replace fr with an authoritarian system of centralized 
production and distribution under chiefly authority. If they 
dissimulated their real aims, missionaries were generally 
tolerated, in the expectation that they would ensure a supply 
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of European goods. But failure to meet these expectations 
caused mistrust and resentment amongst Melanesians, while 
missionaries could in any case rarely compete on equal terms 
with traders in this regard, even had they wanted to do so. 
The greatest handicap which missionaries faced, however, was 
the equation which Melanesians often drew between 
Christianity and death, an equation based on the empirical 
evidence that disease seemed to be highest where missionaries 
had settled, and that Christians and supporters of the 
mission suffered most from its effects. 
It is therefore scarcely surprising that before 1860 
missionary success was slight, except in areas where they had 
managed to win to their cause an important and prestigious 
chief. They were almost always strenuously opposed by the 
dignitaries - elders, sorcerers, war chiefs, renowned 
craftsmen and the like - who customarily shared social control 
with the chiefs, and who suspected, rightly, that the 
missionaries aimed both to enhance chiefly authority at the 
expense of other leaders, and/or invalidate the traditional 
raison d'etre of the latter. Chiefs had most to gain, in 
terms of increased temporal power, from exploitation of 
missionaries, but the latter could only hope to profit from 
the support of chiefs who enjoyed sufficient authority to 
be able to override, or at least neutralize, the opposition 
of the other dignitaries and the apathy of most tribesmen 
towards the new teachings. Indeed, association with a weak 
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or unpopular chief, such as Bweon of Puma, was a positive 
disadvantage, because it aroused the resentment of his rivals 
and their followers, and caused them to remain aloof. At 
Pwebo and the Isle of Pines, however, the cooperation of a 
powerful chief provided the missionaries with the eventual 
opportunity ~ extend their influence throughout the tribe; 
but even in these cases chiefly support did not guarantee 
immediatft success, and a long struggle, and the intervention 
of external factors, was necessary before the traditionalist 
opposition could be reduced to sullen subservience. 
Throughout the pre-annexation period Melanesians 
generally held the upper hand in the process of mutual 
exploitation, by virtue of their immense numerical superiority 
and their confidence in the continuing validity and efficacy 
of traditional methods and answers. Annexation brought no 
sudden change, but the seeds were sown of an altered balance 
in relationships between Melanesian and European. As French 
domination was relentlessly extended, Melanesians found it 
increasingly necessary to compromise with the new realities 
created by the presence of an opponent whose power could not 
be effectively resisted anywhere near the coast, and whose 
ability to strike into the interior steadily developed. 
Melanesians rapidly lost the initiative with the extension 
of the area of pacified territory and were pushed into the 
position of reacting to the stimuli of others, rather than 
of acting on their own terms. Marist missionaries, free 
settlers and colonial administrators all aimed either to 
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convert Melanesians, to conquer them for the sake of their 
most valuable property, land, or to mould their institutions 
to suit European convenience. Melanesians, who had no such 
ambitions with regard to Europeans, except in the limited 
sense of sometimes coveting an individual's goods, were forced 
on to the defensive in every place where they were within 
the effective range of French arms. 
Despite the dependent role for which they were 
intended, and into which they were inexorably forced, many 
Melanesians managed to compromise successfully; i.e., they 
continued to exploit the presence of Europeans to their own 
advantage, at the same time as they changed their ways and 
institutions to meet at least minimum European requirements. 
I have previously presented three case studies of Melanesian 
efforts to meet the challenge posed by European domination. 
Each in its way exemplified a particular response, and no 
stereotype existed, but all demonstrated a studied appreciation 
of where power actually lay, and a sometimes unavailing 
determination to make the most of a situation which was by its 
very nature unfavourable. 
The traditional weakness of the Puma tribe provided 
a paradox. At first intra-tribal dissension gravely 
compromised their ability to meet European penetration 
successfully. After an initial period of confusion, however, 
the chiefs' consciousness of physical inferiority caused them 
to analyse local power relationships with care, to such 
effect that after 1856 ~he Puma were always on the winning 
side, be it Christian Mwelebeng or anticlerical colonial 
administration. 
The Mwelebeng chiefs, on the other hand, read 
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aright the advantages which they would gain from cooperation 
with the missionaries. They used Marist help and advice 
and the goodwill of the fledgling colonial government to 
extend Tinjin authority authority far beyond its traditional 
limits. They were so blinded by their own success, however, 
that they failed totally to come to terms with changing 
circumstances after 1862. Unlike the Puma, who learned 
from hard experience that mission and government were not 
identical, the Mwelebeng made this distinction too late, and 
were in any case too committed to the mission to be able 
to change camps, and they suffered accordingly. 
Similarly, the chiefs of Yengen were at first 
blinded by their own power, and by the successful way in 
which they had for ten years controlled their dealings with 
Europeans. They too learned from experience, and later 
benefited from changed relationships between Europeans. As 
far as the Yengen were concerned, of course, the mission/ 
government conflict was a fortuitous occurrence, quite beyond 
their control. Nonetheless, they used it skilfully to their 
own advantage, and cannot be regarded as mere puppets of the 
administration. Credit is due to Guillain for his 
appreciation of how he could best use traditional antagonisms 
between Melanesians, but the element of manipulation was not 
one-sided, since both the governor and his allies made 
concessions to secure the other's support. 
In other ways, however, Melanesians were 
manipulated to serve the convenience and the planning of 
Europeans, pre-eminently in the sphere of chiefly authority 
and land tenure. Several chiefs, especially Bonu of 
Mwelebeng, must bear a heavy share of responsibility for 
Europeaw misconceptions about these institutions, because 
they willingly cooperated with missionary reforms in these 
areas, despite powerful opposition from within their own 
tribes. Similarly, Bwarat, however much he respected 
412 
traditional sanctions in internal tribal matters, encouraged 
the official misinterpretation of his role and his authority. 
It is a vexed question just how far the European redefinition 
of chiefly authority and Melanesian land tenure was deliberate 
distortion. It was certainly conscious policy on the part of 
the missionaries, but the question of motives is more 
confused as far as the administration was concerned. What is 
certain is that the changes implemented were wholly to the 
government's advantage, and to that extent the question of 
intent is academic. It is almost invariably true that the 
earliest European descriptions of the traditional society were 
far moreaccurate than those of later observers. In part the 
declining accuracy reflected changes which had already 
occurred; in part it reflected fixed European prejudices ~bout 
what Melanesian society should'be like. Men like Mathieu and 
Guillain depicted a simplistic form of social organization, 
and proceeded on the basis of their own preconceptions to 
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accuse Melanesians of lack of sophistication and sublety, 
as in regard to land tenure. Many Europeans refused to 
acknowledge the possibility of complexity in the pre-literate 
society. On this basis they stressed chiefly tyranny and 
simple communal ownership of land because both concepts fitted 
their own grossly oversimplified version of what 'savage' 
society was like. It is difficult, in the light of the 
foregoing, to conclude otherwise than that many Melanesians, 
perforce because they were the weaker party, had by the 1860's 
achieved a far more subtle insight into European motivations 
and the workings of European society than had most 
Europeans into the traditional society. Sadly, in the decade 
after 1870, Melanesian effo~ts to come to terms with their 
conquerors were doomed to failure, because to the latter 
they had become at best irrelevant, and at worst a positive 
hindrance to progress, and all that that implied. 
APPENDIX I 
COMMANDANTS AND GOVERNORS OF NEW CALEDONIA, 1853-1870 1 
NAME 
Auguste Febvrier des 
Pointes 
Jean Joseph de Brun 
Louis Tardy de 
Mont ravel 
de Brun 
Joseph du Bouzet 
1 
RANK 
Rear-admiral 
Commander 
Captain 
Captain 
POSITION 
C.-in-C., Pacific 
station 
S.N.O., New Caledonia 
(commander of the Prony) 
S.N.O., New Caledonia 
(commandant, Indo-China 
sub-division) 
Governor, Etablissements 
fran~ais de l'Oceanie 
(Marquesas, Tahiti, New 
Caledonia) 
FROM 
23 Sept. 1853 
31 Dec. 1853 
9 Jan. 1854 
31 Oct. 1854 
18 Jan. 1855 
TO 
31 Dec. 1853 
9 Jan. 1854 
31 Oct. 1854 
18 Jan. 1855 
July 1855 2 
This appendix is based on miscellaneous letters in ANOM and ANM, on the Bulletin officiel and on 
O'Reilly 1953: passim. 
2 
Du Bouzet left Noumea for Papeete in July 1855, before returning to France for an official enquiry 
into the shipwreck of the Aventure in New Caledonian waters in March 1856. 
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NAME RANK 
Edouard Le Bris Commander 
POSITION 
Commandant superieur, 
New Caledonia 
FROM 
July 1855 
TO 
3 May 1857 
3 10 May 1858 3 May 1857 c. du Bouzet 
Jules Testard4 Major, Marine 
Infantry 
Commandant particulier, 
New Caledonia 
c. 10 May 1858 c. Sept. 1858 
du Bouzet c. Sept. 1858 25 Oct. 1858 
Testard 25 Oct. 1858 21 Dec. 1858 
Jean Durand Major, Marine 
Infantry 
Commandant particulier 21 Dec. 1858 22 May 1859 
Jean Saisset 
3 
Captain 5 Governor, E.F.O. 
Du Bouzet returned to Tahiti from France on 29 December 1856. 
4 
22 May 1859 3 Apr. 1860 
Testard was appointed commandant particulier 19 January 1855 , and was replaced by Durand on 
his own request by decret imperial of 15 September 1858. 
5 
Saisset was appointed governor by decret imperial of 19 May 1858, he arrived in Papeete 18 
September 1858, but did not visit New Caledonia until the following year. 
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NAME RANK POSITION FROM TO 
Du rand 3 Apr. 1860 July 18606 
Du rand Lieutenant Colonel Commandant July 1860 2 June 1862 
Charles Guillain Captain 7 Governor, New Caledonia 2 June 1862 15 Mar. 1870 8 
Jacques Ruillier Lieutenant Colonel, Interim governor 15 Mar. 1870 26 Aug. 1870 
Marine Infantry 
6 
A decret imperial of 14 January 1860 separated New Caledonia from the E.F.O., promoted Durand 
and appointed him commandant of the colony; this took effect in July. 
7 
Guillain was promoted rear-admiral 4 May 1868. 
8 
Guillain's replacement as governor, Captain Gaultier de la Richerie, was appointed by a dicret 
imperial of 11 June 1870. 
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APPENDIX II 
LIMITED RESOURCES AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF NEW CALEDONIA, 1853-1870. 
THROUGHOUT the period 1853-1870 the administrators 
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of New Caledonia were bedevilled by the problem of insufficient 
funds, personnel and material to fulfil the demands of a 
growing colony, and, after 1864, penal settlement. Until its 
administrative separation from Frerich Oceania in 1860 New 
Caledonia had to compete for limited resources with the 
protectorate, while the distance between Port-de-France and 
Papeete caused delay and inefficiency. 1 Almost every report 
by the early governors and commandants of New Caledonia 
complained of difficulties created and aggravated by 
2 inadequate resources. Chief among these difficulties was the 
fact that the French occupation had until 1862 to be virtually 
confined to the southern third of the colony; elsewhere 
Melanesian opposition could at best be contained by an 
occasional expedition, but in the more remote areas it 
flourished unchecked, and isolated missionaries, settlers and 
1 
Du Bouzet to Min., 4 Dec. 1857: ANM, BB4 723; Testard to Min., 
29 Aug. 1858: ANOM, Carton 42. 
2 
E.g., du Bouzet to Min., 25 Oct. 1857': ANOM, Carton 42; 
Saisset to Min., 20 Nov. 1859: ibid.; Durand to Min., 31 Aug. 
1860: ibid. 
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traders could not be adequately protected. Only the most 
limited public works programme could be implemented at 
Port-de-France, but even this further reduced the effective 
3 
military strength, since soldiers had to be used as labourers. 
Before the arrival of Guillain in 1862 only a few 
desultory attempts were made to utilize Melanesians for the 
benefit of the colony. In 1857 a small company of native 
soldiers was set up, to act as scouts and guides during 
expeditions, and for miscellaneous duties around the main 
4 
centres, Port-de-France and Napoleonville (Kanala). In 1859 
a regular courier service, manned by allied tribes, was 
organized between these two settlements. 5 The Melanesian 
company was finally disbanded in 1864 because, with the 
increase under Guillain in the number of Melanesians employed 
on public works, the existence of a separate group organized on 
military lines seemed unnecessary. 6 Later, in the mid-sixties, 
two troops of thirty tirailleurs, recruited from allied tribes 
and armed with muskets, were attached to the Wagap and Gatop 
posts to aid in the suppression of the insurgent tribes 
3 
Du Bouzet to Min., 25 Oct. 1857: ANOM, Carton 40, CG 1857; see 
also Guillain, 'Rapport', [1868]: APM/ONC, 22. 
4 
'Decision du Gouverneur ••• ', 26 May 1857: ANOM, Carton 69; 
[Foucher] 1890:59. 
5 
'Decision du Gouverneur 
6 
4 Aug. 1859: BO 1859-60:154. 
'Decision du Gouverneur ..• ', 25 Jan. 1864: BO 1864: 25. 
7 
of central and northern New Caledonia. 
419 
Guillain's main contribution to solving the manpower 
shortage was to conscript Melanesians on an organized basis. 
Before his arrival it had been believed that they would never 
voluntarily agree to regular work for the administration or 
colonists, because of innate laziness and lack of motivation: 
' .•• gens tres sobres, ne sachant se creer aucun besoin, ne 
comprena~t pas meme celui de se vetir, et partant, 
8 
entierement ordonnes a la paresse'. Guillain avoided this 
difficulty by making it obligatory on every pacified tribe to 
send a regular contingent of workmen to Port-de-France. They 
were engaged for twelve months, paid a small wage, fed, 
clothed and housed, and were punished if they attempted to defect. 
It was hoped that this measure would meet the colony's 
requirements for unskilled labour, and at the same time help 
civilize the Melanesians involved. 9 Within two years, however, 
insufficient funds forced the virtual suspension of this scheme, 1C 
although local corvees continued at the military posts, often 
under very onerous conditions. 
After 1865 an attempt was made to ease the labour 
shortage by the introduction of New Hebridean indentured workers. 
7 
Patouillet 1872:50. 
8 
Durand to Min., 26 May 1860: ANOM, Carton 42. 
9 
'Decision du Gouverneur portant que des indigenes seront 
engages pour travailler, a titre de manoeuvres, sur les chantiers 
du Gouvernement', 19 Jan. 1863: BO 1863:15-16. 
10 --
Guillain to Min., 3 Sept. 1865: ANM, BB4 847. 
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By early 1867 nearly two hundred had been imported and engaged 
by colonists on short-term contracts. But the answer did not 
really lie in this direction, as New Caledonia was not a 
popular work place with New Hebrideans, and labour traders from 
11 Port-de-France attracted recruits with difficulty. It was 
also hoped that the arrival of convicts in 1864 would 
ameliorate the situation, but Guillain's policy of penal 
colonization meant that few prisoners were available for use on 
public works and settlers generally could not afford to 
employ them. Furthermore, although the penal establishment 
formed a virtually autonomous state within the state, with its 
own budget and personnel, its excessive demands on both money 
and manpower no doubt drained resources which would otherwise 
have gone to the free colony; conversely, of course, New 
Caledonia would probably not have been developed by the French 
at all had it not been intended for use as a penal settlement. 
During 1860 the shortage of resources, human and 
monetary, became so acute as to cause the abandonment of the 
Balad post, drastic cutbacks in public works and a reversal of 
Governor Saisset's ambitious programme of military intervention 
against recalcitrant tribes. 12 In August 1860, after the 
11 
Mon., 6 Jan. 1867; Caldwell [c.l871]: 5. 
12--
See above, p.121. 
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separation of New Caledonia from Tahiti had taken effect, the 
Marine Infantry garrison was more than doubled to a total of 
four companies (472 men), and during 1861 a disciplinary company 
1 . d 13 a so arr1ve • But no further increase occurred for nearly 
eight years, 14 despite the requirements of an expanded 
administration and Guillain's energetic policies for the 
pacification and development of the colony. In July 1866 there 
were only 706 European troops of all services in the colony -
this included a small force of gendarmerie and an artillery 
detachment, as well as the Marine Infantry and the disciplinary 
15 
company. Even in 1860, however, lack of money nullified 
16 
much of the good effect of the increase in personnel. 
Guillain's arrival in June 1862 signailed the 
beginning of a new era, when the previously limited and aimless 
development of the colony was channelled and given new purpose 
17 
and direction. The colony's budget was greatly enlarged, 
and the annual metropolitan subsidy on which its finances 
depended was increased to 300,000 francs. According to Guillain,· 
13 
Min. to Durand, 15 Mar. 1860 (draft): ANOM, Carton 25; 
Durand to Min., 31 Aug. 1860: ANOM, Carton 42; Rougeyron to 
Procureur, 28 June 1861: APO. 
14 
Mon., 17 May 1868; Guillain, 'Rapport', [l868]:APM/ONC, 22. 
15 
Mon., 30 Sept. 1866. 
16-
Mon., 6 Jan. 1861; Durand to Min., 8 Mar. 1861: ANOM, Carton 42. 
17-
Mon., 8 June 1862. 
18-
Guillain, 'Rapport', [1868] :APM/ONC, 22. 
422 
however, the budget was already inadequate for the colony's 
needs. It became more so as the pace of governmental activity 
quickened, and the European population increased, 19 and tended 
more and more to settle in outlying areas amongst turbulent 
and often unpacified Melanesians. Early in 1866, however, with 
war clouds gathering in Europe, a ministerial decree 
reduced the subsidy by 83,000 francs. This necessitated the 
20 
closure bf the government's school for Melanesian boys and 
further restriction of the already limited public works 
programme. Not long before, one of the two steam sloops on 
the poorly equipped local naval station had been recalled to 
21 France. This drastically weakened the administration's 
ability to strike quickly in the more remote parts of the colony, 
where sea transport was vital, and where the perils of reef-
clad shores made steam vessels invaluable. Henceforth 
communications, never reliable, became chaotic: for instance, 
it took thirteen days for news to reach Noumea by trading 
vessel of the uprising at Pwebo in October 1867; a year later 
news of another uprising in the north took a similar time to 
22 
reach Noumea by land from Pwebo. 
19 
The European civilian population increased fourfold between 
1862 and 1869, although the rate of increase slowed after 1866, 
and the total in July 1869 was still less than 1,500: 'Tableau 
de la population blanche au 1er juillet 1866': Mon., 30 Sept. 
1866; 'Division de la population blanche par cultes et par 
nationalites', 1 July 1869: ANOM, Carton 172. 
20 
'Arrete du Gouverneur ••• ', 10 Apr. 1866: Mon., 15 Apr. 1866. 
21 
Guillain to Min., 23 May, 3 Sept. 1865: ANM, BB4 847. 
22 
Mon. , 2 1 0 c t • 18 6 7 , 2 5 0 c t. 18 6 8. 
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Upheavals in the north in 1867-8 necessitated, in 
Guillain's eyes, an energetic policy of repression. The 
reinforcements which arrived in May 1868 were insufficient to 
cope with the added demands imposed by new military posts at 
Uvanu, Ubac and Bonde, and numerous expeditions in strength 
during late 1868 and 1869. 23 The insurgent tribes were finally 
quelled,however, and the governor left for France in March 1870, 
sick and .somewhat disillusioned, but satisfied that he had done 
24 
all he could with the means available. But the tide of 
opinion and circumstances in France had turned against him. 
After 1866 French foreign policy had suffered repeated setbacks 
in Europe and Mexico, and by early 1870 Louis-Napoleon, Guillain's 
patron, had lost much of his absolute power. Guillain received 
few plaudits from his superiors, and the instructions given to 
his successor reflected official disapproval with the expense 
25 
and brutality of his policies. In the straitened circumstances 
of 1870, troops, ships and money could simply not be spared for 
the needs of a tiny antipodean colony. The new governor, Captain 
Gaultier de la Richerie, withdrew most of his forces from 
northern New Caledonia. The posts at Gatop, Wagap, Ubac and 
Bonde were abandoned, while only a small garrison was left at 
23 
Guillain to Min., 9 May 1869: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9; 
27 Aug. 1869: ANOM, Carton 166. 
24 
Guillain to Min., 11 Mar. 1870: ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9. 
25 
Min. to de la Richerie, 13 June 1870 (draft): ANOM, Carton 
25. 
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26 Uvanu. Nonetheless, it was in part Guillain's success in 
crushing resistance and implanting a solid respect for 
French arms in this region which made de la Richerie's 
withdrawal possible, and which transformed the French foothold 
on the colony into firm possession. 
26 
Anon., 'Nelle Calidonie! Situation au 23 7bre 1870' 
(draft): ANOM, Carton 26, CG 1865-9; Mon., 17 May 1871. 
APPENDIX Ill 
MARIST ESTIMATES OF MELANESIAN SUPPORT FOR THE MISSION, 1862-1871 1 
SEPT. 1862 2 OCT.1863 4 1865 5 
PRACTISING 4,200 3 4,609 CHRISTIANS } 5,000 CATECHUMENS 4,000 2,230 
AUDITORS 2,900 2,640 
} 6-7,000 WELL-DISPOSED 
c.6,000 4,000 PAGANS 
TOTAL c. 17,100 13,479 11-12,000 
FEB. 1868 6 
c. 7,000 
c. 7,000 
APR. 1871 7 
7,009 
1,056 
308 
8,373 
~ 
N 
c.n 
1 
These figures are reproduced purely as an indication of the Marists' estimate of 
their situation. There is no suggestion that they were necessarily accurate. 
2 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 29 Sept. 1862: APM/ONC, 20. 
3 
Adult Christians. 
4 
Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 21 Oct. 1863: APM/ONC, 20. 
5 
Forestier to the Conseil de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte Enfance, [1865]: APM/ONC, 20. Those 
well-disposed towards the mission were said to have been about one-quarter of the total 
Melanesian population. 
6 
Rougeyron to Yardin, 26 Feb. 1868: APM/ONC, 20. This report gave no figures for 
catechumens or auditors. They were said to have been neglected for several years as 
a result of Guillain's campaign. 
7 
Rougeyron to Cardinal Barnabo, 18 Apr. 1871: APM/ONC, 16. 
population was said to have been about 50,000. 
The total Melanesian 
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Official Records 
France: 
Archives Nationales, section Marine. 
1. Sub-series BB4 (Campagnes 1790~1869):contains the correspondence 
of the officers commanding naval formations or individual 
vessels. Classification is by ports, then by naval stations, 
with a category for vessels on independent missions or 
detached service. I examined in detail cartons covering the 
years 1844-1869, and consulted cartons containing material of 
interest for both earlier and later years. The following 
cartons were used: 635-6, 641, 651, 667, 674, 680, 701, 707, 723, 
724, 726, 747, 761, 773, 774, 789, 797, 804, 816, 835, 847, 859, 
871, 887, 992, 993, 1010, 1011, 1035, 1036. 
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2. Series CC (Personnel): 
a. Sub-series CC3 (Troupes et equipages): The following 
cartons were consulted: 1061-8, 1127, 1843, 1848, 1853, 
1859, 1867. 
b. Sub-series CC7 (Dossiers personnels des officiers): for 
Jean-Joseph de Brun, Joseph du Bouzet and Charles Guillain. 
Archives Nationales, section Outre-Mer. 
The New Caledonia section consists of more than 200 cartons 
loosely catalogued by subject and by year. All cartons 
containing material on the period 1840-1870 were consulted 
·as well as others which seemed likely to be of interest. The 
following cartons contained useful material: 1, 3, 11, 25-6, 
40, 42, 59, 67-70, 87-93, 152, 158; 165, 166, 168, 170-2, 174, 
178, 207, 230-1. The card index of the section has recently 
been published,! and it was not therefore deemed necessary to 
list the contents of the cartons used. 
Bibliotheque Nationale. 
Collection Margry: France. Nouvelles acquisitions, 9448 
(Oceariie et Mers australes. Nouvelle-Caledonie). 
Great Britain (Public Record Office. Microfilm, ANL): 
1 
Admiralty. 
The available records of the China (Australian Division), East 
Indies, Pacific and Australian stations and the Admiralty and 
Secretariat Papers were consulted for the years 1848-1860. 
The following volumes only were used: Adm. 1/5599; 1/5606; 
1/5613; 1/5617; 1/5641 (Admiralty and Secretariat. Papers). 
Colonial Office. 
CO 201/445 (for copies of two letters from Captain J.E. Erskine 
to the Secretary of the Admiralty, enclosed in letters to the 
Colonial Office). 
SCARR, Elizabeth, 1970. 'French Government Archives.' Journal of 
PaCific History, 5:176-94. Corrections supplied by the 
Archives du Ministere de la France d'Outre-Mer were published 
in ibid., 6:170-9. 
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Foreign Office. 
FO 27/919-1854 (France. Correspondence. 1851-1871) were con-
sulted. The following volumes were particularly useful: FO 
27/919-20; 27/1006; 27/1041-4; 27/1161; 27/1247; 27/1287; 
27/1305; 27/1320-1; 27/1331; 27/1766; 27/1768; 27/1775; 
27/1835. 
Marist Missionary Records 
Archeveche de Noumea. Archives du Vicariat apostolique de la 
Nouvelle-Caledonie, Noumea. 
[AMELINE, Joseph], 'Journal de Pouebo apres le Depart du R.P. 
Villard', 16 Aug. 1868-31 Dec. 1869. MS copy. 
ANON., 'Extraits du Journal du R.P. Rougeyron et de Mgr. d'Amata. 
Dates pour servir a la vie du R.P. Gagneres.' MS. 
GOUJON, Prosper, 'Journal de l'ile des Pins', 1848-1854. TS copy. 
Microfilm, ML. 
ROUGEYRON, Pierre, 'Abrege de la vie de Hippolyte Bonou, chef de 
la tribu de Pouebo en Nouvelle-Caledonie.' MS copy. 
______ , 'Biographie du R.P. Gagniere, pretre de la Societe de 
Marie et Missionnaire de la Nouvelle-Caledonie.' MS, incomplete. 
VILLARD, Jean-Marie, 'Journal de Pouebo', 17 Aug. 1875-1882. MS. 
'Memoire sur la catastrophe de Pouebo en 1867.' MS. 
Marist Fathers. Archives of the Province of Oceania, 'Villa Maria', 
Sydney. (N.B., early in 1972 these records were incorporated in 
the Archivio di Padri Maristi, Rome.) 
Letters to the Procureur from New Caledonia, 1858-1869. 
Padri Maristi. Archivio di Padri Maristi, Rome. 
The section ONC ('Oceania, Nova Caledonia') was read for the period 
1842-70. The following files contained relevant material (the 
marginal numbering system is my own): 
1. 5 Ca 180. 'Potestas civilis executiva': 
a. 'Lettres de !'administration civile locale, 1855-8.' 
b. 'Lettres de !'administration civile locale, 1859-63.' 
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2. TS copies of missionary journals (originals in AVNC). 
a. Villard, J.M., 'Rapports sur les bienfaits et graces re~us 
de la Tres Sainte Vierge', 9 Sept. 1889. 
b. Goujon, Prosper and Palazzy, Fran~ois, 'Journal de l'ile 
des Pins', October 1866-25 Feb. 1871. 
c. Palazzy, Fran~ois, 'Journal de l'ile des Pins', 1 Jan. 
1865-13 Sept. 1866. 
d. Villard, J.M., 'Journal de Pouebo', 10 Aug. 1867-16 Feb. 
1868. 
e. [Emprin, A.], 'Notes particulieres', [Bonde, 1869]. 
3. 'Proprietes et biens de la mission de la Nouvelle-Caledonie.' 
4. 5 ea 334. 'Relationes laicorum.' 
5. 418.1. Correspondence with the General Administration of the 
Societe de Marie: 
a. Douarre, correspondence 1842-7. 
b. Douarre, correspondence 1848-53. 
c. Rougeyron to Superieur-general, 3 Sept. 1846. 
d. Rougeyron, correspondence 1855-63. 
e. Rougeyron, correspondence 1864-5. 
f. Rougeyron, correspondence 1866-8. 
g. Rougeyron, correspondence 1869-73. 
6. 411: 
a. Rougeyron, miscellaneous letters. 
b. Rougeyron, 'Circulaires'. 
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a. Forestier to Yardin, 1866-7. 
b. Yardin to Forestier, 1864-7. 
c. Superieur-general and Forestier, correspondence, 1864-7. 
8. 'Potestas civilis' (miscellaneous documents). 
9. Miscellaneous documents. 
10. 'Le clerge colonial, 1862-95.' 
11. 'Demeles avec le Gouverneur Guillain, 1863-9.' 
12. 5 Ca 200. 'Historia' (J. Caste, 'Premieres mentions de la 
Nouvelle-Caledonie dans les documents du Saint-Siege et de la 
Societe de Marie'). 
13. 5 Ca 201. 'Typonographiae' (chronology of the mission). 
14. 5 Ca 210. 'Personae' (TS biographical notes on the New 
Caledonian missionaries). 
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15. Unclassified dossier: 
a. 'Papiers administratifs.' 
b. 'Documents concernant, semble-t-il, le Gouverneur Guillain', 
(mostly undated). 
c. 'Documents semblant se rapporter a "l'affaire des fusils", 
1864 o I 
16. Rougeyron, correspondence with Propaganda. 
17. 'Administration' (Anon., 'Directoire ou guide pour les mission-
aries du vicariat', 27 June 1870). 
18. 'Ristoriae I.' 
19. '1862-1916. Relationes.' 
20. 'Rapports I' (Rougeyron, reports on the state of the mission, 
1861-72). 
21. 'Activite missionnaire.' 
22. 'Massacres de Pouebo, 1867-8.' 
23. Unclassified dossier: 
a. 'Les iles Loyalty.' 
b. 'Affaire du R.P. Lambert, 1865-7.' 
24. 'Administration civile.' 
25. 'Gouverneur Guillain, 1862-9.' 
26. General correspondence: 
a. 1845-9. 
b. 1850-2. 
c. 1853. 
d. 1854-6. 
e. 1857. 
f. 1858. 
g. 1859. 
h. 1860. 
i. 1861. 
j. 1862-3. 
k. 1864. 
1. 1865. 
m. 1866. 
n. 1867-8. 
o. 1869. 
p. 1870-1. 
27. 5 Ca 100 (Laurenge, 'Note sur les proprietes de la mission en 
Nouvelle-Caledonie et, eventuellement, sur celles de la Societe 
de Marie.' TS). 
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Personal files: 
Montrouzier, letters to his family, 1845-97. 
Box 21: 
Montrouzier, letters to his family, 1845-87. TS copies. Most of 
the originals are in Montrouzier's personal file. 
Box 25: 
Collomb, J.S., 'Journal', 1845-7. 
Unpublished Theses and Papers 
CORRIS, Peter, 1970. 'Passage, port and plantation; a history of 
Solomon Islands labour migration, 1870-1914.' Ph.D. thesis, 
Australian National University, Canberra. 
GUIART, Jean, 1954b. 'L'organisation sociale et coutumiere de la 
population autochtone de Nouvelle-Caledonie.' Noumea, Office de la 
Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer, Institut fran~ais 
d'Oceanie. TS, Menzies Library, Australian National University, 
Canberra. 
LARACY, Hugh, 1969. 'Catholic missions in the Solomon Islands, 1845-
1966.' Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra. 
NEWBURY, Colin W., 1956. 'The administration of French Oceania, 
1842-1906.' Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra. 
SALMON, E., n.d •. 'Remarques sur le regime des terres indigenes en 
Nouvelle-Caledonie.' TS in author's possession, by courtesy 
Professor J. Guiart. 
Unpublished Contemporary Journals, Memoirs, etc. 
[BROWN, George], [c.l911]. "'Old Hands" and "Old Times" in the South 
Seas.' MS 1119, ML. 
'Deas-Thomson Papers', 3:261-7 (for a letter from Erskine to Deas-
Thomson, 26 July 1851, enclosing an extract from Oliver to Erskine, 
8 July 1851). MSS A 1531-3, ML. 
H.M.S. Fly, 'Letterbook.' Extracts, 12 Apr.-1 July 1850. Microfilm, 
Pacific History Department, Australian National University. 
KENT, Eliza to her mother, 24 June 1803. In Eliza Kent, 'Journal', 
13 May-13 Oct. 1803 [written in the form of letters to her mother 
during part of a voyage of H.M.S. Buffalo.] 'Kent Family Papers', 
vol. 4. MS A3968, ML. 
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MOORE, Charles, 1850. 'Cruise in H.M.S. "Havannah" to the South Sea 
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MACGILLIVRAY, John, 1852-5. 'Voyage of H.M.S. Herald Under the 
Command of Captn H. Mangles Denham R.N., Being Private Journal Kept 
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Typescript, Library of the Auckland Institute and Museum. Micro-
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Pacific History Department, Australian National University. 
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